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HISTORY
OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND:

EMBRACING THE
OPINIONS OF ALL WRITERS ON MENTAL SCIENCE
FROM THE
EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME.

By ROBERT BLAKEY, Esq.

**AUTHOR OF HISTORY OF MORAL SCIENCE; ESSAY ON MORAL GOOD AND EVIL;
ESSAY ON LOGIC, &c.**

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FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
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CHAPTER I.

METAPHYSICAL WRITERS OF GREAT BRITAIN, FROM
THE YEAR 1800 TO THE PRESENT DAY.

DUGALD STEWART.

THE metaphysical writings of Professor Stewart were hailed, on their first publication, with the most lively feelings of pleasure, by all readers who felt any interest in mental speculations. They were justly entitled to this flattering reception. Never had abstract mental inquiries been clothed before in such brilliant and elegant language; nor been propounded in such a spirit of just criticism; nor been guided by such common-sense principles. Every question and every controversy was touched with the hand of a master; and the author everywhere shows how profoundly and accurately he had studied the doctrines and opinions of his predecessors.

The author's work, "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind," was published in detached volumes; the first appeared in 1792, the second in 1814, and the third in 1827. In addition to this treatise, we have his "Philosophical Essays," 1810; "Outlines of Moral Philosophy;" "Preliminary Dissertation on the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political Philosophy;" and his "Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man."

There are few writers on the human mind whose disquisitions are so little susceptible of condensation or analysis as those of Stewart. He was critical and discursive, rather than systematic and theoretical. We can only obtain a general conception of his philosophy from a consideration of many scattered and isolated fragments. We have to wander over extensive tracts of speculation, although in the company of a delightful and fascinating guide, before we obtain a resting place on any comprehensive principle or mental fact. Speaking with some qualification, he was a disciple of Dr. Reid, and professed to illustrate the leading principles of the system of Common Sense.

Like Dr. Reid's, Professor Stewart's classification of the independent faculties or powers of the mind, is voluminous and extended. It stands thus: 1st, Consciousness; 2nd, Perception; 3rd, Attention; 4th, Conception; 5th, Abstraction; 6th, Association of Ideas; 7th, Memory; 8th, Imagination; 9th, Judgment, or Reasoning.

In a psychological point of view, this arrangement of faculties is defective; and chiefly on ac-

count of the author constituting *consciousness* a distinct power, instead of considering it only as a *condition* of all intellectual states of existence or feeling. It can never be viewed as an active or creative energy, without introducing inextricable confusion into all our reasonings on mental phenomena. If we consider it as *passive*, it may prove of essential service in psychological speculations. Stewart gives activity and vitality to it; but only within a limited sphere. He confines it solely to giving us intimations of mental operations. He says of consciousness; "This word denotes the immediate knowledge which the mind has of its sensations and thoughts, and in general of all its present operations."* It is quite obvious, that if this be the office of consciousness, the author makes an entire and unconditional surrender of one of the chief bulwarks of the common-sense philosophy. He gives his master's system a vital blow. All the disciples and admirers of the sceptical philosophy may turn round, and in the language of triumph, ask; "Why, if you tell us that consciousness can only make us acquainted with the operations of mind, then upon what ground can you maintain that there is any thing external to our own inward feelings? How do you establish a knowledge of external nature?" Our Professor must stand mute; there is no logical loop-hole for him.

The most interesting and valuable disquisitions

* Outlines of Moral Philosophy, p. 18.

of Stewart, illustrative of this classified system of original mental powers, are those which relate to abstraction, memory, and reasoning. In those portions of his works which treat of these topics, much useful and instructive matter will be found.

Professor Stewart was not partial to the phrase *common sense*, so frequently used by Dr. Reid and other writers of his school. He therefore changed this term to "the fundamental laws of human belief," which he considered a more unobjectionable and philosophical definition of what was really meant by the former phrase.

The leading principle which runs through the first division of Mr. Stewart's "Philosophical Essays," is, that we have many general notions or ideas, of whose origin we can give little or no account. They seem to be *suggested* to the mind by the exercise of certain inward faculties, or by the influence of external objects on our organs of sense. The notion of our personal existence is one of those general conceptions which it seems difficult to refer to any distinctive or individual source. The author, however, admits that if mankind did not experience impressions on their sensitive organs, this idea would not have existed. "The very moment," says he, "that a sensation is excited by means of such an impression, we learn *two* facts at once—the existence of the sensation, and our own existence as sentient beings; the existence not only of what is felt, but of that which feels." Our notion of personal existence is not here accounted for; it is not an object of sense or consciousness;

and therefore the author considers it one of those fundamental or primary ideas which belong to the nature or essence of mind itself.

Another considerable portion of the "Philosophical Essays," is devoted to showing the errors into which Mr. Locke and most of his followers have fallen, in limiting the sources of our knowledge to *sensation* and *consciousness*. The Professor endeavours to show that such general and primary ideas as those of the existence of an external world, causation, and the uniformity and stability of the laws of nature, cannot be referred to such sources as Locke points out. All these, and many other similar conceptions, are as elementary and primary as the fact of mental consciousness itself.

Perhaps the following passage will explain more fully what is Mr. Stewart's aim in the many critiques he has on the system of Locke. He says, "That there are many of our most familiar notions, (altogether unsusceptible of analysis), which relate to things bearing no resemblance either to any of the sensible qualities of matter, or to any mental operation which is the direct object of consciousness; which notions (although the senses may furnish the *first occasions* on which they occur to the understanding) can neither be referred to sensation, nor to reflection, as their *fountains or sources*, in the acceptance in which these words are employed by Locke."*

This quotation embodies nearly the whole pith

* Philosophical Essays, p. 103.

of Mr. Stewart's objections to Locke's theory as to the origin of our knowledge. We shall make an observation or two upon it.

The familiar notions of which Mr. Stewart here speaks, are those relating to extension, substance, personal identity, existence, and such like. Why he should remark that "they bear no resemblance to any of the sensible qualities of matter, or to any mental operation," seems an unreasonable, or rather perhaps an incomprehensible, demand. He is here requiring what no real philosopher has any right to ask, why one thing is not like another thing. We must take things as they are. Mr. Stewart's aim in this instance seems to have been that he had interpreted Locke's language, as to the nature of sensation and reflection, in a certain fashion; and as the author of the "Essay" attempts to show that these abstract ideas, such as substance, extension, &c., arise from the conjoint operation of our sensations and inward reflection, the Professor conceives that this was not a sufficient explanation, and that some other power or faculty ought to be devised for the purpose. These familiar notions, Mr. Stewart, in many places of his works, tells us should be referred to *processes of reasoning*, or to *the natural resources of the understanding*. What these processes of reasoning, or what these resources of the understanding, are, he never condescends to inform us; we are left to our own conjectures on the point. His mode of reasoning on extension, personal identity, substance, existence, &c., is by no means any improvement upon that of Mr.

Locke. The *reflection* of the latter is just as intelligible an efficient cause, to which to ascribe the origin of such abstract ideas as the processes of reasoning and the natural resources of the understanding, mentioned by Mr. Stewart. He has not removed one single difficulty in the way of accounting for these notions. We are precisely at this moment in the same position respecting them, as when Locke's work made its appearance.

The employment of the word *occasion* by Mr. Stewart, in reference to the origin of many of our abstract conceptions, is liable to great ambiguity. The word seems to have a reference to two things, *causation* and *time*. We say that such or such a thing is the occasion or cause of another thing; and that "I did not see him on that occasion;" meaning, at that precise period of time. Mr. Stewart's employment of the word refers to causation; it can have no other meaning, from the way in which he uses it. He says the senses are the *first occasions*, on which some particular ideas occur to the understanding; a phrase which must imply some *portion of causation*, or why should the senses be mentioned at all? Why not do here, as we do in every other case of common life, leave out or pass by those incidents which are *not causes*, and come at once to that which we clothe with the power or attribute of absolute causation? If the senses have nothing whatever to do with the production of these familiar notions of personal identity, substance, &c., then why mention them at all? Why call them the *first occasions*. The em-

ployment of such phrases is no improvement whatever upon Mr. Locke's reasonings on the subject.

Mr. Stewart was an enthusiastic admirer of Lord Bacon, and his "Novum Organum." Indeed his enthusiasm on this point seems to have been so intense and indiscriminate, that it obscured his understanding on some points of his system. We meet with the "Baconian Philosophy," the "Baconian Method," the "Inductive Process of Bacon," in almost every page. He laboured under an idea, that if ever the philosophy of mind was to be placed upon a solid basis, and raised to that distinction among the sciences to which its inherent merits entitled it, we must cultivate it in the spirit of the inductive philosophy of the "Novum Organum." It was this opinion which led the Professor into the controversy with the Edinburgh Reviewers. They took an opposite view of the nature and intention of Bacon's method, and maintained that it applied only in a very qualified sense to the cultivation of mental science.

There is no British metaphysical writer, since the days of Locke, who has exercised such a beneficial influence on the European mind, in reference to philosophy, as Dugald Stewart. His power is manifested and acknowledged everywhere. His mind was rarely and happily balanced. Its leading characteristic was good sense; and he joined to this a clearness of conception and elegance of expression, which made every thing that fell from his pen fascinating and instructive. He was above all men the happiest instrument for the full de-

velopment and illustration of the common sense theory of Reid. It was in perfect harmony with the whole frame-work of his understanding. There was nothing crotchety or whimsical about him ; he was no reckless lover of theories, nor dealer in startling paradoxes or dazzling sophisms. There are no mental disquisitions in any country in which so much real and useful knowledge is embodied. There is a practical bearing or import in all his speculations ; and this it is which renders them so interesting and prolific of advantage.

Though these are the general merits of Professor Stewart, yet we ought not to be blind to some defects in his writings. There are two which must be obvious to almost every reader. The one is, that he attaches rather too much importance to individual facts and incidents in the history of mental philosophy. His criticisms, though always in the main plain and sensible, and often ingenious, approach, nevertheless, too near the puerile and fanciful ; and this detracts from the amount of that seriousness and importance which his writings are well calculated, by their general tone, to excite and maintain in the reader's mind. Scores of examples might be culled from his disquisitions, where this defect is very conspicuous. The second imperfection arises from his want of intellectual boldness and courage. He is nervously afraid to give a decided opinion on particular questions ; and after he has entered into a discussion with an apparently suitable stock of zeal and enthusiasm, and gone through the leading points of the con-

troversy, he often abruptly leaves you to guess at his own opinion on the point in question. On all those disputed parts of metaphysics which are closely and necessarily allied to the more serious and important doctrines of morals and theology, he seems to approach with a timid and irresolute spirit; with a morbid sensitiveness that his reputation might possibly get damaged by the inquiry; and with an evident predetermination to compromise, to a certain extent, his own private opinion, rather than run a risk of coming in angry collision with other minds. This spirit is visibly imprinted on all his writings; and it doubtless derived its existence from the constitutional peculiarity of his mind, joined to the particular situation in which he was placed, as a teacher of moral philosophy in one of the leading universities of Europe. He lived under constraint all his life, and never fully breathed the air of intellectual liberty.

This mental subserviency, if we may be allowed to term it such, was, as we have just observed, greatly fostered and strengthened by the circumstances of the Professor's position in the College of Edinburgh. It is a well known fact that he appeared always under a cloud to many of the clergy of Scotland, in reference to his own religious opinions and sentiments. He was considered not orthodox in the Presbyterian faith. This made him an object of suspicion; and as the power of the Scottish clergy is very great over all seminaries of learning and instruction; and every authenticated instance of infidelity, in the

heads of colleges, is certain to incur public displeasure and odium, and is followed often by immediate expulsion from office ; it is easy to see, that in such a gentle and timid mind as Mr. Stewart's, and yet panting after popularity, these circumstances would induce him to contract a cautious demeanour, and to avoid, as far as possible, handling those topics of controversy which might lead to a *test* of the soundness of his own faith. Nor can it be alleged that these suspicions were hastily taken up and erroneously retained. There was always something in the Professor's public conduct, as a teacher of moral philosophy, which gave a countenance and colouring to them. In his lectures he studiously avoided alluding, even in the most distant manner, to the general principles of the Christian dispensation, though this was, in many cases, almost forced upon him by the particular nature of the subject under discussion. And we find in all his writings, especially those published in early life, an almost total silence upon the principles of theology, whether natural or revealed. Besides, we must add to all these considerations, the circumstance, that though he occasionally attended public worship in the National Church, *he never partook of the sacramental ordinance*. This may be considered a trifling circumstance in most other Christian countries ; but in Scotland the case is different. There almost every nominal member of the Church engages in this solemn ceremony ; and the omission of it, particularly in a person filling the important situation of qualifying young men for the ministry

of that same Church, could not fail to give rise to public suspicion, as to his real sentiments in reference to the system of Christianity in general, and the doctrines of the Church of Scotland in particular.

The controversy which the Professor entered into in support of Mr. Hume's theory of Cause and Effect, with a view of affording countenance and aid to his friend Mr. Leslie, exercised an unfavourable influence on his reputation among the more orthodox portion of the Presbyterian clergy in Scotland.

These things are stated solely with the view of accounting, in some measure, for that blemish in his works, which every reader must have perceived and lamented; namely, a want of boldness and independence in asserting his own opinions. And as a confirmation of the truth of these observations, we shall furnish the reader with a short quotation from the Professor's intimate friend and commentator, Sir James Mackintosh. Here the reader will clearly perceive that certain allusions are made to "the slumbering zeal of a Calvinistic people," which evidently point to the same facts which have just been embodied in the above remarks.

"Amidst excellencies of the highest order, his writings, it must be confessed, leave some room for criticism. He took precautions against offence to the feelings of his contemporaries, more anxious and frequent than the impatient searcher for truth may deem necessary. For the sake of promoting

the favourable reception of philosophy itself, he studies, perhaps too visibly, to avoid whatever might raise up prejudices against it. His gratitude and native modesty dictated a superabundant care in softening and excusing his dissent from those who had been his instructors, or who were the objects of general reverence. Exposed by his station both to the assaults of political prejudice, and to the religious animosities of a country where a few sceptics attacked *the slumbering zeal of a Calvinistic people*, it would have been wonderful if he had not displayed more wariness than would have been necessary or becoming in a very different position. The fulness of his literature seduced him too much into multiplied illustrations. Too many of the expedients happily used to allure the young, may unnecessarily swell his volumes. Perhaps a successive publication in separated parts made him more voluminous than he would have been if the whole had been at once before his eyes. A peculiar susceptibility and delicacy of taste produced forms of expression, in themselves extremely beautiful, but of which the habitual use is not easily reconcileable with the condensation desirable in works necessarily so extensive. If, however, it must be owned that the caution incident to his temper, his feelings, his philosophy, and his station, has somewhat lengthened his composition, it is not less true that some of the same circumstances have contributed towards those peculiar beauties which place him at the head of the most adorned writers on philosophy in our language."

SIR WILLIAM DRUMMOND.

The appearance of Sir William's "Academical Questions," in 1805, created no small sensation among the cultivators of mental philosophy in Britain. The boldness of its doctrines, the subtlety of its reasonings, the extent of its scepticism, the plausibility of its sophistry, and the varied and profound nature of its erudition; all conspired to awaken attention, and to arouse the speculative part of the nation from the ordinary routine of their daily studies. All sects and parties had an abundance of work cut out for them. Doctrines which had remained for ages undisturbed were called in question, antiquated dogmas were revived, new theories were propounded; and, in fact, the whole citadel of philosophy was thrown into disorder and confusion, by the sudden and unexpected appearance of a formidable antagonist, who acknowledged no rules of warfare, nor observed any of the ordinary courtesies or amenities of scientific discussion.

After the confusion incident to a first onslaught had subsided, and the besieged had collected their scattered senses together, they perceived that they were in reality more alarmed than injured. They became gradually inspired with confidence and courage. They soon perceived that Sir William's great object was to puzzle and bewilder; and to frighten sound philosophy from "her propriety," by the shadowy spectres of an undefinable and universal scepticism.

We must, however, do justice to Sir William, by noticing one part of his work with unqualified commendation; namely, that wherein he shows the advantages of mental philosophy. This part of his subject is most ably handled. He examines the objections which have often been urged against metaphysical studies, that they are apt to disqualify a man for the more active and important duties of life; and clearly shows that the very contrary is the result.

He says: "Many persons there are, who have conceived a prejudice against the science of which I speak, because they erroneously imagine, that it indisposes the mind towards other pursuits, which are more agreeable to popular taste. The examples of several celebrated men may be adduced in contradiction to this opinion, from the time when "*Omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res,*" to the last century, when the taste and knowledge of Berkeley surprised the artists of Italy; the accomplishments of the young Helvetius were admired in the circles of Paris; and the grave and the gay, the sage and the youth, could take delight in the conversation of the venerable Hume. *I am the person whom you wish to see,* said Plato to his foreign guests, who desired their agreeable host to introduce them to his graver namesake, the philosopher. Why should it be imagined that the mind grows severe as it becomes enlightened, or that the knowledge of man unfits us for the society of mankind?"

The "Academical Questions" may be divided

into two parts; the first embracing a discussion upon the general and abstract questions of mental science; and the second containing a review of the opinions of several celebrated metaphysicians, both ancient and modern.

Sir William finds great fault with the use of the word *substance*; and maintains that it is calculated to mislead the understanding of those engaged in mental investigations; because all we know of substance is merely *relative*. We know nothing of substance in the abstract. When we talk, therefore, of *incorporeal* and *corporeal* substances, we are only, in reality, using words without meaning; and when we clothe these substances with the attributes of *thought, feeling, active* and *passive power*, &c., we plunge ourselves still deeper into the gulf of inconsistencies. Nay, the Author plainly tells us, that we have no ideas of *substance* at all; and the constant practice of philosophers in taking its existence for granted, has been the prolific source of all those various and conflicting systems which history places before us.

The doctrine of separate and distinct faculties of the mind, falls next under the Author's censure. According to his views, the distinct unity of the mind cannot be maintained upon the principle of independent faculties. All we know of our minds is, that the phenomena of thought change, but the moving power is unknown.

On the doctrine of moral necessity he has the following remarks. "It is not because the mind previously wills it, that one association of ideas

gives place to another. It is because the new ideas excite that attention which the old no longer employ; and because the mind cannot but give its attention to the strongest sensations and clearest ideas which offer themselves to its contemplation; and as we thus perceive certain ideas and sensations without our choice, so we constantly attend to them, and their dependent trains, until some new leading sensations or ideas attract our notice.”*

The active and passive powers of the mind, the author denies in toto. But he goes beyond this, and calls in question the existence of any external world whatever.

Before we are in a position to determine anything respecting the attributes of the mind, we must, in the author's opinion, comprehend the following things. “It is necessary, at least, that we should know what is meant by *substance*, *powers*, and *qualities* of matter, before we can allow that any analogy can be drawn from their existence, and before we attribute the same things to spiritual natures. We ought also to inquire what is the connexion between the mind and the body, and what is their mutual dependence on each other, before we assert their union, and reason about their intercourse. The immediate objects of knowledge should be distinctly comprehended by those who hardily maintain that the material archetypes are recognised by sense or by intellect. For this

* pp. 13, 14.

purpose, and in order to facilitate the progress of our inquiries, it will be proper to examine the doctrines which the most enlightened men have held on these questions, and to develop some of the philosophical systems which have had, or which now have, the greatest celebrity. After these researches, I shall be better enabled to explain my own opinions, and my readers will, perhaps, be less likely to be misled by false analogies and inapplicable comparisons.”*

The author then goes into the inquiry respecting *substance* in general, and the doctrines maintained by Locke respecting the *primary* and *secondary* qualities of matter. On these topics the reader will find the usual arguments which have been employed by all speculators in modern times, who have adopted sceptical conclusions as to the uncertainty of the testimony from our external senses. Sir William says nothing new on this point.

In the second division of the Work, the author enters upon a review of ancient and modern metaphysics. He is dissatisfied with all save the theory of Mr. Hume, which he thinks is the only true one.

On the whole, it may be remarked that the tendency of the “Academical Questions” is bad, and calculated to produce mischievous effects on the minds of youth.†

* p. 22.

† In perusing the “Academical Questions,” it is necessary to remark, that the word *idea* is generally used by Sir William in its ordinary

SAMUEL DREW.

Mr. Drew's work on the nature of the human soul, has been, and is yet, a popular treatise. It has gone through several editions both in England and America, and has been translated into French. It is called "An Original Essay on the Immateriality and Immortality of the Human Soul, founded solely on Physical and Rational Principles," and was published in 1811.

This work is unquestionably one of the very best on the important subject of which it treats to be found in any language. There is a profound and candid philosophical spirit breathing through the whole of it. The author enters into a consideration of the commonly received notions of the nature of matter; and likewise examines those seemingly elementary notions we possess of the nature and attributes of mind; and draws from this comparison the conclusion that matter and mind are two distinct and separate substances. He then goes on to illustrate at great length, and in clear and perspicuous language, that consciousness, volition, perception, memory, judgment, imagination, cannot possibly be the result of material properties or qualities, but must reside in a being or substance suited to their own intellectual natures.*

sense; but he entertained the opinion that it very commonly, particularly in abstract disquisitions, had a higher import, something approaching to the divine and intelligible ideas ascribed to Plato.

* An Original Essay, &c., pp. 49, 52, 55, 67, 82.

The power of *reflection* is, in Mr. Drew's conception, the chief characteristic which distinguishes man from the inferior creation, and which clearly and forcibly demonstrates the immateriality of the thinking principle. "By the term reflection," says the author, "I understand that general operation of the mind, by which, when a multitude of ideas are presented to it for inspection, it turns its attention to them. It is on this mass of materials that reason begins and performs its work, by selecting, combining, comparing, compounding, simplifying, or marking the agreement or disagreement between the objects which appear. And when this task is accomplished, the judgment decides upon the relations which are pointed out, pronouncing certain ideas to be contradictory to, or congenial with, one another, as existing circumstances may direct."*

The arguments for the immortality of the soul will be found in the second part of the volume.

JOHN BRUCE.

This author's work, entitled "Elements of the Science of Ethics, on the Principles of Natural Philosophy," was published in 1786. It contains some illustrations of the metaphysical theories of Reid and Beattie, and on the whole is a perspicuous and intelligent work.

The principle on which the treatise is grounded

* p. 159.

is, that the only satisfactory mode of discussing and illustrating the truths of human nature, is to carry on our investigations upon the same rules as are used in natural philosophy. Experiments in physical science take their character from the subjects in which they originate; and the same may be said if we subject our own inward constitution to accurate experiment or observation. The laws of consciousness and intuition accompany every rational deduction relative to mind, and render its laws and attributes strictly matters of demonstration.

Every specific faculty or power of the mind has a distinct class of objects on which to exert its energies, and by which its character is developed and ascertained. Matter in various forms and aspects addresses the organs of sense; these give rise to the perceptions of the mind, which in their turn make an appeal to the understanding; and by this means judgments are formed, and conviction ripens into action. The only way, in the author's opinion, to prevent a mass of useless speculation on man's intellectual nature, is, to prosecute all inquiries into it upon the same method as we investigate the properties and qualities of external bodies.*

DR. JAMES GREGORY.

The "Philosophical and Literary Essays" of

* Elements, &c., pp. 153—161.

Dr. Gregory excited considerable attention at the time they were published, 1792; and his "Letters" in confirmation of some of the leading doctrines contained in them, which appeared in 1819, display an intimate acquaintance with metaphysical science.* The first work is technically wrong in its title, as it contains only one "Essay on the Difference between the Relation of Motive and Action and that of Cause and Effect, on Physical and Mathematical Principles."

The first volume of the "Essays," is occupied with an Introduction, in which the general principles of the author's metaphysical creed are pretty fully developed. He is an admirer of Reid's philosophy; but differs from him on some essential particulars. Dr. Gregory thinks Locke's doctrine of ideas untenable. "This doctrine of ideas," says he, "with all the system of extravagant and ridiculous consequences which are implied in it, and which have been most acutely deduced and gravely maintained by many distinguished philosophers, I consider as one of the most splendid monuments that ever existed, or probably that ever will exist, of the abuse and perversion of human reason."†

Dr. Gregory considers that the great proportion of our abstract conceptions, which have since his day been termed primary or fundamental principles of reason or thought, arise out of the native suggestions of mind itself. "For example," says he,

* These "Letters" are published by Dr. Crombie, together with his Answers to them.

† Essays, vol. 1. p. 35.

“the common notions of space, time, existence, thought, memory, substance, quality, quantity, equal, greater, less, and many other things, appear to be not only just, but nearly perfect; nor do I know of any important addition to them respectively that has been made by philosophy; and no man can abolish in himself those notions, any more than he can alter his species, his sex, or his stature.”*

The “Essay” is, however, chiefly taken up with the discussion of the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, as developed by Hartley, Priestley, and others. The main point which Dr. Gregory aims at establishing is, that *motive* and *action*, considered relatively to each other, are altogether different from mere cause and effect in physics; and, therefore, on the assumption of this radical discrepancy, we are not entitled to draw inference from human conduct, as we do in subjects relating to mere matter and motion.

To those who feel an interest in the controversy respecting human liberty, the writings of the Doctor will prove highly useful; for he displays a great deal of original thinking on this abstruse question.

R. G. SCOTT.

Professor Scott was a native of Old Aberdeen, and educated at the college of that city. He com-

* *Essays*, vol. 1, p. 29.

menced his public life as an Assistant Professor, and filled different chairs in the University of Aberdeen for fifteen years, with distinguished reputation. He was descended by his mother's side from the family of the Gordons, who had held conspicuous stations in the University for nearly two centuries. Mr. Scott died at the early age of 41.

His works on Mental Science are, "Elements of Intellectual Philosophy; or an Analysis of the Powers of the Human Understanding, tending to ascertain the Principles of a Rational Logic," 1805; and "An Inquiry into the Limits and Peculiar Objects of Physical and Mathematical Science; tending principally to illustrate the Nature of Causation," 1810.

The "Elements of Intellectual Philosophy" are based upon the leading principles of Reid and Stewart: though Mr. Scott does not by any means follow those two distinguished writers in a slavish manner, nor adopt all their opinions. He certainly belongs to the common-sense school. On the important subject as to the nature and office of general terms, Professor Scott differs from the heads of that school, and stoutly maintains that man might have acquired all the abstract and essential principles of human knowledge, had there been no general terms at all. In answer to Mr. Stewart's observation, that man was not such a being as to dispense with the aid of general terms, Mr. Scott remarks, "In opposition to this ingenious philosopher, I take upon me to affirm, *that man is such a being*; and that, though general terms are very

convenient and useful signs, both for communicating our thoughts and giving them precision, they are by no means indispensably requisite for enabling us to speculate concerning general classes of objects. Thus, I think, though language had contained no such generic term as *man*, we might have entered into many very useful speculations concerning the whole human race; and in like manner, though we had wanted the words *plant* and *mineral*, we should not have been entirely ignorant of the general properties of the vegetable and fossil kingdoms.”*

The work on Cause and Effect, is a well-reasoned and able performance. It is a much clearer statement of the leading arguments which are currently used in this controversy, than any other that has appeared north of the Tweed. The several propositions on this abstruse subject, are laid down with great care, and the balance of evidence ascertained with impartiality and candour. Mr. Hume’s arguments are considered by Mr. Scott at great length.

DR. THOMAS BROWN.

Dr. Brown was a metaphysical writer at a surprisingly early age. His “Observations on the Zoonomia” of Dr. Darwin, were published when he was only in his eighteenth year. Darwin supported Hume’s theory of *causation*, which had at

* Elements, p. 132.

this time been employed by Professor Leslie to illustrate the physical theory of heat, and in such a peculiar manner, as to excite in the minds of many of the clergy of Scotland an apprehension that infidelity would be instilled into the minds of students by the Professor's development of his system. Dr. Brown, as well as Professor Stewart, came to the assistance of Leslie, and maintained that the theory of causation brought prominently forward on this occasion, was not only perfectly harmless, but the only rational one which could be adopted on the subject.

The Lectures of Dr. Brown on the "Philosophy of Mind," form an interesting and important work. They were delivered in the University of Edinburgh with much gracefulness and effect; but were not published till 1822, after the Author's death.

One of the chief principles laid down by Dr. Brown is, that there are no independent or distinct powers of the mind, apart from the mind itself. These faculties or powers are only certain indications of *states of mind*, and cannot be said to be conversant about *the objects* of our mental perceptions, but are really in themselves all that we do or ever can know of the mind itself.

Having renounced the classification of mental phenomena of his predecessors, he frames one for himself, which embraces only two grand divisions; external affections, and internal affections. The external states of mind comprehend all our sensations, of whatever kind; and the internal states

are divided into two branches, the one intellectual and the other emotional. Under the intellectual affections or states, we have *simple* and *relative suggestions*; and under emotional states, we have all the *passions* and *desires*.

This classification seems simple, but its simplicity is all that can be said in its favour. It is the most ill-grounded and absurd arrangement that has appeared in modern times; and besides, what there is really intelligible about it is not original, but only the oldest notions we have of the operations of the mind, clothed in a new phraseology. The external states or affections are confined to *sensations*, as if these could be separated, even in conception, from the mind which feels and is conscious of them. The intellectual laws of *simple* and *relative* suggestion amount to nothing; inasmuch as they are mere novel words given to common and every-day phenomena of mind. The Doctor renounces the doctrine of Association of Ideas, and institutes Suggestion in its stead. This law is made to account for all mental phenomena; that is, that certain things have the power of *suggesting* or *creating* certain states or conditions of mind. The word *suggestion*, as here used, is tantamount to *creating*, *having the power to do*, *producing*, &c.; and if this be a correct interpretation, there cannot possibly be any thing which bears the imprint of originality in his classification.

But the great imperfection of his system is immediately perceived, when we attempt to test it

by trying how it can account for processes of reasoning, or the formation of those abstract judgments of the understanding, which, in fact, lie at the root of all human knowledge. Here the Doctor's system is entirely at fault, and will not bear a moment's consideration.

The author's mental hypothesis is liable to objections on the score of its being nearly allied, if not substantially identified, with the French theory of resolving all our knowledge into *mere sensation*. The Doctor tells us that every thing relating to the mind is only indicative of *certain states or conditions* of that mind. Now there does not seem to be a very distinct or palpable interval between these *states* and the *sensational* feelings of some French metaphysicians.

There is a principle which lies at the root of Dr. Brown's speculations, which it is essential to keep in view, to understand rightly his arrangement of our mental phenomena ; namely, the analogy he has instituted between physical and mental science. He terms the latter the *Physiology of the Mind*. He remarks ; "There is a *physiology of mind*, as there is a *physiology of body* ; a science which examines the phenomena of our spiritual part simply as phenomena ; and, from the order of their succession, or other circumstances of analogy, arranges them in classes under certain general names : as, in the physiology of our corporeal part, we consider the phenomena of a different kind which the body exhibits, and reduce all the diversities of these under the

names of a few general functions." But the Doctor has failed in establishing this perfect identity, and has involved his system in many difficulties. It is impossible to maintain the perfect unity and indivisibility of the thinking principle, with his notions of inductive logic when applied to mental subjects. This he seems to have been, in some degree, aware of; for he admits that there would be great inconsistency, "*if the analysis of mind professed to be strictly the same as in matter.*" Then we may ask, What is his view of mental analysis, and wherein does it differ from that of physical? Here the Doctor completely breaks down; for he is obliged to confess that his mental analysis must "be VIRTUAL only, like the virtual complexity of the feelings on which it is exercised;" a remark which is tantamount to a declaration that there is really no analogy between mind and matter at all.

The Doctor makes many fruitless attempts to strengthen this part of his system; and amongst the number is his tampering with the reality of external things themselves. He conceived if he could not bring the analysis of mental operations up to the same standard as physical analysis, he might possibly bring down the latter to a comparative harmony and agreement with the former. Hence we find him making the following very singular declaration. "The knowledge of the quality of matter, in the whole range of physics, is not itself a *phenomenon of matter*, more than the knowledge of any of our *intellectual* or moral affections; it is truly, in all stages of conjecture, comparison,

doubt, belief, a *phenomenon of mind*; or in other words, it is only *the mind itself existing in a certain state*. The inanimate bodies around us might, indeed, exhibit the same changes as at present, though no mind had been created. But science is not the existence of these inanimate bodies; it is the *principle of thought itself*, variously modified by them, which, as it exists in certain states, constitutes that knowledge which we term astronomy; in *certain other states*, that knowledge which we term chemistry; in other states, our physiology, corporeal or mental; and all the other divisions of science."* What curious consequences are deducible from all this!

The whole of Dr. Brown's metaphysical system is tainted at its heart's core, with the peculiar ideas he entertained on the nature of cause and effect. He had adopted, and pushed to their utmost extremes, the opinions on causation of his predecessor, Mr. Hume. The Doctor tells us, in plain and direct terms, that when we use the term *power*, we can attach no other idea to it than the Peripetatics did, when they spoke of substantial forms and occult qualities. He affirms that all that can be meant by *power* is only *immediate invariable antecedence*. The *cause* of a thing is only the immediate invariable antecedent in any sequence, while the immediate invariable consequent is the correlative effect. It is somewhat surprising that a doctrine of this kind should have met with so much encouragement in the northern

* Vol. 2, p. 21.

part of the kingdom ; fraught, as it evidently is, with the most absurd and dangerous consequences.*

Another circumstance may be mentioned which is calculated to increase our suspicions as to the soundness and beneficial tendency of Dr. Brown's system of philosophy ; namely, that the Phrenologists have claimed him as a supporter, to a considerable extent, of their peculiar views and principles. On this point we refer the reader to the "Phrenological Journal," Number 6, and to the

* "Voilà le dernier résultat de l'analyse de la sensation et de son mécanisme. Le Docteur Brown, le successeur de Dugald Stewart, et qui résume en quelque sorte dans son enseignement le résultat de ce long et sage examen, par lequel l'école d'Edinburgh s'est justement distinguée, en parlant de cette matière, s'exprime ainsi. Les défenseurs les plus zélés de l'existence réelle du non-moi, sont cependant obligés d'admettre, que bien qu'il n'existât aucune chose créée, outre que le moi, cet être eût pu se trouver constitué de telle manière qu'il aurait éprouvé la même série de modifications sous l'influence de certains phénomènes successifs ; phénomènes dont maintenant une si grande partie est attribuée à l'action des choses extérieures. Nous voilà donc arrivés au scepticisme spiritualiste de Berkeley par la méthode analitique de l'école d'Edinburgh. Les personnes qui sont curieuses d'apprécier les arguments par lesquels il établit cette proposition, les trouveront développés dans le cours qu'il a publié sous le titre de Philosophie de l'Esprit Humain, chapitre 22 et suivans."—(L'Université Catholique, vol. 10, p. 412, Paris, 1840.)

Baron Cousin, in the Preface to his "Remains" of M. de Biran, calls Brown's theory of Cause and Effect, a *fantastical one, and destructive of all true metaphysics*.—Sir John Herschel characterises the theory in question as one "in which the whole train of arguments is vitiated by one enormous oversight ; the omission, namely, of a distinct and immediate personal consciousness of causation, in his enumeration of that sequence of events, by which the volition of the mind is made to terminate in the motion of material objects."—(Article Astronomy, Cabinet Cyclop. p. 232.)

remarks of the Doctor's Biographer and Commentator, Dr. Welsh. The latter observes on this head, "The time is long gone by since this subject, (meaning Dr. Gall's) could legitimately be treated with ridicule; and the absurdity of employing this weapon against it will appear still more obvious, when I mention that many of Dr. Brown's doctrines correspond, *in a remarkable degree*, with the new system. I am convinced that the time is speedily approaching, when, great as Dr. Brown's merits in other respects will always be allowed to be, his greatest merit will be seen to consist in the near approach that he has made to many doctrines of Phrenology, without the aid of the instrument that Phrenology presents." "An acquaintance with the system of Phrenology is most valuable to those who purpose to peruse the works of Dr. Brown; and certainly there are none who will value Dr. Brown's discoveries more than the Phrenologists."

Dr. Brown was educated in the school of Reid and Stewart, but in his "Lectures" he threw off all allegiance to both philosophers. He unceremoniously renounces their doctrines, and attempts to establish a system of his own. His view of what constituted a sound philosophy, was to simplify mental phenomena as much as possible; and this is what he has carried into effect in all his disquisitions. The great number of mental powers or faculties and primary laws of belief, introduced into the theories of Reid and Stewart, Brown designates as "an extravagant and ridiculous" multiplication.

Notwithstanding these defects in point of principle, the "Philosophy of Mind" is fully entitled to hold a respectable station in metaphysical literature. There is a great deal of pleasant reading in the work. The author possessed quick and lively imaginative powers, and this opened out to him a boundless range of illustration and embellishment, which greatly relieves the more abstract disquisitions in his treatise. He forms, however, a very striking contrast to his predecessor in the Chair of Philosophy, Dugald Stewart, in point of perspicuity. It is often difficult to see the drift of Brown's arguments. His power of minute analysis, and his fervid fancy, often lead him into the regions of obscurity. In reference to this imperfection, his friend and biographer, Dr. Welsh, makes the following observations. "As a foil to so many and so great excellencies, it may be allowed that Dr. Brown often shows a preference of what is subtle to what is useful, and is sometimes more ingenious than solid. His style is too abstract, and his illustrations are not always introduced in the manner that might give them effect. Many quaintnesses both of thought and expression are to be found in his writings. His sentences are often too long, sometimes involved; and there is an occasional obscurity, arising from his anxiety to prevent the possibility of misapprehension. He had a perfect mastery over language; but sometimes he lessens the effect by shewing that he has this mastery."*

* Welsh's Life of Dr. Brown p. 486.

RICHARD KIRWAN.

Mr. Kirwan was a distinguished though eccentric cultivator of Natural Philosophy, as his numerous works, both theoretical and practical, on that branch of knowledge, sufficiently testify. He was also ambitious of becoming a profound metaphysician, and hence we have been favoured with his "Metaphysical Essays, containing the Principles and Fundamental Objects of that Science," published in 1809.

In Mr. Kirwan's opinion all metaphysical science may be comprehended within three divisions; the signification of words, correct ideas of mind and its laws and developments, and right notions of a Supreme Being and his attributes.

In conformity, therefore, with this arrangement, the above treatise has only three Essays: the first gives us a definition of terms, the second treats of the human mind and its modifications, and the third discusses the existence of a Deity.

In defining the various abstract terms continually used in mental science, Mr. Kirwan has followed Mr. Locke, though by no means slavishly. He differs from the Author of the "Essay on the Human Understanding" on several points, but they are not of great importance. He refers often to the opinions of Leibnitz, Wolff, Stewart, and several of the French metaphysical writers of the latter part of the eighteenth century.

The modifications of mind may be classed under

two heads; passive and active. The passive are those which the mind receives from an extrinsic cause, which the author maintains can be no other than a *Supreme Being*. The passive modifications may be divided into several sorts; sensual, which arise from the influence of external objects on the sight, the hearing, the smell, &c.; and sensible impressions, those which arise from our internal organs of feeling, as hunger, thirst, &c. Spiritual impressions are those connected with corporeal impressions, but by an invisible and unknown tie or connection; as a discernment of relations, emotions, passions, &c.

The active modifications of mind are two; *judging* and *willing*. The exercise of the latter is termed election or preference.

The existence of a Deity the author conceives is not an intuitive truth; it is the result of our reasoning faculties. It is a truth, however, capable, he says, of being proved demonstratively, both *à priori* and *à posteriori*.

The "Metaphysical Essays" are not of a high order of excellence. They are but a dry and meagre compilation, devoid of any imaginative embellishment or speculative acumen. They may, nevertheless, prove useful to a student on his first entry on the study of the science of mind.

JOHN FEARN.

Mr. Fearn is a voluminous writer, and an independent thinker. His chief works relative to

mental science are, "An Essay on Consciousness, or a Series of Evidences of a Distinct Mind," 1812; "An Essay on Immortality," 1814; "First Lines of the Human Mind," 1820; "Manual of the Physiology of Mind," 1829; with several other smaller tracts, among which may be mentioned, "New Philosophical Thoughts," and "A Demonstration of Necessary Connexion."

The grand object, in Mr. Fearn's estimation, is to ascertain the distinct existence of mind. The question is not whether mind be matter or any thing else; but whether it is a *reality*, or inheres in any substance whatever.

The author's hypothesis is that mind is *extended*, and operates by *process*, altogether distinct from the brain. This opinion is developed at great length, and with copiousness of illustration, in the work on Consciousness. The author endeavours to show that mind and body are two distinct things, and that the former depends upon the latter; that feelings or ideas are not objects, but simply *modes* of consciousness; and that mind, in all its manifestations, is agitated by processes, and this fact demonstrates its extension. All the various operations of the senses and intellect are examined by Mr. Fearn, to show the probability of his general theory; and the conclusion he comes to may be concisely summed up in the following observations on the existence of a cerebral mind. "The brain exists, but it cannot physically account for distinct numerous intelligences, by a general mixture or diffusion of any motions which can be

imagined; and farther, it does not appear to perform any such office by its substance at large; so far from it, that the nerves themselves form the most complex motions in their separate trunk, (of which vision is an instance), and all sensual intelligences take place at that small central region where the impulses conveyed to the senses meet, before any general diffusion can take place.

“On the contrary, a *spherule* mind, reciprocating with the body by means of an undulating surface, accounts for all conscious operations, as well as for the co-operation of mind with the body; but we have, and can have, no other evidence of the existence of a *spherule* mind; an hypothesis supported by facts, is all that the nature of the case admits. The materialist, then, has here his choice between two physical hypotheses; but, besides their physical claims, there is between them this infinitely great distinction, that if brain *can* be supposed mind, then mind is nothing but a *mode*, and is no *real being*; but a *spherule*, distinct from the brain, supposes mind to inhere in a *substance*, and, consequently, that it has a permanent existence.”*

Mr. Fearn's volume, “First Lines of the Human Mind,” relates chiefly to phenomena connected with the faculty of perception; especially in what relates to extension and colour. His speculations on these topics led him into a controversy with Professor Stewart, of whom he complains for mar-
ring his title to originality in some of his funda-

* Essay on Consciousness, p. 373.

mental views. In perception the author endeavours to show, that extension or scenic representation, wherever it exists, must be an attribute of mind. Collaterally with this conclusion, though independent of it, we arrive at this logical position, that "all the purposes of a material world being manifestly answered by the scenic representations of the mind itself," there can be no ground for the absurd supposition of a world of *dead matter*, for which no possible use can be assigned. This proposition, the author conceives, will afford the philosophic mind a secure resting-place for solid knowledge, and he will be led to the "full conviction that the external unperceived cause of our extended sensations is no other than the *energy* or ather the *varied energies of some spiritual agent*."

The "Essay on Immortality," and the other publications of Mr. Fearn, we are obliged to leave to the reader's attention; with the single remark that he will find many observations of value in them, though generally couched in language by no means very perspicuous or intelligible.

ISAAC HAWKINS BROWNE.

This author's work is entitled, "Essays on Subjects of Important Enquiry, in Metaphysics, Morals, and Religion, 1822."

The chief Essay in this collection which bears directly upon mental science, is the first, "On Reason." This power the author affirms may be considered in three points of view; as an original

faculty, as an instrument for the increase of knowledge, and as an exercise of practical skill.

Reason in itself is confined to contemplations on its energies and laws ; to reflecting inwardly on its own movements, and deducing abstract propositions. It is the parent of all the pure sciences, Logic, Mathematics, and Metaphysics.

When reason is employed as an instrument, it is exercised on sensations. Intuitive knowledge is conveyed by means of the senses ; but it is to the understanding alone that we owe the practical moulding of this knowledge to useful purposes.

Reason, as an exercise of skill, brings our knowledge home to practical life : “ It is reason, when considered in this light, which ought to direct our whole conduct, not only with respect to Religion and Morals, but to prudence and all worldly concerns, to innocent recreation, and every exercise whether of body or mind. It is reason, when considered in this light, which displays the skill of every artist who draws his materials from the corporeal world.”*

LADY MARY SHEPHERD.

This talented lady is the Author of “ An Essay on the Relation of Cause and Effect,” 1824 ; “ Essays on the perception of an External Universe, and other subjects connected with the doctrine of Causation,” 1827.

* Essays, &c., pp. 1, 2, 4.

These metaphysical works, considered as the productions of a lady, are justly entitled to high praise. There are great acuteness and subtilty displayed in them, and an intimate knowledge of all the leading and profound controversies in modern metaphysics.

It is impossible to give the reader an idea of the nature or scope of these treatises, without going a little into the question which suggested them, namely, *cause and effect*; and particularly into the history of the controversy respecting the nature of causation for the last century. In these preliminary remarks we shall be as brief and concise as possible.

Mr. Hume, in his "Treatise on Human Nature," and in his "Essays," publicly promulgated the doctrine, as we have noticed elsewhere, that we had no idea of causation whatever; but only that of two events following one another. He says, "We may define a cause to be an object *followed* by another;" and again, in his third definition, "The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind, by a *customary transition*, to the idea of the effect."

This doctrine has been very generally adopted by nearly all the Scottish metaphysicians, though they have differed from Mr. Hume on many other fundamental questions of philosophy. Dr. Reid himself has fallen into the same views; for he says, "What we call natural causes, might with more propriety be called *natural signs*; and what we call effects, *the things signified*. The causes have *no proper efficiency or causality*, as far as

we know ; and all that we can certainly affirm, is, that nature has established a *constant conjunction* between them and the things called their effects ; and hath given to mankind a disposition to observe their connexions, to confide in their continuance, and to make use of them for the improvement of our knowledge, and increase of our power.”* Again he lays down the same doctrine : “ For effects and causes in the operations of nature mean nothing *but signs and the thing signified by them* ; we perceive no proper causality or efficiency in any natural cause, but only a connection established by the course of nature between it and what is called its effect.”†

More recent writers of distinction in Scotland have adopted the same opinions, and expressed them in nearly the same language. Professor Stewart observes, “ It seems now to be pretty generally agreed among philosophers, that there is no instance in which we are able to perceive a necessary connexion between two successive events, or to comprehend in what manner the one proceeds from the other as a cause. From experience we learn that there are many events which are constantly conjoined, so that the one invariably follows the other ; but it is possible, for any thing that we know to the contrary, that this connexion, though a constant one, may not be a necessary connexion ; nay, it is possible that there may be *no necessary connexions among any of the phenomena which we*

* Inquiry Concerning the Human Mind, Chap. 5.

† Ibid., Chap. 6. Sec. 24.

see ; and if there be any such connexions existing, we may rest assured that we shall never be able to discover them." Dr. Brown says, "A cause is an object which immediately precedes any change, and which, existing again in similar circumstances, will always be immediately followed by a similar change." And again, "Invariableness of antecedence is the element which constitutes the idea of a cause."*

Now these opinions upon causation appeared to Lady Mary Shepherd to lead by an inevitable consequence to downright Atheism. For she reasons thus. If there be no idea of real power or efficiency in causes to produce their effects, there being no previous impression to which that idea can be traced ; if we have no reason from intuition, demonstration, or experience, to conclude that there is any efficiency in any thing to produce another ; and if again, when we witness any effect, we have no grounds for concluding that there must have been a cause of it, as there is no truth in the maxim that every effect must have a cause ; then we destroy, at one fell swoop, the foundation of all arguments for the existence and providence of a Deity. It was this conclusion which gave rise to the speculative discussions of her Ladyship. When she undertook a public refutation of these erroneous notions on cause and effect, it must be remembered it was at a time when they were most rampant, and widely spread over the northern parts

* See "Essay."

of Britain in particular. Every young man who came from the Universities of Scotland, attempted to show off his subtlety and academic lore, by denying there was any real causation in the world; all was mere imagination, and a piece of gross vulgar credulity. Her Ladyship's efforts were, therefore, well-timed; and there is no doubt but their influence was decided in giving a considerable check to these illogical and dangerous opinions.

The general propositions her Ladyship attempts to establish are these.

1st. That objects cannot begin their own existences.

2nd. That like objects must have like qualities.

3rd. That like causes must generate like effects.

4th. That objects of which we have had no experience, must resemble those of which we have had experience, for that the course of nature continues uniformly the same.

"These," her Ladyship remarks, "are the only true foundations of scientific research, of practical knowledge, and of belief in a creating and presiding Deity."

On the important doctrine of the existence of a Deity, the fair authoress has the following remarks:—

"As to the existence of God, let it be remembered, that all our *belief* concerning every proposition is the result of what we conceive to be the consistent relations of ideas present in the mind. Now I have shown, that these relations force our minds to believe in continuous existences unper-

ceived. It is upon similar premises that we build the foundation of our belief in Deity. For after some contemplation upon the phenomena of nature, we conclude, that in order to account for the facts we perceive, there must needs be one continuous existence, one uninterrupted essentially existing cause, one intelligent being, 'ever ready to appear' as the renovating power for all the dependent effects, all the secondary causes beneath our view. To devout minds this notion becomes familiar and clear; and being mixed with the *sensible impressions* of goodness, wisdom, and power, begets those habitual sentiments of fear, trust, and love, which it is reasonable to perceive and to enjoy. Our constantly familiar friend, whose presence we speak of, and whose qualities we love and admire, affords us no further proof for his existence and his qualities, than the reasoning adduced in this book:—he must needs be another being than ourselves, having qualities which are not our own but *his*, that are sufficient to engage our sympathy; or the relations of our thoughts would be rendered inconsistent with each other.”*

On the certainty of our own existence, Lady Mary observes:—

“Again, the idea of our own independent existence is generated by observing, that the compound mass we term SELF can exist when we do not observe it; and we have thus the *idea* of our own existence, in that it needs must *continue to*

* Essays, p. 150.

exist when *unperceived*, as well as during the *sensation* of it when perceived. Besides, on this subject, as on every other, it is the *causes* for the *constant* effects, (the objects whose union shall bear out similar results,) to which there is a tacit reference as the *true and continued existences in nature* :—

“ Now the *causes* for the general powers of sensation cannot be the same as those for any particular sensation, and so must be independent of each ; and indeed each sensation is always *felt* as an effect, ‘ as beginning to be ; ’ therefore what we allude to as *self*, is a continued existing capacity in nature, (unknown, unperceived,) fitted to revive when suspended in sleep, or otherwise, and to keep up during the periods of watchfulness the powers of life and consciousness, especially those which determine the union of memory with sense. For as sensation is interrupted, and is an *effect*, the original cause must be uninterrupted ; and such an uninterrupted cause as is equal to keep up the life of the body, or mass deemed our own body, and to unite it under that form with the powers of memory and sense. Identity, therefore, has nothing to do with *sameness of particles*, but only has relation to those powers in nature (flowing from that continuous Being the God of Nature,) which are capable of giving birth to that constant effect, the *sense of continuous existence* ; which sense, when analysed, is the union of the *ideas of memory* with the *impressions of present sense*. Should it be objected that the causes for such an union might be interrupted, then as these would ‘ begin their ex-

istences,' and would *only be effects*, the mind would go backwards till it reposed in some *uninterrupted* cause, and would consider such, and such only, as an independent capacity in nature, fitted to excite the union of memory with present sense, and as the complicate being *self*; which when conscious, could take notice of its existence; and when unconscious, (as in sound sleep), could exist *independently of its own observation*."*

GEORGE PAYNE.

Dr. Payne is not a metaphysical writer who aims at any novel theory or system of his own, but one who simply contents himself with furnishing us with a brief and common-sense survey of the opinions of some of the most intelligent and popular writers on mental science, of modern times. His work, "Elements of Mental and Moral Science," appeared in 1828.

The system of classification of mental phenomena, adopted by Dr. Payne, is that of Dr. Brown. He thinks it, on the whole, more complete and perfect than the theories of Dr. Reid and Professor Stewart. The following is, however, a more full and methodical statement of Brown's hypothesis, than that which he has furnished us in his "Lectures :"—

* Essays, p. 153. See also Note A. at the End of the Volume.

Division 1.

EXTERNAL AFFECTIONS OF THE MIND.

ORDER 1.

The less definite External Affections.

CLASS 1.

Appetites : such as hunger, thirst, &c.

CLASS 2.

Muscular Pains.

CLASS 3.

Muscular Pleasures.

ORDER 2.

The more Definite External Affections.

CLASS 1.

Sensations of Smell.

CLASS 2.

Sensations of Taste.

CLASS 3.

Sensations of Hearing.

CLASS 4.

Sensations of Touch.

CLASS 5.

Sensations of Sight.

Division 2.

THE INTERNAL AFFECTIONS OF THE MIND.

ORDER 1.

Intellectual States of Mind.

CLASS 1.

Simple Suggestions.

Suggestions of Resemblance, Contrast, Continuity.

CLASS 2.

Relative Suggestions, or Notions of Relation.

Species 1.

Relations of co-existence, Position, Resemblance, Degree, Proportion, Comprehensiveness.

Species 2.

Relations of Succession.

ORDER 2.

Emotions ; such as Love, &c.

CLASS 1.

Immediate Emotions.

CLASS 2.

Retrospective Emotions
Species 1.

Retrospective Emotions having relations to others.

Species 2.

Retrospective Emotions having reference to ourselves.

CLASS 3.

Prospective Emotions.

The objects of intellectual science are pointed out by Dr. Payne in his first and second chapters. All sensations, ideas, thoughts, &c., reside in the mind, or rather, are only particular states or conditions of it. He says "the faculties of the mind, or its powers and susceptibilities, are not to be distinguished from the mind itself. The words denote the constitution it has received from its Creator, by which it is capable of existing in all those different states which form the consciousness of life."

Though Dr. Payne adopts Brown's theory of *suggestion*, considered intellectually, yet he differs from him, when he applied it to moral questions. *Why* this should be, we can readily enough perceive; but Dr. Payne does not clear up the matter to our satisfaction. We know that almost every possible view which can be taken of Dr. Brown's system, in special reference to the doctrines of revelation, must, if rigorously carried out to their legitimate logical consequences, prove inimical to religion and morals.*

JOHN YOUNG.

Dr. Young was a Professor in Belfast College, and a man of considerable attainments and ability. The "Lectures On Intellectual Philosophy," published in 1835, had been delivered at that Academical Institution for several years previous to the Author's death, which took place in 1829.

* See Dr. Payne's 2nd. Edition of his Elements, 1842.

The Doctor resolves all mental phenomena into a small number of elementary principles,—sensation, memory, and judgment. We have the following analysis of perception. “Perception,” says he, “is that act of the mind, by which, through the medium of our organs of sense, we obtain a knowledge of external things.” * * * “With regard to many of these states of mind, which, in common language, we call perceptions, there can be no doubt; as when we say, that, at a single glance, we perceive a mountain, a ship, a fowl, at a considerable distance. Such perceptions, as they are called, imply various operations of mind; they are, in fact, habits of rapid judgment, acquired by long experience, and might be resolved into various acts, expressed by distinct propositions.”* The author then proceeds to show, that in every case of perception, in after life, there are so many acquired habits involved in the intellectual operation, that it becomes almost impossible to consider it as a simple or elementary principle. At the same time, Dr. Young is constrained to acknowledge, that such perceptions as heat, cold, softness, fluidity, and hardness, are possessed of unity. These he thinks are not susceptible of decomposition, nor are they referable to any distinct faculties or powers. “Can any thing,” he says, “be more simple than the perception of resistance from a solid body? It appears to be the simultaneous affection of your touch; no previous experience

* Lectures, &c. p. 59.

is required; and no succession of mental operations is felt.”*

On the subject of personal identity, of which so much has been written, Dr. Young differs from the opinions of Professor Stewart and some other modern writers on mental science. It has been commonly maintained by the school of Reid, that the consciousness of a sensation, and the consciousness of our existence, are simultaneous; feeling is blended with or involved in existence. Metaphysicians have thrown around the notion of personal identity a great deal of unnecessary mystification.

Our idea of personal identity does not essentially differ from the personal or individual notion which we have of any thing else. In ordinary cases personal identity is the same thing as memory; and Locke's reasonings on this subject have never been invalidated. My own personal identity, and the identity of the tree in my garden, are precisely the same; and if I want to prove either, I immediately fall back upon the resources of memory; I marshal up past remembrances, and offer them as incontestable evidence of identification. If man had had no power of recollecting the past, he never could have had such a thing as a notion about personal identity at all; nor indeed the personal identity of any thing else. But having this power of memory, he has that which gives rise to the notion of unity or individualization, which is only another form for the mere expression

* Lectures, &c. p. 61.

of past ideas and emotions in the soul. There are no subtilities or difficulties about the idea of personal identity, which may not be urged against the identity of any other thing. The identity of a rose, and the identity of a man, stand upon the self-same basis; and the only proof you can offer for either, must be drawn from the sources of memory.

On the question which has so often come before us in this history, relative to the existence of a material world, Dr. Young makes the following candid observations. "After all, however, it is possible that our sensations may be produced by the immediate agency of God; nay, for aught we can demonstrate to the contrary, our sensations may be excited by the moon, or by magic influence, or by galvanic energy. But upon subjects which do not admit of demonstration, we ought not to discard probability. We have no proof of our own existence as distinct from the ideas or feelings from which that existence is inferred; and no man can show a good reason why his memory is entitled to confidence. But when the existence of an external world has been proved to be possible, and when we find that all men, without exception, do actually form the notion of its existence, and cannot avoid it, we have certainly the highest reason to prefer the common opinion to the ideal theory."*

* Lectures, p. 512.

JAMES MILL.

Mr. Mill's work, "Analysis of the Human Mind," published in 1829, is a valuable addition to modern British publications on the science of mind. It displays considerable thought, and a familiar acquaintance with the subject in all its leading ramifications and bearings.

The treatise is founded upon the principle that an analysis of the human mind is precisely analogous to an analysis of material objects. Now this we conceive is a great mistake. In all physical analyses, you can always, in the course of your inquiries, leave out of consideration any particular item or items, without at all suspecting that these omissions will, in any degree whatever, affect the result which you are aiming to accomplish. You try this and try that; you decompose one thing into ten or a dozen elements, and only think of one or two of them, or perhaps even none. But in analysing mind, every component part or division is of immense consequence as to the result we wish to obtain. There is no discretion here, to pass over this or that phenomenon. Everything must be duly considered and accurately estimated, or no just conclusion can be come to in the matter.

Indeed, a purely analytical work on the human mind, must, from the very nature of things, prove unsatisfactory. Analysis by itself can lead to nothing. There must always be a number of *a priori* powers called into requisition, to make the

analytical results useful and intelligible. 'To analyse is to separate, to divide, to decompose, to set apart. What is the purpose of all analysation? To detect some general law or property of mind or matter, on which to ground a formal proposition of scientific truth or general knowledge. By what power do you detect this law or common property? Can you submit *it* likewise to analysis before you employ it? By no means. This eludes all your investigations and decompositions; only its influence or power is always manifest. The faculty of analysation cannot analyse itself. Besides, another power is called into requisition; a power of embracing[•] or recognising general truths, which constitutes one of the most effective instruments of human knowledge. This is the faculty of gathering together, so to speak, all the analysed or scattered fragments, and affixing to their aggregate number a common character or designation. A man can no more give you a correct idea of what mind is, by analysis alone, than he can give you an adequate conception of what a piece of marble statuary is, by pointing individually to all the chemical ingredients of which it is composed.

Analysis is doubtless a useful instrument; but alone it can only give you a one-sided view of things. It cannot lead to general results or general truths; these all owe their existence to another and a higher source.

As the main object of the author's work is to decompose the complex phenomena of thought into their primary elements, he commences with sen-

JOHN MILL.

Mr. Mill's work, *Analysis of the Mind*, published in 1829, is a valuable and modern British publication on this subject. It displays considerable thought and acquaintance with the subject, leading to conclusions and bearings.

The treatise is founded upon the principle that an analysis of the human mind is proper to an analysis of material objects. To suppose otherwise is a great mistake. In an analysis, you can always, in the course of your inquiries, leave out of consideration items or items, without at all suspecting that omissions will, in any degree, affect the result which you are aiming at. Try this and try that; you may divide into ten or a dozen elements, or one or two of them, or pass over in analysing mind, every question is of course, and every conclusion we wish to draw, and every fact we pass over, and every conclusion must be drawn, and every fact or no fact.

analytical results, and the art of finding out
 how to separate, to divide, to dissect, and the art of
 apart. What is the purpose of analysis? It constitutes the
 To detect some general law, or to find instruments which
 matter, or which to ground a theory, or for almost every
 of scientific truth or general principle, clusters and binds
 power in you detect this is the power of ideas into parcels
 Can you submit it? By no means. *Simple notions*; and
 employ it? By no means. *Lesser number*, are
 investigations and discoveries, this, called *series of*
 cause or power is also called *series of* as to communicate
 unification cannot be called *series of* trains of thought, to
 power is called into *series of* we have the whole
 looking or recognition, *series of* of the Human Mind.
 creates one of the *series of* are copies or images of
 human knowledge. *Series of* notions and ideas, to cluster
 together, so to speak, the faculty of giving names
 fragments, and also the elementary processes of the
 human mind.
 as well give *series of* the Author enters into
 the mind, *series of* his powers and faculties of the
 conception, *series of* cognition, which is simply a gene-
 or pointing, *series of* term for all mental phenomena
 State of *series of* notion is likewise a generic term
 Analytically, *series of* thought. All *abstractness* are
 some, *series of* terms. *Memory* is not an original
 thing, *series of*; it is made up of two ingredients;
 mind, *series of* numbered, and the idea of having seen
 ingredient is, however, analysed into
 component parts: my present remem-
 my past remembering-self; and these

sations. These he describes much in the same manner as Locke and other subsequent writers have done, with the exception of certain speculative observations "On Sensations in the Alimentary Canal," and with the expressed opinion of the author, "that there is every reason to believe that a perpetual train of sensation is going on in every part of it."*

After sensations cease, something is left behind in the mind; this something Mr. Mill calls an *idea*. "After," says he, "I have seen the sun, and by shutting my eyes see him no longer, I can still think of him. I have still a feeling, the consequence of the sensation, which, though I can distinguish it from the sensation, and treat it as not the sensation, but something different from the sensation, is yet more like the sensation, than any thing else can be; so like, that I call it a copy, an image, of the sensation; sometimes, a representation, or trace, of the sensation."† The process which generates these ideas, or copies of sensation, Mr. Mill calls by the quaint term *ideation*. Sensations, and ideas, which are their images or copies, constitute, then, the whole material of our thinking principle.

According to Mr. Mill, there are two primary states of consciousness; namely, those feelings immediately derived from the senses; and those which accompany muscular action. Consciousness is not a power or faculty of itself, but simply a

* Analysis, Vol. 1. chap. 1. sec. 6. 7. 8.

† Analysis, &c. Vol. 1. p. 14.

general term under which all modes of feeling are arranged and designated.

The power of association of ideas, and the art of giving things certain names, which constitutes the mechanism of speech, are two instruments which Mr. Mill employs to account for almost every mental phenomenon. Association clusters and binds certain kinds of sensations and ideas into parcels of various dimensions, called *complex notions*; and these again, in a greater or lesser number, are made to run into tracts or paths, called *trains of thought*. Language enables us to communicate these complex notions, and trains of thought, to others of our kind; and here we have the whole frame-work of the "Analysis of the Human Mind." Sensations; ideas, which are copies or images of them; the power of sensations and ideas, to cluster or run together; and the faculty of giving names to them; these are the elementary processes of the intellectual structure of man.

With these instruments the Author enters into an analysis of various powers and faculties of the mind, such as *Conception*, which is simply a general or abstract term for all mental phenomena whatever. *Imagination* is likewise a generic term for all *trains of thought*. All *abstractions* are purely concrete terms. *Memory* is not an original power or faculty; it is made up of two ingredients; the thing remembered, and the idea of having seen it. The last ingredient is, however, analysed into three other component parts: my present remembering-self; my past remembering-self; and these

being united by a certain train of consciousness, unite the two *selves*, which form a compound we call personal identity. *Belief* or conviction is of three kinds ; a belief in real existences, a belief in the testimony of others, and a belief in certain axioms or propositions of science.

The second volume of Mr. Mill's work has an especial reference to the *active* powers of man. Before, however, he enters into an analysis of these, he discusses the nature of our ideas of relation, number, extension, quantity, quality, time, space, and motion. The Author combats, at considerable length, the notions of Mr. Harris on the nature of our conceptions of time. This part of the work is fully entitled to an attentive and careful perusal.

The *active*, in contradistinction to the intellectual powers of man, are accounted for in this manner. We have sensations of a pleasurable, and sensations of a painful cast ; these produce their images or copies, called *ideas* ; and thus we have ideas of an agreeable or disagreeable kind. Desires and aversions arise in consequence of these ; and these give rise in their turn to all the various passions, emotions, and feelings in the human breast. The *will* is only another term for desire.*

Mr. Mill assumes, throughout all his speculations, the theory of Cause and Effect laid down by Hume, Brown, and others. He says, " In the sequence of events called cause and effect, men were not contented with the cause and effect ;

* Analysis, Chapters 19, 21, 23, 24.

they imagined a third thing, called *force* or *power*, which was not the cause, but something emanating from the cause, and the true and immediate cause of the effect." * * * "A cause, and the power of a cause, are not two things, but two names for the same thing."*

The power of *reflection*, maintained by Locke, and many other metaphysicians of distinction, Mr. Mill considers as identical with simple consciousness. "Reflection is nothing but consciousness; and consciousness is the having the sensations and ideas."†

Mr. Mill's theory is a decided *material* theory. Man is, in substance, only a cluster of sensations; for the fanciful and rather clumsy expedient of *ideation* makes no change in the general result. There is, therefore, no essential difference between him and the most *ultra* of the French sensational school. Every thing has a material basis, and is worked out by mechanical and material agencies. Mind is, in his hands, a lame and sorry affair. A few impressions upon our eyes, and nose, and ears, which leave certain faint copies behind them, (*how*, we are not informed) constitute all that which we term the human intellect! A noble and wonderful result of "Analysis" truly! The execution of the work is in good keeping with the theory; it is dry, husky, and heartless; not relieved with a single ray from the imaginative power, nor graced by a single noble or lofty aspiration.

* Analysis, &c. Vol. 2. p. 256.

† Ibid, Vol. 2. p. 137.

HENRY M'CORMAC.

This author belongs to the medical profession. His work, "The Philosophy of Human Nature, in its Physical, Intellectual and Moral Relations," was published in 1839.

The chief aim of the Author's work is of a practical rather than theoretical character. It breathes throughout kindly and philanthropic views on matters connected with our physical condition, intellectual improvement, and moral culture; and endeavours to show that comfort and happiness are susceptible of a wider and more general extension among our race, than we witness at the present moment. All methods for social and individual improvements must however take their rise from correct and comprehensive views of the nature of man; for these alone are capable of furnishing us with those lights and suggestions indispensably necessary for directing us to solid measures of amelioration. In this work of improvement, mental science is of supreme importance. The Author observes, "The science of mind forms the basis of education, legislation, and morals; it is the criterion of truth in numerous matters of vital importance; it involves the consideration of the being and providence of the Deity, and of all that is good and great in humanity; it is the invincible and never-ceasing opponent of ignorance

and error; and, under God, the guarantee of man's advance in wisdom, knowledge, and happiness."*

The second part of the treatise is devoted to mental disquisitions. The author conceives that all ideas are derived from the senses; but that, though the impressions on the organs of sense are passive, yet there is an inward principle of vitality, by which we are able to recall past knowledge, and repeat the experience to others. Our primary sensations are but few in number, compared with the vast stock of ideas of which they are the source; and this is a wise and providential arrangement in the mental economy, because it is the cause of that singleness or individuality of feeling and thinking, by which the great and widely scattered family of mankind are enabled to hold social and intellectual intercourse with each other.

The Doctor maintains that mind and matter are two distinct things, and he steers entirely clear of that common error into which many distinguished medical gentlemen fall, of reasoning and speaking about mind as if it were a mere quality or attribute of physical organization. "Mind and matter," says the author, "have nothing in common, and to confound them is to assert that sensations, and the external sources of them, are one and the same."†

The Author's observations on the regulation of the mind, and the best methods of improving it,

* The Philos. of Human Nature, p. 134.

† Philosophy &c., p. 173.

are highly judicious; and cannot fail to be read with interest by every student of mental philosophy.

S. T. COLERIDGE.

Coleridge is not a systematic writer; he is a metaphysical amateur. He cultivated mental science partly from his peculiarity of mind, and partly for literary display. He had an intellect both elevated and subtle; and his stock of philosophical knowledge was far above an average. His speculations on metaphysics are spread over three of his publications; his "Biographia Literaria," his "Aids to Reflection," and "The Friend."

Coleridge was early in life imbued with the spirit of the German philosophy. Kant and Fichte were his favourite authors. This circumstance gave a peculiar turn to all his mental disquisitions; and stamped them with that transcendental and mystical character, for which they are remarkable. Sensation, understanding, reason, and will, were, in his conception, the four fundamental faculties of the mind. Following Kant, he made a distinction between the understanding and the reason; the former he thought might fairly be attributed to the animal creation, but the latter was peculiarly the prerogative of man. On this point, he observes,—

"I should have no objection to define *reason* with Jacobi, and with his friend Hemsterhuis, as an organ bearing the same relation to spiritual objects, the Universal, the Eternal, and the Neces-

sary, as the eye bears to material and contingent phenomena. But then it must be added, that it is an organ identical with its appropriate objects. Thus, God, the soul, eternal truth, &c. are the objects of reason; but they are themselves *reason*. We name God the supreme reason; and Milton says, ‘When the soul *reason* receives, and reason is her being.’ Whatever is conscious *self*-knowledge is reason.”*

In another passage he again observes, relative to the idea of pure being or intelligent existence,—

“The power which evolved this idea of being,—being in its essence, being limitless,—how shall we call it? The idea itself, which, like a mighty billow, at once overwhelms and bears aloft, what is it? Whence did it come? In vain would we derive it from the organs of sense; for these supply only surfaces, undulations, and phantoms! In vain from the instruments of sensations; for these furnish only the chaos, the shapeless elements of sense. And least of all may we hope to find its origin or sufficient cause in the moulds and mechanism of the *understanding*; the whole property and functions of which consist in individualisation, in outlines, and differencings, by quantity, quality, and relation. It were wiser to seek substance in shadow than absolute fulness in mere negation.”†

In the Author’s “Aids to Reflection,” he incorporates his metaphysical ideas with moral and

* Friend, Vol. 1. p. 266.

† The Friend, Vol. 3. p. 202.

religious topics. The faculty of volition is an important one in the eyes of Coleridge; and he stoutly contends against those sensational and material speculators who aim at referring it to mere sensation as its source. With Kant, he considers it as the life and soul of all intellectual, moral, and religious feeling and principle; and as being decidedly of a holy and heavenly origin. Jointly with the will, the understanding, and the reason, he deduced another mental power termed *faith*; a faculty which imparts a vividness and tangibility to certain intellectual conceptions, which mere understanding and reason cannot give. "Faith," says he, "consists in the synthesis of the reason and the individual will. By virtue of the latter, therefore, it must be an energy; and, inasmuch as it relates to the whole man, it must be exerted in each and all of his constituents, or incidents, faculties, and tendencies; it must be a total, not a partial—a continuous, not a desultory or occasional energy. And by virtue of the former (that is, reason), faith must be a light—a form of knowing—a beholding of truth. In the incomparable words of the Evangelist, therefore, faith must be a light, originating in the *Logos*, or the substantial reason, which is co-eternal and one with the holy will, and which light is at the same time the life of men."

The quotations we have now given from Coleridge will enable the reader to form a pretty correct idea of his views as a metaphysician. System or theory he had none. His mind was not

adequate to grapple with and develop any closely concatenated scheme of abstract thought. He loved to hop from twig to twig; to cull a little out of this theory, and a little out of that; and wile away the time in patching the fragments together, for some temporary purpose of display. He said many good things, and some profound ones; but his judgment as a whole could never be relied on in any matter where a comprehensive and logical decision was indispensably requisite. He was too much the creature of impulse for this.

JOHN BALLANTYNE.

In this Reverend author's work, "An Examination of the Human Mind," 1828, we find a somewhat novel method of classifying the phenomena of mind. The author does this under four principles; the sensitive principle, the associating principle, the voluntary principle, and the motive principle.

Mr. Ballantyne conceives that the constant appeal of Professor Stewart, and others imbued with peculiar notions of the utility of the Baconian philosophy, in demanding an unlimited number of facts, before any conclusion is drawn, is pernicious to the real progress of mental science. For the want of principles we become so encumbered and blocked up, that our stock of materials proves nothing but an impediment in our path. The author observes; "The facts pertaining to mind already ascertained, and ascertained with all the

evidence that any reasonable person can desire, are innumerable. They are presented to our consciousness in myriads every hour; and are more troublesome, indeed, by their number and variety, than by any other circumstance with which they are attended. It is not so much particular facts that we need to investigate in the study of the mind, as the general laws by which they are regulated."*

Mr. Ballantyne conceives that in sensation we have not only the feeling we term sensation, but the notion of *extension* communicated at the same instant. We do not obtain the idea of extension *from* the sensation; for both enter the mind at the same moment of time. "Every impression on a sensitive part of the body suggests a sensation; and in connection with it an idea of a portion of extension corresponding to the extent of the impression."† The same thing may be urged relative to time or duration. Every impression made upon an organ of sense gives us an idea of time, as well as what we call a sensation, and the notion of extension. These three all arise in the perceptive faculty at the same moment. "No person pretends that he can experience an impression on the organs of sense without experiencing an idea of duration, nor does any person pretend that he can discern the slightest interval between this idea and those now mentioned, and to ascribe them therefore to different sources seems very unreasonable."‡

* An Examination, &c., Introd.

‡ An Examination, &c. p. 36.

† Ibid., p. 56.

On the associating, the voluntary, and motive principles, the author displays a considerable portion of bold and original thought. He argues his points well, and shows great discrimination in developing the constitutional differences among many mental phenomena, which have been blended and mixed together by several of our most influential and popular writers on the mind.

JOHN ABERCROMBIE.

Dr. Abercrombie's work, "Inquiries concerning the Intellectual Powers," 1831, excited, particularly in the North, a considerable degree of interest. His eminence as a physician, and his zealous devotion to the interests of the church of Scotland, aided greatly to extend the circulation of his opinions on mental science.

Dr. Abercrombie was a supporter of the theories of Reid and Stewart. With Dr. Brown's theory of suggestion he does not appear to have much sympathy. Indeed he says, in one part of his work, that it is very doubtful if Brown contributed any substantial benefit to the science of mind. Dr. Abercrombie's theory, if it can be so called, of the origin of our knowledge, is perception and reflection. But as these two sources are limited to what a man experiences himself, a third power is provided, and this power is testimony.

That portion of the Doctor's work which is more nearly allied to his own profession as a physician, is perhaps the most interesting, as it certainly is

the most original, section of the "Inquiries." Dreaming, insanity, idiocy, spectral illusions, and remarkable cases of somnambulism, are all treated of in a manner calculated to excite and sustain the attention of the reader.

Dr. Abercrombie's work on "The Philosophy of the Moral Feelings," appeared in 1833. The foundation of the Author's reasoning in this treatise is, that all our feelings are "intuitive articles of moral belief."

To a mind familiarised to any extent in philosophical theories and systems, the writings of Dr. Abercrombie will not afford much pleasure or instruction. He did not know much of the history of mental science; and his works on this subject were written only in short intervals of time which he snatched from arduous professional avocations. This circumstance imparts to them a commonplace and desultory character, which is their obvious feature.

THOMAS TAYLOR.

Thomas Taylor, sometimes called "Plato Taylor," is a name justly entitled to honourable mention in any history of mental speculation. He spent above forty years in an exclusive devotion to what he considered the first and most august philosophy; and is the only modern, since the days of the Emperor Julian, or the age immediately succeeding, who has penetrated to its remotest sources, and effected its perfect mastership. He translated the

whole of the writings of Plato, and nearly the whole of those which remain of the great Platonic succession, including Aristotle. Mr. Taylor strenuously contends that Aristotle was not only the pupil, but in the strictest sense a holder of the Platonic dogmas, contrary to what he considered the ignorant and rash deductions of some modern writers, who, never having fully comprehended either master or scholar, have fancied the Stagyræ the founder of an opposing sect,—Proclus, Plotinus, Porphyry, Jamblicus, &c. Mr. Taylor conceives that all which the moderns possess of moral science consists of nothing else than small and broken, though splendid, fragments of the great Platonic union of the universe. He employed himself not in studying the truth by their inspection, but in elaborate re-constructions of the whole as a concatenated and perfect system, according to its pristine form and splendour. He therefore, with a contempt which appears narrow and somewhat arrogant, rejects acceptance of, and declines all attention to, the dark and partial systems of modern writers; not, however, out of any deficiency of powers for judging of them, but from a conceived previous fulness and redundancy of loftier and better knowledge. He was as regardless of outward circumstances, and as contented with poverty, as were the philosophers of old; as temperate; as indifferent to fame or pleasure; as far above the passions “immersed in matter,” as were the mighty of vanished days.

Amongst other peculiarities of this extraordinary

man, there is one which is deeply to be lamented. The Platonic Philosophy being strictly and essentially theological—in which, accordingly, all other principles and knowledge become themselves religionised, so to speak—Mr. Taylor adopts it in its fullest extent, with all the old profoundly significant and representative mythology attached to it; and perhaps (I speak with diffidence) in a more absolute and dogmatic sense than even the Platonists themselves intended. As a consequence of this, Taylor looks with coldness and distrust on the principles of Christian theology. He understands Plato thoroughly; but it is quite clear that he has studied the principles of natural and revealed religion through a miserably corrupted and distorted medium. This has led him to throw a gorgeous halo around the Grecian system; and to look at pure and undefiled truth through a dim and hazy atmosphere.

Mr. Taylor advocated the immediate intuition of all truth, but with this important qualification, that we cannot ascend the highest point of mental intelligence whilst we are encumbered with material ties on earth. He says, “The conceptions of the experimental philosopher who expects to find truth in the labyrinths of matter, are not much more elevated than those of the vulgar; for he is ignorant that truth is the most splendid of things; that she is the constant companion of the Divinity, and proceeds together with him through the universe; that the shining traces of her feet are conspicuous only in form; and that in the dark wind-

ings of matter she left nothing but a most obscure and fleeting resemblance of herself. This delusive phantom, however, the man of modern science ardently explores, unconscious that he is running in profound darkness and infinite perplexity, and that he is hastening after an object which eludes all detection and mocks all pursuit."

DR. WHEWELL.

Professor Whewell has long been known as one of the most distinguished natural philosophers in Europe. He has of late years appeared in a somewhat new character, in his "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences," and in his "Elements of Morality."

We have often heard the remark, and have witnessed hundreds of illustrations of it, that good mathematicians and natural philosophers seldom reason well on politics, morals, or metaphysics. On these subjects they are commonly at fault. They appear stiff and stilted; always laying down matters as axioms which are no axioms at all; and drawing inferences not in the least warranted by principles previously laid down. The mere mathematician and natural philosopher are apt to materialize every thing they touch; they divide human nature into a series of lines, angles, circles, or arbitrary classifications; and parcel out the superficies of society as they would parcel out the globe; their reasonings are always the most cogent imaginable, and no one else can reason like them. They

demand strict demonstration, where strict demonstration cannot be given ; and they refuse their assent to the most obvious and common-place truths because they are not reasoned out in the same manner as they demonstrate the square of the hypotenuse to be equal to the square of the other two sides of a right-angled triangle. All mind, feeling, passion, sentiment, emotion, sympathy ; all moral and political movements of individuals and societies ; and all judicial regulations, rules, precedents, and principles, are, in their eyes, nothing save lines and surfaces ; and are as easily resolved into their pure logical elements, as are the most complicated questions of numbers into the rudimental units of arithmetic.

Now this we apprehend arises, in a great measure, from the radical difference between mathematical evidence and reasoning, and matters appertaining to human nature. An appeal to consciousness, the only one we need in the case, is sufficient to confirm this position. In mathematics the axioms and definitions are conceived by the mind as always existing without alteration or modification. We cannot conceive them contrary or opposite ; and this is the reason, perhaps, why we call them immutable and necessary truths. Principles of mind are, however, viewed relatively, and not absolutely ; they are considered in reference to final ends and purposes, and these are continually varying from peculiar events and circumstances. The moral actions, for example, of individuals and bodies of men, must be considered relatively to many inci-

dents and situations before they can be pronounced to be wise or foolish, just or unjust, expedient or inexpedient. There is nothing laid down in any code of morality, the contrary of which cannot be readily conceived by the understanding, and which is not susceptible of considerable modifications, when applied to the exigencies of individuals and communities. Not so, however, in mathematics. Here you are compelled to give your assent to the truth of certain axioms, totally irrespective of their application to any specific end or purpose whatever.

The science of Morality does not lie immediately in our path; but before passing to the consideration of the "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences," we shall make a few remarks upon the "Elements." The author says, that "Moral no less than physical science must be founded on axioms," and these axioms he calls elements. He argues for the perfect analogy between geometry and morality; and maintains, that the axioms of the one, and the elements of the other, lead to the same result; namely, science. These two departments of knowledge, geometry and morality, have each their *elements*, and each their *philosophy*. Geometry is "a series of positive and definite propositions, deduced one from another in succession, by vigorous reasoning, and all resting upon certain definitions and self-evident axioms." The *philosophy* of this science involves the cogency of the evidences abstractly considered, the nature and degrees of proof from axioms and definitions, and the way and

manner the mind perceives and assents to mathematical proof generally. Morality is likewise deduced from axioms by successive steps of reasoning; and by this means it constitutes as connected and demonstrable a science as geometry itself. Morality has also its philosophy, which consists in examining into the nature of that evidence on which these moral maxims rest; how they affect the mind, and how conviction is fully brought home to it, in all moral conclusions and principles.

We cannot enter into an examination of this moral theory; but we feel confident that Dr. Whewell has failed in supporting the analogy between geometry and moral principles. There is nothing discreditable in such failure, for he could not be expected to perform impossibilities. Every philosopher before him has been vanquished in such an attempt; and this will be the case to the end of time. Though it be conceded that the principles of moral obligation and right are like mathematical propositions, intuitively certain, still the two sciences, geometry and morality, have to be developed and illustrated in two different modes. They may have the same starting point, but they diverge considerably from each other in their route.

“The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences” is an able work, and many principles of vital interest in mental science are elaborately discussed throughout its pages. His system, as a whole, is a compound of German and Scotch speculation. He falls into Kant’s views as to *matter* and *form*; and time and space he considers, with Kant, to be the

two categories of sensation. The sources of all knowledge are *sensations* and *ideas*; the former are passive, and the latter active. Ideas are independent of sensation; they belong strictly to the understanding, as original *à priori* forms of the mind. The author divides these ideas into *fundamental* and *secondary*; time, space, causation, belong to the former; length, breadth, number, succession, to the latter. This logical arrangement seems capricious, and unwarranted by actual phenomena; number and succession being invested with the same *à priori* attributes as space or causation.

Dr. Whewell's opinion on the nature of general ideas or conceptions is this, that the general proposition which is expressive of a collection of individual facts, and forms them as it were into one fact, is not the aggregate sum of these facts, but something new is added, and this is a certain *conception* of the mind, which does not belong to the facts individually. He says, "The particular facts are not merely brought together, but there is a new element added to the combination by the very act of thought by which they are combined."

Now this is nothing more nor less than the old Scholastic doctrine revived. The Doctor tells us that he is not a *realist*, nor yet a *nominalist*, but a *conceptionalist*; which is a thing difficult to conceive. There never was any middle course to steer between realism and nominalism; one or the other system must be adopted. If there be a "new element" which takes its source out of any "combination," we are entitled to demand what it is. Our author

answers, a conception. A conception of what? Of something which does not belong to any one of the items of this "combination," but which is a thing so *real* and so important that there can be no science, no knowledge,—nothing, in fact, which man can set any value upon,—unless we have it. This *conception* which the Doctor grasps, and holds with such tenacity, is all that the most ultra-realist ever contended for; and it must be well known to him, from his perusal of the Scholastic writers, that the few *conceptionalists* who figure at intervals in that long and bitter controversy, were almost invariably hooted off the stage amidst the jeers and laughter of their opponents. And this was quite natural. There can be no logical compromise between absolute nominalism and absolute realism. And in respect to Dr. Whewell, he is pre-eminently under a weighty obligation to adopt the realist opinion in its fullest extent, seeing that he invests *his* conceptions with every mental attribute which can possibly impart reality or tangibility to them. Take away his conceptions, and all that remain to him are a few poor detached sensations, without a particle of spontaneity or life in them.

The belief in the uniform stability of nature is considered by some philosophers as an instinctive suggestion of the mind, and by others as a generalized fact from experience. Dr. Whewell adopts the former opinion; and he enters very fully into the nature of necessary and contingent truths. This discussion forms an interesting portion of his work.

Before making any observations, however, on this topic, we shall just observe, that there is an important consideration necessary to be kept in view, when we sit in judgment on the reasonings and conclusions of Professor Whewell, on the sources of human knowledge, or indeed on any other mental subject; and it is this, that all his examples, by way of illustration, are taken from material sciences. Now looking at the matter in its prominent bearings, we are somewhat startled at this; for it is nothing short of discussing the nature and operations of what we call *mind*, by the properties and laws of that which we denominate *matter*; which two things, be it observed, Dr. Whewell labours to prove are altogether two different elements, and have nothing in common with each other. He does not reason on the nature of metaphysical principles as a metaphysician does; but he reasons on them as a mathematician and natural philosopher. We have axioms and definitions, matter and motion, the power and the weight, perpetually before our eyes. We never get out of the laboratory or observatory; we are either poking our microscope among infusorial animalculæ, or sweeping the heavens with a fifty-feet telescope. The phenomena of mind itself are nothing; the faculties, powers, emotions, and feelings are all matters which must be illustrated and judged of according to the laws of hydrostatics and hydraulics. This earthly machinery, it is almost needless to say, not only greatly mystifies the reader, but leads the doctor himself into innumerable and inextricable difficulties.

But let us return to the consideration of necessary and contingent truths. "Necessary truths," says he, "are those in which we not only learn that the proposition *is* true, but see that it *must* be true; in which the negation is not only false but impossible; in which we cannot even by an effort of the imagination, or in a supposition, conceive the reverse of that which is asserted. That there are such truths, cannot be doubted. We may take, for example, all relations of numbers. Three and two make five. We cannot conceive it otherwise. We cannot by any freak of thought imagine three and two to make seven."

To this it has been replied, that the relations between numbers are entirely a matter of personal experience; that children or uneducated persons have no intuitive notions of numerical relations; but that every man has to learn to count, multiply, add, and divide, in the same manner as he has to learn other things. People inexperienced in the use of numbers often make erroneous calculations, and persist in their accuracy, until they are taught otherwise; and, although when they are corrected they cannot perceive the contrary of the numerical result, still this is only a species of imaginary induction solely derived from actual experience. And the same thing is maintained as to mathematical figures. Two straight and parallel lines can never meet; this is termed a necessary truth. Dr. Whewell calls it *à priori* truth; his opponent, only a generalized fact from experience. We cannot know from actual experience, that they will never meet; but we form a conclusion from that which

we have witnessed to that which lies beyond all empirical knowledge whatever. Still it is confidently affirmed such an axiom is by no means absolutely true, it is only a result of reflected experience.

It is obvious, however, that this attempt to refer our ideas of numerical and mathematical relations to mere experience, is not justified by any solid or substantial argument. Experience can never assure us of *perfect* circles, triangles, squares, or straight lines; and the whole force and cogency of mathematical reasonings rest upon the assumption of the absolute perfection of those figures. Once doubt this, and the whole science of mathematics falls to the ground. It would be revolting to our reason to maintain it for one moment. We are bound, therefore, to acquiesce in the view which Dr. Whewell takes of this subject; indeed it is just the same view which has been taken of mathematical relations since the earliest records of time.

Dr. Whewell is not, however, so happy with some of his other necessary truths. Let us look at one relative to causation. "*Every* effect must have a cause." The Doctor goes on then to state, "That this idea of cause is not derived from experience, we prove (as in former cases) by this consideration; that we can make assertions, involving this idea, which are rigorously necessary and universal; whereas knowledge derived from experience can only be true as far as experience goes, and can never contain in itself any evidence

whatever of its necessity. We assert that "Every event must have a cause;" and this proposition we know to be true, not only probably and generally and as far as we can see; but we cannot suppose it *to be false in any single instance*. We are as certain of it as we are of the truths of arithmetic and geometry. We cannot doubt that it must apply to all events, past, present, and to come, in every part of the universe, just as truly as to those occurrences which we have ourselves observed. *What* causes produce what effects:—what is the cause of any particular event; what will be the effect of any peculiar process; these are points on which experience may enlighten. But that every event must have *some* cause, experience cannot prove any more than she can disprove. She can add nothing to the evidence of the truth, however often she may exemplify it. This doctrine, then, cannot have been acquired by her teaching; and the idea of cause which the doctrine involves, and on which it depends, cannot have come into our minds from the region of observation."*

Now there are many weighty considerations against the position of "*Every* effect must have a cause" being a necessary or absolute truth. Can we rear any philosophy of *human nature* upon such a truth? Clearly not. When we consider man intellectually, morally, and religiously, we have to go on another tack; we have to renounce

* The Philos. of the Induct. Sciences, Vol. 1. p. 159.

this maxim, and assume the existence of an entirely opposite one; *that something must exist without a cause*. Nothing can be proved by an eternal succession of causes and effects. We are compelled, by the irresistible impulse of our understandings, to invest certain objects with an innate spontaneity of action, and to consider them as absolutely independent, and completely removed beyond the sphere of any extrinsic influence whatever. However logically embarrassing this may be, it *is* done, and *must* be done; or human knowledge is no knowledge at all. Take your absolute truth, that "every effect must have a cause," and try if you can reason on the existence or attributes of Deity with it. You will soon find yourself obliged to abandon it, to throw it to the winds, and place its very opposite in its place. The same may be said of the science of morals. Fetter the operations of the *will* with any extrinsic power or cause, and what becomes of our notions of obligation, duty, rewards, and punishments? They are manifestly absurd. Further, let us look at those *à priori* conceptions and judgments, on which Dr. Whewell and many other distinguished philosophers justly set so high a value? What are they? Are they objects, or things, which have a *cause* lying behind them? Are they not contended to be the pure results of *mind itself*; of the simple, unfettered, uncreated substance we designate by that name? *A priori* conception would be no *à priori* conception at all, upon the maxim of "every effect must have a cause;" it was, in fact, to ex-

press a completely contrary proposition that this term *à priori* was invented and brought into current use in philosophical discussions. It has no earthly meaning but this, that we come to a point where all causation terminates, and we invest something with a power to do a thing from no extrinsic or internal cause at all. If we do not follow this course, everything intellectual, moral, and theological must be perfectly unintelligible, irrational, and contradictory.

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.

Sir William has not favoured philosophical readers with any elaborate or formal treatise on mental science, but has confined his labours to critical expositions of it on some points of considerable interest and importance. These have appeared at intervals in the "Edinburgh Review," and have been collected together and published in Paris, translated by M. Louis Peisse, under the title of "Fragments de Philosophie," 1840. The same expositions have also appeared in the form of Notes or Dissertations prefixed to an edition of the Works of Dr. Reid, 1846.

In these Notes to Reid, Sir William has undertaken to purge the "Common Sense" philosophy of whatever is imperfect and irrelevant, and to strengthen the arguments for what is sound and conclusive in it. In order to accomplish this effectually, we must comply with the following conditions:—1st, "That we admit nothing unwar-

rantably—not even an original datum of consciousness itself. 2nd, That we embrace *all* which *are* original data of consciousness, with their legitimate consequences. And 3rd, That we exhibit each in its integrity, neither distorted nor mutilated. It is the want of observing these precautions which has led to the multiplication of philosophical systems, in every conceivable aberration from the unity of truth; so that philosophy has simply to return to *natural consciousness*, in order to return both to unity and truth.”*

Certain other conditions are laid down as to the “legitimacy and legitimate *application* of the argument of common sense.” This application is regulated by two considerations; namely, that every proposition suggested by common sense be identical with, and fairly derived from, a primary datum of consciousness; and in the second place, “that the primary data of consciousness are one and all admitted to be true.” Besides these, every supposition which common-sense philosophy makes *must* be admitted, and must have a certain philosophical character or appearance of universality about them. This feature may be indicated from our impossibility to give any account of them; from their absolute simplicity; their necessity and complete universality; and from their affording a comparatively large measure of certainty and reality.

The most important speculations contained in these notes to Reid, are those connected with the act of perception. The commentator enters fully into the nature of this operation as developed and

* Note A. Sect. 1.

explained by the founder of the common-sense school of metaphysics ; and he has shewn, with consummate learning and acuteness, the errors into which Reid and other subsequent writers on the mind fell relative to the nature and limitations of this primary and elemental faculty of the intellect. The speculations and remarks of Sir William are of that character which effectively precludes our giving anything like a fair abstract of them ; we must leave them, therefore, to the careful perusal of the reader, being well assured that he will not feel his time has been ill spent in their attentive consideration.

The following works are either such as embrace metaphysical speculations or principles, as illustrative of some other branches of knowledge, more or less in affinity with them ; or are scarcely of that individual character and weight which could entitle them to a more lengthened and formal analysis and development. It is our wish to give as copious an account of works on mental science as possible ; because these productions are not only interesting in themselves, but they may prove of considerable utility in guiding the judgment of subsequent historians of this the most interesting portion of all philosophy. The principles of mind more immediately connected with general education, morals, and questions of a political and social character, must always claim the special attention of the scientific metaphysician and philosopher ; for

although they may seem to be well known to him, as an investigator of purely mental phenomena, they nevertheless assume new and interesting appearances, when placed in contact with other speculations.

DR. BROOK TAYLOR.—Dr. Taylor's work, "*Contemplatio Philosophica*," was published about the year 1720. It is a small treatise, and contains some metaphysical speculations entitled to consideration by a student of the science. The principal of these relate to what the author says on substance, time, space, necessary action, &c.

R. CASWAY.—This author's work, under the title of "*A Miscellaneous Metaphysical Essay*," was published in London in 1748, under the designation of an "*Impartial Inquirer*." The object of this treatise is to elevate our ideas respecting the existence, nature, and operations of the Divine Being, by a consideration of the order of providence, and the constitution of the world of matter and thought. There is appended to the work "*A Conjectural Scheme of the Creation of Beings in General*," and two plates, illustrative of some branches of the Cabalistic philosophy.

F. SAYER.—Dr. Sayer was of to the medical profession, and his treatise, called "*Disquisitions, Metaphysical and Literary*," was published in 1793. He belongs to the school of Hartley and Priestley. The Author enters into an analy-

sis of Beauty, and adopts the same principles of association as those on which the speculations of Dr. Priestley and Mr. Alison rest.

In treating of perception, Dr. Sayer maintains that the mind is capable of attending to only one idea at the same moment of time. He says, "If we reflect upon the surprising velocity with which ideas pass through the mind, and the remarkable rapidity with which the mind turns itself, or is directed, from one object of contemplation to another, this might alone give us some suspicion that we may probably be mistaken in supposing ideas to be synchronously perceived;"—"that the mind, whether immaterial or the result of organization, has certainly a wholeness or unity belonging to it, and that it is either not composed of parts, or that no one of the parts from which it originates is, by itself, mind; in this case it is difficult to conceive how two ideas should be impressed upon the mind at the same instant; for this would be supposing that part of the mind could receive one idea, and part another, at the same time; if the parts do not perceive singly, this is evidently impossible."

GOVERNOR POWNAL.—This author's work, "Intellectual Physics," was published anonymously, in 1795. He affirms that man's intellectual nature is just as much an object of physical investigation, as his body. He considers mental phenomena in the same light as material objects; and that the only sound knowledge we can obtain of the nature

of the inward principle of thought is, to reason from facts, "from particular to particular, as they lie in co-existence, or are connected in consequent effect." The author also affirms that mind is a positive and living energy, endowed with innate spontaneity. He says, "After all, when I recur, as I find myself obliged to do, if I would be clear in my own apprehensions and sincere in my declarations, to what I experiment in myself, I cannot but say, what I cannot but be conscious of, that I feel, immediately, directly, and without any inference whatever, that I have, as at a centre, an internal spontaneity, a self-activity; that I am an agent self-motive, without depending, as an effect moved, on any preceding external mechanical cause, otherwise than as combined with my self-activity."

Space, according to the author, is not a mere privation of material substance, or an abstract idea of relation, but has an actual and positive existence, and *ab extra* impresses on the mind an idea of objective existence.

JOHN DUNCAN.—This author's treatise, "Philosophy of Human Nature," 1815, embraces both intellectual and moral phenomena. He contends for the immateriality of the mind, but he thinks it is substantial and extended; which appears to be something very incongruous. Though this opinion has an evident material complexion, still the author, in the course of two separate sections, endeavours to show that mind is not a quality or attribute of matter.

There is an Appendix to the work, on the Origin of Evil, in which the author endeavours to show that pleasure and pain are mere relative states or conditions of mind. His disquisitions on this topic are not very happy or satisfactory.

G. M'CAUL.—Mr. M'Caul's work, "The Philosophy of Mind and Matter," was published in 1827. It contains few metaphysical materials for comment or observation. Mind is considered by the author in connection with civilization, music, suicide, courage, honour, duelling, religious ceremonies, and insanity. The work is written in the form of dialogue, and the tenth dialogue is devoted to the consideration of the immateriality of the soul. The reader will find some excellent observations in this section of the treatise.

MR. SMART.—This author has published several small tracts, containing more or less of mental philosophy. These are collected in one volume, entitled "Beginnings of a New School of Metaphysics." The author is an admirer of Locke's philosophy, as well as of some portions of the Common-Sense theory of Reid and Stewart.

Mr. Smart gives us the end or object of his labours in the following terms. "I have only to say, in conclusion, that, in putting the three Essays into one volume, and publishing them as 'Beginnings of a New School of Metaphysics,' I pretend to have accomplished thus much; I have investigated the true relation between thought and lan-

guage; I have shown how intellection begins; I have proved the error in purpose of all systems of metaphysics, Locke's excepted; and I have distinguished the province of metaphysics, by a clear line of demarcation, from that of physics."*

ROBERT MUDIE.—Mr. Mudie's book, "Man in his Intellectual Faculties and Adaptations," 1839, is a sensible and pleasantly reading work. It is not a systematic or theoretical performance, but a discussion on branches of mental science, with an especial view to educational purposes, and individual intellectual cultivation. His opinions are spiritual and lofty; and he displays a decided repugnance to all material theories of mind. The author observes on this point, "The mind, in its nature or essence, is not, and cannot be, an object of the senses, because it has, and can have, none of those qualities, and display none of those phenomena, which render matter apparent to the senses. As little can we borrow any analogy from the material world by means of which to shadow it forth, even in the most dark and imperfect manner in which one subject of thought can be shadowed forth by another."....."The mind of man, though a creation by the same Being, is a totally different act of the creative fiat from the material creation, either in its substantive existence, or in any kind or degree of its action."†

JAMES PIERREPONT GREAVES.—Mr. Greaves is

* A Way out of Metaphysics, p. 74.

† Man, &c., p. 135.

known for his metaphysical mysticism ; but chiefly from his connexion with Pestalozzi, in the system of general education. Greaves was a London merchant, but falling into embarrassments he repaired to the Continent, first to Heidelberg, and then to Switzerland, where he sojourned ten years with Pestalozzi.

Mr. Barham, in a Memoir of Greaves, gives the following account of him.* “His mind was of a very ethereal, transcendental, and mystical cast, resembling that of Jacob Böhme, to whom he was fervently attached. This peculiarity in intellect did not well accord with the mercantile business in which his earlier years were spent, and, after getting rich in commerce, he lost his fortune in imprudent speculations. On the settlement of his affairs he went abroad, and became particularly intimate with Pestalozzi and his educational system ; in short, Greaves was for years Pestalozzi’s right-hand man. It was during his residence abroad that Greaves became profoundly initiated in the German and Swiss illuminism ; he also attached himself to the æsthetic or sentimental philosophy on which Baumgarten, Kant, Richter, and Schiller wrote so eloquently. This æsthetic philosophy, long popular in Germany, Greaves endeavoured to promote in this country ; and he formed an Æsthetic Society, the only one I ever met with in Britain, which used to meet every week in his house in Burton Street.

“The divine reality to which Greaves ever

* See Mr. Barham’s work, entitled “Alism.”

directed attention was the life of God in man's soul. He professed himself an *Alist* emphatically in my presence. He recognised, like Fenelon, Poiret, Law, and other mystics, an inspiring vital divinity, which he used to term the central spirit or fountain of immortality within. It is almost impossible to describe aright the fervour and enthusiasm with which Greaves maintained the reality of the alistic and divine spiritualism. He professed that he realised it as actually present, as an element in life more intense than any imaginable electricity; and his faith in this spirit, by which he felt himself inspired, always preserved in him the most lively cheerfulness and freedom from anxious care. This was the more remarkable, as Greaves drank nothing but water, and ate only fruit and vegetables for many years before his death. He said to those who recommended him a grosser style of diet, that the central spirit always burned brighter and stronger in proportion to his abstinence from meats; nor was his joyous animation apparently depressed by a painful internal disease, which tormented him extremely, and finally brought him to the grave.”*

“CHRISTIAN ETHICS; or, Moral Philosophy on the Principles of Divine Revelation. By Ralph Wardlaw, D.D.” London, 1834. 1 vol.

This work is in a great measure elemental, and so it was designed by its author. He appeals to

* *Contrasting Magazine*, 1827; “Physical and Metaphysical Hints for Every body;” “Thoughts on Spiritual Culture.”

Christians, and to Christians alone; and on this account he enters into no questions or theories which are calculated, either directly or indirectly, to compromise two great leading principles of Religion, the existence of a Deity, and the truth of the Sacred writings.

The theory involved in Dr. Wardlaw's treatise is, *that the will of God is the real standard of all moral obligation.* "I have," says he, "shewn that if God sustains the character of a Moral Governor, and man is a subject of his dominion, it follows unavoidably, that the law of the subject's duty can be nothing else than the supreme will; that the knowledge of this will was originally possessed by intuitive discernment, and, being 'written on the heart' found a disposition there perfectly consentaneous to every iota of its holy requirements; that through the defection of man from his uprightness of heart, the knowledge of God himself, and consequently the knowledge of his will, has been fearfully impaired, and, although still discovering itself in the dictates of his conscience, yet has necessarily been bereft of its certainty and its consistency as a standard of moral rectitude; and that this knowledge, lost by the sinful aversion of the human heart to retain it, has, through the unmerited favour of God, been restored in divine revelation."*

This doctrine is laid down by Dr. Wardlaw with considerable qualifications; and the question in the

* p. 200.

reader's mind is, whether these qualifications do not almost repudiate the general principle. The fact is, that however ingenious our distinctions as to limitations of the Divine will, and its exercise in human affairs, may be, yet it is difficult to steer a middle course : all things as we find them must be the fruit of the will of God, or they are not. This is the exact nature of the question to be solved. To those who rear a system of morals upon the basis of Revelation, the only tenable ground left them is to take the will of God as their guide in all its fulness. It will be found the easiest and most consistent course.

The Doctor denies that such a thing as *Pure Ethics* exists; that there is no such science, whatever, without the Scriptures. He says, "According to the Scriptures, then, there is no morality without religion; for of the two great principles on which the law of God is summed up, the first is the religious principle. And it stands first, not as insulated from the other and capable of being neglected while the other is duly obeyed; but as demanding the first attention, and indispensable to that moral state of the heart that is necessary to any acceptable obedience whatever."*

SAMUEL BAILEY.—This author's works are, in many respects, a valuable acquisition to the metaphysical student, although they cannot strictly be classed as theoretical disquisitions on mental science.

* Lect. 7.

They have a practical tendency, and that tendency is beneficial, particularly to the youthful inquirer after knowledge. The author's works are, "Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions;" "A Review of Berkeley's Theory of Vision;" and "Essays on the Pursuit of Truth."

REV. WILLIAM SEWELL.—"Christian Morals," London 1840. The Reverend Author is Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford. The object of the work is to restore the connexion so long dissevered between the Science of Morals and the Christian Dispensation; and also to bring out somewhat more prominently those questions which occupy attention in the present times.

Three-fourths of the volume is taken up with subjects belonging exclusively to theology. The remaining portion is devoted to moral speculations.

On the origin of moral sentiments, the author lays down the following positions. "We may learn the origin of our moral sentiments. How is it that men approve or disapprove of certain actions, call them right or wrong, and consequently desire to punish or reward them? The process is the same which takes place in any other perception of relations between two objects. I see a tree forty feet high, by the side of another only twenty feet high: I contrast the two, place them side by side, pass from one to another; and there rises up in my mind an idea of relation between them; a consciousness of superior magnitude in one, of less magnitude in the other. Now, this notion of greater

or less is not derived from the sight of either tree by itself, but from the comparison between the two. It is like a plant, which the sun and the soil give birth to ; it is neither in the sun, nor in the soil, but is produced by the joint action of the two. Or as the pain which follows a blow ; it is neither in the stick, nor in the body, but results from them both. Or like a musical note, which is neither the impulse of the hand, nor the vibration of the string, but is born from them both together. Musical notes, indeed, which lie dormant and buried in chords, without our being able to anticipate them before experience, or to call them out without striking the strings, are a fair illustration of all those ideas and feelings produced by the contemplation of two objects in relation to each other. Let any one examine his ideas of number, for instance, space, time, proportion, causality, effect, coincidence, magnitude, motion ; and he will see at once what a multitude of our ideas are ideas of relation. If the truth were told at once, I ought to say, that a vast number, if not all, are perceptions of relation between two objects, of neither of which are we conscious, or know any thing of them, but the relation in which they stand to each other. It is a strange statement, but true. For instance, no one knows any thing of God, but relations which he has been pleased to reveal between himself and his creatures. And no one knows any thing of his own mind, but its relation to other things ; and yet, what is religion but a sense of the relation between our mind and God ? So the notion of a

line is that of a certain relation between one point and another ; but a point itself is invisible. No one ever saw a point which is without length, or breadth, or thickness. This is another mystery of our nature ; but I will not dwell on it further than to repeat, that all our knowledge is, in fact, a perception of relations.”*

This is the doctrine of *relations* on which the author grounds his leading arguments. The feelings which arise from them, he considers instinctive, and consequently as universal and eternal.

Perception, and these feelings, are the sum total of man's moral nature. This nature is, however, a corrupted thing from its birth ; and from this cause these moral relations appear to him through an erroneous and distorted medium ; and this brings vice and misery upon him. Sound instruction consists in the right conception of these relations ; and this instruction can only be secured from an act of Christian baptism, which places us in a new position, by renovating the heart and will. He is now fit to enter into the Catholic Church, where his instruction is perfected by the adoption of its doctrines, and the participation in the holy mystery of communion ; by which act we become partial partakers of the Divine Nature.

CHARLES BRAY.—The title of this author's work, “The Philosophy of Necessity,” 1841, indicates, in some degree, its scope and tendency. It is a compound

* p. 348.

of physiological and phrenological speculations as to the nature and attributes of mind ; with a view of applying them to the solution of intellectual, moral, and political questions.

WILLIAM THOMPSON.—This writer, who belongs to the Episcopal Church, and to the University of Oxford, has furnished us with a small treatise entitled, "Outlines of the Laws of Thought," 1842.* It has Logic for its especial object; but there are many observations made, and principles laid down, which properly belong to the science of mind. The Reverend Author has drawn most of his materials from Kant, and the "*Philosophia Rationalis*" of Wolff. It may be considered in some measure a misfortune for a young English writer to commence his career in mental science in a school of this kind ; for he is in great danger of contracting habits of thought and forms of expression which will place him under a cloud for the remainder of his life. The whole Wolffian school of Germany was a net-work of interminable definitions ; of distinctions without differences ; and of explanations without any thing being explained. It hung about the mind of the nation like a mill-stone for more than half a century. Minute definitions of mental phenomena are always to be viewed with suspicion, for they are often little more than the mere substitution of one set of words and phrases for another ; while, at the same time,

* Pickering, London.

they are apt to contract the powers of the mind, and make it whimsical and crotchety. In cultivating a thorough acquaintance with metaphysical theories and systems; to view them in all their aspects and bearings; and to seize the leading principles which bind them together, or separate them from each other; a man must not insist, at every step in his progress, on a too scrupulous attention to technical phrases and established modes of expression. We cannot perceive the proportions and beauties of external nature with a pair of microscopic eyes. We must learn to give and take a little; to guide the judgment more by mental realities than by verbal distinctions. To use the latter as a leading instrument in metaphysical disquisitions, is to labour under a radical misconception of the nature of language, and the offices it performs in the mental economy.

In the Introduction to the "Outlines of the Laws of Thought," and indeed throughout the whole work, Mr. Thompson displays a strong tendency to minute and fanciful verbal distinctions, which detracts from the real value of his observations, and imparts to them a forbidding uncouthness and aridity. Few or none of the definitions he gives us of the "forms" or laws of thought are supported by mental phenomena, nor are they improvements upon the ordinary language of preceding philosophers. It is easier to coin new words, than to develop new principles of human thought.

The Reverend author has great acuteness and logical tact, and we feel confident he would ad-

vance the cause of sound mental philosophy, were he to throw himself fully into it, and be guided by general and comprehensive views of its nature and utility. But a habit of too minute analysis impairs the strength and vigour of the intellect, and generally terminates unfavourably for both an author's reputation and usefulness.

SAMUEL SPALDING.—Spalding was the author of "The Philosophy of Christian Morals," London 1843. In the Preface to this Volume we are informed it is a posthumous work of an amiable and highly talented gentleman, who died at the Cape of Good Hope, (whither he had gone for the recovery of his health), at the age of thirty-six.

The object which Mr. Spalding seems to have in view in the "Philosophy of Christian Morals" is, to give an answer to the question, so often asked, What is virtue? In the answer he analyzes the moral nature of man, and then attempts to show, that this nature is in perfect unison with the doctrines and declarations of the Holy Scriptures.

The various remarks he has made on the moral theories and speculations of others, evince a profound knowledge of the subject of moral philosophy generally; but into this part of the author's work we cannot, for obvious reasons, enter. Most of the theories he has examined appear to him defective; and the following remarks seem to embody, in substance, the principal considerations, in a metaphysical point of view, on which his objections rest.

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“The error into which, in our humble opinion, these writers have fallen, may probably be referred to an important law of the human mind, which, to prevent subsequent misconception, we shall here briefly state. An intellectual perception or conception is necessary to the rise of every emotion. For example, the emotion of surprise, when excited by anything material, requires the perception of a new object, or of an old object in new and unexpected circumstances. Without this, the emotion could not exist. It is the surprise, however, that invests the cause thus intellectually perceived, with all that is interesting and important to us. In like manner, the intellectual conception of injury is necessary to excite the emotion of fear. But it is the emotion which makes us conceive of objects as fearful, and which makes us regard them with so deep an interest. It is precisely the same with our moral emotions. The cause, whatever it is, must be intellectually perceived; but it is the emotion which gives it its relative importance. It is from these respective emotions that we learn all that is truly distinctive of virtue and vice, as compared with the cause of our other emotions. It is from the emotions alone that we learn that virtue is the highest good; that it is superior both in kind and degree to every other source of enjoyment; and that it has a right to entire supremacy over all the faculties of the mind.”*

* p. 36.

METAPHYSICAL RAMBLES.—This is a work written by a gentleman in Dublin, and published anonymously there and in London. It has considerable merit. The Scottish philosophers seem to have been studiously consulted, as well as some continental authors.

JOHN STUART MILL.—This author's work, "A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive," 1843, does not strictly come within the range of metaphysical treatises. Mr. Mill's book is not, however, a mere dry collection of formal rules or syllogistic classifications, but embodies many important principles of mind. Reasoning is treated philosophically, not technically; and on this account the author's disquisitions are fully entitled to our consideration.

Mr. Mill maintains that all *efficient* causes are radically inaccessible to the mind, and that the constant relations of succession or similarity are the only subjects which can come under the cognizance of the understanding. Whatever other men, or other philosophers, may mean by *cause*, he has nothing in view but these relations.* This theory of Hume's on causation pervades the whole of Mr. Mill's reasonings on the nature and principles of mind; and of course imparts a one-sided view to doctrines of great moment.

That portion of Mr. Mill's treatise devoted to

* Vol. 1. p. 422.

remarks on Dr. Whewell's necessary and contingent truths, is interesting and instructive. The author maintains that all truths,—the definitions and axioms of mathematics among the number—are experimental, and have no *à priori* existence. He says, "The conceptions, then, which we employ for the colligation and methodization of facts, do not develop themselves from within, but are impressed upon the mind from without; they are never obtained otherwise than by way of comparison and abstraction, and, in the most important and most numerous cases, are evolved by abstraction from the very phenomena which it is their office to colligate. I am far from wishing to imply that it is not often a very difficult thing to perform this process of abstraction well, or that the success of the inductive operation does not, in many cases, principally depend upon the skill with which we perform it."*

DR. CAIRNS.—This Author's work, "A Treatise on Moral Freedom, containing Inquiries into the Operations of the Intellectual Faculties in Connection with Moral Agency and Responsibility," was published in 1844. The Doctor informs us that it was suggested by a declaration of Lord Brougham's to the youth of the University of Glasgow, that men were no more responsible for their theological opinions than for the form of their features or the colour of their hair.

* System of Logic, Vol. 2. p. 218.

Dr. Cairns conceives that all moral principles derive their origin from the *intellect*. The reader will find many acute and important speculations throughout the work, on the spirituality of the thinking principle, and the dependence of moral motives and actions upon it.

SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH.—The writings of Sir James only touch slightly and indirectly upon intellectual speculations. He confines himself chiefly to theories of morals, and to matters of politics and history. There are, however, in his sketches of moral writers and systems, some acute and valuable observations on metaphysical disquisitions. These will be found chiefly in his "Dissertation" in the 7th Edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. His whole works are collected, and published in 3 volumes, 1846.

Mr. James Mill wrote a "Fragment on Mackintosh," containing severe strictures on some of the principles laid down in the "Dissertation." These strictures seem to have been provoked from certain observations pointedly directed by Sir James against some modern utilitarian and selfish theories of morals.

ISAAC TAYLOR, "Elements of Thought."—The design of this small work is to afford the student elementary explanations and instructions on matters connected with the human mind. It is an able and valuable condensation of much that has

been written on mental philosophy for the last century. It is also partly initiatory to the science of Logic.

"OUTLINES OF MENTAL AND MORAL SCIENCE," Dublin, 1846.—This work is introductory, as its title implies, to the study of Logic, Metaphysics, and Ethics. It is chiefly designed for the use of the students in the Dublin University. The Scottish philosophy of Common Sense forms its basis.

REV. JOHN DAVIES, D.D., "An Estimate of the Human Mind," 1847.—The metaphysical principles embodied in this work are of an immaterial and lofty cast. The author makes a special application of them to illustrate and develop his opinions on the foundation of morals and theological truth. Dr. Davies is hostile to the theory of "suggestion" advanced by Brown, and considers it decidedly inimical to sound knowledge and religious truth.*

HENSLEIGH WEDGEWOOD, "Development of the Understanding," 1848.—This is an elementary work of considerable ability. It will prove a useful guide to the University student, for whom we presume it has, in a great measure, been compiled.

* See Note B. at the end of this Volume.

CHAPTER II.

METAPHYSICAL WRITERS OF GERMANY FROM THE YEAR 1800 UNTIL THE PRESENT DAY.

WE shall be obliged, for obvious reasons, to fall considerably short of what is verbally implied or promised in the title of this chapter. To give an account of all the writers on the mind who have appeared in Germany, from the commencement of the present century to this time, would indeed be a voluminous and arduous task. Several volumes would be required for such a purpose. We must, therefore, select; but the selection shall have an especial reference to all the leading points in German metaphysical speculation, so that the reader may readily obtain a general view of it in all its multifarious and singular aspects.

A few observations on the general character of modern German speculation seem requisite, before entering into matters of detail. It must always be kept in mind that it is a unique thing, and like nothing but itself. On a first glance it

appears rambling, disjointed, and unconnected, giving the most unlimited range to the imagination and fancy; and though always appealing to the reason or understanding, seems little inclined to submit itself to the sober and rational suggestions of either. But a closer inspection will in a great degree remove this impression. We shall be able to perceive a unity of character and design running through the whole German intellect; and that, though systems and theories are widely dissimilar as to their final end or purpose, yet the framework of all is modelled after one fashion, pattern, or type.

The German mode of philosophising is radically distinct from ours. We usually commence with analysing mental faculties and feelings; with instituting inquiries into the *outward* manifestations of mind; and from these draw certain conclusions and inferences. Now this is a very humble and subordinate department of science in the estimation of the German. He has more lofty aspirations, and aims at doing greater things. He plunges into the deepest recesses of what he calls *himself*; his inward and living principle; and categorically demands to know the reasons why it is as it is, and why he is stimulated and goaded on to know the why and the wherefore of his own individual existence, as well as the existence of everything which surrounds him. He seizes hold of his own mind or consciousness, and compels it to submit to a peremptory interrogation and cross-examination. He does not trouble himself much about an exter-

nal world ; for his purpose is to dig a deep and firm foundation out of his own thinking principle. Here he seeks for the primitive truth ; the *Urwahr*, or the absolutely and eternally true. Like *Christian*, in the "Pilgrim's Progress," he feels himself oppressed by a heavy load of doubt and perplexity relative to the existence of a Deity, the universe, and the human soul ; and he feels convinced there is a *somewhere* in nature where all this obscurity and haziness will be removed, and where we shall be able to see everything "face to face as in a glass." Animated with this hope he bends his weary steps in search of this temple of truth, and presents his buoyant and indomitable resolution in firm opposition to all the difficulties and obstacles of the uncertain and perilous journey.

The German philosopher is encouraged in his speculative enterprise by historical recollections. He believes himself labouring in a sacred and holy cause, consecrated by the names of the most venerated of our race. The elemental principle of all science and wisdom, of which he is in search, has been shadowed forth from all time. He finds it was eagerly sought after by Thales, Plato, and the Eleatics ; there were enthusiastic searchers of it at Alexandria, and in the East ; and, in fact, among every remnant or section of the human family, do we witness intelligible and lively aspirations after this interesting principle of all knowledge and science.

Besides these encouragements which a recollection of bygone ages strengthens, the German be-

believes that his own nation has made greater progress in the way of discoveries in mental science than any other. Until the appearance of Kant, the labours of metaphysicians had invariably taken a wrong direction. He was the first to obtain a glimpse of the *absolute* and *eternal*, and to unfold, in some measure, their nature and vital importance. His speculations afforded at once the necessary succedaneum to philosophical research. Various clumsy instruments were in vogue, such as *instinctive feelings*, *original conceptions*, and the like, for the accounting for mental phenomena; but these have all been now superseded by more comprehensive and efficient principles of ontology. We can now, say the Germans, attempt to establish the existence of a Deity, the immateriality of the soul, and the immutability of moral distinctions, upon something approaching to irrefragable conclusions, far removed from all sensual sources. We can now dislodge the sceptic from his logical retreat. We shall cut from under his feet his strong-hold, the world of sense, and vanquish him completely, by laying the foundation of the great truths of religion, virtue, and science, in the depths of the human heart. The boundless regions of all knowledge lie before us; where the matter and form of the eternal reason will unfold to us all the mysteries and holy influences of religious and poetic feeling, and render human life, what it was originally intended to be, a life of inward and joyous contemplation.

FREDERIC BOUTERWECK.

Bouterweck* viewed the "Critique of Pure Reason through the commentaries and glosses of Jacobi. According to Bouterweck, the knowledge of oneself, (*Selbstverständigung*) is the foundation of all true criticism; and the *apodictical*, or demonstrative, is the true corrective to every species of scepticism. The only proofs we can obtain of reason, and its various powers and offices, must be sought for in itself. To think, to know, and to act, are the three great problems of human existence. The apodictic naturally divides itself into three parts; the apodictic logic, the apodictic transcendentalism, and the practical apodictical.

In the apodictic logic, reason examines and interrogates itself. It is a searching critique of the pure understanding. The necessities we are under oblige us to consider thought as something in itself;—as a true and unquestionable fact.

Under apodictic transcendentalism all discursive thought is considered as purely subjective. Absolute being serves as the foundation of absolute

* "Aphorismen der Vernunftkritik, &c.," 1793; "Pract. Aphorismen," &c., 1808; "Ideen zu einer neuen Apodiktik," 1799; "Philosoph. Dialogen," 1798; "Die Epochen der Vernunft, &c.," 1802; "Ideen zur Metaphysik des Schönen," 1807; "Neues Museum der Philosophie u. Literatur," 1803; "Anfangsgründe der Speculativen Philosophie," 1802; "Anleitung zur Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft," 1803; "Was ist Wahrheit? &c.," 1807; "Epochen der Vernunft, nach der Idee einer Apodiktik," 1802; "Lehrbuch der Philosophie," 1820; "Der Philosophie Wissenschaften, nach einem neuen System entworfen," 1802; "Kleine Schriften, Philosoph. &c.," 1818.

reality. But when we seek to comprehend being, we suppose it already present; the thing we look for is involved in the very act of looking for it. The foundation of a true philosophy must not be sought for in a blind sentiment, but in a living and active principle. This principle is that of absolute reality, which is the foundation of all thought and sensation; and even reason itself is comprehended in its range. Existence and knowledge cannot be separated; they must be united in the principle of absolute reality. When this principle reduces our sensations and reason to a complete unity, the problem of apodictic transcendentalism is solved.

The practical apodictical involves all action. The knowledge of ourselves naturally leads to the active principles of our nature, which are developed and stimulated under the influence of want. The *will* cannot be demonstrated; it rests in the *moi*, conceived under the form of a living power or force. *I wish* is the principle of practical conviction.

The metaphysical speculations of Bouterweck are acknowledged by his own countrymen to be involved in considerable obscurity. The general notion on which his disquisitions seem to rest is, as far as this can be ascertained from his ordinary reasonings and illustrations, that all human knowledge is based upon the primitive connection which subsists between the faculty of thinking and the internal feeling or sentiment of *spiritual life*. What this connection really is, the author is by no means very happy in explaining. He was

unsteady and versatile in his opinions; and the principle of religious mysticism forms an active and influential element in his character.

W. T. KRUG.

Krug* was a professor, at different intervals of his life, at Wittenberg, Francfort, Königsberg, and Leipsic. He was a man of talent, and obtained considerable reputation in his day.

His New Philosophical Organ is a clear and intelligible exposition of what he considered the first truths of science. A principle is a proposition intuitively certain. When we seek such as these, we cannot go beyond ourselves; for they must all rest there. The principle of absolute reality is the *principium essendi*, and the ideal principle is the *principium cognoscendi*; the first possesses perfect unity; the second is either material or formal. Material principles are those embraced by all philosophical or general knowledge, comprehending that crowd of facts and circumstances which press upon our consciousness from without; while formal principles are those which indicate and regulate the movements and conditions of existence of the divers intimations of the conscious state.

In his "Fundamental Philosophy" Krug en-

* "Aphorismen zur Philosophie des Rechts." 1800; "Bruchstücke aus meiner Lebensphilosophie," 1800; "Ueber den wesentlichen Character der Pract. Philosophie," 1796; "Ueber den Einfluss der Philosophie auf Sittlichkeit, Religion u. Menschenwohl, nebst einer Abhandlung über den Begriff und die Theile der Philosophie," 1796.

deavours to show that mathematical science has the advantage, in point of certainty, over the philosophy of human nature. In the latter we can never arrive at perfect certainty; there is only, even under the most favourable aspects, an approximation to it.

In all speculations on the nature of the mind, Krug conceives it detrimental to the interests of real knowledge to multiply distinct faculties or powers, without an urgent necessity. If we study the mind carefully, we shall discover that all phenomena may be comprehended under two principles, theoretical and practical. They both rest on three things; sensibility, understanding, and reason.

In consciousness, all subjective and objective knowledge is united. We cannot go beyond this; it is the furthest boundary of mental science. We exist; there is also something which exists external to us: these two things are made for each other. And this firm conviction which is rooted in the minds of all mankind, must ever be the germ or element out of which every thing in the shape of knowledge or philosophy arises.*

* "Krug was an inventive and zealous writer, and took every possible means to extend the philosophical opinions of Kant. Speeches, articles, programmes, dictionaries, essays, manuals, and in fact all forms of literary publication, were used to effect this grand purpose. When nothing better presented itself, even ridicule and satire were employed to shut the mouths of his opponents. He appeared, after a long life spent in contentions and struggles, to have obtained some compensation for his labours; but if we are rightly informed, his wounded pride contemplates with considerable bitterness the slights which the rising generation have put upon his philosophical dissertations." (M. Amand Saintes, "*Histoire Critique du Rationalisme*," p. 207.)

J. F. FRIES.

Professor Fries* was a writer of considerable distinction and powers of thought. His chief object in "A New Critique of Pure Reason," is to ground the categories of Kant upon sentiment or feeling. Having entered deeply into the views of Jacobi, and being also a man of active and lively sympathies, he looked upon the "Critique" of Kant as a cold and repulsive exhibition of mind. To his conclusions as to the "understanding" and the "reason," Fries yielded a mental assent; but he also zealously maintained there was a principle of *faith* through which all the deductions of the intellect should be viewed. This believing power is the only infallible instrument that can lead us to absolute truth. It imparts to us an intimate view of the nature of things; directing the mind to the intuitive foundations of all that is good and beautiful.

Fries maintains that we know nothing of the manner in which external objects affect us; and our internal emotions and feelings are regulated by a series of distinct faculties or powers. — These

* "Ueber Fichte's u. Schelling's neueste Lehren von Gott und der Welt;" "System der Philosophie als evidente Wissenschaften," 1804; "Philosoph. Rechtslehre u. Kritik aller posit. Gesetzgebung," 1803; "Reinhold, Fichte und Schelling," 1803; "Neue Kritik der Vernunft," 1807; "Wissen, Glaube und Ahnung," 1805; "System der Logik," 1819; "Grundriss der Logik," 1819; "Von Deutscher Philosophie, Art u. Kunst," 1812; "Handbuch der practischen Philosophie. "Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie," 1819.

demonstrate that we are beings endowed with knowledge, that our knowledge is rational, that reason governs both the internal and external senses, that we possess the faculty of reflection, and that, though we cannot comprehend what things are of themselves, we are nevertheless so constituted as to derive great pleasure and gratification from them.

Feeling and reason are opposed to each other. Feeling is the direct and immediate expression of reflection. Our notion of existence is derived from this source, as well as all philosophical judgments. Reason is the law of truth, and embraces an immediate knowledge, purged from all alloy of doubt and error. Here repose the inward convictions of the existence of a Deity, the supreme good, the elements of all beauty and virtue, and our conceptions of what is right and just.

FRED. VON CALKER.

This author* taught philosophy at the University of Bonn. He adopted, in all its leading features, the system of Kant. The final end and purpose of science is, in the author's opinion, the uniting of a belief, to the formal perception of the ideal, or general conception of mind. Mental philosophy is a knowledge of the nature and laws of our inward

* "Bedeutung der Philosophie, einleitende Vorlesungen," 1818: "Propädeutik der Philosophie, &c.," 1821; "Urgesetzlehre des Wahren, Guten u. Schönen, Darstellung der sogenannten Metaphysik," 1819; "Denklehre, oder Logik u. Dialektik, nebst einem Abriss der Geschichte u. Literatur derselben," 1822.

principle; in opposition to natural philosophy, which is limited to the material world. Metaphysics is the science of the true, the good, and the beautiful. The perception of an external object by the means of our organs of sensation, and the perception of the mind's innate activity through the means of an internal perception, constitute what Calker considers intuition, in its general and comprehensive signification. One species of perception creates an external and sensible intuition, and the other an internal one. Pure intuition is synthetical unity, simultaneous with space; and this pure intuition likewise embraces succession, that is, time. The limitations of space and time create our ideas of place and duration. Empirical intuition is that with which experience furnishes us, or memory in the absence of experience. Notion is a representative thought of sensible knowledge. The lowest species of knowledge is immediate perception; and this is of three kinds, material, formal, and transcendental. Truth consists in the harmony of a knowledge of the objective with a notion of the subjective; and science is the agreement of consciousness with perception and intuition; an agreement involved in our belief of reality. Science requires proofs, and these proofs are derived from demonstration and deduction, acquired through the means of the union of pure with empirical intuition.

C. G. BARDILI.

Bardili* was a professor at Stuttgard, and he made a vigorous attempt, in his writings and public addresses, to prove the *absolute* the foundation of philosophy. Taking his point of departure from *thought*, he gave his Logic an ontological basis. He wished to find in the thought of *myself* an existing reality; or rather was anxious to demonstrate that the divine nature and perfections could be recognised through the channel or instrumentality of the human mind. Deity is the first principle of all reality, of all thought, and of all being, (*Seyns*).

The Deity cannot be demonstrated in himself, but his manifestation is demonstrable, and is demonstrated. All true philosophy must take its departure from this point.†

J. G. FICHTE.

Fichte was one of the most able, zealous, and original expounders of Kant's metaphysics. He possessed all the subtilty and love of system of the latter, with much more boldness and speculative recklessness. If the "Critical Philosophy" were

* "Grundriss der ersten Logik gereinigt von den Irrthümern bisheriger Logiken überhaupt, der Kantischen insbesondre." Stuttgard, 1800. "Beytrag zur Beurtheilung des gegenwärtigen Zustandes der Vernunftlehre in einigen Bemerkungen über die Tieftrunk'sche und Schulze'sche Logik." Landshut, 1803.

† See Michelet, Vol. 1. pp. 263—273.

dark and obscure to many when it came from the hands of its parent, it became still more enveloped in mystery under the patronage of Fichte. He made no hesitation in pluming himself on his great skill in the shadowy and obscure, by often remarking to his pupils, that "there was only *one* man in the world who could fully understand his writings; and even *he* was often at a loss to seize upon his real meaning."*

There is something touching and romantic in the first introduction of Fichte to the "Critical Philosophy." He had studied the system with much diligence and success when he was first introduced to Kant. The young aspirant for philosophical renown was in a state of great poverty and embarrassment. Indeed his first steps in life were bitter and sorrowful. He experienced the inconstancy of fate, the caprices of man, the pressing sting of want. He was obliged to lower his proud and lofty spirit to the most humble conditions. In his "Diary," published by his son, we find the following moving incidents recorded.

* "Appelation an das Publicum über die ihm beigemessenen atheistischen Aeusserungen," 1799; "Grundlage des Naturrechts, nach den Principien der Wissenschaftslehre," 1796; "*Sorberg's* Beitrag zur Geschichte des Atheismus;" "Ueber die Bestimmung des Menschen," 1800; "Ueber die Bestimmung des Gelehrten," 1794; "Grundriss des Eigenthümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre," 1802; "Das System der Sittenlehre, nach den Principien der Wissenschaftslehre," 1798; "Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre &c.," 1798; "Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre," 1802; "Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten und seine Erscheinung im Gebiete der Freiheit," 1806; "De philosophiæ novæ Platoniciæ origine," 1818.

“28th June, in evening. I commenced yesterday to revise my ‘Critique.’ Some happy and excellent ideas have come into my mind, which unhappily have convinced me that my first work was entirely superficial. I wished to extend this examination further to-day, but my imagination has so completely subdued me, that I have not been able to do any thing all day. This is not astonishing, seeing my present actual condition. I have calculated I have only the means of subsistence for fourteen days. It is true that I had before found myself in similar embarrassments, but then I was in my own country. Besides, in becoming older, our sentiment of honour increases in delicacy, and we feel poverty and dependence more keenly: I have not been able to form any resolution as to my movements. I shall not reveal my situation to the pastor M. Borowsky. If I communicate my feelings to any one, it shall be to no other than to Kant himself.

“1st Sept. I have taken a firm resolution, which I shall communicate to Kant. A place as tutor has cost me some little concern that it did not present itself; on the other hand, the uncertainty of my situation prevents me from working with a free spirit, and profiting by the instructive admonitions of my friends. I must return to my own country. Perhaps I may procure from Kant the little pecuniary assistance I may need for this purpose. I called upon him for this object, but my resolution and firmness failed me. I have resolved upon writing him.

"2nd Sept. I have finished my letter, and forwarded it to Kant.

"3rd Sept. I have been dining with Kant. He received me with his accustomed cordiality; but told me he was not in a situation at the present moment to accede to my request; but that he would be so in a fortnight's time. What amiable frankness! * * * I have done nothing lately; but I must set myself to work, and leave the result to a kind Providence.

"6th Sept. Dined with Kant, who wished me to sell the MS. of my "Critique" to Hartung the bookseller.

"12th Sept. I wanted to work to-day, but I found I could do nothing. How will this terminate? What will become of me in a week's time, when all my money is gone?"*

* "Follow me a few moments, under this cloudy sky in the North of Prussia, to the middle of the narrow and dark streets of the gloomy town of Königsberg. There in some miserable inn, partaking of the commonest fare of the table, was found a man who, after having measured his bread, perceived that he had only sufficient for fourteen days! He seated himself down, however, and composed a work. When finished, he again measured his bread, he had scarcely enough for eight days. Now what is it which this man has written? It is a magnificent introduction to philosophy; it is the 'Critique of all possible Revelations.' Again, you find him in the presence of another man. At the moment when he found himself without bread, smarting also under exile and servitude, he solicited alms to enable him to return to his own country; this was refused him! Who is he who has written? It is Fichte. And who is it whose own deprivations compel him to refuse? It is Kant. Kant and Fichte; two demi-gods of thought; two sovereigns of the kingdom of intelligence! Deplorable history of the past, in which we read only too truly that of the future." (Barch. de Penhøen, *Hist. de la Philos. Allem.* Vol. 1. p. 330.)

The private affairs of the philosopher took, however, a more favourable turn. He obtained the chair of philosophy at Jena. This he was soon obliged to resign. He afterwards obtained that of Erlangen, and ultimately the chair at Berlin. In 1813 he joined the campaign in the cause of German freedom ; but contracting a fever from attendance on his beloved wife, he fell a sacrifice to its malignity in 1814.*

We have already noticed that Fichte threw himself into the Kantian system with the feelings of an ardent enthusiast. In this system three primary faculties were recognised ; sense, understanding, and reason. The first was the channel through which all our knowledge, in its rude and rough state, was conveyed. The understanding moulded these crude elements, and the reason gave them abstract cohesion and systematic unity. This was the position of the "Critical Philosophy," when Fichte entered upon his speculations.

He implicitly adopted this system for some time, but, from reflecting more profoundly on its elements, and consulting the writings of others, he began to doubt its soundness as a perfect whole. He conceived it might be reconstructed in such a form as to give us a complete *à priori* theory of all human knowledge, purged from every appearance of doubt or uncertainty. This he called scientific truth. It rested upon a self-evident basis, and could proceed, step by step, with irrefragable de-

* See Fichte's "Leben und Briefwechsel," 1836.

monstration. This basis was *consciousness*. It must be the primary foundation for all knowledge. We cannot move beyond the limits of our own thinking being. All those states of it which we denominate by the various names of sensations, ideas, conceptions, abstractions, judgments, conclusions, &c. constitute the sole materials of everything which comes within the sphere of knowledge or science.

Having adopted this starting point, he expresses himself in raptures with his new discovery.

"I have found the organ," he says, in his "*Bestimmung des Menschen*," "by which to apprehend all reality. It is not the understanding, for all knowledge supposes some higher knowledge on which it rests, and of this ascent there is no end. It is faith, that voluntarily reposing on views naturally presenting themselves to us, *because* through these views alone we can fulfil our destiny, which sees our knowledge, and pronounces that it is good, and raises it to certainty and conviction. It is no knowledge, but a resolution of the will to admit this knowledge. This is no mere verbal distinction, but a true and deep one, pregnant with the most important consequences. Let me for ever hold fast by it. All my conviction is but faith, and it proceeds from the will and not from the understanding; from will also, and not from the understanding, must all the true culture proceed. Let the first only be firmly directed towards the good, the latter will of itself apprehend the true. Should the latter be exercised and developed while the

former remains neglected, nothing can come of it but a facility in vain and endless sophistical subtleties refining away into the absolutely void inane. I know that every seeming truth, born of thought alone, and not ultimately resting on faith, is false and spurious; for knowledge, purely and simply such, when carried to its utmost consequences, leads to the conviction that we can know nothing! Such knowledge never finds anything in the conclusions, which it has not previously placed in the premises by faith, and even then its conclusions are not always correct.....Every human creature born into the world has unconsciously seized on the reality which exists for him alone through this intuitive faith. If in mere knowledge—in mere perception and reflection—we can discover no ground for regarding our mental presentations as more than mere pictures, why do we all nevertheless regard them as more, and imagine for them a basis, a *substratum* independent of all modifications? If we all possess the capacity and the instinct to go beyond this natural view of things, why do so few of us follow this instinct, or exercise this capacity? nay, why do we even resist with a sort of bitterness when we are urged towards this path? What holds us imprisoned in these natural boundaries? Not inferences of our reason, for there are none which could do this. It is our deep interest in reality that does this—in the good that we are to produce—in the common and the sensuous that we are to enjoy. From this interest can no one who lives detach himself, and just as

little from the faith which forces itself upon him simultaneously with his existence. We are all born in faith, and he who is blind follows blindly the irresistible attraction. He who sees follows by sight, and believes because he will believe.”*

This passage gives us some insight into the peculiar views of Fichte, but we must follow him a little further in his analysis of consciousness. He had placed himself in precisely the same logical position as Descartes, with his *Cogito, ergo sum*; and after pondering on the naked consciousness of his internal feelings, he perceived the barrenness of the thing in itself, and the utter hopelessness of constructing anything out of it, unless he imparted to it some essence, quality, or attribute. Consciousness, of itself, is nothing. It can yield no logical results; and Fichte saw this distinctly, and felt the force of the conclusion. He did what Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibnitz all did in their separate and peculiar modes, he invested the consciousness with *activity*, with a self-spontaneity; and from this moment the raw material of his theory became plastic and fertile in his hand. He was now in a position to *act*; he could *do* something; and he commenced to mould this active and living principle into something which, he conceived, would lead us to the fountains of all true and sound knowledge.

The absolute principle then is consciousness—*self*. Is there any thing beyond this? If there

* Translated by Mrs. Percy Sinnett. 1846.

be, what is its nature, and in what relations does it stand in reference to our feelings? These are the points which Fichte set about solving.

We cannot go beyond consciousness. If an external world even existed, we could only know it through a mind. We can have no possible guarantee of any thing exclusive of the intellectual organ. To those who affirm that we are so framed that the internal feelings compel us to assume and believe in an external world, our philosopher answers, that this does not relieve the difficulty a jot; for, in this instance, we only make a simple declaration of our own consciousness or feelings; we only impart to mind a subjective reality. No matter what may be urged about a *necessity* to believe this or that; nor about any fundamental laws of belief; nor about instinctive feelings, and instinctive suggestions; all these amount to nothing more nor less than a declaration of the subjective laws of the thinking principle. We must take our stand upon simple consciousness; and beyond it we cannot pass. This is the *idealism* of Fichte. What we call the *external* world is nothing but thought; the hills and valleys, the rivers and woods, the populous city and the barren waste, the sun and moon and stars, are all only so many fleeting visions through the mind. Mankind have always, Fichte affirms, been under a gross delusion on this matter. They have invariably *assumed* the existence of a material world, and considered our sensations or perceptions as a *result* of it: whereas the real scientific method is, to take our stand upon

our internal feelings, and then try to demonstrate external objects. We are perpetually reasoning in a vicious circle; we say our sensations exist, *therefore* there are external bodies which produce them;—there are external bodies, *therefore* our sensations exist. This is what we are always doing; while it is quite obvious that of the two real objects, the most logical for antecedence is the fact of our consciousness.

These conclusions somewhat startled Fichte, and he thought he could wriggle out of this apparent outrage to the common feelings of mankind, relative to the existence of an external universe, by the following expedient. As we have said, he invested the *moi*, or consciousness, with a principle of activity. Consciousness gives two results; the *ego* or self, and the *non-ego*, or non-self. We cannot think of ourselves as one, without thinking of something which is *not ourselves*. How is the reality of the *non-ego* established? By an appeal to consciousness; by an act of its own internal spontaneity. This *non-ego* is indispensable; for without it, the *ego* would exhaust itself in unlimitable and fruitless activity; but it is kept within proper bounds by a negative power, which men call material and *outward*. Here then we have an object and a subject; a body and a mind; but they are both included in one thing, *consciousness*. The external world, and the conception of it, are one and the same thing.*

* It is curious to notice the feverish enthusiasm which Fichte had wound himself up to, in investing consciousness with the principle of

Notwithstanding this attempt at establishing the reality of object and subject, the great work was still only half done. Consciousness was to be moulded to an especial purpose for the illustration of all knowledge and science. We were to contemplate it seriously, steadily, and dispassionately; and if we did this we should see the absolute and unconditional principle of all truth, evolving itself from the mind's spontaneous activity. The first act is the principle of identity, (*Satz der Identität*), $A = A$; this is intuitively certain, in form and matter. In this principle something is involved; it is a judgment. $A = A$, affirms something; though it demonstrates the existence of nothing. It is a conditional declaration that if such a thing as *A* exists, it is equal to *A*; which is an assertion of

activity. He says, "I am free; and it is not merely my action, but the free determination of my will to obey the voice of conscience, that decides my worth. More brightly does the everlasting world now rise before me; and the fundamental laws of its order are more clearly revealed to my mental sight. My *will alone*, lying hid in the obscure depths of my soul, is the first link in the chain of consequences stretching through the invisible realms of spirit; as in this terrestrial world, the action itself, a certain movement communicated to matter, is the first link in a material chain of cause and effect, encircling the whole system. The will is the efficient cause, the living principle of the world of spirit, as motion is of the world of sense. I stand between two worlds, the one visible, in which the act alone avails, and the intention matters not at all; the other invisible and incomprehensible, acted on only by the will. In both these worlds I am an effective force. The Divine life, as alone the finite mind can conceive it, is self-forming, self-representing will, clothed, to mortal eye, with multitudinous sensuous forms, flowing through me, and through the whole immeasurable universe: here streaming through my veins and muscles; there pouring its abundance into the tree, the flower, the grass. The dead, heavy mass of inert matter, which did but fill up nature, has disappeared, and in its stead there rushes by the bright, everlasting flood of life and power, from its Infinite Source."

the *me* ; and it stands thus, Ego = Ego. This is not all ; a principle of *negation* is also involved : A is not = A. This negative principle is conditional in *matter*, but unconditional in *form*. The principle of identity assumes the mind contemplating itself, as the absolute *subject* ; the principle of negation, as an *object*. The two considered in themselves are contradictory, and mutually destructive ; a third must, therefore, be found, and this is the idea of *limitation*. This regulates and limits the positive and negative. The matter then stands thus ; we declare our own being,—as an absolute existence ; we affirm that there is something opposed to it,—an absolute object ; and then the principle of limitation steps in between them both, and regulates their mutual action, influence, and determination.

These fundamental points are the ground work of his *Wissenschaftslehre*, or Doctrine of Science, which he divides into theoretical and practical.*

Such is the basis on which Fichte's idealism rests. Its grand characteristic is the perfect identity of object and thought. In this respect he nearly, if not entirely, coincides with Berkeley and others of the ideal school. Fichte's views excited great attention, both in Germany and in other continental countries. His system met with considerable opposition, particularly from the Clergy ; because it was considered destructive to all rational and common-sense principles of theology. This

* See on these points Chalybäus' "Entwicklung;" Fichte's "Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre;" and Michelet's "Geschichte der letzten Sys." vol. 1.

was the reason for which the author was accused of atheism, and obliged to vacate his chair of philosophy at the University of Jena.*

F. W. J. SCHELLING.

Frederick William Joseph Schelling† is a writer

* "Fichte," says M. Cousin, "a été plus loin encore que son maître (Kant) dans la même voie. Dans Kant, le point de vue sous lequel le sujet pensant considère les objets dépend de sa nature propre. Dans Fichte, l'objet en général n'étant pour le sujet que ce que la nature propre du sujet le fait être, n'est qu'une induction de ce sujet, c'est-à-dire le sujet lui-même, c'est-à-dire le moi; et voilà le moi, non plus simple mesure, mais principe de toutes choses. Voilà donc l'idéalisme déjà si subjectif de Kant devenu pour Fichte un idéalisme subjectif absolu. Dieu pour Kant était une conception nécessaire de la pensée, une croyance irrésistible de l'âme. Pour Fichte, Dieu n'est pas autre chose que le sujet même de la pensée conçu comme absolu; c'est donc le moi encore. Mais comme il répugne, Messieurs, que le moi de l'homme qui avait bien pu être transporté à la nature, soit imposé à Dieu, Fichte distingue deux moi : l'un phénoménal, le moi que chacun de nous représente; l'autre, le fond même et la substance du moi, qui est Dieu lui-même. Dieu est le moi absolu. Quand on est arrivé là, on est arrivé au dernier terme de l'idéalisme subjectif, comme la philosophie de la sensation en était arrivée à son dernier terme, quand elle était arrivée à prétendre que l'âme n'est que la collection de nos sensations, que Dieu n'est qu'une idée générale abstraite, représentable en dernière analyse par toutes les idées sensibles particulières dont elle se compose, c'est-à-dire par les sensations."—(Cours de la Philosophie, Leçon 12.)

† "Bruno, oder über das Göttliche und Natürliche Princip der Dinge," 1802; "Anti-Certus, oder über die absolute Erkenntniss," 1807; "Vom Ich, als Princip der Philosophie, &c." 1795; "System des Transcendentalen Idealismus," 1800; Hegel, "Kritisches Journal der Philosophie," 1803; "Philosophie u. Religion," 1804; "Darstellung des Wahren Verhältnisses zwischen Natur- und Fichte-scher Philosophie," 1806; "Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur," 1797; "Von der Weltseele, &c." 1806; "Abhandlung über das Verhältniss des Realen u. Idealen," 1808; "Philosoph. Schriften," 1809; "Zeitschrift für speculative Physik," 1801; "Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Natur-Philosophie."

of great natural powers. He displays, on many occasions, a subdued and sober thought, a deep conviction of the importance of truth, and a zealous and disinterested desire to obtain it. He has been called the "German Plato;" and there is certainly in many parts of his writings a lofty and native grandeur in his conceptions, a constant aspiration after ennobling themes, and an independent tone of mind to consider things in his own way. These have not, however, led him to disregard the philosophical opinions of others. He pays them, on all occasions, great deference and respect.

One of the distinguishing features of Schelling's metaphysical philosophy is its universality. It embraces the whole creation; ascending from nature to "nature's God." He applies his mental opinions to disquisitions on religion, art, history, natural philosophy, criticism, and poetry, and makes them all subservient to his grand design, the establishment of one universal principle, the source of all wisdom, power, knowledge, and intelligence.

Schelling was a student of Fichte's, and occupied the chair of philosophy at Jena when the former left it. The master, as we have just seen, maintained that thought and matter—or, as he termed it, object and subject—were one and the same thing. Schelling formally acquiesced in this dogma; but he soon felt himself heavily encumbered by its manifold perplexities, and he conceived the idea of modifying and extending it. Being a man of lively and imaginative powers, he had no

great difficulty in throwing off the load of sameness and sterility of Fichte's system. From the days of Descartes there had always been floating in the philosophic mind of Germany, certain loose and incongruous ideas of a pantheistical nature, not digested into any regular system, but which seemed to hover over the genius of the nation, as something which seemed indigenous to its character. These ideas Schelling seized upon; made them objects of his steady and concentrated thought; and at length saw them capable of being applied to a grand and comprehensive scheme of spiritualizing the whole system of creation. He set to work with all diligence and speed; and in a comparatively short period, German metaphysical speculation appeared again under a new and imposing aspect.

Schelling's imaginative and poetical temperament felt chilled and benumbed under the idea that there was no material world around him; that the woods and the groves, the mountains and the valleys, with the tender and mournful cooings of the wild pigeon, on which his mind had often dwelt with ecstatic rapture, were, after all, but a few cold and negative mental phantoms, if even they amounted to that. This was too great a punishment for him; too great a humiliation to submit to; and, therefore, something must be done to restore reality to external nature, and to establish her once more upon that ancient domain, which had been attempted to be torn from her by a few bold and reckless speculators,—revilers and scoffers of her authority and power.

Under these impressions, Schelling resolved within his own breast that an objective world should again form part of the philosophy of his country. He found that the belief in this objectivity was as solid and universal, as the belief in the suggestions or intimations of simple consciousness; in fact, that men were as firmly persuaded that there existed something external to their minds, as that the minds themselves existed. Here was a double, a compound belief; the two elements of which must be reconciled in some mode or other. There was, he conceived, a principle of harmony upon the face of them; and it only required a little careful philosophical consideration to effect their complete and lasting identity.

Fichte compressed every thing within the Ego—the human soul. This placed philosophy in a prison house; she could have no liberty nor expansive capabilities. Her sphere of action must therefore be enlarged; and for this purpose another principle must be brought into play. This principle is the “intellectual intuition,” (Intellectual. Anschauung,) by which we obtain an immediate knowledge of *the absolute*. This intellectual intuition is a lofty and spiritual faculty, by which we are able to recognise the infinite both within and without us; and we are thus enabled to withdraw our contemplations from the narrow and contracted circle of subject and object, and direct them to that great and all-absorbing potency, from which every thing in the universe is derived. All matter and thought lie now stretched out before us; the im-

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prisoned faculties of man are set at liberty ; and we are in a position to test every power and agency in nature, and discover those relations and ties which they have with the self-existent ONE, who fills all space, and exists in all time.

Schelling having now got this new principle fairly launched, began to make active use of it. In the first place, he descanted loftily on its great dignity and importance. The "intellectual intuition" contained within itself the elements of its own creative energy. It was not, as some philosophers conceived, a simple substance, with the two properties of extension and thought ; but an eternal, self-spontaneous, and self-developing mind ; the living and perpetual vivifying soul of the universe. And we are told, moreover, that this august energy was sacred from vulgar participation ; it was not to be gazed on by common mortals ; it was only to be known and comprehended by the favoured few. Plotinus considered his *Ecstatic* principle of philosophy capable of being communicated only to certain persons, and to them at uncertain intervals ; so in like manner does Schelling confine the knowledge of his "intuition" of the absolute. It is not a mental power enjoyed by all men. Indeed it cannot be comprehended by them. And our philosopher expresses great contempt for the uninitiated, and accuses them of stupidity, for what, after all, is more their misfortune than their fault. "Really we do not see," says he, "why philosophy should pay any attention to incapacity. Better far that philosophy be isolated from the common

routes of knowledge, so that they may not lead to it. Philosophy commences where ordinary knowledge ends."* Schelling considers the lower sciences founded on the relative and conditioned of thought; whereas the high philosophy, which embodies the loftiest wisdom, is based on the absolute and unconditioned. It is always necessary to keep this marked distinction in view.

The following arrangement will give the reader a bird's-eye glance at his system.

God.

Absolute Totality.

TOTALITY, RELATIVELY TO THE REAL.	TOTALITY, RELATIVELY TO THE IDEAL.
1. Gravitation, Matter ;	Truth, Science ;
2. Light, Motion ;	Goodness, Religion ;
3. Life, Organism.	Beauty, Art.
The System of the World ;	History ;
Man.	Government.

Reason.
Philosophy.

The reader will perceive that the philosophy of Schelling, as a whole, is comprised of three leading divisions; the philosophy of nature, the philosophy of transcendentalism, and the philosophy of the

* Neue Zeitschrift für Speculative Physik, vol. 2, p. 34.

absolute. It is easy to see, that with a gratuitous principle like the "intellectual intuition," of such a yielding and pliable nature, there was really no obstacle in the philosopher's way, of applying it to any thing or every thing in the universe. The principle was an all-pervading and creative one; it was always at hand; it demanded no niceties in its application; nor could any difficulties call in question its supremacy and efficiency. It was like the universal remedy of the empirical practitioner, it removed all doubts and short-comings of intellectual perception, whether they related to material or spiritual things. There was no mental disease which this *intuitive* elixir could not cure. In fact, all reasoning or demonstration is superseded; we have only to look at its subtile and universal operations, to be in possession of all knowledge and science.

In the sphere of reality we have matter, an emanation from the Infinite Mind; or rather, as a sort of modification of the eternal mind itself. This appears to us under three different aspects, or as a thing endowed with three different qualities; repulsion, attraction, and gravity. These are the attributes which make matter appear what it is in our eyes, a lifeless and impenetrable thing; although it is only these subtile and unperceived powers which we designate by the term material, and which are only manifestations of the absolute.

The second sphere of reality is *light*, which is a sort of soul to the first, by which nature can behold

and contemplate its own work. The inertness of matter gives way to motion and activity, which develop or manifest themselves under three distinct forms, magnetism, electricity, and galvanism ; and these in certain combinations, and through the influence of certain laws or relations, produce all those varied phenomena which we attribute to mere matter, or to its inherent agencies or powers.

The powers of the first and those of the second spheres of reality, are united to form a third. They centre in individualism ; they succeed in making some living animal or creature, which is a microcosm, or a little world, in itself. This is commonly denominated organized life ; which is only a combination of matter, light, electricity, and other potencies in the sphere of reality. This forms the climax of material existencies ; and beyond this lies the region of the ideal or spiritual.*

We now pass into the *mental*, or transcendental part of philosophy. Here Schelling follows closely on the foot-steps of Fichte, relative to the knowledge of the absolute, which he places in the same formula, $A = A$. We have also all knowledge divided into the theoretical and the practical. Mind, according to Schelling, is the second grand movement of the absolute ; the spiritual emanation returning back from the finite into the bosom of the Infinite. As there are three great spheres in the world of reality, so likewise we have three in the sphere of the ideal ; knowledge, mental spon-

* See "Zeitschrift für Spec. Phys." vol. 2. ; "Von der Welt-seele ;" "Ueber den Ursprung des Allgemeinen Organismus."

taneity, and art; and these three give rise to separate divisions of philosophy, those of intelligence, practice, and art.*

After Schelling had worked out these philosophical problems at great length, and expended a deal of ingenuity in their illustration, he began to discover the deep slough into which he had immersed himself by his reasonings on the absolute. Though his philosophy, as a whole, was well received throughout Germany, and his fame widely extended; yet he saw the necessity to make another move, to qualify the pantheistical views of his system. Every thing was engulfed in the absolute; and his whole theory was simply this, that God and the universe were identically the same thing. This doctrine could not be long tolerated, even in Germany; something therefore must needs be done. He commenced his *positive* philosophy, which was to be the corrective principle of all his previous speculations, which he designated by the term of *negative* speculation. The office of this *positive* science was to supply the personality of the Deity; to separate Him from the works of creation and providence; to consider external things as things made for a specific purpose, and by a personal and specific agent; and to manifest those relations in which we stand, as moral and independent beings, accountable for our actions and duties. In fact, this second course of speculation was nothing more nor less than to unsay all that

* "System des Transcendentalen Idealismus," Intro. Sect. 2, 3. Part 4.

Schelling had hitherto said ; and renounce every principle for which he had previously contended. It was a virtual recantation of his whole philosophy, made under a hollow and specious pretext.*

Schelling's speculations have exercised a great influence over the German mind, and that influence is visible at the present moment. His system was imaginative and showy ; though the principle on which it was reared was a purely gratuitous one.† Still it answered the intended purpose. He adorned it with all the pomp and circumstance of a demonstrative science, and the speculative mind of his country was substantially satisfied. That there is great genius displayed in all his writings, is unquestionable ; but that their general character is a compound of pantheism and mysticism, is equally true. His theory is one which a clever man may make, with the like materials, at all times, with considerable ease and facility ; because his chief ingredient,—the active element in his philosophical preparation,—is of such a plastic and expansive nature, that it accommodates itself to all dif-

* “ Cette seconde époque est inspirée par le besoin de développer le côté idéal du système, et de trouver en Dieu et dans l'homme un principe de personnalité et de liberté. Elle est signalée par l'écrit *sur la liberté humaine*, dans lequel Schelling, malgré son originalité, se laisse dominer par certaines idées de la doctrine de Jacob Böhme, comme il s'était appuyé, dans la période précédente, sur les travaux de Giordano Bruno et de Spinoza.”—(“ *Essai Théorique et Historique sur la Génération des Connaissances Humaines*,” Bruxelles, 1844.)

† M. Willm, in a Memoir to the French Academy, maintains that Schelling's theory of knowledge was founded, 1st, On an illusion ; 2nd, On a paralogism ; 3rd, On an exaggeration ; and 4th, On a hypothesis.

ficulties, and glosses over by vague generalities what it is inadequate to explain.*

GEORG. MICH. KLEIN.

Klein† took Schelling's philosophy for his model. He affirms that all logical forms are merely general expressions of metaphysical principles. He divides the science or art of logic into analytical and dialectic. We have certain *à priori* notions on which all the higher departments of reasoning rest. Without these, there never could have been such a thing as logic.

There are, according to Klein, three kinds of knowledge : the experimental ; the super-sensible ; and philosophical experience, which is a compound of the two first. All human knowledge is limited either to the external world of nature, or to what passes in the human mind ; beyond these, all is impenetrable darkness.

There is an immediate knowledge by the senses, and an immediate rational knowledge by intellectual intuition. But the most universal and all-pervading manifestation of thought is that which Klein calls *universal sense or perception*, (*Allsinn*), which is the indication of intelligence in all orders of animated nature ; and the common oracle of the whole of nature's wishes and purposes.

* See Note C. at the end of the Volume.

† " Anschauungs- und Denklehre, zum Gebrauche bei seinen Vorlesungen," 1817 ; " Darstellung der Philosoph. Religions- und Sittenlehre," 1817 ; " Die Verstandeslehre," 1810 ; " Versuch, die Ethik als Wissenschaft zu bearbeiten," 1811.

A good portion of the philosophy of Klein relates to subjects of morals, and to the elements of natural theology. These topics are treated of in an interesting manner; though they are all, more or less, tainted with certain pantheistical notions which the author had adopted from his teacher Schelling.

LORENZ OKEN.

Oken* was a native of Offenbergl, and a physician by profession. The speculative system of this author is embodied in his work, "The Philosophy of Nature." It is the most elaborate and systematic attempt at world-making which has appeared in Germany, or perhaps in any other country in modern times; and has created a considerable degree of attention among most of the philosophers of Europe.

It is impossible to give here even an outline of this system, that would be productive of any great advantage to the general reader. It is one of those things which must be studied thoroughly, and judged of as a whole. We shall, however, make a few brief observations upon it.

All philosophy of nature, in Oken's opinion, has, for its main object, to develop the eternal transformations of the Deity in the world of matter and of mind. This philosophy naturally divides itself into three branches; the first treats of God and his

* "Lehrbuch des Systems der Natur-philosophie," 1811; "Ueber das Universum, als Fortsetzung des Sinnen-systems," 1808; "Abriss des Systems der Biologie, oder Moral-philosophie," 1805. The author's Physico-Philosophy has just been translated by Alfred Tulk, Esq., 1848.

attributes ; the second, of the phenomena of the external universe ; and the third, of the divine influence on individual things. The Deity is, however, all, and comprehends all.

Reality is only manifested in multiplicity. The real and ideal are one and the same thing ; only the ideal has an undetermined form, eternal, simple ; whilst multiplicity and diversity constitute the form of reality.

The *monad* is exempt from the determinations of time and space. It exists, and yet it may be said not to exist ; it is eternal, it is the absolute. Zero, in its abstract sense, has no predication ; it is not anything, yet it is not *nothing* ; it is neither positive nor negative, one nor multiple ; it is the absolute without determination. Zero and the absolute are only two different names for the same thing. There is nothing real but the absolute itself. An individual thing is nothing in itself ; it has only a negative, not an absolute existence. All individual existences are deceptive and illusory.

The creation of the world is nothing but the reflected consciousness of the Deity. The Divine consciousness is manifested only by expressed language, λόγος, the word. Every object in nature may be considered only as a divine thought solidified and crystallized ; in fact, as the word of God.

One and the same scheme is distinguishable throughout the whole range of nature. She is always the same, though exhibited under different forms and aspects. The solar system is not a mechanical, but a dynamical production ; it is the

result of the polarisation of light, regulated by fixed and eternal laws.

Immaterial polarity is the soul. The Supreme Mind is a mesmeritic decomposition, each individual member of which has an independent existence. The philosophy of mind is a portrait or type of nature; for the mind is only nature spiritualized. The Deity is the sum total of all mentality. Human *reason* is then a part of the Divine understanding.

FR. ANT. NUESSLIN.

This author* maintains that philosophy is the science which connects things with a principle of absolute existence, or with God. The notion of a Supreme Intelligence is the basis of all sound knowledge, whether mental or physical. He divides all philosophical disquisitions on the mind into two grand parts; namely, theology and cosmosophy (*Weltweisheit*). This cosmosophy is again divided into three departments, physiology, pneumatology, and psychology. Logic is considered a branch of pneumatology. The grand object of the author is to unfold what he considers the *criterion* of truth.

IGNAT. THANNER.

The metaphysical school of Schelling was a nu-

* "Grundlinien der allgem. Psychologie, zum Gebrauch für Vorlesungen," 1821.

merous and influential one in Germany. We are compelled, however, to pass over many names, whose works display considerable genius and profundity. We have only space for a brief notice of two or three of his followers.

Thanner* takes his departure from the principle of *absolute identity*; and he endeavours to demonstrate that whatever be the *forms* of thought, the progress of the mind is invariably the same. Another favourite notion of the author is, that logic and metaphysics do not properly belong to philosophy; although he was firmly of opinion that their study was absolutely necessary to all those who wish to soar to the loftier regions of science.

J. J. WAGNER.

Wagner† was a Professor of Philosophy at Würzburg, and the author of many works of considerable merit. He takes an extensive range, and occupies himself with the whole philosophy of material existence, as well as with the human mind, and its logical rules of thought. He aims at imparting a mathematical form after the fashion of Raimond Lully and Bruno.

* "Lehrbuch der Metaphysik, &c." 1808; "Handbuch der Vorbereitung und Einleitung zum selbstständigen wissenschaftlichen Studium, besond. der Philosophie," 1807; "Versuch einer möglichst fasslichen Darstellung der absoluten Identitätslehre; zunächst als wissenschaftl. Orientirung üb. die Höhe u. Eigenthümlichkeit derselben," 1810; "Lehrbuch der theoret. Philosophie, &c." 1812; "Lehr- und Handbuch der pract. Philosophie," 1811.

† "Grundriss der Reinen und allg. Logik," 1806.

J. J. STUTZMANN.

Stutzmann* was a Professor at Erlangen, and died in 1816. His chief metaphysical principle is, that man is the central point of universal nature. In man we see relative and absolute unity combined. He is the image of the Deity, and consequently embodies in his nature an eternal and immaterial principle. The author applies these opinions to the investigation of all the philosophical questions he undertakes to discuss.

FRANZ XAVIER BAADER.

Baader† is a philosopher in whose writings much that is wild and foolish, as well as solid and substantial, will be found. He grounds his system upon mind alone; the internal rational soul is all things to him. In his mystical speculations he has borrowed largely from Jacob Böhme and Paracelsus.

Of his views of modern pantheistical opinions, and of their inevitable tendencies, he talks rationally and wisely. He shows that they destroy the real

* "Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit," 1808; "Philosophie des Universums, &c." 1818.

† "Ueber die Begründung der Ethik durch die Physik," 1813; "Fermenta Cognitionis," 1823; "Ueber Divinations- u. Glaubenskraft," 1821; "Beiträge zur dynamischen Philosophie im Gegensatze der Mechanischen," 1809. The author also wrote two works in French, "Sur l'Eucharistie," and "Sur la Notion de Temps."

essence of Deity by denying the personality of God. There can be no true knowledge of His nature and government but through a direct revelation of his will; nor can man find any source of true happiness but from revealed truth. If we surrender ourselves to the Deity, as docile instruments, we shall find virtue and goodness; if to the senses and will, sin and death.

HENRY STEFFENS.

Henry Steffens* is one of the mystical philosophers of Germany, who sprung out of the philosophy of Schelling. As may readily be predicated of such a character, his philosophy takes a wide range. Indeed, though decidedly of a wild and visionary cast, he possessed a mind of great power and versatility of invention; and on every branch of knowledge on which he descanted, we find many profound and valuable observations.

Light forms an important and active element in his philosophical system. He makes it identical with all form.

In his "Anthropology," he considers humanity under three points of view; namely, as the last term of the development of our planet in the past; then as the centre of the system of organised beings in the present; and lastly, in concealing, in

* "Grundzüge der Philosoph. Natur-wissenschaft," 1806; "Grundriss der Philosoph. Geschichte;" "Caricaturen des Heiligsten;" "Anthropologie;" "Nachgelassene Werke," &c.

itself, the presentiment of an infinite future. The author remarks "that it is necessary to seize the existing and permanent relations between the external world and man, in their first presentation; this is the only sure means of being able to conceive accurately and fully those ulterior relations, which arise out of them, as manifested in time; relations which not only exist in humanity in general, as displayed in particular nations and tribes of mankind, but in individuals themselves. If this mode of philosophising be neglected, the ameliorating and perfecting the various institutions of humanity will elude our grasp. Man ought not to be considered independently of nature; for he is nothing when considered apart from his union or conflicts with it."

Michelet observes that "the substance and spirit of the philosophy of Schelling are strikingly manifested in the speculations of Steffens. 1st, In his 'Principles of Natural Science Philosophically Considered,' he makes a near approach to Oken, and to the formal rules of the philosophy of nature. 2nd, We perceive again the spiritual side of knowledge portrayed in the 'Caricaturen des Heiligsten.' 3rd, From another class of his writings we have the *unity* of nature and spirit developed, and presented under various aspects. *First*, eternal nature is viewed historically, as manifesting itself in time, and, consequently, as demonstrating its nature as an immaterial or spiritual thing; an idea which had been dwelt upon by Herder, and which Steffens looks upon as the great

theme of his life, and the consummation of all his philosophical investigations. To this may be added his 'Contributions to an inward Natural History of the Earth,' and his 'Polemical Treatise toward the Advancement of Speculative Physics.' In the latter publication, he shows how the original or primary union of spirit with nature had been an ancient opinion—e. g. that of Roger Bacon; how the mechanical view of physics became predominant in the seventeenth century; and how in the eighteenth, men began to ascend from meagre material relations to the dynamical opposition of magnetism, of electricity, and of chemistry; that is, to a dynamical system of physics; until in our own day, the striking union of all the chief phenomena of nature, under the notion of one spirit, has introduced the dawn of natural science, *properly so called*. * * * *Secondly*, in his 'Anthropology,' Steffens has portrayed mind or spirit as something reposing upon nature, and remaining in close unity with it, much in the sense of Schubert. *Thirdly*, he proceeds to view the principle of religion in its mystical aspects, much in the same way as Baader does, and reproaches himself with the reckless boldness of his earlier knowledge. To this period we must refer his writings on 'False Theology and True Faith—A Voice out of the Churches,' and his work, 'How I again became a Lutheran, and what to me is Lutheranism.' "

J. P. V. TROXLER.

This author* was a professor of philosophy at the Lyceum at Lucerne, and adopted many of the views and opinions of Steffens. Man, in the eyes of Troxler, is the source of all knowledge and philosophy. Every form of scientific truth is simply the development of the principles of reason in the human mind; and the reality of that truth is implied in the very existence and exercise of these principles. Man is a microcosm, or little world of his own, in which the whole universe of nature is reflected as in a mirror. In this we have simply to look, in order to obtain all the requisite portion of knowledge of which humanity may stand in need. All our notions of Deity must be derived from those original conceptions of his nature and attributes, which the human reason reveals to us in every age and form of its existence.

GOTTHILF HEINRICH SCHUBERT.

Schubert† is one of the most distinguished of the mystical followers of Schelling. He was a professor at Munich, and enjoyed during his life considerable reputation as a public teacher.

* "Philosoph. Rechtslehre der Natur und des Gesetzes, mit Rücksicht auf die Irrlehren der Liberalität u. Legitimität," 1820; "Blicke in das Wesen des Menschen," 1812; "Elemente der Biosophie," 1808.

† "Symbolik des Traums," 1821; "Altes u. Neues aus dem Gebiete der inneren Seelenkunde," 1817; "Ansichten von der Nachtseite der Naturwissenschaft," 1817.

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He enlarged, in his "History of Nature," upon an idea developed by Schelling, that what appears under a negative and deranged aspect in the universe, is the result of the fall of man. Originally all things were perfect. The first man possessed the key to all the hidden principles and mysteries in nature. This knowledge was revealed to him in plain and significant language, which, since the confusion of tongues, has become nearly unintelligible. The ancient state of things is not entirely obliterated from the annals of humanity; for it develops itself now and then in the shape of miracles, and the appearance of our Saviour is destined to change the whole face of universal being.

G. D. BERGER.

The philosophy of Berger* is grounded upon the principle that all science must rest upon a knowledge of our own mind. He makes the absolute of intuition the basis of all real intelligence. The author however explains, that the development of the absolute gives rise to many degrees of knowledge. All things are but the manifestations of ourselves, as in the past, the present, and the future. Mind is the living and vivifying principle, and nature is its external form; but both mind and nature constitute only one organized principle. The mind is the central point of all organization, and

* "Allgem. Grundzüge der Wissenschaft," 1821: "Ueber den Scheinbaren Streit der Vernunft wider sich selbst, besond. in Religions-sachen," 1818; "Philosoph. Darstellung der Harmonie des Weltalls," 1803.

emits its flashes of intelligence upon the infinite variety of external things.

K. W. F. SOLGER.

Solger* was born in 1780, and died in 1819. This author follows closely the track of Berger. His chief aim is to work out the precise formulæ which characterise the full development of the absolute. He attempts to render visible and palpable, the emission of those rays of intelligence from the centre of mentality, and the laws which regulate their action and intensity.

This view of things gave his speculations a religious and artistic bias. He discovered through the deep workings of religious sentiment and feeling, the finger of the Supreme Being pointing to the future destiny of mankind ; whilst in that vast and surprising chain of material and mental phenomena which excite our emotions, and ideas of the sublime and beautiful, of the estimable and of the good, we detect the rays from that eternal source of intelligence,—the absolute of all-being. It is man's relation to this principle of intelligence, that constitutes him that reasoning being which he is ; and enables him to perceive that he is made in the image of the Deity Himself.

* "Philosoph. Gespräche," 1817 ; "Four Dialogues on Beauty and Art ;" besides several other works published by Tieck and Raumer, in 1826.

CHRIST. ADAM ESCHENMAYER.

This author* was a professor of philosophy and a physician. He embraced Schelling's philosophy, but subsequently fell into mysticism and supernatural visions. He took psychology for his philosophical point of departure. Psychology was, in his conception, what analysis is to the geometrician. His mode of philosophising is to commence with the more obvious and clearly defined faculties of the soul ; show their relationship with our physical organization ; and then to contrast the whole with the harmonious arrangements of the material universe. When the author applies these principles of investigation to political science, he brings them under four points of view ; namely, 1st, The period of nature, when the personal right and independence of the individual are all powerful ; 2nd, The state of slavery and despotism ; 3rd, The period of liberty, as it existed in the republics of antiquity ; and 4th, The establishment of the monarchical principle, which commenced with Christianity, and which, in the author's opinion, will only be fully carried out, when a perfect and general organization of all Christian states shall be effected.

Eschenmayer, in his *Philosophy*, during its transit to the non-philosophy, maintains that the absolute

* "System d. Moralphilosophie," 1818 ; "Moral-Recht, &c.," 1820 ; "Psychologie in 3 Theilen, &c.," 1822 ; "Religions-Philosophie," 1822 ; "Sätze aus der Naturmetaphysik," "Die Philosophie in ihrem Uebergange zur Recht-Philosophie," 1804, &c.

cannot be recognized by reason ; what we see of it is only its image ; and it is only by the principle of faith that we can arrive at a perfect and certain knowledge of it.

GEORGE WM. FRED. HEGEL.

We come now to another conspicuous landmark in the wide ocean of German speculation. Hegel is a striking example of the great and the puerile, the sublime and the fantastic, combined. He imprints his own image on every thing he touches ; but it has little resemblance to any thing in the whole creation of thought and philosophy, either ancient or modern.*

This distinguished philosopher was, in the early part of his life, an enthusiastic disciple of Schelling ; but he soon discovered that distinction and fame were not to be obtained by expounding and propagating other men's opinions ; and he consequently bethought himself that something must be done to attract public attention ; some new soil must be turned up to secure a rich and fruitful harvest. His *à priori* judgments in this matter proved correct. He knew his countrymen ; he

* "Differenz des Fichte'schen u. Schellingschen Systems," 1801 ; "System der Wissenschaft, &c.," 1807 ; "Wissenschaft der Logik, &c.," 1812 ; "Encyclopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften," 1817 ; "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts ; auch unter dem Titel : Naturrecht und Staatwissenschaften im Grundrisse," 1821. We may just notice, that the whole works of Hegel are now published in twenty volumes octavo. There is a very useful abridgment of them by Franz and Hillert, (Hegel's Philosophie in Wörtlichen Auszügen, Berlin, 1843,) where all the substantial parts of Hegel's system may be found.

knew the material he had to work upon ; he knew how quickly the ear caught, and the eye glistened at "some new thing;" and knowing these matters, he zealously embraced the golden opportunity, and presented his admiring friends with a varied assortment of speculative rarities. He had all the requisite intellectual qualities for such an enterprise. Nothing could check his boldness, nor damp his ardour. He despised alike the authority of heaven, the authority of men, and the authority of common sense. He set out on his speculative cruise upon the supposition that no one had ever thought before him, and that none would ever think after him ; that he embodied in his own mind all positive and possible knowledge. Men might ridicule him, sneer at him, laugh at him, deride him, spit upon him, or condemn him ; he cared not ; he rested with perfect composure on the rock of his own mental infallibility, heedless of the surges and billows at his feet.

Such qualifications made his path comparatively clear and open. He commenced operations forthwith. Schelling's system was to be attacked first ; for this was an object which stood in the way, and which was necessary to be removed to a distance. Schelling's "intellectual intuition" was called in question, as being a pure piece of assumption ; an unphilosophical dogma, not to be tolerated for a moment. Schelling had an obvious hankering after something external, something objective, something which was not thought, and on which thought rested, or with which it had some con-

nection, either real or assumed. Now this, Hegel could not endure. Our knowledge must be purged and sublimated from every particle of matter; not the smallest residue of the objective must be left. Pure unalloyed thought, this is the true starting point; the only key to the storehouse of knowledge and science.

Mind,—the *moi* in itself,—this is every thing. Matter and mind, thoughts and the things thought of, are one and the same thing. Whatever is true of ideas, is true of things. This mind, this *moi*, is subjected, from its nature, to manifest various developments of its own being. At first, it is simple consciousness; then consciousness of itself as something existing; then consciousness in its inward contemplations; and again, consciousness in acting. In the progress of these respective developments, it arrives at that stage of its movements, that it grasps itself; moulds its nature or essence into various forms; and then rests upon the absolute of mind, giving birth to *Æsthetics*, Religion, and Philosophy.

This view of mind, or the *moi*, is the *absolute idealism* of Hegel's philosophy. The term *idée*, or the absolute, designates the fundamental element of the theory.*

It required no great profundity to perceive, that a system founded upon the principle that what

* The word *idée* is used here in a different and more extended signification than in common language; it stands for the ultimate or primary principle of thought.

was really true of the thought, was true of the thing, must needs have many vulnerable points. Kant, many years before, had looked at this matter, and shrewdly and pithily remarked, that there was a real difference between a man's having a hundred dollars, and not having them. Hegel felt the force of this ; and, though he could not reconcile the two contradictory states, yet he thought he could bring into full play a new element in philosophy, which would go far to bewilder and confuse all such low, grovelling, and mercenary objectors. This element is the *identity of contrarieties* ; which we shall now endeavour to explain.

Hegel's proposition is, that thought and the thing thought of, or subject and object, are one and the same. But there is something beyond this, something underneath, which is implied in the very forms of the proposition. This something is the principle of negation. When a thing is said to exist, there is something meant in addition to bare existence ; there is an implied declaration of *non-existence*. John is *not* at Covent Garden theatre ; *therefore* John exists, and is in some other place. What is this *non-existence* ? Hegel tells us it is a real and positive thing ; just as real and tangible as existence is. It is a thought ; *therefore* it has the same right to the title of reality as its opposite existence. (" Das Nichts *ist* ; denn es ist ein Gedanke.") But we are not to consider *nothing* as a mere thought ; it is the same as being or existence itself ; it is a pure and unconditioned

expression or development of the absolute mind. "Being, and not being, are the same thing." ("Seyn und Nicht ist dasselbe.")

Mankind have always imagined, and expressed themselves in accordance with this imaginative conception, that existence was opposed to, and entirely excluded, non-existence. This, Hegel says, is sheer ignorance. Every thing which exists, exists by virtue of contrarieties; without them nothing would exist at all. Contradiction is the essence of every thing; the living principle from which all things derive their being. External things are nothing; the perception of them is nothing; it is the relation of contrarieties which gives them reality, and makes them interesting to us. On the other hand, to deny existence would be false; for the *negative* or abstract conception of nothing, is, notwithstanding, the same as abstract being or existence itself.

Now this is certainly the primest piece of speculative trifling and absurdity in existence. It is discreditable to the human understanding that it should be tolerated in any community where learning and talents are cultivated. Yet, strange to say, this system was hailed in Germany as the highest effort of human wisdom; and, even at this hour, it constitutes the philosophical creed of more than one half of all the speculative literati in that country.

We shall now make a few remarks on the way or manner this absolute idealism is unfolded in the system of Hegel. According to his notion, the

idee, or absolute, manifests its movements in three different modes, which give birth to three corresponding branches of knowledge ; Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of Mind or Spirit. The first represents thought in a naked, denuded state, as simple sensation ; the second, in its objective conditions, as external nature ; and the third, in its mental or reflective forms, as intellectual phenomena.

Hegel does not, like other writers, consider logic as merely expressive of the *forms* of thought, but as constituting its very essence and reality.* Logic displays three different mental states or movements. We simply consider or look at a thing. We then separate that thing from others ; for nothing can exist in absolute *unity* ; it must have two aspects, or a positive and a negative side ; and then out of these arises a certain *relation*, which alone constitutes truth, reality, being, the absolute. There is thought in its immediate existence ; thought as communicated ; and thought as forming a full and complete conception of its own self. The formal arrangement of Hegel's logic runs thus :—

1st. *Thought in its immediate Existence or Being.*

QUALITY : comprehends Being (*Seyn*), Existence (*Daseyn*), Independent Existence (*Für-sich-seyn*.)

* “Die Logik ist die Wissenschaft der reinen Idee, das ist der Idee im abstracten Elemente des Denkens.”—(Logik, p. 28.)

QUANTITY: Pure Quantity (Reine Quantität), Divisible Quantity (Quantum), and Degree (Grad).

MEASURE, (Mass): The union of quality and quantity.

2nd. *Thought or mind as communicated.*

GROUND OF EXISTENCE: Pure Notions of Essence; Essential Existence (Existenz), Thing (Ding).

PHENOMENON: Phenomenal World (Welt der Erscheinung), Matter and Form (Inhalt und Form), Relation (Verhältniss).

REALITY: *Embracing the union of the Ground of Existence and Phenomenon.* Relation of Substance; Relation of Cause; Action and Reaction.

3rd. *Thought or Mind as Forming a Conception of itself.*

SUBJECTIVE NOTION: Notion as such (Begriff als solches), Judgment (Urtheil), Inference (Schluss).

OBJECT: Mechanical Powers (Mechanismus), Chemical Powers (Chemismus), Design (Teleologie).

IDEA: Life (Leben), Intelligence (Erkennen), Absolute Idea (Absolute Idee).*

* For a more detailed account of Hegel's "Logik," see his *Cyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, vol. 6.

We come now to the *philosophy of nature*, but *how* we arrive at it from the "Logic," it is difficult to perceive. Hegel tells us it is just another movement of thought; another phase of the *idee*; but *why* it should be, and by what means it is, effected, he does not condescend to say a word. However, we must take things as we find them. If "the mountain will not come to Mahomet, Mahomet must come to the mountain." He brings us to the "Philosophy of Nature," and we must look at it through his own medium.

In logic, the *idee* or absolute has many internal movements, struggles, manifestations, developments, relative to its own self; but when it wishes to treat us with a little *exteriority*, or to materialize itself, it then displays internal throes and motions of another kind. These movements assume, however, the same threefold appearance as in logic.

1. MECHANICS: Mathematical Properties; Mechanical Properties; Properties of Absolute Motion in Space.
2. PHYSICS: General Forms of Matter; Relative Forms of Matter; Specific Forms of Matter.
3. ORGANISM: Geological Structure; Vegetable Structure; Animal Structure.

After the *idee* has manifested its *exteriority* in the philosophy of an external world, we come to notice its third great development, the "Philosophy of Mind." Here, as in the two preced-

ing movements of the absolute, we have three divisions ;

1. MIND VIEWED SUBJECTIVELY : Anthropology ; Psychology ; Will.
2. MIND VIEWED OBJECTIVELY : Jurisprudence ; Morals ; Politics.
3. MIND VIEWED ABSOLUTELY : *Æsthetics* ; Religion ; Philosophy.

This is a very brief outline of the system of Hegel ; but the space we have hastily run over reminds us, that we must bring this notice to a close. We shall just, by way of finish, make a general observation or two upon some of its leading topics.

As a mere piece of speculative philosophy, the system of Hegel is absurd and untenable. The absolute idealism he maintained, instead of throwing any light on the origin of our knowledge, tends to envelop it in additional obscurity. He leaves us nothing but a series of *relations* ; these constitute the whole universe of mind and matter. There is neither body, nor soul, nor external world ; these are all visionary things ; but there are certain *relations* among these things which alone are invested with reality, and which are the real elements of absolute existence. He fails, however, to inform us how these relations can arise out of things which do not exist themselves ; and by what process they become invested

with the attribute of reality from the mere development of the *Idee*. None of these things he attempts to explain. Indeed, he leaves the great problems of mental philosophy just where he found them.

It seems strange, and we are filled with melancholy thoughts when we think of it, that this system has even now many able supporters in Germany; men who pride themselves on the adoption of every particle of absurdity which belongs to it; and whose whole lives are spent in playing one paradox against another, and in striving who shall promulgate the most startling and outrageous conceits. Such, however, is the real state of things. Ambitious singularity seems to be the only moving principle of a vast portion of German speculators.

In a religious point of view, Hegel's theory is equally unsatisfactory. He destroys the personality of the Deity; and of course this strikes at the root of all religious doctrines and sentiments. There is no God distinct and apart from the world; everything is merged in the universal *Idee*, or the absolute. The external universe is merely a form of the Divine thought; not different, or proceeding, from the thought, but actually the thought itself. These views have, as might naturally be expected, from the celebrity of their author, been prolific of the most wild and outrageous theological doctrines in Germany; doctrines so entirely denuded of every particle of scriptural authority and common sense, that we stand aghast in amazement at the audacity and folly which gave utterance to them. There are, however, distinctive signs that this fever of

speculative folly is now rapidly abating; and that there are good grounds for hoping that German philosophy will once more come within the pale of reason and common sense.

JOHN FRED. HERBART.

Herbart* was a professor of philosophy in the University of Göttingen, and afterwards succeeded Kant at Königsberg.

Herbart felt little or no sympathy with the philosophy of Fichte and Schelling; he conceived it unsound and extravagant in all its fundamental principles. He does not, however, place himself entirely against it, but seems desirous of steering a middle course, and of falling back upon something real and external to the thinking power. He stood alone for many years defending his own opinions and views against the overpowering influence and fame of his rivals, with a firm and indomitable perseverance; and he had, in the end, the satisfaction of seeing that his principles were daily becoming more generally appreciated by many distinguished philosophers of his own country.

Herbart lays it down as an axiom in philosophy, that beyond consciousness we cannot go. All the

* "Hauptpüncte der Metaphysik und Logik," 1807; "Allgem. Pract. Philosophie," 1807; "Ueber Philosophisches Studium," 1807; "Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie," 1821; "Streit über die Modephilosophie," 1814; "De attentionis mensura causisque primariis psychologiæ, principia Stoica et mechanica exemplo illustr.," 1822; "Ueber die Möglichkeit und Nothwendigkeit, Mathematik auf Psychologie anzuwenden," 1823.

mass of ideas which this power furnishes us with, are, however, subjected to a certain inward process, which recognises them, separates them from one another, and arranges and classifies them in accordance with certain rules and principles. Unless we acknowledge a series of mental powers appropriated to these several purposes or ends, it is impossible, says Herbart, to cultivate or develop any branch of science whatever.*

Analysis is the instrument, in Herbart's opinion, for the successful prosecution of philosophy. The reality of things does not consist in considering them in their totality, but as mere phenomena. The process then which the mind must adopt, is to make itself acquainted with these; and this can only be done by pursuing the analytical method of investigation. This instrument has, however, a limit. We obtain by it a vast number of individual ideas or perceptions, which seem to be impressed with reality; but then our understandings are not satisfied with this apparent reality, but demand that we shall place them all upon some simple substance or body, which will form a common basis for them, and give a guarantee for their *absolute* reality. The mode in which we are enabled to reconcile these conflicting demands constitutes the science of mental philosophy.

Now, the mode which the mind instinctively follows, in considering objects around us, is, to go from one quality or property to another, step by

* Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie, pp. 6, 12, 16.

step. A piece of iron is hard, fusible, malleable, &c. ; these qualities or properties make it what it is ; and the same may be remarked of every other material object. Iron is therefore a *thing*, which possesses *unity*. Our notions of *matter* are, that it is extended, or fills a certain portion of space ; that it consists of an infinite number of particles called atoms. *Mind* we know as a compound of various ideas, feelings, perceptions, passions, and the like. These three objects, *unity*, *matter*, and *mind*, form the three great divisions of the science of metaphysics. The first, Herbart denominates Ontology ; the second, Synechology ; and the third, Eidology.*

Ontology attempts the solution of the problem, how multiplicity is contained in unity, and *vice versa*. This is explained by the *method of relations*. The different qualities or properties of any thing are independent of each other ; they *appear* as the result of *one* object, but they are really different objects. The independent essences of which all things are composed remain invariably the same ; it is only when they are considered from various points of view, that variety is developed. These are the *relations* which subsist amongst them ; and which we, in common language, designate as separate qualities or properties, residing in a given object possessed of *unity*.

Synechology explains the phenomena of matter as a whole ; in relation to time, space, motion, infinite divisibility, and the like. Matter com-

* See "Haupt-punkte der Metaphysik."

posed of ultimate atoms or *monads*, which fill no space; but when these are viewed in *relation* to each other, then the ideas of space, extension, and the like, arise in the mind. All the phenomena depending upon attraction, repulsion, organization, &c., are attempted to be explained upon this principle; which, it may be observed, seems precisely the same as that involved in the theory of matter, propounded by Father Boscovich.

Eidology illustrates the phenomena of the mind upon the same principles. We feel and speak of the mind as *one* object, notwithstanding it is perpetually changing its ideas and perceptions. These are, however, independent operations; and it is only when we look at them in conjunction with each other, and observe the relations among them, that we impart *unity* to them, and speak of them as *one* thing.

All religious doctrines and sentiments Herbart bases upon a principle of *faith*.

DANIEL ERNEST SCHLEIERMACHER.

Schleiermacher* is one of those theological metaphysicians, and admirers of Schelling, who applied his philosophical theory to religion, morals, and politics. He was anxious to place theology upon a real and lasting basis. Religion, with him,

* "Ueber Religion, Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern," 1822; "Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre," 1803; "Monologen," 1822; "Ueber die Wissenschaftliche Behandlung des Tugendbegriffs," 1819; "Ueber den Begriff des höchsten Gutes," 1827.

is the immediate perception of universal being ; it is the conception and realization of the finite in the infinite ; the transitory in the eternal. Theology must be considered altogether apart from science, morals, and art. It cannot be denominated a science, because it is grounded on *belief* ; it is different from morals, because it is necessary ; and it differs from art, because it is instinctive. The union of the finite with the infinite is the great end of all religious sentiment and feeling. Man here elevates himself to Deity, he brings Him to dwell inwardly with himself. The whole history of the world should be considered under the light of a direct manifestation of the Eternal Mind ; for organization and eternal vitality are its constituent characteristics. Religion, therefore, recognizes God in the world of nature and the world of history ; or rather perhaps, it consists in viewing the Divinity in nature and history, and conceiving these both as manifestations of his existence and attributes. To realize God in the world and in human nature, there must be a deep and absorbing emotion of the mind ; and we must not look upon this as a mere *consequence* of religion ; it is the whole of religion. It is its sole essence, and without this personal realization it is nothing. Religion is not, therefore, either a mental faculty, or a philosophical science, or an artistic effort, or a representation of natural appearances ; but it is the whole of these at once, it is the sum and substance of all things. "The universe," he remarks, "is one continued series of active and stirring agencies,

manifesting themselves every moment. Every form it displays, and every being to whom it gives existence and life; every event which teems from its rich and exhaustless bosom, is exercising its influence on us. To grasp, therefore, every single occurrence and event, not individually, but in reference to a whole; to view every limited operation, not in opposition to any other thing, but as a development of the infinite in our own life; and to give full play to the inward emotions which these things are fitted to create—these constitute religion.” * * * “The one and all of religion is to view all feeling in its highest unity as one and the same; and every particular thing as only deriving its existence from *this*; we shall consequently regard our life as a life and being in God.”* Religion never, however, appears in its *essence*; but only in its *forms*; sometimes as a religion of the state, a religion of moral duties, a religion of artistic excellencies, a religion of war, a religion of nature; or, in other terms, as Judaism, Christianity, Paganism, Mahometanism, or Sabeism.

But how do we realise our finite natures with the absolute; how do we become partakers of the divine nature? It is by *Christ*, who is the perfect union of the divine and human natures; and as we are exhorted and commanded to live according to the pattern He has left us, we effect by this means a union with Deity. Michelet remarks, that, “as Schleiermacher could not but perceive that the in-

* Reden über die Religion, pp. 43. 58. 59.

dividual very imperfectly expressed the universal, and while he rested the main strength of his philosophy upon the peculiar, it was requisite he should have some personal channel or link to connect the two. This he found in Christ—the highest manifestation of the absolute. This forms the sole principle of unity in which the multitude can recognise themselves as one. There are, therefore, in the life of the individual, two sources of holy joy which should be commemorated; the one our birth-day, and the other the festival of Christmas. The first is the symbol of a *definite* and *limited* feeling; and the second designates a *universal* feeling, in which we celebrate human nature as it emanates from the Divine principle.”

ECKHARTSHANSEN.

This is one of the mystic German philosophers, whose works have excited some attention not only in his own country, but in France, where his treatise “*La Nuée sur le Sanctuaire*” appeared in 1819.

The author sets out with maintaining that Kant had clearly proved that human reason, in its natural state, can know nothing of the super-natural or the transcendental; and that, therefore, some other mode must be discovered for unfolding the great and important truths connected with these subjects—and this is done by revelation.

There is in the human blood a species of *gluten*, approaching more to the nature of animal life than to mind. This gluten is the germ of sin. It is subject to modifications and influences from external

agents; and from these influences certain varied manifestations of its evil nature develop themselves. In a more rarified state of expansion, this gluten gives rise to presumption, pride; in another state, to avarice, self-love, egotism; and in a third, to all the lower vices of intemperance. This evil germ in the blood is communicated from generation to generation, and can never be fully eradicated from our race; but still the *will* exercises some power over its movements and influences. The only effectual correction to this evil principle is revelation.

The human understanding has seven powers. 1st, that which recognises objects external to us; *intuitus*:—2nd, that which enables us to pay attention to these objects; *apperceptio*:—3rd, that which reflects upon objects perceived; *reflexio*:—4th, that which gives variety and multiplicity to our perceptions; *fantasia, imaginatio*:—5th, that which passes a judgment on any thing; *judicium*:—6th, that which discovers the relations among divers things; *ratio*:—and 7th, that which consolidates or unites in one general conception the truth of many individual things; *intellectus*. This last power contains within itself the whole of the other six.

The *will* of man has also seven faculties or powers. 1st, the power to desire; *desiderium*:—2nd, the power to make one's own choice of things; *appetitus*:—3rd, that power of giving our desire a distinctive form and tangibility, with a view to the perfect and full gratification of our desires; *concupiscentia*; 4th, that which suspends the influence of contrary motives, or holds them in the balance; *passio*:—5th, the power of absolutely resolving for

or against anything; *libertas* :—6th, the power of full choice, deliberately taken; *electio* :—and 7th, the power of conferring existence on the object; *voluntas*. This last contains likewise all the other six.

K. C. F. KRAUSE.

The philosophy of Krause* is grounded upon the inward reflection of the mind upon itself: that is, upon psychology. Three problems are to be solved: the intuition of the *moi*; a knowledge of its fundamental essence; and its nature and modes of action relative to knowledge in general.

The philosophical range of Krause is extensive; embracing, in fact, all the phenomena of the mental or spiritual life, and all the questions connected with the social state of man; religion, civil right, morals, art, science, and industry. Though eclectic in its spirit and development, his theory is subjected to the rigorous ordeal of logical reasoning and demonstration. It professes to be a system of universal harmony, sublimated from all gross error, and resting upon a basis of irrefragable truth.

The point of departure for all rational science

* “Idee der Menschheit, als eines geselligen Ganzen, für alle, welche an den höheren Angelegenheiten des Menschen Antheil nehmen, besonders für Freimaurer,” 1810; “Grundriss der historischen Logik für Vorlesungen,” 1803; “Anleitung der Naturphilosophie,” 1804; “Grundlage des Naturrechts,” 1803; “Versuch einer wissenschafts. Begründung der Sittenlehre,” 1810; “Vorlesungen über das System der Philosophie;” “Vorlesungen über die Grundwahrheiten der Wissenschaft;” “System der Philosophie.”

or knowledge, is self-consciousness. Its essence is mind and body. It is from this mixed nature that we are enabled to fix and determine its true attributes—those phenomena which manifest themselves in man, and in the power and influence he exercises over others. The *moi*, in fact, is an organized and independent being.

All our fundamental notions are *à priori* ones; they are not the result of mere abstraction from particulars to generals, as is commonly imagined; they have a superior, an eternal and immutable existence.

Mind must be considered as a spiritual organised whole, in perfect harmony with its own internal structure, and with the external and physical world around us; and as also containing the ideas of perfect unity, infinity, and of the absolute. This mental organized creation may be viewed under the following relations.

ORGANIZED KNOWLEDGE.—(Unity, Infinity, Absolute.)

SUPER-ESSENTIAL KNOWLEDGE. — 1. *Sensible Knowledge*. External; Internal.—2. *Intellectual Knowledge*. Conception. (Common, Abstract.) Super-Sensible. (Universal, Necessary.)

The idea of Deity has its foundation only in Deity itself. It is primary, absolute; and embodies, in its nature or essence, the seeds of all truth, particular and general, relative or absolute.

The Deity is not, however, the world; His personality is manifested by innumerable proofs, as well as by the primary suggestions of the un-

derstanding. . These resolve themselves into several theorems.

1. The Essence of Deity is the Essence. God is mental life and moral regeneration in every department of humanity. It embraces man in the height of his intellectual power and glory, in his moral sentiments and emotions, in his loftiest aspirations after knowledge here and immortality hereafter, and in his personal liberty and independence. By the absolute conception, God-man, Christianity places itself above time and space; defining the progress of time, and carrying civilization, knowledge, virtue, and holiness to every corner of the habitable globe.—God. Fundamental conclusion.

2. The Essence constitutes the Deity's essentiality; God is Divinity.

3. The Essentiality of the Divine Being is unity.

4. The Unity of His Being is identity and totality; God is absolute and infinite.

5. Essential unity is essentially primary.

6. The Deity is possessed of infinite reason. He is truth, its infinite and absolute personification.

Rational theism is the science which treats of the relation between the infinite Creator and His finite creation.

Christianity is the *résumé* of every philosophical theory, either ancient or modern; and is destined to sow the seeds of truth and life, and to regenerate all human institutions.

JOS. HILLEBRAND.

This is a German metaphysician who views our mental powers and faculties through a religious medium. He maintains that the Deity has revealed himself to man in the power of consciousness; and that this revelation is amply sufficient to lead us to a general knowledge of all scientific truth, as well as to those elementary theological principles which constitute the foundation of natural religion, and on which even the Holy Scriptures are based. The testimony of consciousness must, therefore, be taken as the testimony of God Himself; and be considered as the sole groundwork of all reality and truth.*

K. W. F. SCHLEGEL.

Schlegel† is better known as a commentator on philosophy, than as a profound and systematic philosopher himself. He was born at Hanover in 1772. For many years he gave lectures on the Belles-Lettres, History, &c., and occupied his leisure time in contributions to the periodicals of the

* "Versuch einer allgem. Bildungslehre, wissenschaftlich dargestellt aus dem Principe der Weisheit für Gelehrte und Gebildete," 1816; "Grundriss der Logik und Philosophie, Vorkenntnisslehre," 1820; "Propädeutik der Philosophie, &c.," 1819; "Anthropologie als Wissenschaft, &c.," 1823.

† The principal works of Schlegel where his philosophy is developed, are his "Lucinde," "The Philosophy of Life," "The Philosophy of History," and "The Philosophy of Language."

day. He was originally of the Protestant faith, but afterwards joined the Romish Church, and settled at Vienna, where he became Secretary to the Court. He died at Dresden in 1829.

There are many excellent things to be found in his works, but his opinions on mental philosophy are only to be gathered from among a great variety of other materials with which they are blended. He may be said to have had a philosophy of his own; though it was not by any means logically arranged and consolidated. His literary pursuits and tastes were of a discursive and desultory character, and therefore he was not destined to gather immortal laurels from methodical treatises or profound theories.

According to Schlegel's notions, philosophy is not a particular, but a universal science; it is the foundation of, and comprehends, all others. The different sciences are but particular and special branches of philosophy, which is the vivifying and animating principle which pervades and gives life to all of them.

This philosophy, to be any thing, must have a method; that method must be sought for in logic: not however in its common acceptation, as an embodiment of the mere rules of thinking; but in its highest, as embracing the genetic or speculative mode of reasoning. It is only in this method that we can attain to a knowledge of the laws of general existence, and solve those knotty problems connected with the science of human nature, in all its varied aspects and relations.

This theoretical method has three divisions ; abstraction, construction, and reflection. The first enables the mind to seize hold of the objects of its thoughts ; the second, to arrange and methodise them ; and the third, to bind or ré-construct them into one consolidated unity.

In Schlegel's History of Philosophy, we have criticisms on the various systems or schools of idealism, scepticism, empiricism, mysticism, and pantheism. In all these there is more or less of truth, mingled with error and delusion. The only resource which mankind have, therefore, is to search for some other and loftier principle, which will be susceptible of uniting all the results of sound knowledge into one whole. This principle, Schlegel conceives, is *faith* ; which was dimly shadowed forth in the Platonic philosophy, but which has now been clearly and fully developed in the Christian dispensation.

Now, what is the grand object of this dispensation ? It is to restore man to the lost image of his Maker. Since his fall he has been immersed in gross and material objects and pursuits ; a slave to his passions ; dead to his immortal interests, and to the true end of his being. To arouse him to a lively sense of his actual situation ; to inspire him with a love of truth, and to direct his eye heavenward, is the end and object of Christian philosophy.

In the author's Philosophy of Life, he treats of the soul psychologically. Man is a compound of mind, soul, and body. The mind has two powers, the will and understanding ; the soul possesses a

like number, reason and imagination. But besides these two last powers, the soul has other four of a subordinate kind ; the external senses, the passions, memory, and conscience.

It is the office of the imagination to invent ; of the reason, to regulate or balance ; the-understanding, to perceive ; and the will, to impel to action.

When man was first created, all these respective powers and faculties acted in perfect harmony with each other, to produce the greatest amount of happiness to the individual. But sin has thrown them into confusion. It is the end of religion and philosophy to restore them again to their pristine vigour and harmonious action.

Theological truth is the *eye* of knowledge and science. Whether in the universe of nature, or in man's social and political relations, divine wisdom is eminently conducive to his philosophical pursuits and attainments.

In the author's *Philosophy of History*, we find the various operations of the healing and renovating principle which is destined to emancipate human nature from ignorance, vice, and misery. Here Schlegel gives the reins to the fancy ; and while we find much to amuse, there is but little to satisfy the understanding. At the fall, the divers elements of the human consciousness were thrown into deplorable confusion ; and various classes of our race, possessed, in corrupt and imperfect isolation, various mental faculties and powers. The Chinese obtained a monopoly of reason ; the Indians, imagination ; the Egyptians, understanding ;

and the Jews, the power of will. This all took place in the first period of the world's history. The second period begins with the Persians, and includes the Greeks and Romans. Here we witness signs of improvement and amelioration. We see mind developing itself with more vigour and intelligence; and the principles and maxims appertaining to man's individual and corporate rights and duties, laid down with more precision and method. Then comes the Christian age. Here is the active principle which is to restore harmony once more to our shattered understandings. All mankind will be ultimately united in brotherhood and affection.

Schlegel's Philosophy of Language describes the final completion of man's intellectual and moral regeneration. Language is the instrument which conveys the ideas of Deity to man; religion is that which realises the Divinity in the soul; and external nature is a perpetual manifestation of the love and power of the Deity.

H. C. W. SIGWART.

The speculative disquisitions of this author* are not of any great importance. His work on Logic is highly respectable, which he defines to be that science which unfolds the laws of thought.

* "Ueber den Zusammenhang des Spinozismus mit der Cartesianschen Philosophie," 1816; "Die Leibnitzsche Lehre von der prästabilierten Harmonie, in ihrem Zusammenhange mit früheren Philosophemen betrachtet," 1822; "Handbuch zu Vorlesungen über die Logik," 1818; "Handbuch der theoret. Philosophie," 1820.

In an extended point of view it embraces the whole theory of human intelligence, and has the entire framework of the mind for its basis. Practical logic, he says, is that which influences our thoughts, so as to enable us to form mental propositions and conclusions. There are, throughout many parts of this work, a considerable number of original and valuable remarks, on the abstract nature of all judgments generally, and upon the advantages and disadvantages of the syllogism as an instrument of reasoning.

T. A. RIXNER.

This author follows in the path of Fichte and Schelling. He considers Logic as a universal science, under the relation of *quantity*, and divides it into two parts, namely, *true science* and *apparent science*. The general metaphysical principles of the author are merely the same as those of Fichte and Schelling.*

J. FR. MEYER.

The metaphysical speculations of Meyer† partake largely of the mystical character, which was doubtless derived from the school of Schelling. According to Meyer, intellectual and moral ex-

* "Aphorismen aus der Philosophie, als Leitfaden der angehenden Wissenschafts-Candidaten," 1809; "Aphorismen der gesammten Philosophie, &c.," 1818; "Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie," 1823.

† See Rixner, t. 3.

cellence and perfection consist in full and complete recognition of truth, beauty, and goodness united. But this object is always very difficult to obtain ; inasmuch as we are perpetually liable to be deceived by appearances, and to take the shadow for the substance, the counterfeit for the real coin.

The strongest proof of man's divine origin and destiny, is from his actions and his every-day movements in life, which manifest an inherent desire to grasp the true, the beautiful, and the good. These are not by any means generally attained, still there is that uniform and powerful aspiration after them in the mass of our race, that we are fully warranted in forming the conclusion, that man has commenced a super-sensible life, even while he is upon earth.

Though human nature clearly points heavenward, and all its faculties and powers, all its longings and desires, are in that direction, yet there is something wanting ; some assistance needed to correct our proneness to error, and to low and grovelling pursuits. This aid is faith in the Deity, which strengthens and fortifies the mind for the necessary conflicts with the evil principle. The Bible and Nature are man's two grand sources of intellectual nourishment. Neither is sufficient without the other ; only there is this difference, that we derive more knowledge from the Scriptures than from the book of nature. The former is the key to all the enigmas and secrets of the latter.

Nature, to a mind inspired with Christian faith, is full of interest and loveliness ; and there is a holy

warmth and vigour imparted to the imagination in all its communings with earthly things. Under such an influence, the whole universe assumes another aspect. What was naturally mysterious is explained; what contradictory is reconciled; confusion is reduced to order; and the vicious and repulsive, to the beautiful and good.

J. HERMANN FICHTE.

Professor Fichte,* son of the philosopher already noticed, is at present attached to the University of Bonn, and is a man of extensive erudition and great talent. His philosophy is, in its general features, a compound of Schelling's and Hegel's speculations. He takes his stand upon the simple fact of consciousness; for he maintains this must be the primitive element or source of all truth. He calls it the beginning, middle, and end of all philosophical inquiries. Consciousness has four distinct phases or developments.

First, sensation and perception bring us merely within the pale of intellectual life. We are here upon a level with the animal creation; we simply feel, that is all.

In the second epoch of consciousness, we rise a few degrees above this passive state. Activity

* "Beiträge zur Charakteristik der neuern Philosophie;" "Ueber Gegensatz, Wendepunkt und Ziel heutiger Philosophie," Heidelberg, 1832; "Grundzüge zum Systeme der Philosophie;" "Religion-Philosophie."

manifests itself by retaining and contemplating our ideas. Memory and imagination take their rise from this source.

The third epoch or stage gives rise to abstract ideas or conceptions ; and order and method are the result. Logic springs out of this mental movement ; embracing conception, judgment, reasoning, inference, and the like.

The fourth and highest manifestation of consciousness is the province of philosophy, where general systems or truths are considered either relatively to each other, or relatively to some grand whole. Experience, reflection, and speculation are here the three leading instruments in the mental process. Experience embraces sensation, analogy, observation, &c. ; reflection leads to criticisms and judgments on the forms and laws of mind ; and the speculative comprehends them both, and carries the logical proofs to their highest pitch of intellectual refinement and elevation.

Theological truth is considered by Fichte as the loftiest species of philosophy ; as, in fact, calling into requisition the most important of our mental faculties. This truth is illustrated and enforced from three great sources ; from the material phenomena of nature, from the operations of mind, and from the manifestations of humanity. In external nature we perceive the lowest expression of the Divine Idea ; in the structure of mind we have a more elevated one ; and in the phase of general humanity, the Deity displays Himself in

his grandest attributes ; as the Father and the Upholder of man. In all searches after truth *experience* is our sole guide ; it is the beginning and end of all philosophy.*

* See Note D. at the end of this Volume, where a copious list of German authors and their works is given, from 1800 to the present day, which we have not been able to comment upon individually.

CHAPTER III.

THE METAPHYSICAL WRITERS OF FRANCE, FROM
THE YEAR 1800 TILL THE PRESENT DAY.

WE left the mental philosophy of France, at the termination of the eighteenth century, at its highest degree of development, as a sensational and material system. We touched slightly on the disastrous consequences it produced, both on the mind and feelings of the nation. The frantic ravings of its patriots and philosophers reverberated in every corner of the civilized world, and excited sentiments of regret and bitterness in every section of the religious community of Christendom.

The philosophy of our countryman Locke is not to blame in this matter. During the whole of the eighteenth century, the speculative ideas of this country flowed rapidly into France, despite of the barriers which mistaken zeal and bigotry attempted to place betwixt the two nations. The French took Locke's theory on trust ; they were comparatively ignorant of the science of mind ; and they soon fell into innumerable errors and delusions. The *sensation* of Locke was never meant to stand alone ; it

was *one*, but only one of his fundamental positions ; all of which, be it ever remembered, were carefully hedged around with all the higher principles of morality and religion. When, therefore, this mental law of sensation became isolated and separated from every vestige of religious belief and sentiment, it necessarily became one of the most arid and pernicious dogmas that ever seized hold of the minds of men. Whilst it was in the hands of the English philosopher, allied with a high sense of patriotic philanthropy, and warmed by the glowing spirit of a rational piety, it was worthy of enthusiasm, and of becoming the creed of the wise and enlightened. But stripped of these valuable adjuncts, it sunk at once into an avowed system of selfishness, and heartless ribaldry and folly.

There were several predisposing causes which corrupted and distorted the philosophy of Locke, and rendered it a system of delusion and error. The great body of the French clergy stood aloof from philosophical discussions. This was a false step. Religion and philosophy are indissolubly connected ; when united they became invincible ; when separated they mutually destroy each other. To create jealousies and distrust between them, is to do the greatest violence to the constitution of humanity. The French Clergy did not, however, view matters in this light ; they almost entirely repudiated the philosophic spirit, and sheltered themselves within the narrow citadel of their own theological creed. They declined, with supercilious contempt, the clear stage and open arena of discussion ; and thought they were doing their duty, and

strengthening their cause, by fulminating, now and then, their decrees from the cloisters of the Sorbonne. All this was short-sighted policy, injurious to the best interests of man ; and the consequence was, that a spirit of supineness and sloth crept over the whole body of the priesthood ; and they rather made a surrender of the entire field of discussion, than were actually beaten from it.

Besides these considerations, we must look at the peculiar liability of Locke's doctrine being misconceived and misrepresented in France. The national character of a people has much to do with every system of speculation ; this is proved by the history of philosophy in all ages. Locke's theory was a palpable and tangible thing ; it was something that appeared to be susceptible of almost handling and touching, instead of thinking about. Now this was a tempting attribute to the French mind, which has a constitutional dislike and inaptitude to abstruse reasoning. A Frenchman always likes to see his way ; he dislikes wandering in a haze or mist ; the shadowy ever produces a number of spectral illusions in his brain that bewilder and confuse him. He can always reason sharply and cleverly, if the process be not too long, nor too much below the ground. He would rather swim any day on the surface, than dive to the bottom of the well for the pearls of knowledge. Though always clear, sensible, intelligent, and enthusiastic in the pursuit or communication of scientific truth ; yet he never displays much anxiety to know *how* or *from where* it proceeds. It is sufficient for his purpose that it is there to his hand. In its chief features

and palpable lineaments, he will develop it as forcibly and truly as any man on earth ; but talk to him of its *à priori* origin, or envelop with drapery of ontological speculations, and he will tell you, by one of those expressive shrugs of the shoulder, which a Frenchman alone can give, that you are passing a joke at his expence.

When Locke's system became somewhat generally known in France, it was considered as the most perfect and beautiful thing imaginable ; indeed many conceived that they had never till then been really *in their senses*, by so long neglecting to see how intimately their functions were connected with all inward thoughts and perceptions. *Sensation* was practically the great test of the intellectual existence of the nation. The *senses* are every thing to a Frenchman ; he never allows them to become dull or rusty, but preserves their vitality and liveliness to the last hour of his mortal life. He was delighted, therefore, to perceive that the most important problems in philosophy could be so readily solved by such unerring and palpable instruments. *Sensation* became thus a rallying cry among all the *savants*, who never gave themselves any further heed about the other appendages which belonged to our English philosopher's theory. It was a tangible and universal instrument, and admirably suited the hands which used it, and the purposes which its employment was intended to effect.

After the establishment of the Consular and Imperial dynasties, mental philosophy underwent a visible change in France. It experienced a sud-

den and temporary collapse. Napoleon saw the influence which speculative pursuits had exercised over the minds of the people, and he considered them but little favourable to the consolidation of that power he was so desirous to obtain. He set his face decidedly against them. He checked their cultivation in all the social and political movements of his time; and endeavoured to substitute studies more congenial to his views, and to the active pursuits of his ambition. He attempted to stifle all freedom of thought among the rising generation of France. The youth of the public schools were initiated into the most ridiculous and slavish doctrines. They were to listen no more to the seductive voice of philosophy. Instead of allowing them to look into the laws of their own mind, and to recognise the end and object of their being, he gave them the following questions as their daily intellectual food :—

Qu.—What are the duties which Christians owe to reigning Princes? and what in particular are the duties they owe to Napoleon the First, our present Emperor?

Ans.—Christians owe to governing Princes in general, and to Napoleon our present Emperor in particular, love, respect, and obedience. To honour and serve our Emperor, is then to honour and serve God himself.

Qu.—What ought we to think of those who neglect their duty towards our Emperor?

Ans.—According to the apostle Paul, they resist the established order of God himself, and subject themselves to eternal damnation!

The Imperial antipathy against the cultivation of mental philosophy was not only openly manifested, but where he could not by direct disapprobation accomplish his purpose, he failed not to employ the seductive influence of honour and flattery in its stead. Every man who had a predilection for the studies of mind was inimical to him, and was either to be subdued by his frowns, or moulded to subserviency by the smiles and favours of the Court.

This state of things only lasted a few short years. Speculation and rational inquiry were not to be for ever stifled in France, any more than in other countries. The nation became more ideal, contemplative, and refined, in its tastes and sentiments. Materialism soon comes to an end, soon wears itself out; and the intellect begins to yearn after the religious, the sentimental, and the poetical, as soon as the earthly frenzy has subsided. This is strikingly exemplified in the history of French speculation in the present century. Mental studies soon assumed an imposing attitude in the cultivation of general literature; as we shall now endeavour to illustrate more in detail.

The metaphysical works we are about to mention in this chapter are numerous, and diversified in character and attainments. The French have cultivated mental science with remarkable assiduity and success, since the commencement of this century. In all the public seminaries of learning throughout the kingdom, there are now regular professors of this branch of knowledge. Within the last thirty years in particular, a more sound

and healthy spirit has been infused into all mental investigations ; theoretical speculations have been kept within reasonable limits ; and the old leaven of materialism, infidelity, and blasphemy, has been gradually disappearing from every part of the land. In every new work we see manifest indications of improvement, both in tone, and in spiritual and elevated sentiment. All systems and theories are discussed with candour, gravity, and decorum ; and all investigations are conducted with a constant reference to other important and kindred branches of knowledge.

Nor has this improvement been without its due reward to the promoters of it. We have seen of late years that the cultivation of metaphysical literature has been, in almost all cases, a sure stepping-stone to public honour and renown. Many of the most influential public men of France, at the present moment, are indebted for nearly all the general favour and influence they enjoy, to their able and zealous expositions of the philosophical principles of human nature.

Our notices in this chapter of the various French publications, must necessarily be brief and superficial, and but ill suited to their intrinsic importance. But still we hope they may in some degree prove useful and instructive ; chiefly by stimulating the reader to examine the respective works for himself, and to form his own judgment upon the nature and value of the abstract principles they contain.

M. DE GERANDO.

M. De Gerando* is one of those French philosophers to whom the whole of Europe is under deep obligations. He was a native of Lyons ; served in the army of Italy ; was appointed to several places of dignity under Napoleon ; and at the Restoration was made Professor of Civil Law. In 1837 he was created a Peer of France, and died in 1842.

M. De Gerando entered upon the arena of metaphysical discussion in France in the year 1800, by the publication of the treatise on the Signs of language and the Art of thinking. This work is one of the most original of the author's productions. It relates to the influence of language in all the operations of the mind ; a subject of vast importance and great complexity. Mr. Locke treats of the subject, and in a very judicious manner ; as well as his celebrated French commentator, Condillac ; but the conclusions to which they both arrived were not considered by the French *savants* so full and satisfactory as could be desired. In consequence of this impression, they offered an academical prize for the best Essay on this important topic ; and it was honourably awarded to M. De Gerando. In this philosophical work he

* "Des Signes et de l'Art de Penser," 4 vol. ; "Histoire-Comparée des Systèmes de Philosophie," 8 vol. ; "Du Perfectionnement Moral," 2 vol. ; "De la Bienfaisance Publique," 4 vol. ; "De l'Education des Sourds-muets de Naissance," 2 vol.

follows the footsteps of Condillac, but with some considerable qualifications. His own words are, "It is the distinguishing characteristic of a lively and vigorous conception, to push its speculative conclusions somewhat beyond their just limits. Hence, in the logical discussions of this estimable writer, (Condillac), these maxims, stated without any explanation or restriction, *That the study of a science is nothing more than the acquisition of a language*; and, *that a science properly treated is only a language well contrived*. Hence the rash assertion, *that mathematics possess no advantage over other sciences* but what they derive from a better phraseology; and that all of these might attain to the same character of simplicity and of certainty, if we knew how to give them signs equally perfect."*

"The same task which must have been executed by those who contributed to the first formation of a language, and which is executed by every child when he learns to speak it, is repeated over in the mind of every adult when he makes use of his mother-tongue; for it is only by the decomposition of his thoughts, that he can learn to select the signs which he ought to employ, and to dispose them in a suitable order. Accordingly, those external actions which we call *speaking* and *writing*, are always accompanied with a philosophical process of the understanding; unless we content ourselves, as too often happens, with repeating over

* Des Signes et l'Art de Penser, p. 20.

mechanically what has been said by others. It is in *this* respect that languages, with their forms and rules, conducting, (so to speak) those who use them into the path of a regular analysis; tracing out to them, in a well ordered discourse, the model of a perfect decomposition; may be regarded, *in a certain sense*, as *analytical methods*. But I stop short; Condillac, to whom this ideas belongs, has developed it too well to leave any hope of improving upon his statement."

M. De Gerando further remarks, "In asserting that languages may be regarded as analytical methods, I have added the qualifying phrase, *in a certain sense*, for the word *method* cannot be employed here with any exact propriety. Languages furnish the *occasions* and the *means of analysis*; that is to say, they afford us assistance in *following* that method; but they are not the method itself. They resemble signals and finger-posts, placed on a road to enable us to discover our way; and if they help us to analyse, it is because they are themselves the results, and, as it were, the monuments of an analysis, which has been previously made; nor do they contribute to keep us in the right path, but in proportion to the degree of judgment with which that analysis has been conducted."*

Those who have a general acquaintance with French metaphysics, must know what an important element the nature and origin of language forms in the mental speculations of the country. On

* Des Signes, pp. 138. 139.

this account, it cannot be considered out of place to make a few cursory remarks on the offices and influence of language, as an instrument of reasoning. These remarks will have a direct bearing upon the general principles embodied in many disquisitions on language, which have been currently adopted in France since the days of Condillac, and particularly upon the ingenious speculations of Destutt-Tracy and De Gerando.

We shall not enter here into any discussion on the origin of language; this will come before us a little further on. Our remarks shall now be confined to practical, rather than theoretical considerations.

The question, What offices do words fill in the general economy of mind? has long been, and is still, an unsolved problem. Do we ever carry on processes of reasoning in matters relating to human nature,—to mind, morals, religion, politics, and the like,—merely by signs or words, as with characters in algebra or arithmetic; or is it only by ideas or mental conceptions with which the mind is familiar? This is the point at issue. One class of thinkers arrange themselves on one side of the question, and another on the opposite; one thinks that in carrying on trains of reasoning, we only dwell upon the signs, and not on the things signified; while the other maintains the contrary, and affirms, that if we attend at all to the matter under consideration, with a reference to its full comprehension, we must dwell solely on the ideas which words designate; upon that *sub-*

stratum of thought which lies comparatively hidden by verbal phraseology. I think the latter opinion the most tenable and conclusive. It is impossible to conceive what is meant by reasoning on mind, morals, theology, &c., if we only attend to signs, as in arithmetic or in algebra. We may take any sign to represent a thousand, and reason by it conclusively, without directing the thought to the thousand units which compose the general term ; but can we reason of mental faculties, their natures, their powers, their relations, their final purposes ; can we reason of the Deity, his attributes, his providence, his creative power, &c., merely by a *sign* ; and discard those ideas and perceptions of mind, which, in fact, seem to be the very elements of its nature ? The slightest consideration, I conceive, will be sufficient to negative the *nominal* theory ; for it involves us, at every step, in inextricable difficulties ; it abounds in short, with the most outrageous conclusions and startling paradoxes.

Leaving, however, this discussion, for the reader to carry out, we shall hasten to make a few practical remarks on the nature of language.

Language is used by all mankind for two special objects, to represent their own individual conceptions, and to convey them to others. The necessity and utility of definitions naturally spring out of this double purpose. They are of the greatest importance in all philosophical disquisitions on human nature ; but just in proportion to this importance, is the great difficulty they give rise to.

Verbal definitions, abstractly considered, are endless ; they are the mere substitution of one word, or set of words, for another. No general rules can be laid down for either the common or philosophical meaning of terms ; we must, therefore, in all cases, fall back upon the ideas or conceptions of the things signified by them. And hence it is a general maxim of the greatest moment for the successful cultivation and extension of mental science in particular, that we depart as little as possible from the ordinary language of mankind on the subject. It must be remembered that prominent mental phenomena are cognizant to all men, totally irrespective of their station or knowledge. The language, therefore, which they employ to designate these mental powers and emotions, is entitled to our particular attention ; and our scientific terms and modes of speaking ought always to aim at as near an approximation to it as possible. This is of immense practical importance in all matters connected with the study of the human mind.

As we have just observed, no formal rules whatever can be laid down to guide us in our definitions of terms ; the only general rule, (and it is very general indeed), is to fall back upon the thought, and upon the ordinary meaning which may be attached to the particular word, or set of words. In the cultivation of philosophy, all habits of verbal quibbling ought to be strenuously repressed ; and every inquirer into the secrets of nature, ought to keep his attention perpetually fixed on phenomena, and not be led astray by pre-

tended verbal accuracies, and attenuated definitions. All language, whether applied by ourselves or others, should hang loosely around us; and we should keep perpetually before us the forcible though quaint aphorism of Hobbes, "that words are the *counters* of wise men, but the *money* of fools."

But to return to a more direct notice of De Gerando's philosophy, we may remark, that he originally belonged to the school of Condillac; but as he advanced in life, and became more conversant with the speculative doctrines of other nations, he gradually assumed more spirituality in his views. This change is fully apparent in his *Memoir to the Berlin Academy*, entitled "*De la Génération des Connaissances Humaines*;" but particularly in his "*Histoire Comparée*," where very enlightened and profound views are displayed on every branch of mental science. Common sense is a predominating characteristic in his philosophy; and a sincere, candid, disinterested spirit seems to have animated him in all his investigations in mental science.

M. KERATRY.

This author's system of *ontology*,* may be embodied in the following observations. He supposes that, at the beginning of all things, there

* "*Examen philosophique des Considérations sur le sentiment du Sublime et du Beau, dans le rapport des caractères, des tempéraments, des sexes, des climats et des religions*," 1 Vol.; "*Inductions Morales et Philosophiques*," 1 Vol.

existed only one being, but that was a Being of Supreme Intelligence. He wished to create; and suddenly he penetrated the immense void of nothingness, where, perhaps, matter and mind had lain from all eternity. These two elements were, by an act of intelligent creation, combined together in thousands of different forms. These combinations produced individual existences, which peopled the universe; and varied, almost to infinity, its organized inhabitants. In our own planet there were three distinct orders of creation, namely, Minerals, Vegetables, and Animals. The orders displayed various combinations of the two principles, mind and matter. The organized beings lived for such a period of time as was prescribed to them by the laws of their existence; and then they died. When this occurred, the power and substance of each of them separated, not, however, to enter again into a state of nonentity, but to continue their existence under new forms and combinations. Such, for example, is the state of the soul of man, which, though united to body, disengages itself from it, to appear under new relations, and in a state where it will doubtless unite itself again with an organic form, of a more delicate and refined description than any that are witnessed here below. Thus we can explain by this divine agency and law, the *creation* of spiritual and material beings, their *terrestrial union*, their *separation*, and their final *restoration* in another state of existence.

P. LAROMIGUIERE.

Laromiguière is the author of "Leçons de Philosophie," 2 vols. Paris, 1815. The substance of this publication is composed of popular lectures delivered to young students in the French metropolis. The leading aim of the author is thus stated in his own words. "We shall attempt to throw some light upon the unperceived causes of things, and to discover their remote origin. If ideas be created and developed under our eyes, it will be easy to observe the mode in which human intelligence is formed; to learn in what its nature consists; to determine all questions of probable evidence respecting it; to assign a reason for its existence; and to see how its limits extend to the utmost boundaries of our sensible perceptions. This will be to resolve the fundamental problem of philosophy."*

In prosecuting his subject, the author enters into a most minute and rigid examination of the metaphysical system of Condillac, and disapproves of his enumeration of the faculties of the soul. He then lays down another theory of his own. This appears to consist of a compound, so to speak, of the system of *sensation*, as explained by Condillac, and a principle of *sentiment*, or sympathy.

M. Laromiguière maintains that there are *three* things clearly distinguishable relative to sensation.

* Page 6, Vol. 1.

1st, That the mind is sometimes passive, and sometimes active. 2nd, That sensibility is not in itself a mental faculty. 3rd, That we are ignorant of the precise manner in which external objects act upon the mind by means of sensation. He also lays down the following positions:—That the faculty of the *understanding* is not a principle or attribute of sensibility; that the greater or lesser number of sensations has not much influence on our principle of intelligence; that the understanding comprehends within it three other minor faculties or powers, neither more nor less; namely, *attention*, *comparison*, and *reasoning*; and that the faculty of the *will* also contains three powers, *desire*, *preference*, and *liberty*.

The author defends the system of Condillac upon the whole; and maintains that it is not by any means conducive, as some have affirmed, to the scheme of materialism.

In the second volume of this publication we find extended discussions on the writings of most of our modern metaphysicians on the nature of simple and general ideas. These discussions may be read with advantage.

The general conclusion of the author is, that the analysis of *thinking*, and the analysis of *sensibility*, form two theories which tend to the same object. The one makes us see how the soul acts; and the other how it is itself affected. These two combined, teach us how we obtain knowledge.

Though the author expresses himself in favour of the general scope and tenor of Condillac's sys-

tem, yet it is quite obvious that his leading principles of philosophical discussion go to undermine the fabric of the learned Abbé. He has shaken the theory of *transformed sensations*, and shows that the human mind ought not to be considered in the light of a *tabula rasa*. All these points of difference between M. Laromiguière and other popular writers in France, are so ably and eloquently sustained, that he is fully entitled to be considered as one of the most able metaphysicians of modern times.*

* "Le système des facultés de l'ame, selon M. Laromiguière, commence non pas à la sensation, mais à l'attention, la première de nos facultés actives. L'attention, dans son double développement, produit successivement toutes les facultés, et celles dont se compose l'entendement, et celles dont se compose la volonté. Les facultés de l'entendement sont diverses; mais on peut les réduire à trois; d'abord l'attention, la faculté fondamentale; puis la comparaison; puis enfin le raisonnement. Dans ces trois facultés rentrent toutes les facultés intellectuelles: le jugement est ou la comparaison elle-même, ou un produit de la comparaison; la mémoire n'est encore qu'un produit de l'attention, ou ce qui reste d'une sensation qui nous a vivement affectés; la réflexion, se composant de raisonnemens, de comparaisons, n'est pas une faculté distincte de ces facultés; l'imagination n'est que la réflexion, lorsqu'elle combine des images; enfin, l'entendement est la réunion des trois facultés élémentaires et des autres facultés composées qui leur servent de cortège. Or, la réunion de plusieurs facultés n'est pas une faculté réelle, ce n'est qu'une faculté nominale, un signe sans valeur propre et sans réalité. Il n'y a de réel que ces trois facultés élémentaires: je dis élémentaires, parce que, dans leur développement, elles engendrent d'autres facultés; mais, dans le vrai, il n'y a de faculté élémentaire, selon M. la Romiguière, que l'attention. En effet, la comparaison n'est que l'attention double, l'attention donnée à deux objets, de manière à discerner leurs rapports. Sans attention, point de comparaison possible, et sans comparaison, point de raisonnement; car le raisonnement n'est qu'une double comparaison, il naît de la comparaison, comme la comparaison naît de l'attention. L'entendement est donc tout entier dans l'attention."—(Cousin.)

M. ROYER-COLLARD.

This distinguished French writer* was raised to the Chair of Philosophy in the Normal School of Paris, in 1811; and immediately commenced a course of lectures on subjects of mental philosophy. He took for the basis of his system the prevailing theory of Condillac, as it had been corrected, explained, and modified by several recent writers on the mind. But Royer-Collard had not entered far into the "Traité de la Sensation," until he found many defects in the reasonings of the Abbé; and the exposition of these defects, in a course of lectures, rendered extremely popular by the eloquence of the Professor, has been considered, in France especially, as forming the epoch of the "decline and fall" of what is termed the *sensational system* of mental philosophy.

The imperfections which the Professor points out in Condillac's system relate particularly to the nature of *substance* in general, to *cause* and *effect*, *time* and *space*. On these four topics, the leading innovations which the public lecturer made on the national metaphysical creed of France, may be said to rest.†

Royer-Collard paid great attention to the philo-

* "Fragmens."

† On comparing our notions of time and space, Royer-Collard has the following remarks:—"Comme la notion de durée devient indépendante des événemens qui nous l'ont donnée, de même la notion de l'étendue, aussitôt que nous l'avons acquise, devient indépendante des objets où

sophy of Dr. Reid, and felt a lively interest in its elucidation and promulgation among his countrymen. The judgments of common-sense seem to take a great hold of mind; and when viewed in conjunction with the bare and naked system of sensation with which his mind had long been familiar, he seems to have come to the conclusion that there was yet much to learn in the philosophy of mind.

MAINE DE BIRAN.

This author* was one of the early revivers of spiritualism in France. In the year 1800, he obtained the prize offered by the National Institute for the best Essay "On the Influence of Habit upon the Faculties of Thinking." Here he displayed considerable talent; but all his speculations at this period were based upon the notions of Condillac, and consciousness is defined and illus-

nous l'avons trouvée. Quand la pensée anéantit ceux-ci, elle n'anéantit pas l'espace qui les contenait.

"Comme la notion d'une durée limitée nous suggère la notion du temps, c'est-à-dire d'une durée sans bornes qui n'a pas pu commencer, et qui ne pourrait pas finir; de même la notion d'une étendue limitée nous suggère la notion de l'espace, c'est-à-dire une étendue infinie et nécessaire qui demeure immobile, tandis que les corps s'y meuvent en tous sens. Le temps se perd dans l'éternité, l'espace dans l'immensité. Sans le temps il n'y aurait pas de durée; sans l'espace il n'y aurait pas d'étendue. Le temps et l'espace contiennent dans leur ample sein toutes les existences finies, et elles sont situées dans l'espace, et elles ont aussi leur moment dans le temps; mais le temps est partout, et l'espace aussi ancien que le temps."

* "Œuvres Philosophiques de Maine de Biran," 3 Vol. edited by Cousin, Paris 1841.

trated throughout the Essay as the effect of the action and reaction of the nervous system. In 1803, he obtained another prize for an Essay "On the Decomposition of the Faculty of Thinking;" and it was here that the first indications of a change of opinions were recognized. The Academy of Sciences of Berlin offered, in 1807, a prize for the best dissertation on the question "Whether there is in man an immediate internal intuition, and in what it differs from the perceptions of the senses." This prize also Maine de Biran carried off; and likewise another, a short time after, from Copenhagen, on "The Mutual Relation of Man's Moral and Physical Constitution." He wrote several other pieces on metaphysical topics.

The leading principle in the metaphysical speculations of Maine de Biran, in the latter part of his career, was the *activity* of the mind or soul. This activity was voluntary and absolute. It was not to be considered an attribute, or power, or faculty, but the very nature or essence of mentality itself. Without activity the mind was nothing.

The soul or mind of man is, therefore, the primary and efficient cause of all its movements; of all our ideas, notions, and sentiments.*

This doctrine is, however, laid down with some limitations. Our sensations are unquestionably produced by external objects; or at least we receive these through some species of sensibility. Now our author calls this *physical sensibility*, or the

* On Causation, part 1, sec. 2; On Power, Will, Personality, part 2nd, chapt. 2.

sensitive soul, which is of a material nature, possesses extension, and whose centre of nervous action lies in the brain. This physical sensibility is not an attribute of the rational soul, for this is spiritual or immaterial, and consequently indestructible.

There is no mind, therefore, where absolute liberty and spontaneity of action are not present. These stamp every thing with mental life.

Maine de Biran places his theory in another point of view. He says personal identity, or the *moi*, is just a phrase indicative of the principle of activity. Every thing relative to our existence must be the legitimate offspring of this activity, or we can have no knowledge of any thing which can substantiate the existence of our own consciousness. Pure passive feeling will not answer the purpose. There must be attention; there must be an inward turning of the eye of the mind on itself; there must be action; or nothing is remembered, nor any traces of our existence visible. This principle of activity is, in fact, that which I denominate and call myself. I appeal to some action, or some feeling where action has been awakened, in order to ascertain and be assured of my identity.*

* “L’entendement divin seul peut entendre la substance pensante comme susceptible de l’infinité de modifications que comporte sa nature. L’homme ne s’entend pas lui-même à ce titre; et toute la profondeur de la réflexion, toute la sagacité du génie, ne lui révéleront jamais ce qu’il est dans le fond et le *passif de son être*. Mais si nous ignorons ce que nous sommes comme substances passives, chaque personne indivi-

In every exertion of the will, there are three distinct things involved ; the conception of a power to do a certain act, a movement made, and a perfect conviction that there exists between these two a certain and specific relation. The mind, however, always rests upon the first, the capacity or power to act. This constitutes what I call *my action*, *my doing*, *my production*, *my energy*, and the like. There is nothing *out* of me, nothing *beyond* me. I know, and believe, and affirm, and declare, that I, my individual *self*, am the cause of whatever takes place from this exercise of the power of will. I also know, and the conviction and belief is the daily active regulating principle of my life, that if this action were not referred to *myself*, as its ultimate or absolute cause, the action would not constitute any part of me whatever ; and that the world would never think of identifying it with me, as to any, even the smallest circumstances or events, of which it might be the efficient cause.

This is the speculative doctrine laid down by Maine de Biran ; and there is no doubt whatever but that he has seized upon a striking and original power of the mind ; a power which forms an essen-

duelle sait du moins ce qu'elle est comme force qui agit et opère par le vouloir ; elle s'assure par la raison qu'elle n'est autre pour elle-même que telle force ou énergie ; que c'est là le fond de son être, comme celui de sa vie de conscience, ou de son *moi* ; que c'est là la seule chose qui demeure identique, quand tout le reste passe, ou est dans un flux perpétuel. . . . et que c'est en vertu de cette énergie, ou de ce pouvoir d'agir, que l'homme conçoit l'idée du devoir." (Nouvelles considérations, &c. p. 330.)

tial element in the intellectual constitution of mankind, and which they recognise in thousands of different modes, every day of their lives. But to make a principle of this kind, to constitute the activity a living and vital energy, something more must be added to mere spontaneous action. The will implies *intelligence*. This power or principle is embodied in every conception of the voluntary faculty. To take away the intelligence is to destroy the voluntary act; it is no longer voluntary. Our French philosopher does not seem to have kept this consideration steadily in view, in the course of his reasonings; and this omission has exposed him to the fire of his opponents. He has been charged with *absolute idealism*: and certainly his principle of causation, if pushed, without the power of intelligence with it, lies open to such an accusation.*

Whatever opinions may, however, be entertained of Maine de Biran's philosophy as a whole, certain it is, that all philosophers must agree that it is historically, as well as intrinsically, important. It undoubtedly tended to give a new direction to philosophical disquisitions in France; and the subjects themselves have ever been deemed highly interesting; inasmuch as they are vitally interwoven with matters of deep concern to all mankind. That the author has evinced great originality in their investigation and development, is unquestionable; he thought for himself, and in a manner as if he were only anxious for the establishment of the true principles of mental philosophy.

* See Cousin's Preface to the "Nouvelles Considérations," p. 27.

M. LANCELIN.

The "Introduction à l'Analyse des Sciences," 1803, is the production of a young philosopher who died at the age of thirty-five. It made its appearance when the system of Condillac was generally cultivated in France; and as the author, on his own confession, scarcely knew of any other metaphysical writer than the Abbé and Locke, it is only what might be expected, that his views should be moulded in the school of *sensations* and *ideas*.

The work of Lancelin is divided into three parts. The first is occupied with an analysis of the power of thinking, which is based on the same principle as that of Condillac. Here the author also enters into an examination as to *the influence of signs upon the formation of ideas*. The second section of the work is devoted to an introductory examination of those sciences more immediately connected with the exercise of the human will. In the third and last division of the treatise, Lancelin gives us a formal classification of general knowledge, accompanied with many judicious observations on the progress and constitutional limits of the human mind.

FRENCH THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY :—
LE MAISTRE, LAMENNAIS, BONALD, D'ECKSTEIN, BALLANCHE, BAUTAIN, VISCOMTESSE DE LUDRE, THE PRINCESSE DE BELGIOJOSO, &c. &c.

We have classed all these writers under one ge-

neral head, and chiefly for two reasons. They all, more or less, advocate the principle of divine and human authority in matters of abstract philosophy ; and they also all, in divers forms and degrees, discuss the mental principles of man, through the medium of Divine Revelation generally, and the Catholic Faith in particular. In France they have been set apart under the denomination of the "*Ecole Théologique*;" and the nature and spirit of their respective publications show that this classification is at once appropriate, and responded to by public opinion in that country.

The great efforts which the clergy and lay members of the Catholic Church have made, in recent times, in France, to have their voice publicly heard in the decisions of philosophy, may be easily and naturally enough accounted for by the operation of the ordinary principles of human conduct. In the whole history of the Christian world we cannot find a single instance, where the religious profession, as a body, have suffered from such severe and repeated attacks from speculative philosophy, as in France. Here the troubles, miseries, and mortifications of the Priesthood, have been beyond all description. For many years before the Revolution, they saw the sappers and miners zealously labouring to deposit the materials of combustion in the citadel of their faith ; and even some of their own body joined, unconsciously, in the contemplated work of destruction. The political circumstances of the country, and the position of the Church itself, greatly facilitated these hostile

proceedings; so that the clerical profession were, at that time, too weak, bewildered, and supine, to make any successful head against them. At length the period came when the spark of ignition fell; and all was buried, in a moment, under a desolating mass of ruins.

The ministers of the Church were scattered, by the shock, in all directions. They were many years doomed to wander as outcasts in society, and to have the finger of scorn and derision pointed at them. To men reared as the tender favourites of the community, and sincerely believing in the truth and sacredness of their creed, this could not but prove a season of severe affliction. At length order began to arise out of confusion, and their hopes and prospects brightened. They were gradually restored to power and influence; and the Catholic Church was once more publicly recognised as the national organ of religious sentiments and opinions.

Now, after the Clergy, as a public body, had fairly recovered themselves, they would naturally look upon this speculative philosophy with peculiar feelings. They would see in it the source of all their past troubles; and would not be without their forebodings of annoyances for the future. They would see that this philosophy had interwoven itself with the national literature of their country, and that its cultivation had become one of the leading paths to popularity and power. It had, it is true, assumed various appearances, and had undergone numerous modifications, of a fa-

vourable character ; but still the whole system could not be viewed but with peculiar feelings of anxiety and dread. It seems natural, therefore, under these circumstances, for the clerical body to say to themselves ; “ Well, here is a mass of speculation, closely allied by its nature to all the leading principles of religion generally, and to our creed in particular ; and we must endeavour to give it, if possible, a new direction, or attempt to extract a portion, at least, of the poison out of it. These abstract speculations have taken a deep root in the public mind, and we cannot expect to eradicate them completely ; but we may do something to temper or modify them, so that we may not again be subjected to the intense sufferings we have recently endured. Let us calmly and dispassionately examine this mental philosophy, and perhaps we shall be able to place its leading principles in such a point of view, that our spiritual power and influence may be, in future, greatly strengthened, instead of weakened, by its effect upon the mind of the nation.”

Such, we have no doubt, has been the train of thought in the minds of the great body of the Catholic divines of France, who have a taste for letters and philosophy ; and such the resolves they have made. They have entered upon their labours with great animation and zeal ; and, it must be confessed, by all who have attentively and candidly perused their writings, that they have brought to the task no ordinary portion of talent and controversial ability. They write like men who are deeply

in earnest, and are resolutely bent upon achieving a given end or purpose; and that end is, to make the philosophy of human nature rest upon revelation generally, and the Catholic doctrines in particular.

We shall now, as concisely as possible, endeavour to lay before the reader the principal controversial instruments which these metaphysical theologians have used for the contemplated reformation of philosophy. In doing this, we cannot enter into any lengthened arguments on them; but must leave the important points in dispute to the reader's own judgment. We shall, however, endeavour to make our several notices as useful and interesting as possible.

And here we may be just allowed to observe, that all the leading questions which the "Theological School" of France has undertaken to discuss, are important in themselves, totally irrespective of the motives of the writers, or the end which they wish to accomplish. Every section of the great Christian community is interested in their discussion and development; and each party is at full liberty to take its stand upon any portion of the philosophical argument, at any point, where it conceives soundness ends and imperfection commences. They are all, in the strictest sense, open questions to philosophers and divines of every shade of opinion.

LE COMTE JOSEPH DE MAISTRE.*—The metaphysical writings of the Comte Joseph de Maistre assume, in most of his publications, the character of scattered and detached remarks and observations, rather than formal disquisitions. His "*Soirées de Saint Pétersbourg*," is a popular work on the Continent, among a certain class of philosophers. It was composed whilst the author was discharging the important duty of Ambassador at the Russian capital. The work is written in the form of dialogue, and as the topics of discussion are professedly upon the nature of temporal governments and of a Divine providence, we can easily imagine that a wide field is opened to philosophical inquiry.

Man, according to M. de Maistre, is doomed to suffering, which is the just punishment which the fall has inflicted on him. The only alleviation to his earthly misery is through religious sentiment or feeling, which displays itself in prayer and in the performance of meritorious deeds. These will not only assuage his pain and grief, but direct him to that true source of all knowledge, a Divine revelation, where alone a philosophy can be found which can prove of any benefit to human nature.

* "*Considérations sur la France*," 1 vol.; "*Essai sur le principe générateur des constitutions politiques*," 1 vol.; "*Sur les délais de la justice divine dans la punition des coupables*," 1 vol.; "*Lettres d'un gentilhomme russe sur l'inquisition espagnole*," 1 vol.; "*Du Pape*," 2 vols.; "*De l'Eglise gallicane dans son rapport avec le souverain pontife, pour servir de suite à l'ouvrage intitulé Le Pape*," 1 vol.; "*Soirées de St. Pétersbourg, &c.*," 2 vols.; "*Examen de la philosophie de Bacon, où l'on traite différentes questions de la philosophie rationnelle*," 2 vols.

The author combats the whole philosophy of Locke on *innate ideas*, and treats it with the most sovereign contempt; maintaining "that all rational doctrines are grounded upon previous knowledge; for man can learn nothing but what is previously known."* The same principle is laid down in a dozen different forms and places in the "Sixième Entretien," and in the notes at the end of the chapter, where the author defends this opinion by numerous quotations from Aristotle and Plato.

The author's "Examen de la Philosophie de Bacon," which has already been alluded to in a previous volume, is the most instructive and amusing of his philosophical productions. It is racy and witty; and he pounces upon the weak parts in the Baconian philosophy, and tears them to tatters. His enmity to every thing mechanical, material, and sensational, knows no bounds; and conscientiously believing that all kinds of philosophy built upon such foundations are delusive and pernicious, he keeps no terms with their abettors and supporters. "The style of Bacon," says he, "shews his incapacity in matters of philosophy. His style is, so to speak, material; nothing but forms, masses, and movements, exercise his mind. His thought seems, if we may so speak, to corporise itself, and to amalgamate itself with those objects which it can alone occupy. Every abstract expression, every word of the intelligence, which contemplates itself, gives him offence. He refers to the Scholastic philosophy every idea or conception which does not

present him with three dimensions. In all his works he has not a single word which addresses itself to the spirit; that of *nature*, or of essence, for example, chokes him; he would much rather say *form*, because he can *see* it. The term *prejudice* is too subtile or refined for his ear; he says *idol*, because it is a statue of wood, of stone, or of metal, and has form and colour, and can be touched, and placed on a pedestal. Instead then of saying, national prejudices, corporal prejudices, &c., and those prejudices which we all more or less derive from character and habit, he calls them idols of the cave; for the internal structure of man appears in his eyes only like a humid cavern, and the errors which distil from the vault form concretions, like stalactites which hang from subterranean excavations.”*

Notwithstanding this ridicule of our great English reformer of philosophy, De Maistre makes many excellent observations on the best mode of cultivating human knowledge; and to those philosophers who think there is nothing true beyond the line and compasses, he administers a severe but just rebuke.†

* Examen, vol. 1, p. 56.

† The following are the terms in which the French Editors speak of the general merits of Joseph de Maistre. “Jamais la philosophie abjecte du 18^{me} siècle ne rencontra d’adversaire plus redoutable: ni la science, ni le génie, ni les renommées, ne lui imposent; il avance sans cesse, abattant devant lui tous ces colosses aux pieds d’argile; il a des armes de toute espèce pour les combattre: c’est le cri de l’indignation; c’est le rire amer du mépris; c’est le trait acéré du sarcasme; c’est une dialectique qui atterre; ce sont des traits d’éloquence qui foudroient. Jamais on ne pénétra avec plus de sagacité dans les replis les plus tortueux d’un sophisme, pour le mettre au grand jour et le montrer tel

ABBE LAMENNAIS.*—This French writer is one of the most distinguished, if not the most able, members of the theological school. He has certainly entered more profoundly into the question of authority than any of his contemporaries.

M. Lamennais affirms that the reason and sentiment of mankind, when considered in themselves, are insufficient to lead us to truth. Our external senses are apt to deceive us, and we can derive no information from them on which we can infallibly depend. Our inward sentiments are equally liable to delusion, from their dependence upon individual and temporary causes of excitement. And what we term reason is also a blind guide; for it has

qu'il est, absurde et ridicule; jamais une érudition plus étendue et plus variée ne fut employée avec plus d'art et de jugement pour fortifier le raisonnement de toute la puissance du témoignage. Puis ensuite quand il pénètre jusqu'au fond du cœur de l'homme, quand il visite, pour ainsi parler, les parties les plus secrètes de son intelligence, soit qu'il en explique la force, soit qu'il en dévoile la faiblesse, quelle foule d'aperçus ingénieux, de traits inattendus, de vérités profondes et nouvelles! Que de sentiments tendres, délicats et généreux! quelle foi pieuse et inébranlable! quel esprit que celui qui a pu concevoir des pensées si grandes, si étonnantes sur la guerre! quel cœur que celui d'où il semble s'écouler, comme d'une source pure et vivifiante, des paroles si animées et si touchantes sur la prière!"

* "Essai sur l'indifférence en matière de religion avec la défense, &c." 4 vols.; "Esquisse d'une philosophie," 5 vols.; "Discussions critiques et Pensées diverses sur la religion et la philosophie," 1 vol.; "Amschaspands et Darvands," 1 vol.; "Mélanges religieux et philosophiques," 1 vol.; "Paroles d'un croyant," 1 vol.; "Le Livre du Peuple," 1 vol.; "Politique à l'usage du peuple," 2 vols.; "De l'esclavage moderne," 1 vol.; "Questions philosophiques et politiques," 2 vols.; "De la Religion," 1 vol.; "Du passé et de l'avenir du peuple," 1 vol.; "Servitude volontaire," 1 vol.

only our sensations and emotions to work upon, which themselves rest upon no solid basis.

The only safe guide, then, according to M. Lamennais, is *Authority*. This is defined to be the testimony of a greater or lesser number of men, worthy of credit, as to their belief in the truth of certain facts and principles. This authority ought to be a uniform rule for the government of our judgments. Where this rule is neglected, our judgments must be doubtful or erroneous; or rather, we can form no judgments at all; for the ideas we derive from the senses, from sentiment, and from reason, are all vain and delusive perceptions of the mind.

Now from what is this authority derived? It is founded on the Scriptures. According to our author's opinion, there has only been ONE religion on earth. It has been *three* distinct times revealed; and every successive revelation has been productive of additional light and authority. All these three separate declarations of the divine will to man, contain the same primary and fundamental principles of truth. In the Patriarchal, in the Mosaic, and in the Christian dispensations, we find the same general ideas of man's nature, duty, and future prospects. All these are transmitted for our guidance and instruction, through Adam, Moses, and Jesus Christ. The outward machinery of these respective revelations varies; but the internal movements, and principles of action, are precisely the same.

Nor are these positions invalidated by any considerations arising from the number or universality

of erroneous systems of religion prevalent in the world. All these, in the author's judgment, when rightly considered, are strikingly confirmatory of the truth of the Christian system.*

Thus far we are to consider the Abbé as the defender of the Church : but since the publication of his "*Indifférence en Matière de Religion*," he has appeared in an entirely new character. He is now without the pale of that Catholic community, for the doctrines of which he was so recently a strenuous champion. This change was manifested in his "*Esquisse d'une Philosophie*," which astonished the public, and made his friends weep. The metaphysical doctrines laid down in this treatise, which must be allowed, even by its enemies, to

* "What philosophy," says the Abbé, "is there, whose pretensions are not all delusive, false? The senses are blind guides, they attest nothing which is clear, definite, complete. Feeling is as little to be relied on; its object, although more evident and simple in its appearance, is still nothing but a source of perpetual doubts and illusions. As to reason, it is tainted at its heart's core. In the first place, it deals with the data furnished by the senses and the feelings, (things delusive in themselves); and then in the next place, when these data are at hand, how does it deal with them? What guarantee have we of the legitimacy of its movements or intimations? What can we think of the contradictory conclusions it can draw from the same premises; and what of the identical ones it deduces from different premises? What truth has it not called in question, and to what error has it not given currency? In fine, must it not rely upon memory in all its operations? And is this a faithful ally? Reason, feeling, sense!—faculties without control! delusive means of obtaining knowledge!—principles of error and doubt! These are they which deprive man of all hope of obtaining knowledge or faith from himself; there is reality neither within or without for him. There is nothing, not even the truth of his own existence, on which he can place any reliance, unless he has some better ground than his own reason or sentiment, and his own individual consciousness."

evinced great talent and eloquence, is a broad species of pantheism, which has alarmed all the religious sects upon the Continent. The author uses no great disguise to conceal his heterodox opinions; on the contrary, he brings them out pretty openly to the light of day. The reader will find his peculiar opinions, bearing on this doctrine, in the first volume, where he treats, in several chapters, of *God and the Universe*.*

The *idea* of philosophy, according to Lamennais' definition of it in his "Esquisse," is, that it is an attempt of the human reason to conceive all things, with every thing that is the product of them; in one word, all sciences, all their developments, all their relations. It combines and systematises all primary or elemental truths, as the basis of its operations; carries them forward to the true causes and principles which the mind can grasp; deduces from these, legitimate consequences; and combines them into a system or theory, which comprehends a principle of universality, both of things, and the laws which regulate their existence or movements.

This is the nature or object of philosophy; what is the *method* to prosecute it? The learned Abbé tells us, that the single or individual mind is incapable of establishing a philosophy, as it cannot go beyond its own personal views and feelings. Another foundation must be sought for, and this lies in the suggestions of the human reason as they are developed in *masses of mankind*. To whatever

* *Esquisse*, tom. 1st, pp. 40. 47. 58. 65. 80. 86. 104. 113. 121. 132. 133. 140. 149. 180. 211. 262. 263. 277. 333. 339.

the aggregate reason yields assent, that is, must be, true. All such general conclusions are freed from the errors and imperfections which attach themselves to the conclusions of individual minds, and individual experiences and observations.

Having now obtained a clear starting ground, the Abbé asks three questions, which, he thinks, comprehend all philosophical inquiries.—Does any thing exist? How, or in what manner does any thing exist? Why, or for what reasons does any thing exist? To the first question no answer of an argumentative nature can be given; we cannot demonstrate existence; it must be taken as a primitive, an elementary fact; all mankind receive it and acknowledge it as such. We know being *per se*, and being *per alium*; to deny these is to strike at the root of all consciousness. The grand object, therefore, of philosophy, is to inquire into the nature of Deity, and of the universe around us.

All disquisitions on the nature and attributes of Deity, establish three things, *power*, *intelligence*, and *love*. These are developed in the Holy Scriptures, as the Father, the Son, and the Spirit; and they constitute the only and true source of all forms of existence.*

A philosophy without God, is a philosophy without any foundation. When, however, we recognise the attributes of power, intelligence, and love, we have then a key to all the mysteries of creation.

* Esquisse, vol. 1, pp. 25. 48.

The philosophy of creation may be viewed under a variety of aspects ; and from every point some truth is observable. There are some things here which are incomprehensible to human reason, and others again which it can readily recognise. We know that Deity must have contained the *copies* of every thing in His own nature ; for nothing could have sprung into existence without a *form*. Power, intelligence, and love, are the three concurring principles of all creation. This is, in fact, an *external* realization of that which was *within* the Divine Mind ; and if we fully comprehend and appreciate this truth, we are in possession of all that philosophy can teach us as to the stupendous act of creation.

Upon the supposition of creation being a realization of the ideas in the Divine understanding, what is *matter* ? The Abbé tells us it is a *negative* thing ; it is nothing. The only *positive* things are power, intelligence, and love ; the limitations of these attributes create *negative* appearances, which constitute what we call *matter*. Pure matter, according to the ordinary notion of it, has no existence whatever ; indeed the very conception of such a thing implies the most palpable contradiction. "The existence of a thing which limits, involves that of a thing limited ; consequently every body is *complex*. Whatever its station in the scale of being, that which makes it a fixed or determined thing,—that *positive* attribute it has distinct from matter,—is purely that which is *limited by matter*. Of the two elements of which it is composed, the

limiting and the limited, the one expresses that which *is*, and the other that which is *not*; that is, the limit in space, the circumscription of its own nature.”*

In the Divine existence, the Abbé tells us, there is neither *time*, *space*, nor *motion*; hence all these, as modes of existence, are merely *negative*. *Time* is the *limit* of eternity; *space*, the limit of immensity; and *motion*, the *limit* of Omnipresence. This is the explanation of that passage in Scripture, “In Him we live, and move, and have our being.”

In the further development of his system; the Abbé brings us to the consideration of the universe as a whole. Can we by our reason discover that it bears the marks of *power*, *intelligence*, and *love*; the attributes of a Divine Mind? The general answer which all science and knowledge give to this question is, that in every department of nature we see the most striking manifestations of power, intelligence, and love. This satisfactory reply rests upon the investigations which the Abbé enters into on inorganic matter, the various gradations of organised existence, and the phenomena of mind.

Passing over the laws and properties of inorganic matter, and the nature of the various grades of animated nature, we come to *man*, on the philosophy of whom the Abbé concentrates all the energies of his fertile invention and active imagination. First comes the great stumbling-block,

* *Esquisse*, vol. 1, p. 129.

the origin of evil. All evil springs from moral evil, which takes its rise from the relations which subsist between Deity and man. The very fact of "creation, involves the existence of two opposing principles; the one uniting itself to the infinite, as the root of its life or vitality, its fundamental or primitive condition of being; the other as that which, constituting its own individuality, tends to separate itself from the infinite, from God." There are, consequently, two tendencies in human nature; one towards *God*, and the other towards *self*; and it is the harmonious co-operation of these that constitutes true wisdom. The power of freedom, or the will, which every individual possesses, disturbs this equilibrium, and causes disruptions in the law of unity. Sin is a *negative* quality or thing, arising from the soul's limitation from the communion of God.

The author considers man likewise as an organised and intelligent creature; to the first belong nutrition, reproduction, life, sleep, death, &c.; and to the latter *mind*, which is the intelligent principle, and which, from its very nature, has the power to perceive Deity, through the instrumentality of pure, abstract, and general *ideas*. Human intelligence is an emanation from the Divine Mind.

To know the laws and nature of the former, we must not commence our inquiries upon a psychological basis, as Descartes and Kant have done, but on ontological grounds; because it is only from the intuition of the Infinite that we can fully arrive at a comprehension of what mind really is.

Human intelligence assumes two aspects; the

passive and the active. When the Divine Mind pours its effulgence on the finite understanding, and *faith* acts in concert, then the whole movements of the individual are passive; but when we aim at reflective knowledge by *judging, comparing, reasoning*, and the like, the mind is then developed in its active capacity. These two distinct proceedings relative to the acquirement of knowledge, constitute the two mental laws of intuition and logical deduction.

The mind being divided into passive and active, the author divides again the passive into two faculties; the consciousness of perceptions or spontaneous intuitions, and *memory*, which gives rise to the sentiment of personality or identity. The active powers all rest on *attention*; an act which gives rise to the manifestations of *self* or the *moi*. Comparison, reasoning, and imagination, produce all the phenomena of mental life.

The *emotions* of the human soul arise from the relations in which we stand to the Divine attribute of *love*. These emotions are of two orders, organic or sensitive, and mental or spiritual. From the conflicts between them arise those opposing forces which we attribute to the *flesh* and *spirit*.

The author, in addition to all these matters, enters into discussions relative to industrial occupations, the arts, architecture, painting, sculpture, music, poetry, oratory, the sublime and beautiful; and then into all *science*, and all *history*.* Into these matters we cannot follow him.

* The author's speculations on History have not yet appeared.

Whatever opinion the reader may form of Lamennais' system, he will not fail to recognise his splendid talents. He has brought to his task a mind of the first order of greatness.

VISCOMTE DE BONALD.*—M. Bonald is one of the most distinguished writers of France; a man of great ability and genius. He ridicules the practice of modern metaphysicians making constant appeals to consciousness, for the truth of certain theories of the mind. In the first chapter of his "Recherches Philosophiques," he points out, with great force of reasoning and copious illustrations, the numerous errors and contradictions into which philosophers fall who take this course. Having thus displayed the inadequacy of previously developed systems of philosophy, he advances his own views on the matter; and dwells at great length on one important fact of his system, the gift of language.† This is the general problem he has under-

* "Essai analytique sur les lois naturelles de l'ordre social, ou du pouvoir, du ministre, et du sujet dans la société," 1 vol.; "Du Divorce considéré au 19^{me} siècle, relativement à l'état domestique et à l'état public de la société," 1 vol.; "Législation primitive, considérée dans les derniers temps par les seules lumières de la raison; suivie de plusieurs traités et discours politiques," 3 vols.; "Pensées diverses et opinions politiques," 2 vols.; "Recherches Philosophiques sur les premiers objets des connaissances morales," 2 vols.; "Mélanges littéraires, politiques et philosophiques," 2 vols.; "Démonstrations philosophiques du principe constitutif de la société, &c." 1 vol.; "Théorie du pouvoir politique et religieux dans la société civile, démontrée par le raisonnement et par l'histoire," 3 vols.

† "Il s'agirait donc de trouver un fait, un fait sensible et extérieur, un fait absolument primitif à *priori*, pour parler avec l'école, absolument général, absolument évident, absolument perpétuel dans ses effets; un

taken to solve, connected with *the origin of human knowledge*. He perceived that all the theories on this subject, both ancient and modern, were exceedingly defective ; and he set himself therefore to a serious and elaborate examination of the whole question : the result was that he found it necessary to take his stand on untrodden ground, and to discover some general, immutable, and universal fact, from which to make a starting point in his philosophical examinations. This general fact is language ; and he attempts to prove, that to ascertain the origin of our ideas, as systematic truths, we must direct our attention to the origin of speech.

The origin of language has been a fruitful topic of dispute. The subject is full of interest, but encircled with many difficulties. The generally prevailing opinion among the philosophers of Europe, for the last century, has been that speech is an *acquired* thing ; that we have a certain mental apparatus for the acquisition of it ; and that its development is the growth of years and circumstances. The theory of language prefixed to Adam Smith's "*Moral Sentiments*," has substantially been adopted by most of the English, and many of the Continental philosophers, of modern times.

Now the doctrines laid down in this theory, the theological school of Philosophy in France repudiate *in toto*. They maintain it is supported by no

fait commun, et même usuel, qui peut servir de base à nos connaissances, de principes à nos raisonnements, de point fixe de départ, de criterium enfin de la vérité.... Ce fait est le don primitif et nécessaire du langage."—(Rech. Phil., p. 86.)

reasonings worthy of the name, and by no single fact from the phenomena of human nature. M. Bonald, in particular, lays down the metaphysical and historical arguments against this theory at considerable length. The scientific argument is, that it is totally impossible for man to invent or construct a language for himself. Its form, its complexity, and its whole nature generally, as an instrument of thought, distinctly and forcibly show that it could never be the pure invention of man. And this opinion is strengthened by the consideration, that all theories to account for the origin of language, have proved the most untenable and childish things. They are supported only by the most gratuitous and contradictory suppositions.

Besides, M. Bonald asks, Is it probable that the Almighty would make man, with such a multitude of powers and principles, all connected together with such wonderful harmony, and then leave him to make, by his own efforts, such a thing as a language, without which the whole machinery would have been useless? The presumption is strongly against any such arrangement. The whole analogical chain of reasoning on the Divine procedure, in reference to the stupendous work of creation, is in direct opposition to a theory that language is merely a mechanical acquirement.

The historical argument in favour of the Divine institution of language, is founded upon scriptural grounds; but we regret that our limits will not allow us to enter into it. We must, therefore, refer the reader to the works of M. Bonald for information on this point.

M. Bonald maintains it is necessary we should recognise the doctrine of innate ideas, of whose existence the whole economy of language is an ample proof. It is impossible to conceive how there could be any general and mutual interchange of ideas among men of different nations, were not the whole mass of fundamental conceptions of the mind, the universal inheritance of our race. The intimate and indispensable connection between thought and speech is seldom noticed; but the slightest reflection on the subject will demonstrate that ideas have a prior existence to the instrument which depicts them to the understanding of others. Were this not the case, words would be entirely without meaning. In our attempts to communicate knowledge to those who have a language different from our own, we only dwell upon the difficulty of arranging the mutual signs of intercourse; never entertaining any doubt whatever, but that if we can obtain the right word, the corresponding mental conception will infallibly be found. And this fact, so strikingly developed in the intellectual constitution of all mankind, seems entirely inexplicable upon any hypothesis save that of innate ideas.*

* " Dans ce que nous avons dit de la nécessité de l'expression pour la manifestation ou la présence même mentale d'une idée, c'est-à-dire, pour la représentation d'un objet qui ne tombe pas sous les sens et ne fait pas image, on peut trouver un moyen d'accommodement entre les partisans des idées innées, et ceux qui ne veulent que des idées acquises par les sens, ou des *sensations transformées*: l'idée est innée, son expression est acquise. Si l'idée ne précédait pas dans l'esprit l'expression, jamais on ne pourrait nous faire comprendre les sens des mots, et nous n'entendrions pas plus les mots *ordre* et *justice* que nous n'entendons des

It has been objected to the theory of Bonald, that supposing all he advances on the nature of a primitive and divinely communicated language be true, still we must look to the reason and understanding as the true sources of all thought. Now this, I apprehend, is not meeting the question upon fair grounds. M. Bonald argues strenuously for the existence of those ideas which belong to the reason and understanding as part of their very essence ; but he only argues for the existence of a specific and primitive instrument by which these ideas can be communicated and understood. The mental conceptions are one thing, and the language which expresses them is another. The former are *innate*,—belonging to, and arising out of the constitution of the intellect ; the latter is acquired, but the first invention of it was not derived from man himself, but from his Maker. The doctrine of a primitive language does not necessarily interfere with any theory that may be adopted as to the origin of our ideas ; whether they be altogether acquired, or are innate or universal. It stands

mots forgés à plaisir. Donc l'idée existe avant le mot qui la rend présente. D'un autre côté l'expression est acquise, puisque nous apprenons à parler, et que nous ne parlons pas sans l'avoir appris ; mais cette expression, toute acquise ou adventive qu'elle est, est absolument nécessaire à la représentation même mentale de l'idée.... Ainsi l'idée est nécessaire pour que le mot signifie quelque chose, et soit proprement une expression ; et l'expression est tout aussi nécessaire pour que l'idée soit sensible à l'esprit. Mais l'idée est universelle, donc elle est *native* ou innée ; l'expression est locale et différente dans les diverses langues, donc elle est acquise. Ainsi l'on peut dire que l'idée est à la fois innée et acquise."

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upon an independent basis of its own ; and is equally as applicable to a theory of mere sensation, as to a transcendental hypothesis.

BARON D'ECKSTEIN. — The Baron D'Eckstein maintains, that it is not by an appeal to internal consciousness that a man can be led to satisfactory conclusions as to the nature of the human understanding ; but by *faith* and *authority* alone. And why cannot consciousness be relied upon ? Because an appeal to consciousness is only an appeal to *personality* ; it is only to *myself* ; it is confined to the knowledge of the feelings and emotions of an *individual* only. Such an appeal, the writer contends, can never lead us to an infallible conclusion as to the general truths relating to bodies of men ; because it is only *myself* of which I have any positive knowledge, by a mere appeal to consciousness. Man, in *general*, can be known only from history, and the documents which it furnishes. The being called *myself* is only the creature of the day ; a mere fraction of humanity ; and not the man *in general*, the ideal man, the type and model of the whole race. It is only in Adam, and in Christ, that we can see the true personification of our general nature ; the one created good, but subsequently fallen ; and the other of divine perfections. These two characters are, then, man abstractly considered ; the true and philosophical representatives of humanity. To know, therefore, truths interesting to the whole human race, of general import and universal application, we must

consult the records of history, relative to Adam and Christ; and from them, and them alone, deduct what is the true philosophy of human nature.

There are many very interesting speculations of D'Eckstein, in a periodical work of his, in 16 volumes, called "*La Catholique*." The volumes where metaphysical articles will be found, are the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 15th.

M. BALLANCHE.*—This author displays considerable genius and ability. He adopts the theory of Bonald on the nature of language. His own hypothesis is grounded on religious principles and views. According to his idea, when the Almighty created man, he gave him a revelation of his will, which, by the exercise of his intelligence, in the use of his organs of sense, he was to unfold and teach by writing and speech, which had been expressly conferred upon him for that purpose. By these means truth and wisdom were to be conveyed to his mind. *Fides ex auditu*; faith came by hearing. All the primitive creeds of mankind were furnished by the conjoint influence of the *word* and the Holy Spirit. Man thought when the Deity spoke. This knowledge was handed down from generation to generation by the means of *tradition*. This primitive and genuine tradition, in the course of time, branched out into many local and national channels; and has, in its course, assumed *three*

* Œuvres Complètes, contenant les Essais de Palingénésie Sociale, Antigone, l'Homme sans Nom, 4 vol., Paris.

different aspects or characters. First, it was confined purely to speech; then it was both spoken and written; and lastly, it became written, spoken, and printed. In consequence of all these successive developments of this primitive revelation, it has been subjected to various interpretations; but still it is the only repository for all those grand truths connected with man's immediate existence and happiness, and necessary for that gradual and progressive improvement which the human mind is destined to experience throughout future ages.

In the Author's "*Palingénésie Sociale*," the doctrine of progressive improvement is fully illustrated. Man will be ultimately restored, through the medium of Gospel truth, to his original state of innocency and perfection; and the whole universe will present one delightful scene of peace and concord. Then shall the prophetic inspirations of Scripture be fulfilled, when,

"The wolves with lambs shall graze the verdant mead,
And boys in flowery bands the tigers lead;
The steer and lion at one crib shall meet,
And harmless serpents lick the pilgrim's feet;
The little infant in his hand shall take,
The crested basilisk, and speckled snake;
Pleased, the green lustre of their scales survey,
And with their forked tongues shall innocently play."*

M. Ballanche, says Damiron, is "of the same faith as M. de Maistre, but possessed of somewhat

* Pope's Messiah.

different feelings. The former has more tenderness, and deeper sympathies for mankind, and more lively hopes of their destiny. If Ballanche has not the wing of the eagle, he has not its stern look, its pitiless cry, its thunder ever ready to strike. In a less lofty region, but of more calmness and serenity, he moves like the dove, scattering in his path sentiments which soothe and words which console. Society, in his conception, is not for ever doomed to receive good only in fractional instalments; to have eternally its plebeians and patricians, its weak and powerful, its righteous and wicked. From day to day the principle of *progress* will extend the circle of its influence, the multitude will be evangelised, and will become entirely virtuous and happy.”*

ABBE BAUTAIN.†—The works of the Abbé Bautain display great acuteness and vast erudition. They also show a thorough acquaintance with all the modern theories of philosophy, in Germany, France, and England.

The intellectual and moral state of every country in Christendom, indicates that there is great confusion in the minds of men respecting the grand and primary truths connected with their improvement and happiness. Doubt, and the most conflicting opinions, reign everywhere.

* Damiron, Histoire de Philos. Vol. 2, p. 368.

† “Philosophie du Christianisme, ou Correspondance religieuse,” 2 vol.; “Cours de philosophie, psychologie expérimentale,” 2 vol.; “Cours de philosophie, philosophie morale,” 2 vol.; “De l’enseignement de la philosophie dans ses rapports avec la certitude,” 1 vol.; “De l’enseignement de la philosophie en France au 19me siècle,” 1 vol.

Men know not where to seek for truth, nor can they always recognize or appreciate it when it is found. The remedy for this anomalous state of things lies in adopting a sound *philosophy*, not as the *source* of truth, but as a *means* to guide us to her temple.

Now the *kind* of philosophy becomes the grand question to solve. The Abbé discusses the merits of several systems, in conjunction with the present state of University education in France. It would appear, from his statement, that the three leading systems of philosophy more or less referred to in all academical instruction are, the theory of Condillac, the common sense speculation of Scotland, and French eclecticism. Condillac's views of philosophic truth, the Abbé considers as both shallow and pernicious; and the Scotch system falls far short of a solution of many of the most important problems within the range of mental philosophy. The principles laid down by the best writers of the Eclectic school are not to be depended on; they are more brilliant than solid, and have a strong tendency towards pantheistical views of Deity.*

* "L'art, cette création du génie de l'homme social, n'est pour les panthéistes que la manifestation de l'idée par la forme. Or, l'idée, c'est tout, c'est Dieu. L'art est donc une manifestation divine; l'artiste, au moment de l'inspiration, est identifié au tout, il lui sert d'organe. L'art est donc comme la nature, une forme du développement de l'absolu; et ainsi il a en lui-même sa vérité, sa loi; il est au-dessus de toute règle et de toute mesure, il est transcendant." * * * * "La religion n'est que de l'esthétique, de la symbolique; et si le catholicisme est la plus sublime des religions, c'est moins par son esprit, par sa doctrine, par sa parole grave et ses mystères, que par sa forme: ce sont ses cathédrales avec leurs flèches, leurs ogives, leurs rosaces; c'est son culte avec ses cérémonies, ses pompes, sa musique et ses chants qui le rendent encore aujourd'hui si intéressant." * * * * "La société est une scène, un grand drame où chaque homme joue un rôle puisqu'il

M. Bautain informs us that in the theological seminaries of France there are *two* philosophical systems in use ; a compilation from the old scholastic systems, and that of universal or common sense. The former is arid and lifeless ; and the latter, although possessing many good points, is still, as a whole, full of contradictions and absurdities. The only remedy, therefore, is to fall back upon the *word of God*, and make it the standard of truth ; not, however, to reject philosophy, but to make it subservient to the illustration and consolidation of Scripture truths. Philosophy ought not to be placed before religion, but should be her attendant, supporter, and handmaid. This is the only effectual mode of removing the film of ignorance from the eyes of mankind, and dissipating that mass of doubt and speculative contention which everywhere abounds in the world, not only in reference to philosophy, but even in reference to matters of every-day moment and interest.

VISCOMTESSE DE LUDRE.—This learned and amiable lady is the author of “ *Etudes sur les Idées et sur leur Union au Sein du Catholicisme*,” 1842. This publication has been highly praised by a certain class of metaphysicians in France ; and by no means on light grounds. The discussions are conducted upon strict Catholic principles ; but there is great acuteness and an enlightened spirit, manifested throughout the work.

y tient sa place, et y développera d'autant plus de grandeur et de vertu, que son rôle sera plus important, c'est à dire qu'il aura plus de part à l'action générale, qu'il manifestera plus de la vie universelle.” (Correspondance philosophique, tom. 2.)

In the opinion of the fair authoress, there is only one thing in the Universe—being, or life ; and man is the only creation of this universal life. All the phases of human existence and passion, are combined in this unity of being. Love is the desire of life, beauty the splendour of life, intelligence the knowledge of life, and wisdom the enjoyment of life.

The sentiment of religion at once embraces life, power, splendour, and duration. Every moral doctrine has its root or foundation in some theological principle or doctrine ; and this is the cause of the moral obligations of duty.

In whatever direction a man speculates, there are in the Catholic faith guides and beacons to direct him. Like the mariner's compass, this system of theology points out his way, in the boundless ocean of philosophical inquiry.*

* We have much pleasure in quoting the following notice of this highly gifted lady, from a recent number of one of our most respectable and popular periodicals. " In the mean time, I cannot refrain from noticing at present several interesting evening visits I paid to a most accomplished French lady and authoress, who, however, keeps her name for the present from the public eye. The lady in question is the Countess de Ludre. She has written a very profound and clever work on " *Philosophy considered in Relation to Catholicism*." The fair author is quite at home on the most abstract and recondite topics. Her knowledge of English, German, Italian, and Spanish literature, is varied and extensive, and the methodical arrangement of her knowledge renders her use of it pleasant and profitable to her hearers. With all this information and talent, calculated to turn the head of many pretty women, we see combined the most genuine simplicity of character, a vigilant attention to all domestic duties, and the feelings and sentiments of a pious disposition. It was to me a singularly agreeable sight to witness the lively interest which the Count, her husband, always displays in her studies and literary enterprises. He dotes upon her as if there were not such another woman in existence.

M. MARET.—This author's work, "Essai sur le Panthéisme dans les Sociétés Modernes," is an able one. The publication gives us a history of pantheistical systems from the earliest times; those of India, (which seems to have been their birth place), of Egypt, Chaldea, Persia, China, and Greece. The author traces the system through the various Grecian schools of philosophy, through the Middle-age schoolmen, and from thence down to Schelling and Hegel.*

The chief end, however, which M. Maret has in view, is to show that nearly all the modern speculative systems of France are more or less tainted with pantheistical opinions, destructive alike of real knowledge, and inimical to sound religion. The author animadverts, with some severity, on the system of M. Cousin, to whose talents and abilities he pays, nevertheless, becoming homage. Maret conceives that Baron Cousin's reasonings on the nature of pure reason, on Deity, on creation, are totally erroneous; inasmuch as they attempt to bring the Infinite down to a level with the finite; making the Divine nature a *process of mind*, instead

To say the truth, not many men have such grounds for passionate admiration. It must be remarked here, for the edification of the general reader, that the Countess de Ludre belongs to a class of writers whose aim is to strengthen the main bulwarks of Catholicism by means of appliances from philosophy. Whatever opinion may be formed of the object in view, certain it is, that great talent has been displayed within the last forty years by all the authors, male and female, belonging to the school of philosophical divinity." (Colburn's New Monthly Magazine, Nov. 1847.

* Essai, &c., chap. 4, pp. 104—187.

of an eternal and independent personality.* The opinions of MM. Jouffroy and Damiron are also noticed ; and M. Maret conceives that their philosophical opinions must, if consistently carried out, end in pantheistical views. The eclecticism which they respectively advocate necessarily leads, it is affirmed, to this fatal result.†

M. Michelet, the celebrated historian of German philosophy, falls next under M. Maret's censure. He conceives his writings have a palpable, a direct pantheistical tendency. The historian speaks of Deity as if forming part of the universe of thought and action.‡

Lerminier's speculations are next examined by M. Maret, and he maintains that they have the same pantheistical tendencies as those of Cousin and Michelet. Lerminier, however, the critic says, has no philosophy of his own. He shows great cleverness at seizing and arranging the ideas of others ; but he has no great thoughts which seem

* Essai, &c., chap. 1, pp. 5—25.

† La méthode psychologique, qui est le point de départ de l'eclecticisme, nous fournit une observation importante. Dans les mains de M. Jouffroy et de M. Damiron, cette méthode se montre timide, incertaine dans sa marche, et lorsqu'une fois elle est sortie des faits intérieurs, elle n'ose rien affirmer ; elle n'envisage qu'en tremblant les plus importantes questions, en ajourne indéfiniment la solution. Sa réserve va jusqu'au point de n'oser affirmer la spiritualité, l'immortalité de l'âme ; et, l'existence de Dieu mise à part, elle ne trouve qu'incertitude dans toutes les autres questions."—(Essai, &c., p. 31.)

‡ "Il a parlé de Dieu trois ou quatre fois dans son livre. On peut en inférer qu'il n'admet pas l'idée absolue de Dieu ; l'idée de Dieu va toujours en se perfectionnant. 'La pensée divine n'est que l'idée générale du peuple.' D'abord Dieu est tout, tout est Dieu ; à ce degré l'idée divine n'est que le panthéisme."—(Essai, p. 36.)

to spring from his own mind. He is by turns a disciple of Plato and Aristotle, of Spinoza and Kant, of Fichte and Schelling, and of Rousseau, Condorcet, and St. Simon.*

M. Guizot's historical works are also criticised, and in their spirit and general tendency found to be inimical to the religious spirit. The French mystical writers, St. Simon, Fourier, and Pierre Leroux, are at once condemned, and their several writings pronounced to be pantheistical in a high degree.

Maret endeavours to show that there is no sure protection against such dangerous tenets, save in the bosom of the Catholic Church. The whole history of philosophy in the last century clearly demonstrates the point. And this must ever be the case; for the author declares, that every attempt to solve the great questions respecting the universe, the Deity, and the human soul, throughout every country in Europe, has proved an entire failure. Philosophy must retrace its steps. It must invariably and unconditionally recognise truth as something *immutably fixed* or determined; not as a thing liable to fluctuation, or progression; but eternally preserving the same nature and attributes. This is the light in which the Catholic Church views it. It takes its starting point from this grand basis. It tells us that the Divine

* Le but avoué de M. Lerminier est de montrer que l'esprit humain est la seule force qui agisse ici-bas. C'est à l'esprit humain qu'il faut rapporter l'origine des idées, les institutions religieuses et politiques comme les sciences et les arts; c'est l'esprit humain qui seul détermine tous les événements, toutes les révolutions de l'histoire."—(Essai, p. 41.)

truths, one and all, are preserved on earth by a living and infallible authority ; and by this means all men can read them with the Almighty's seal appended to them. If, however, this mode of considering truth be rejected, and we look upon it as a moving, variable, progressive, and shifting thing ; as an object continually appearing to us modified by time, forms of government, and manners ; we must then fall into irreconcilable contradictions, and be for ever doomed to wander in search after true wisdom, without ever having the slightest chance of finding it.

Pantheism is one of those charges easily made, but not so easily refuted. And we think M. Maret has been led, by the warmth of his zeal, and the desire to make out a case, a little beyond what truth and candour warrant. Many of his critiques are certainly well founded, but there are others again which are sustained by very insufficient and feeble arguments. It is always difficult to draw the line of distinction between some pantheistical notions and true orthodox principles ; because they are separated by such slight shades of difference, and language itself fails us in clearly portraying the evanescent discrepancies of meaning. As a general rule it may be laid down, that where a writer seems to confound the Creator with the universe which is made ; where every thing is referred to one simple indivisible element or power ; where this becomes the all in all, without any implied or understood personality ; and if he deals invariably in vague generalities, as to essences,

and powers, and unities, and influences, and energies, and eternal living principles; we have then some good grounds to suspect that his mind is somewhat unsettled, and that if he has not yet fallen into pantheism, he is standing upon the very brink of it. But still it is not from one or two isolated passages of his writings, that we are authorised in making this charge against him; it must be from the general spirit, tenor, and scope of the entire mass of his speculative opinions and principles. There are many passages in the Scriptures themselves which, considered isolated from the context, will bear a strictly pantheistical construction; but yet there is no doctrine they collectively so decidedly and emphatically denounce, as this particular form of speculative infidelity and error.

LA PRINCESSE DE BELGIOJOSO.—This lady is the author of an “*Essai sur la Formation du Dogme Catholique*,” Paris; a work which displays not only great reading, but considerable ingenuity. The basis of all Catholic doctrines, in the opinion of this fair lady, is the constitution of the universe as we find it; the suggestions of human reason, and the declarations of the Scriptures, are the constituted instruments for giving us all the requisite knowledge we need as to creation and eternal being.

The Princess’s disquisitions on the philosophy of Vico, are sagacious and interesting.*

* This Princess is now (May 1848) at the head of an Italian regiment in her native country.

P. J. B. BUCHEZ.*—M. Buchez was originally a disciple of St. Simon, but has subsequently relinquished the peculiar opinions attached to this mystical speculator. Our author is still, however, a strenuous advocate for the doctrine of *progression*, which he has endeavoured to establish from the phenomena of history.

In searching for a remedy for the evils which afflict mankind, we must look into their history scientifically. We shall then be able to form our opinion of the future from the past. History, considered as a science, has two eyes; humanity and progress. The former, viewed abstractly, is that function which maintains and carries on universal order, and which is the loftiest expression of the Divine conceptions; the latter is that *law* which this universal order follows; a law which is analogous to what we see in every domain or province of nature.

The *method* of studying history scientifically is to seize those general laws of human thought and activity which develop themselves in large masses of mankind, and which make their appearance at stated intervals of time. By doing this, we are in a position to mark, with tolerable accuracy and precision, the amount of actual progress made, and to base our calculations for a further advancement upon this ground.

* "Traité Complet de Philosophie, ou point de vue du Catholique et du Progrès," 3 vols.; "Introduction Philosophique à l'Etude des Sciences, leçons orales recueillies et rédigées par Henri Belfield-Lefèvre," 1 vol.; "Introduction à la Science de l'Histoire," 1 vol.

The author's speculations on the origin and natural history of our own globe, are interesting. He discusses the creation of man, and the different revelations which have, from time to time, been made to him by his Creator. All these discussions are made to bear upon the general principle of *progression*.

M. Buchez finds, in the Catholic views and doctrines of the Christian system, the germ of every principle which he unfolds in his philosophy. The universal ideas of all science and knowledge lie here; history is only the instrument which more fully displays them to the understanding of men.*

MARQUIS GUSTAVE DE CAVOUR.—“Fragmens Philosophiques,” are from the pen of this author; and they constitute an able, though somewhat eccentric, publication. The general character of the metaphysical opinions contained in the work, seems to indicate that they were derived from the school of Malebranche and Condillac. The most important division of the treatise is the third, in which the author treats of the “Philosophy of Christianity.” Here the principles of faith and authority are fully and circumstantially laid down.

The Marquis tells us we should always consider life as a journey, and that our better country is elsewhere. As education becomes more extended in society, and the genius of Christianity more

* M. Buchez is, at the moment this is penned, (May 1848), President of the National Assembly of France.

completely developed, the human character will undergo such a happy transformation, that the ordinary labour of mental and moral training will be greatly diminished, and man will be able to obtain all useful and interesting knowledge upon much easier terms than at the present moment. When Gospel truths are every where recognised ; when men walk in the paths of rectitude they inculcate ; and when the Church exercises to the full that power and authority which inherently belong to her ; men will then cease to oppress each other ; the sword will be converted into a pruning hook, and we shall learn the art of war and aggression no more.

THE "UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE."—We must specially notice this widely circulated and influential French Periodical, because it is a full and complete embodiment of all the philosophical opinions and doctrines of the Clergy of France. It was commenced in 1836, and it now consists of many volumes. The grand object of the publication is to discuss all knowledge, scientific as well as literary, and even the principles of the fine arts, *through the medium of the Catholic religion*. For this comprehensive object writers have been selected for all the various divisions of human learning, with an especial eye to their aptness and ability in certain departments of study. The principal writers of these subjects directly and indirectly connected with the science of mind, are the Abbé de Salinis,

one of the most profound metaphysicians of France, Abbé de Genoude, Abbé Gerbert, M. Steinmetz of Bruges, and Montalembert.

The principle on which all speculative doctrines relative to man are here based is, that the intellectual world is not to be considered in the light of a development—the result of material agencies or powers—but a type of the Supreme Reason; and that the material universe was called into being expressly to give exercise, and add power and glory, to this intellectual nature.

All philosophical sentiments of theology are grounded on three distinct conceptions; the creation; the hierarchical distinction of mind and body; and a future state of existence. There are also three elementary principles involved in the Christian dispensation; the Deity, Jesus Christ, and a body of men denominated the Church. There are likewise three grand divisions of error; Atheism, Deism, and religious heterodoxy.

All philosophy, whether relating to the laws of matter or of mind, in order to be sound and useful, must be discussed with an especial reference to three fundamental points; the existence of a Deity, the Divine mission of our Saviour, and the authority of the Church.

We would recommend to the reader's attention the "Cours sur la Religion," in a series of lessons, by the Abbé de Genoude; "Psychologie Chrétienne," by M. Steinmetz; "Panthéisme," by Léon Boré; the various articles on the Unity of Truth, and on the Philosophical School of Alexandria.

All the articles on speculative topics show great talent, and are highly finished.*

The principle of authority involved, and stoutly enforced, in all the publications of the "Ecole Théologique," is an important one, on which much may be said on both sides. The principle is not necessarily confined to Christianity as a system; but arises out of every manifestation of religious feeling and sentiment. They contain, in their very nature or essence, an inherent check to inquiry. Whether we direct attention to the religious emotions of the savage, or to the disciples of the cross, full of learning and meekness, we come in contact with a *negative* principle; with something which tells us that our knowledge is imperfect and limited, our dependence unquestionable, and our need of a guide strikingly imperative. The dictates of reason and philosophy are for the moment hushed into silence. We are feelingly alive to their inadequacy for *every* state and condition of humanity; and the form which this conclusion assumes, and the authority it innately carries with it, make us yield ourselves implicit instruments to its calls and desires. In fact, as long as man is considered to be in any sense whatever a religious being by nature; to carry about him in his inward thoughts, feelings, desires, and fears, the recognition of something above or beyond him; authority, in some shape and in some degree, must ever ex-

* We have been obliged to curtail this account of the "Ecole Théologique;" but the reader will find a list of authors, who belong to it, and their works, in Note E. at the end of this Volume.

ercise an influence over the comparatively slow and uncertain deductions of his reason and judgment. This is not a matter left for philosophical axioms or principles to settle; it lies infinitely beyond them; and all we have to do in the case, as rational and intelligent creatures, is to act here as we have to do in thousands of other instances, not absolutely to renounce the influence of a general truth, but to take it as a guide or finger-post, to direct us how far to go, and where to stop.

The admission of the truth that there is an intelligent and all-powerful Creator of the universe, is to admit the existence of the principle of authority. Finite must be subordinate to the infinite. Christianity, which is a direct declaration of this grand and primary truth of all religious sentiment, opinion, and feeling, must and does recognise the same principle. And accordingly we find that since its first introduction to the world, since the first day it was placed face to face with the mere abstract movements and conclusions of the human understanding, there has, to a certain extent, and in a certain mode and manner, been a direct and open conflict between them. And this must ever be the case. Authority is not a thing of yesterday; it does not belong to this or that system of theology; it is inherent in all, and influences all. The whole history of philosophy and religion, either viewed separately or combined, incontrovertibly demonstrates this opposition; and shows that man is placed here, as in many other situa-

tions, under the influence of two antagonistic agencies.

It is true that we find the principle of authority, in matters of reason, more prominently, more undisguisedly, nay offensively, brought forward at one time than at another. St. Paul declared it openly before the Areopagus at Athens; the earliest Fathers of the Church proclaimed it everywhere; every form of Church government and Christian doctrine has subsequently ratified it; and even philosophy herself, high and disdainful as she commonly is, has been obliged, in every age of the world, to modify her claims, to bend her stubborn neck to the yoke, and to give up her rights to absolute and unconditional sovereignty. This mental authority must not, therefore, be considered as a novel doctrine, either in form or in substance; not as a distinctive feature of the Catholic Church of the present age; for it belongs to every ritual observance, every religious sentiment, and every doctrinal form of faith current among mankind.

It is, therefore, an error for Catholic philosophers to suppose that they are the only expounders and promulgators of the principle of authority; and it is equally erroneous, partial, and unjust, for Protestant writers to make this a criminal charge against their Catholic brethren. If there be error in the case, they are both participators in it. But there is no error. Authority and reason, religion and philosophy, are not radically and essentially opposed to each other, nor strive for

each other's destruction. They are mutually conservative, enlightening, and improving. They respectively aim at different objects, and for the accomplishment of different ends and purposes. Reason may be denominated the philosophy of fact ; religion, the philosophy of feeling ; the one is destined to regulate temporal matters ; the other looks beyond them : the one proclaims its absolute sovereignty within its own sphere ; the other is expressive of the dependence which the finite must feel in reference to the infinite. All this is simply descriptive of the exact state of being. We cannot alter it. No man has hitherto been able to demonstrate, by a chain of reasoning, the existence, nature, purpose, or end of religious sentiment ; no more than he has been able to demonstrate his own existence. It is a fact ; and one of the most striking in the constitution of human nature. We must not, therefore, drag it out of its own sphere ; make it amenable to a foreign tribunal ; or deny its existence altogether. It is there for an end or purpose. It is as indestructible by pure reason, as our very existence itself, of which it forms an integral and necessary part.

To regulate the religious principle, or the maxims of authority, becomes then the real question at issue. To lay down formal rules for this, to meet all cases and circumstances, is clearly impossible. The powers of our nature, collectively, will always counteract any violent conflicts between the philosophic and religious principle. Candid and enlightened discussion is the safest and

surest guarantee for mutual peace and harmony between them. A man will not live twenty-four hours on pure religious sentiment, however sublime and rational it may be; nor, on the other hand, can a man live upon mere abstractions, or *à priori* intuitions of his understanding. Something more is wanted to sustain the staple of human existence; the wear and tear of the vital principle. To mix, to blend, to amalgamate, becomes here the obvious duty; and though we cannot draw a logical line of demarcation which certain minds will not in their ardent career overstep, yet we may rest assured that no real injury will be inflicted on the permanent interests of mankind by such speculative and erratic excursions.

And so convinced are we that true religion and science are mutually aided by enlightened and philosophical discussions, that we should earnestly recommend all the members of our own Protestant churches to peruse the works of the "Ecole Théologique" of France. They not only evince intellectual abilities of the highest order, but they develop theological and philosophical principles in such a manner as to throw mutual light on each other. These all stand on their own merits, totally separated from any logical connection with the mere sectarian part of the general question. The Catholic divine may say, and does say, "These are my principles and views;" but the Protestant has an equal right to make the same declaration. There is no monopoly of truth or argument here; princi-

ples, and principles alone, are the matters of discussion; and the elucidation of these is, or at least ought to be, as interesting to the Protestant as to the Catholic divine or philosopher.

The question of authority, considered in reference to the universal opinions of mankind, stands upon a somewhat different ground from theological authority. The former is, nevertheless, entitled to take its stand as a recognised principle, in all philosophical inquiries which have human nature for their object. We must look at and classify the general results of mind, as exhibited upon the wide stage of the world. It would be impossible to reason accurately on intellectual phenomena without the aid of this authority. We could never go beyond the single, the personal, the transitory, were the authoritative voice of mankind entirely unheeded. On the other hand, this species of authority is liable to great abuse in its philosophical application. It must not always be taken as a primary or fundamental principle, but solely as a corroborative witness for the truth of certain doctrines or theories. Human authority, when strictly considered, is only another phrase for *common sense* or *common reason*.

F. J. V. BROUSSAIS.

The chief object of this author* is to show, by physiological statements and facts, that the thinking principle of man is the result of his peculiar

* "De l'Irritation et de la Folie, ouvrage dans lequel les rapports du physique et du moral sont établis," 1828.

organization. The author was of the Medical profession, and filled the Professor's chair in the Military Hospital at Paris. He seems to have taken the theory of Cabanis as a guide, for there is scarcely any thing new in the metaphysical speculations in which the author has indulged. The same ground has been often traversed before him, and with nearly the same logical results. The only thing which strikes us as novel, is his assertion, that the study of psychology, and the attempts to spiritualize the mind, have both a detrimental influence over the progress of sound philosophy. His reasons on this branch of his subject are exceedingly shallow indeed, and have been most ably answered by MM. Jouffroy, Tissot, and others.

The leading arguments which Broussais employs to illustrate and enforce the doctrine of irritability, have been examined with great minuteness by M. le Duc de Broglie, and M. Tissot in his "*Anthropologie*." As the theory is of a physiological cast, and as we shall have to speak of several analogous ones in the latter part of this volume, we shall not enter upon the question at the present moment; but simply refer the reader to the writings of these two respectable authors, who, it is well known, have paid great attention to the whole matter.*

* The "*Méditations Critiques*" of M. Gruyer, may also be advantageously consulted, p. 539.

BENJAMIN CONSTANT.

Benjamin Constant* was one of the earliest writers of France who expressed dissatisfaction with the ideological system of Condillac and his commentators. His metaphysical speculations are blended with the disquisitions of theology; but they are interesting in themselves, and exercised a considerable influence over the opinions of his countrymen in the early part of the present century. The basis on which his views of natural religion rest, is that the religious feelings of mankind are purely *instinctive*; they are not, in any sense of the word, acquired. Neither the bodily organs of sensation, nor the *à priori* principles of thought, have any influence in their creation; but they are simply the direct manifestations of that Almighty power, who has so willed that there shall always remain, engraved on the human soul, a lasting memorial of Himself.

F. BERARD.

The physiological speculations of this writer† differ in many essential particulars from some other French publications on the same subject.

* "De la Religion Considérée dans sa source, ses formes, et ses développements," 5 vol.; "Du Polythéisme Romain," 2 vol. Paris, 1833.

† "Doctrine des rapports du physique et du moral, pour servir de fondement à la physiologie intellectuelle et à la métaphysique." Paris, 1823, 1 vol.

M. Bérard is anxious to preserve inviolate the immateriality of the thinking principle; and sedulously to guard against its being merged into the physical powers and properties of the body. What relates to matter he treats of as materialists generally do; and what appertains to the mind, he examines and discusses, by making appeals to our power of consciousness alone. Hence it has been remarked by one of his own countrymen, that "he observes like a physician, and reasons like a psychologist."

M. Bérard does not seem to dispute the ordinary doctrines of physiologists about the *molecules* of bodies, and the fixed laws which seem to regulate and determine their action. But he thinks that all material theories are, in themselves, inadequate to account for the intellectual and moral phenomena of human life. According to his views, besides *sensation* there is in man a sentiment, or internal sense or feeling, as real and certain as any thing we know and believe. If we, then, interrogate this internal feeling, and faithfully record its testimony, we shall recognize it to be a principle altogether distinct from matter. This principle is an active, animating, and living principle; the source of all motion and impulsion; and a real and absolute power. It is energy without materialism. It possesses power by virtue of its own nature, and independently of any connexion with organic forms of life. This power is neither the effect of a molecule, nor an assemblage of molecules.

The author then goes on to prove that this internal feeling or sense is that which reasons, wills, and comprehends. It is altogether different from that power which is manifested in the ordinary functions of the animal frame, such as absorption, digestion, nutrition, &c.

The general principle on which the author's psychology rests is that, comparing facts with facts, there is not the slightest analogy between matter and the human soul. The idea we invariably entertain of the latter, instead of being that of extension, figure, and colour, is that of passion, sympathy, and intelligence. This soul is the active and vivifying principle of existence; and is that of which we speak when we say, *I* or *myself*. It is one, indivisible, but not material.

That the soul or thinking principle cannot be the result of any peculiar organization of the brain, or nervous system generally, the author has shown in many parts of his work. He says, "The mind is one and indivisible, immaterial, though united to the body; it cannot take a part in this union except as *mind*; and not in accordance with those laws which unite body with body. The thinking principle cannot be separated from the body, or placed in the midst of its organs; but it is present in them; it perceives through them; it communicates activity to them, and receives it from them in return. It is bound, in its movements, by certain physiological and vital laws, without which it could not manifest its faculties or powers; but it does not owe these faculties to the organs of

sense ; it is a power, co-operating in harmony with other powers, all of which have their functions and attributes in a fixed and determined system of organization."

M. TH. JOUFFROY.

M. Jouffroy* is one of the solid and rational philosophers of France ; one whose reputation stands high both as a philosophical moralist and a metaphysician. He was the translator of Dugald Stewart's "Moral Philosophy ;" and he afterwards translated the whole of Dr. Reid's works, and accompanied them with many valuable observations of his own. He has always been considered in France as the zealous disciple and advocate of the common-sense philosophy in that country.

In the introductory remarks to the English works he has translated, he has furnished us with several of his own opinions on matters of importance. These may be embraced under four heads ; 1st, Of the internal phenomena of thought, and of the possibility of discovering their law ; 2nd, On transmission and demonstration of our notions of consciousness ; 3rd, On the opinions of physiologists on the facts of consciousness ; and 4th, On the principal facts of consciousness.

The great check to the successful prosecution of mental science, M. Jouffroy conceives, lies in the free and reckless use of theories. We should attend

* "Cours de Droit naturel ;" "Mélanges Philosophiques ;" "Nouveaux Mélanges de Philosophie ;" "Cours Esthétique."

to a careful and systematic arrangement of facts ; and use great caution and circumspection in drawing general or sweeping conclusions. We should prosecute the philosophy of mind as we do that of natural science. The author asks, " From whence are we to derive light ? In what direction are we to seek for it ? Solely in careful and profound observations of the phenomena of nature ; and particularly in the study of facts connected with our own consciousness, a department of study which has been too much neglected."

Man must be viewed and studied as a compound of two elements ; a *bodily whole*, and a *person*. The former is a natural production, under the influence of necessary laws and material impulses ; the personality of human nature possesses that *power*, by which all our internal faculties and energies are called into full activity and vigour, for the fulfilment of certain ends and purposes of our existence. This division necessarily makes human life appear under two distinct aspects ; as an impersonal and a personal existence ; each displaying a separate class of faculties and powers. These our author arranges thus : The *personal faculty* is that which directs the eye of the mind inwardly, takes cognizance of its ideas, classifies and divides them, and then brings them out to open day, by an exercise of that which we denominate liberty or will. Then we have *primitive inclinations*, which are a collection of instincts, and constitutional tendencies and sympathies, which irresistibly impel us in certain directions. The *locomotive power*

embraces the energetic movements of the body, through the influence of certain nerves and muscular actions. The *expressive faculty*, is that of depicting our thoughts, ideas, sentiments, and feelings to others, through means of signs and representations. *Sensibility* is a kind of passive power, indicative of our susceptibility of being agreeably or disagreeably affected, by internal passions of desire, love, hatred, revenge, and the like. *The intellectual faculties* comprise all the more lofty principles and powers of thought; such as are connected with abstract reasoning on all branches of human speculation and knowledge.*

“1° Attribuer à un appareil organique quelconque la vertu de produire certains phénomènes, c'est lui attribuer une faculté que nous ne découvrons pas en lui et que nous ne saurions y découvrir. Nous voyons bien, par l'expérience, qu'il y a une dépendance entre l'appareil organique et la production du phénomène; mais comme cette dépendance existerait également, si cet appareil, au lieu d'être le principe de cette production, n'en était que l'instrument, il est impossible d'assigner une raison de préférer la première supposition à la seconde.

“2° L'observation ne découvre dans le cerveau comme dans tout autre organe qu'un amas de particules matérielles arrangées d'une certaine manière. Comment cet amas de particules matérielles est-il capable de produire quelque chose? C'est ce que les physiologistes ne comprennent pas du tout: le mot *organe*, employé pour désigner la cause de certains phénomènes, ne laisse donc pas dans l'esprit une idée plus nette que le mot *ame*.”

“3° Il nous est facile de concevoir l'hypothèse d'une force servie par des organes, tandis que nous ne concevons pas du tout comment des parties matérielles, qui n'ont pas par elles-mêmes la propriété de penser, peuvent constituer par leur réunion seule et le mode de leur arrangement des forces pensantes. Hypothèse pour hypothèse, celle de la distinction de la cause et de l'organe, est donc plus intelligible.

“4° Comme il est démontré que les organes des sens et les nerfs sont indispensables à la perception et à la sensation, et ne sont cependant que des instrumens qui ne sentent pas et ne connaissent pas . . . il nous est

M. VIREY.

This author's work, "*De la Puissance Vitale*," was published at Paris in 1823.

His ideas of the nature of *life*, the *vital power*, or the *vital principle*, are the following.

This vital power is an active principle, which emanates from an immutable and eternal Being. It assumes, in time and space, an infinite variety of forms, without, however, experiencing the least tendency to exhaustion or weakness. It passes from phenomena to phenomena, and is incessantly active in the work of generation, preservation, and transformation. This power, placed in the midst of the universe, creates millions of animated creatures, all of which live their appointed time, and then die; that is to say, pass into a new state of being, which they assume, to be again deprived of it, and run another course of existence, which the Almighty has traced out for them. Death only appears as an intermediate link between two different states or modes of life. All nature lives, and is always living. In the mineral kingdom, we perceive life composed of isolated powers, which approach each other, but do not

facile de concevoir par analogie que le cerveau, tout indispensable qu'il soit à la sensation et à la perception, n'est lui-même qu'un autre instrument, une autre condition de la production de ces phénomènes Dans cette application, l'hypothèse de la distinction a donc encore sur l'autre une supériorité de clarté particulièrement remarquable." (Œuvres.)

unite; the molecules of which they are composed being less advanced in the scale of intelligence. In vegetables, on the contrary, we find a closer approximation to unity of power; and nature is here more distinctly organized. When we come to the animal kingdom, and particularly to man, we see the highest degree of perfection; for here we recognize the living principle, more completely centralized, and, of course, giving rise to individual action, thought, and power.

The author applied these theoretical principles to the explanation of the general laws of nature, as exhibited in the material world, as well as in human nature. All his reasonings and illustrations are forcibly and neatly stated.

H. AZAIS.

M. Azais is the writer of "Précis du Système Universel," 1 vol.; "L'Explication Universelle," 4 vols.; "Cours de Philosophie Générale," 8 vols., Paris.

His "Système Universel" is a very able and important work. He first treats of the formation and movements of unorganized bodies; then embraces the laws of the material world, as exhibited in the sciences of astronomy and geology; treats of the application of the universal cause to the formation of organized bodies; and then applies the whole to the laws of the human mind.

This author, as a metaphysician, possesses a character of his own. He is not the servile follower of any of the distinguished writers of France.

We shall endeavour to furnish the reader with a concise view of his system, nearly in his own words.

The universe is composed of an immense number of beings, and their almost infinite relations to one another. These beings and relations are perpetually undergoing divers changes. An *action* is then necessary to the existence and preservation of this universe.

Matter, the substance of beings, is a passive subject of this universal action. God imprints this action upon it, and matter obeys the fiat.

Expansion is the uniform mode in which this universal action manifests itself. That is to say, that every material being is penetrated, in every part of its volume, with a subtile action, which tends to expand it, to divide its atoms, to augment indefinitely the space it occupies, and consequently to hurry it to complete dissolution. Thus, if any material being, no matter of what kind, could for a single moment be alone or insulated in space; if during this moment it formed in itself the universe alone, it would from that moment enter upon its eternal and absolute dissolution.

But each material being, of whatever kind, occupying a given portion of space, is encircled with other similar or dissimilar objects, but all of which are penetrated, like itself, with a perpetual expansive power; and the conflict which thus arises among them, represses and moderates the tendency to individual annihilation. The indefinite ex-

pansion of each body is itself repressed, checked, and modified, by the united operation of the same influence in other surrounding bodies ; so that, in reference to the universe at large, the repressive and preservative power of the whole is the natural result of this *universal expansion*.

The author then goes on to make a general application of this *expansive* principle to the government of the planetary system, and our own globe amongst the rest. He then applies it to the formation and principle of life and motion belonging to organized beings, as plants, insects, and animals. Then he arrives at man, the highest link in the chain of animated nature. Here he makes the following observations.

Man, like every thing else, is subjected to the influence of this *universal expansion* ; but the repressive modifications of it, are more complicated in him, than in other living beings, from the elevated and peculiar nature of his position in the scale of life. We are all of us desirous of riches, power, pleasure, and renown, and we can only become satisfied and contented in proportion as the expansive principle is regulated within us. If we abandon ourselves to its natural impetuosity, we must encounter the resistance of others ; a resistance, which proceeds from their expansion, and which, if it be not placed under restraint, must, in like manner, become injurious, violent, and oppressive. Human laws of every description, whether civil or criminal, have always for their object the regulation of this expansive re-action of whole

communities of men, against the usurpations and irregularities of individual expansion. Every human law is a social form given to the universal law, the law of *compensations*.

In fact, every nation may be considered as an aggregate of expansive beings ; an aggregate which constantly tends to the acquirement and accumulation of wealth, territory, political power, and enjoyments of all kinds. This expansion, while limited and regulated by prudence and wisdom, becomes a principle of power and harmony ; but if, on the contrary, it be subjected to rashness, and a mistaken and insatiable ambition, the expansive re-action of neighbouring nations will be encountered, and excited revenge become the inevitable consequence.

This is a brief outline of the system of M. Azais. The reader will find the principle on which it rests worked out, in the several publications of the author, with considerable ingenuity and cleverness.

J. P. BRISSOT.

The work of this philosopher is entitled “ De la Vérité, ou Méditations sur les moyens de parvenir à la Vérité dans toutes les Connaissances Humaines.” He informs us, in his Preface, that the publication was only introductory to a much larger one on the same subject. The “ Méditations ” are not of a theoretical or speculative character, nor do they treat of the theories of other writers on the mind. They simply furnish us with a sketch of

the various faculties or powers of the intellect, and of the best means of arriving at truth, and communicating it to others. This plan necessarily embraces many rules and observations which belong, properly speaking, to logic. On the whole, the work is creditable to the author, and it will prove of service to students who are in want of elementary knowledge on the science of mind.

JOSEPH DROZ.

M. Droz* can scarcely be classed among the French metaphysicians, inasmuch as his speculations are mostly of a moral cast. There are, however, several principles of mental science interspersed amongst them. In the works of M. Droz, we find all the leading doctrines of Condillac and his material school; and these are elucidated in such a manner as to give a very sombre and mechanical complexion to all his disquisitions. Nothing seems so cold, arid, and heartless, as even moral speculations, when thoroughly imbued with a material spirit of this kind.

H. F. DE LARSCHÉ.

De Larsché is one of the philosophers of Geneva, a city famous for its spirit of rational inquiry. His work, "*Essai sur la Raison*," 1822, is grounded

* "*Essai sur l'art d'être heureux*;" "*De la Philosophie Morale ; ou des différents systèmes sur la science de la Vie*;" "*Application de la Morale Politique*."

on the question as to the legitimate influence of the principle of authority in matters of reason, and in all disquisitions connected with religion and philosophy. The general question is stated and discussed with great clearness and candour ; but the author fails in laying down any precise or intelligible rules for its application.

The individual opinions of the author seem to be a modification of those of Condillac, according to his recent commentators and disciples. There are, however, in various parts of his works, clear indications that the writer has imbibed some of the ontological and ideal principles of the German philosophy.

The general result of the discussion in the "Essai" is, the establishment of the supremacy of reason in all matters relative to truth.

A. GARRIGUES.

In the author's work, "Cours de Philosophie," 1821, he divides philosophy into two grand parts, theoretical and practical. The first comprehends the study of nature, of man, and of the Supreme Being; the second, that of the duties which man owes to himself, the Deity, and to others. The author conceives there can be no valid philosophy of human nature unless we admit the existence of primary or innate ideas. There is an original and innate sense for the production of these. Our acquired notions and opinions are derived from reason, and the moral power of conscience.

There is a principle of beautiful harmony and concord between all our innate conceptions and our acquired ideas; and this agreement is so marvellously striking, that the author considers it one of the most convincing proofs of a Divine Governor of the Universe.

M. LAURENTIE.

M. Laurentie is the author of an excellent common-sense work, entitled, "*Introduction à la Philosophie, ou Traité de l'Origine et de la Certitude des Connaissances Humaines.*" The author maintains that one of the chief ends of philosophy is to establish the distinction between good and evil. This distinction is founded on a knowledge of a Deity; without this knowledge all actions would remain, abstractly considered, indifferent. The distinction which is commonly made between the divine and natural law, Laurentie considers as chimerical. In the natural law, right is totally inexplicable. All written laws are themselves devoid of authority, unless they be judged of in reference to the existence and moral attributes of a Deity. All certainty as to every branch of knowledge must rest on this basis.

VICTOR COUSIN.

M. Cousin,* who stands at the head of French

* "*Cours de Philosophie, professé à la Faculté des Lettres de 1816 à 1820,*" 1840, 1841; "*Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie,*" 1841;

philosophers, was early in life initiated into metaphysical studies. In his nineteenth year he attended the interesting lectures of M. Laromiguière; and in his twenty-third year he succeeded M. Royer-Collard, in the chair of Philosophy at the Normal School at Paris. For five years he laboured, with great industry and zeal, to make his public lectures as interesting and instructive as possible; and he succeeded beyond all expectation in riveting the attention of the young students, and directing their minds to the principles of mental science.

From some unworthy motives, the government of the day deprived him of the Professor's chair. He went, a short time after, into Germany, with a view of making himself thoroughly acquainted with the systems of mental speculation generally cultivated in that country. Here he formed an acquaintance with Jacobi, Schelling, Hegel, and other distinguished men; and having become deeply imbued with the spirit of their philosophy, he returned to France, and commenced a course of lectures on intellectual science, which at once raised him to the highest pinnacle of literary fame and renown. He was made a Peer of France in 1832; and in 1840, Minister of Public Instruction.

His own account of the system of tuition he under-

"Introduction à l'Histoire de la Philosophie;" "Histoire de la Philosophie du 18^{me} siècle;" "Fragments Philosophiques;" "Philosophie Ancienne et Scolastique;" "Manuel de l'Histoire de la Philosophie, traduit de l'Allemand de Tennemann," 1839; "Des Pensées de Pascal, &c." 1843; "Leçons de Philosophie sur Kant," 1842; "De la Métaphysique d'Aristote, &c.," 1838; "Cours de Philosophie, professé pendant l'année 1818, &c.;" "Fragments Littéraires."

went, not as a scholar, but as a philosopher, is interesting and instructive. He says, "M. Laromiguière taught me the art of decomposing my own thoughts. He exercised me in descending from the most abstract conceptions and general notions, to their several constituent elements; and to detect and mark the play of the faculties in this analytical or complex operation. Royer-Collard also pointed out to me, that however sensation might affect these faculties or powers, yet they were amenable to certain inward laws; to certain conditions or principles, on which mere sensation itself could throw no light; and which seemed, as far as consciousness could testify, to belong to the native energies of the mind. With Maine de Biran I studied the phenomena of the will or voluntary power. This admirable philosopher taught me how to separate, in my general notions and in the simple facts of consciousness, those items which really belonged to them, from those which were derived from the voluntary activity of the mind; that activity by which our own personality is made known to us. It was under this threefold discipline that I was instructed; and was enabled to undertake the public instruction of philosophy, at the Normal School, in 1815."*

This was the course of philosophical tuition to which he submitted, and which has placed him at the head of the metaphysical writers of France at the present moment. His course of lectures,

* Preface to the 2nd Edition of the "Fragments Philos."

delivered to nearly two thousand students, produced an intense sensation not only in Paris, but throughout the whole country; to allay which the political journals of the day found it their interest to publish *in extenso* the whole of his lucubrations.

But though Baron Cousin is one of the most popular and influential writers on the human mind in France at the present day, he is by no means the clearest and most intelligible. There is a haziness, which is almost impenetrable, about him. He appears always straining after something which he cannot reach. This painful and struggling effort, which seems to have had its foundation in a morbid desire to appear remarkably profound and original, has been greatly strengthened from the circumstances in which he has been placed. Entertaining an early predilection for the German system of speculation, he has constantly, in the subsequent years of his life, been aiming at their full comprehension in the first place, and their complete amalgamation with French theories in the second. This has produced mental conflicts in his mind; and placed him in a constrained and shackled attitude. He is perhaps the only French philosopher who has earnestly set about grappling with all the ontological speculations of the Kantian school; and he has laboured with great zeal to unite what views were currently entertained in France with the deductions of the "pure reason." This has produced that cloudiness and strange medley of opinions and notions, manifested through-

out all his publications ; for no two things in nature were ever so dissimilar as German and French metaphysics.*

It is a somewhat difficult matter to furnish the reader with any perfect conception of Cousin's philosophy as a whole. It is voluminous and discursive ; by no means yielding readily to a condensed analysis. We cannot, therefore, hold out an expectation that our *exposé* will be successful. We often see only so much of his system ourselves as to make "darkness visible."

In the Prefaces to several of his works, we are told by the author, that philosophy may be divided into three great branches ; method, psycho-

* "La philosophie de M. Cousin se réduit, en effet, à ces deux éléments. D'une main, M. Cousin perfectionne, continue la psychologie des écoles française et écossaise, de l'autre il emprunt à l'école de Hegel ses résultats historiques. Mais quel est le lien de ces deux choses ? comment sont-elles arrivées à se mêler, à se confondre sous une forme nouvelle ? c'est ce que nous ne pouvons concevoir. La psychologie de l'école de Condillac ou de l'école écossaise ne saurait jamais aboutir aux points de vue de Hegel sur l'histoire, l'art, l'état, la religion, la philosophie ; ces points de vue appartiennent à une ontologie tout autre que celle de ces écoles. Les opinions, les points de vue de ces écoles sur tous ces objets ont été, en effet, tout autres jusqu'à présent que ceux que nous venons d'exposer. De l'hypothèse ontologique de Hegel et de l'observation psychologique de Condillac découlent deux ordres d'idées, qui partout se heurtent et se repoussent, loin de s'attirer et de se confondre. Nous ne serions point étonnés que la chaleur de l'improvisation eût été pour quelque chose dans l'espèce de rapprochement, de soudure momentanée, qui s'est fait entre elles, dans les éloquentes paroles de M. Cousin. Tout plein d'études psychologiques, longues et sérieuses sans doute, M. Cousin fut initié plus tard, et en partie, assure-t-on, par la conversation, aux résultats principaux de la philosophie de Hegel ; il en fut séduit, captivé."—(Berch. de Penhœn, Hist. Allem.)

logy, and ontology. With Cousin, however, there are but two branches in his system ; for psychology is the method which he adopts.

Psychology, to constitute a valid philosophical method, must be, in the author's estimation, made as perfect as possible ; that is, there must be a careful observation of mental facts ; they must be sufficiently numerous ; and they must be reasoned upon with judgment and patience. Hasty and ill-digested generalizations are invariably the bane of psychological methods. Cousin accuses Locke of great carelessness and inattention to these essential precautions. The Baron recommends that we should acquire and exercise the art of retiring upon our own consciousness ; looking carefully into every corner of the mental edifice ; registering with precision and nicety every thing we see ; separating at the same time what is incidental or isolated from what is general and connected ; what is primary and absolute from what is secondary and finite. These are the rules and precautions which every psychologist should observe, in order to effect a judicious and philosophical arrangement of mental phenomena.

In the classification of mental powers or faculties, Cousin differs both from the French ideological philosophers, and from the systems of Reid, Stewart, and others of the Scottish philosophy. The facts of consciousness are arranged by our author under three heads ; those of the will, those of the reason, and those of sensation.

M. Cousin tells us that he studied the facts con-

nected with human liberty, under the guidance and instruction of Maine de Biran. The latter philosopher's ideas of voluntary powers, Cousin has adopted, and added little or nothing to them of his own. It is the naked principle of activity which he makes the mainspring of our personality and intellectual responsibility; therefore all that may be fairly urged against the system of Biran, may be directed against the theory of his pupil. According to his ideas, every thing which appertains to human nature, and which is detached from any direct or indirect connection or influence with the voluntary power, is to be considered as having no more to do with the *personality* of man, than the movements of the heavenly bodies have to do with it. Without the spontaneous principle, nothing which we can properly call human exists.

This theory of spontaneous activity is defective in one essential point; the author *separates liberty from intelligence*. Nothing can be more unphilosophical than this; nor can any thing more strikingly demonstrate the Baron's total neglect of his own excellent rules for the observance of mental phenomena. The will can never be viewed simply in its activity. The idiot and the savage display activity; but it is not the activity which we attribute to the man of intelligence and moral responsibility. The word liberty, when applied in reference to the movements of the mind, always involves the idea of intelligence; and is, indeed, inconceivable without it. The whole fabric of language proclaims this. Intelligence, on the other

hand, can have no meaning without voluntary power. Were it not that we can conceive them in consciousness separately, we should be almost warranted in concluding that they were only two different words for the same notion or idea. There can be no freedom without having a plurality of modes of action before us ; for it is solely through the means of this plurality that our intelligence can act in making a choice. Destroy or deny this, and fate or destiny must prevail.*

On account of the defective manner in which M. Cousin has developed the principle of mental spontaneity, there is no foundation in his philosophy, either for intelligence or moral agency. Right, duty, obligation, wisdom, science, virtue, are all unmeaning words upon his theory, as he has left it at the present moment.†

* See what is said on this subject in the notice of Maine de Biran, p. 201. of this Volume.

† " Or, pour ne nous arrêter qu'aux opinions les plus saillantes qu'il exprime sur chacun de ces points, nous remarquerons d'abord qu'il regarde la liberté comme le principe et l'essence de la personnalité. Selon lui, le *moi* est tout entier dans la liberté, il est la liberté elle-même ; dans tous les faits où il y a empire de soi, possession de soi-même, activité maîtrisée, il y a *moi* et personne ; dans les autres, il n'y a pas *moi*, la fatalité en rejette toute espèce de personnalité. Ainsi les actes de raison, comme ceux de la sensation, ne sont pas sans rapport au *moi*, mais ils ne lui viennent pas de lui-même, au moins dans le principe ; il s'en empare par la suite, s'y mêle et y intervient ; mais dans l'origine il ne le fait pas. Avant de se mettre librement à penser ou à sentir, il faut que l'âme ait d'abord la pensée et le sentiment, qu'elle les ait reçus, en quelque sorte, et les ait vus se développer par le fait des circonstances au sein desquelles elle est placée ; en d'autres termes, avant d'agir comme force libre, il faut qu'elle agisse comme force fatale avec une intelligence

Reason or intelligence, according to Baron Cousin's views, is composed of *three* distinct but inseparable parts or elements. These govern and characterize all its movements; and constitute it what it really is. The first of these elements or principles of reason is expressed by the words unity, identity, substance, absolute cause, the infinite, pure thought, and such like epithets. The second element of the reason or intelligence, the author designates by the terms plurality, difference, phenomenon, relative cause, the finite, determined thought, &c. The first of these parts, unity, identity, &c., though absolute in nature, does not, however exist absolutely in itself; it manifests existence only in consequence of its being conjoined with the second part, plurality, difference, &c. By the union of the two, as cause and effect, a third principle or elementary part of reason is produced, which is the *relation* which subsists between them. There are, therefore, three categories under which every thing relating to the reason or intelligent principle must be arranged.*

It may be observed, however, that this power of

et une passion qui s'exercent fatalement : c'est pourquoi l'âme ne devient une personne, ne se fait un être moral, ne peut parler d'elle et en son nom, que quand elle est parvenue à être pour quelque chose dans les mouvemens auxquels elle se livre. Jusque-là si elle est un *moi*, ce n'est qu'à titre de conscience, parce qu'elle se sent exister : c'est comme individu, comme vie distincte, comme force sortie de l'être où tout est vaguement, et venue dans des rapports qui la déterminent et la définissent ; mais ce n'est pas comme *moi* moral et responsable, comme personne devant la loi." (Damiron, Histoire de la Philosophie.)

* Œuvres, Vol. 1, pp. 31, 34. Vol. 2, pp. 23, 36, Bruxelles.

reason does not, according to Cousin, belong to our nature ; it is not *ours*, in the strict meaning of the phrase ; it is of an absolute or divine nature. The only thing which really belongs to us, is voluntary power or spontaneity of action. Whatever is not the effect of our free and spontaneous efforts, forms no part of our personality, as we have already noticed. The intelligent faculty is conversant only about what is true ; but truth does not depend upon the efforts of the voluntary power. It has an independent existence. We have our rational or intellectual vision through another channel ; it is divine communication, or revelation from God. The ideas which consciousness makes known to us, do not belong to ourselves ; but are the property of this absolute principle of reason or intelligence.

Reason then, in conformity with Cousin's hypothesis, is an impersonal thing. This is a bold proposition ; and one which is scarcely warranted by a sound view of mental phenomena. When a man reasons or judges, he is just as conscious of his personality ; just as firmly convinced that it is himself who reasons, as when he wills, desires, and acts. The train of thought which seems to have induced the French philosopher to maintain this opinion, may thus be stated. To most of our purely intellectual efforts, we feel the power of the will requisite. Most persons who are practised in literary composition will readily understand what we are now stating. We make an effort ; we muster all our forces ; we banish irregular and discursive thoughts ; and we keep the mind steadily

gazing on the object of our pursuit. When we have thus marshalled our internal energies, we then conceive we are in the requisite position for obtaining some new thoughts ; for, in fact, exercising what we term our invention. In this sort of revery or abstraction, some of our best thoughts make their appearance. We never recognised them before ; know nothing from whence they come ; nor have they any perceptible connection with the previous arrangements we have, by our voluntary powers, made. We are astonished, delighted, and think ourselves almost inspired ; we are in the attitude of recipients of providence, and are fed by the intellectual ravens in the wilderness. Reason seems altogether separated from any thing belonging to ourselves. She drops in upon us, as it were, unexpectedly ; pays us a short visit, and then vanishes. Nothing remains but the intellectual apparatus we had erected to entice her to make her appearance. Thoughts come spontaneously ; we are conscious of no effort of the will ; and hence we conclude that truth is the result of an immediate and heavenly inspiration. This would seem to be Baron Cousin's notion, from what he has himself told us on the subject. He says, " It is by observation that within the steep recesses of consciousness, where even Kant never descended, and under the conviction of the existence of necessary principles and their relations, I have succeeded in seizing and decomposing the instantaneous, but true and spontaneous conception of truth ; a conception which, not immediately reflecting itself, is apt to pass unperceived in the

profound depths of the consciousness ; and yet it is the real foundation of that which afterwards, through the instrumentality of reflection, assumes a logical form, and forms a clear and distinct idea of the mind. All notion of the existence and reflective power of mind is thrown out of sight by this spontaneous conception. But the first glare of it is so intense and pure, that it is almost unperceived, and we take the reflected light instead, which often tarnishes with its borrowed lustre the purity of the former. Reason becomes subjective by its connection with the voluntary *moi* ; but in itself, abstractly considered, it is impersonal ; it does not belong to one more than another ; not even to humanity as a whole ; for its laws emanate only from itself." *

That sudden and apparently spontaneous trains of thought spring up in the mind, even when we seem entirely unconscious, nay, even when we are engaged in an entirely different direction, is a fact that the generality of men, in almost every station of life, must have frequently noticed. But whether these trains are so distinctly severed from the voluntary powers, as M. Cousin conceives, is another matter. Consciousness does not seem susceptible of solving the question. This, however, we know, that in no case whatever do we allow intelligence or reason to be separated from the will, when any reference is made to the mental character and moral responsibility of the individual.

* Œuvres, vol. 2. pp. 33, 118.

They must stand or fall together. If it could be demonstrated that men, in their intellectual attainments and moral capabilities, were only the recipients of another and a foreign influence; that they *themselves*—*personally* in its most absolute sense—were not the authors of their own ideas, and motives, and actions; we should no more think of lavishing praise upon them, for any mental or moral achievement, than we would think of praising them for the complexion of their skins or the color of their hair.

In reference to *sensation*, M. Cousin may be considered as belonging to the *ideal* school. Sensation, with him, is the power or faculty which makes us acquainted with external nature. It does not tell what objective existence is in itself; whether it be a material body, with a *vis inertiae* as we conceive it, or something possessing a mere phenomenal existence. Sensation tells us there is something external to ourselves; something which affects us in a particular way; something which does not belong to the *moi*, or *myself*. We are so constituted that whenever we are affected from *without*, we attribute the effect to some *cause*. Hence we have a notion that the external world can produce an endless series of effects; and this power we place in some principle or substratum, in which we conceive it lies. These effects from *without*, limit, regulate, and modify the power and influence of the will. We are constantly, therefore, holding communion with these external forces; constantly talking and thinking of them, and com-

ing in contact with them. But whether there is any thing beyond mere *force* or *power*, is a matter entirely hidden from our knowledge. Natural philosophy, M. Cousin considers, is decidedly of a *spiritual* rather than of a *material* cast ; inasmuch as it is always conversant with *forces* and *laws*.*

M. Cousin's third grand philosophical division is *Ontology*. This comprehends matters of great moment. He steers a middle course between some German systems and those commonly propounded by philosophers in England and Scotland. The Germans commence their inquiries from the abstract conception of Being ; and from this, the source of all things, they mould their peculiar notions of the laws of universal nature. In Great Britain, however, these ontological speculations have not been much indulged in ; and Cousin agrees with those philosophers who think that psychology, as an analysis, is the only sound foundation for a knowledge of the absolute of existence. This is effected, in his theory, by the impersonal nature of reason, which receives truth spontaneously, by immediate conception ; and we are thus, he contends, enabled to establish a valid connection between the existence of our thinking principle and the existence of a material world.

Existence in general is viewed under three distinct phases. We are conscious of our own individual existence and voluntary powers ; these rest in *ourselves*—in the *moi*. Something seems to

* Œuvres, vol. 2, p. 37.

exist *without* us, which acts upon us in divers modes, and compels us to pay more or less attention to its intimations. This we term nature—the material world around us. Neither this material universe nor ourselves are infinite; we are both limited, finite, conditioned; and therefore must have been created by a power possessing the attributes of self-existence, infinity, eternity. This power, or absolute Being or essence, is God.

The most interesting portion of this general division of M. Cousin's philosophy, is that which relates to religious doctrines and feelings. He maintains that the nature of the Divine intelligence is within the range of the human comprehension. The three elementary parts of reason, as he defines it, constitute a portion of the Divine nature. The Supreme Mind is the absolute cause of all things, and must, of necessity, create other things. But these things are not created out of nothing; this M. Cousin considers as absurd; but they are derived from the innate exercise of His spontaneity, and the essence of His nature. The universe is to be considered as a manifestation of the Deity, but not the Deity himself; it is simply Almighty power passing into a state of activity. M. Cousin conceives that his metaphysical hypothesis is the only one that can fully and adequately explain the nature and attributes of the Supreme Being, and the relations in which He stands to the material universe. He says: "God creates; he creates by virtue of his creative power, and he draws the universe, not from nonentity, but from

Himself, who possesses absolute existence. His distinguished characteristic being an absolute creative power, which cannot but pass into activity, it follows that creation is not a possible act, but a *necessary* one."

Here we have, in substance and principle, the atheistical notion of a Supreme Being chained down by an imperious necessity. Upon this logical position of M. Cousin, the created thing which we call a universe is really a part of the Creator himself. It is nothing more than a manifestation of His existence. All *necessary* influence, when applied in its absolute sense, (and philosophically speaking it can be taken in no other), is completely destructive of the idea of Deity, considered in any view applicable to a rational theism. The Divine nature must be invested with the most perfect independence of existence and spontaneity of action. This nature cannot be placed upon any foreign or external cause whatever; otherwise it can never be conceived to be that which we designate by a Supreme Creator or Governor of the universe. Let this hypothesis of M. Cousin be viewed in every possible light, it will be found full to overflowing of the most contradictory and irrational inferences.

The serious charge which has been commonly brought against the theory of M. Cousin, is that of its favouring pantheistical notions. This doctrine, it is true, he professes to repudiate; but it is quite obvious that his system, in all its leading principles, is a direct declaration of the essential elements of this irreligious hypothesis. The chief

characteristics of pantheism are *uniformity of substance*, and *an exclusion of all creative power*. Now if these two elements constitute pantheism, then it must be a difficult task to purge the author's system of a direct tendency towards it.

The accusations brought forward, by his French critics, to substantiate this charge, may be classed under the following heads. 1st, Whenever he speaks of a *uniform substance*, he takes the meaning of the word *substance* in a Platonic sense. 2nd, He affirms that the world and the human soul are only *modifications* of a *uniform substance*. 3rd, He calls the universe and the human soul *phenomena*. By the definition he gives of this word *phenomena*, he excludes all idea of every thing approaching to *real substance*. 4th, He terms the world and the human soul, *powers* and *causes*. 5th, He virtually denies the freedom of the human will. 6th, He maintains the *necessity* of creation, and in such a sense as effectually to exclude the personal intelligence and spontaneity of the divine nature.*

The following passage from M. Cousin is considered as containing a pure specimen of Pantheism. "The God of consciousness is not an abstract Being, a solitary King, reigning beyond the bounds of creation, upon a desert throne of eternal silence, and passing an absolute existence amid surrounding nothingness. He is a God at once true and

* See the following passages in his works: "Fragmens Phil." pages 18. 19. 63. 69. 70. 72. 76. 221. 222. 307. 312. 313.; "Cours de Phil." Leçons 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 13.

real, at once substance and cause ; always substance and always cause, being substance only as a cause, and cause only as a substance ; that is to say, being absolute cause, one and many, time and eternity, space and number, essence and life, individuality and totality ; in fine, at once God, Nature, and Humanity. Indeed, if the Deity be not all, he is nothing ; if he be absolutely indivisible in himself, he must be inaccessible, and consequently incomprehensible.”*

As we have already hinted, M. Cousin repudiates the charge of Pantheism. It is but fair we should cite his last defence of his opinions on this subject. He says, “But if I have not confounded God with the world ; if my Deity is not the Universe-Deity which the Pantheists make Him, neither is He the bare abstraction of absolute unity ; the lifeless God of the Schoolmen. As God is made known only so far he is an absolute cause, on this account, in my humble opinion, *He must create*, (ne peut pas ne pas produire).” * * * “In the system of Spinoza, creation is altogether impossible ; in mine it is *necessary*.”

It must be quite obvious that M. Cousin is not more fortunate in these explanations, than in his original statement. We know, and we implicitly believe in his declarations, that he is professedly, and upon principle, opposed to the views of Spinoza, and to every shade of his doctrine ; but candour and truth likewise oblige us to state,

* “Fragmens,” tom. 1. p. 76.

that we think his own opinions, on this fundamental principle of all theology, just as unfounded, as obscure, and as pernicious in their practical bearings, as the system of the Amsterdam philosopher. The two theories spring from an identical root; they diverge in somewhat opposite directions, but here they are united; and this common centre of union is *necessity*. A *necessary creation*—a *necessary Creator*, which M. Cousin claims as his own peculiar dogma, is not only a contradiction in terms, but militates against every rational theistical idea we entertain of a Deity.

And we are the more firmly convinced that M. Cousin labours under very erroneous opinions as to the theological tendencies of his system, from seeing, in some of his historical developments of philosophy, the use he makes of his doctrine of reason. He throws the same *necessary* action into all its manifestations, as that which he does in reference to the creative powers of the Deity. What he calls spontaneity, is no spontaneity at all; it is a blind and impersonal power; a ball set in motion, (when or how, no one knows), and we only witness its perpetual movements in endless space and time. Reason is an instinctive, indiscriminating, unreflecting thing; divested of all those attributes or qualities which we are led, from the constitution of our minds and the construction of language, to invest it with. To reflect, the philosopher tells us, is to open the door to error and delusion. We must act from a pure conception; we must intercept, nay, we must sit still till something else in-

tercepts the rays from the Divine Mind, or we have no pretensions to reason at all. This was the mode, and the only mode, which enabled the wise men—the prophets and inspired sages of ancient times—to reveal their thoughts to their kindred. Inspiration has nothing specific, nothing individual about it; it is merely the internal development of the absolute mind, which all may, or may not, just as it happens, be partakers of. The whole frame-work of Christianity has nothing particular or personal about it; it is not a simple means towards a specific purpose; it only comes within the chapter of accidents; for the Divine light, the absolute intelligence, might have taken another direction. The prophets and apostles were only the accidental recipients of Divine thought; and to maintain that they were respectively sent upon the individual missions connected with their history and names, is to acquiesce, according to the theory of M. Cousin, in an arrant absurdity.

We have here presented the reader with a few observations on the leading points of M. Cousin's philosophy.* We have perused it often with care; and the more we have considered it, the more firmly are we persuaded that it is generally, as a whole, unsound, both metaphysically and theologically. That he is a philosopher of splendid talents and acquirements, is unquestionable. He says many true and sensible, and many brilliant and eloquent things; but there are also many inconsistent and erroneous positions laid down, which are calculated

* See Note F. at the end of this Volume.

to exercise an unfavourable influence on the progress of sound knowledge.

LE BARON MASSAIS.

Baron Massais* has been a zealous and laborious student of philosophy for many years; and all his works evince considerable penetration and a sincere and ardent love of truth. He considers there are three leading facts which appertain to human nature, and constitute it what it really is; namely, instinct, intelligence, and life. Instinct is the commencement of human existence, intelligence develops it, and life completes it.

In the first dawn of man's career, before he is able to reflect, or to exercise his intelligence or will, instinct labours and acts for him, with the most unerring regularity and certainty. This power is the ruling and superintending providence of his fate. Then comes slowly, and step by step, the power of intelligence. This supersedes, in a certain degree, the power of instinct, and substitutes in its room, thought, liberty, and moral obligation. The instinctive power has for its immediate object, the preservation of the individual, and also of the species; and intelligence, operating through the medium of reason and sentiment,

* "Rapport de la Nature à l'Homme," 5 vol. 1821; *Problème de l'Esprit*, 1825; *Traité de Philosophie Psycho-Physiologique*, 1830. "Théorie du Beau et du Sublime," "Examens des Fragments de Royer-Collard, et des Principes de la Philosophie Ecossaise."

embraces a multitude of other things, not necessarily connected with the wants of mere animal life ; such as things which are useful, ornamental, true, good, proper, &c. The third principle, life, is derived from the assimilation of instinct and intelligence. They must all three be combined into one ; and this constitutes the being we call *man*.*

M. Damiron observes that Massais “ regards the whole creation as a great drama. The mysterious and divine Poet who has conceived it, and put it into action, is observable to no one ; he is not here rather than there, he was not yesterday more than to-day ; but in all places and at all times he makes himself felt. Though veiled, he demonstrates his existence ; and without intimately developing his nature or attributes, he makes himself known by signs and symbols. There is sufficient here to satisfy reason, if not our curiosity.”

* “ Nous allons essayer de rendre sensible à l'imagination ce que nous venons d'exposer aux yeux de l'esprit. Supposons une montre intelligente, renfermée dans la grande horloge de l'univers, en recevant son mouvement, inscrivant et lisant sur son cadran tous les phénomènes extérieurs qui s'y répètent en petit ; ayant aussi un mouvement propre qui peut seconder ou contrarier l'action générale, sans pouvoir cependant s'en affranchir totalement. On voit, dans cette hypothèse, que le *rapport* en vertu duquel la montre perçoit en soi l'action universelle, se compose de sa propre action, de sa propre perception, combinées avec l'action et l'intelligence universelles ; le lien qui les unit est leur action commune et réciproque.

“ *Homme*, créature finie, dépendante par son organisation et sa pensée de l'univers et des lois qui régissent l'univers, à l'action duquel elle s'associe par la perception et l'intelligence, et, par son libre arbitre, soumise aux lois du devoir, auxquelles elle peut obéir ou désobéir.” (Rapport de la Nature, &c.)

G. LERMINIER.

M. Lerminier* has attempted, in many publications, to point out the influence which the philosophy of the eighteenth century exercises over the political, religious, and social condition of the world in the nineteenth. Religion, politics, and general literature, are respectively criticised, as well as many particular doctrines relative to the human mind.

The theoretical views of M. Lerminier are not very prominently developed in his writings. He seems to be not satisfied with any of the modern systems of mental philosophy. The old theory of Condillac is rather roughly handled, and the eclectic school of France is not much in vogue with him. Some of the German writings seem to have excited his curiosity, and gained a little upon his esteem; but even here, he evinces great reserve in stating his own opinions on the abstruse speculations of that country.

M. ANCILLON.

This philosophical writer† was a Protestant

* "Etudes d'Histoire et de Philosophie," 2 vol.; "De l'influence de la Philosophie au 18^{me} siècle sur la Législation et la Socialité du 19^{me} siècle;" "Lettres Philosophiques;" "Philosophie du Droit;" "Au-delà du Rhin, ou Tableau Politique et Philosophique de l'Allemagne."

† "Essais de Philosophie;" "Essai sur la Science et sur la Foi Philosophique;" "Mélanges de Littérature et de Philosophie;" "Nouveaux Essais de Politique et de Philosophie;" "Médiateur des Extrêmes en Politique et en Littérature."

Clergyman at Berlin, and became before his death Foreign Minister to the King of Prussia. His works are pretty numerous, and enjoy a fair share of reputation among a certain class of Continental writers.

Knowledge, in the conception of M. Ancillon, is almost purely a matter of intuition or faith. What is commonly called demonstration, especially considered in reference to mental science, is often little better than a mere quibble or play upon words. It would be impossible to obtain that general assent which we find among mankind, on all the leading phenomena of mind, were it not that its suggestions, for all the purposes of social and ordinary life, are almost entirely instinctive. In his opinion, *philosophical faith* is the grand key to all the branches of science connected with human nature. Regulated by an enlightened, reflective power, it becomes all powerful in the development of scientific truth.

F. PERRON.

M. Perron's "Essai d'une Nouvelle Théorie sur les Idées Fondamentales," is a somewhat bold, and as its name implies, novel production. The author aims at placing knowledge upon a foundation which he thinks the only solid one. A considerable portion of his treatise is occupied with showing, that all previous systems of philosophy, from Plato downwards, have been reared upon perfectly gra-

tuitous and arbitrary principles. Philosophers have assumed certain logical conditions as subsisting among the relations of our fundamental ideas or notions, and have invested them with the characters of necessity, universality, immutability, and the like. This is a great error. These logical conditions do not possess a more *à priori* origin than any thing else which can be seized by the understanding. The attempts of some modern philosophers of note, to place *reason* beyond the pale of mind, to make it an emanation of the absolute or Divine Mind, does not establish the validity of an external world. The author tells us also, that the nature and offices of the Categories of the understanding have been strangely misunderstood by all previous philosophers.

Man has but one thinking faculty ; this is, however, of such a comprehensive nature as to embrace all truth immediately, with the rapidity and unerring aim of instinct itself. What we perceive of external objects, constitutes their veritable properties or modes of existence. Our knowledge commences with concrete perceptions ; and what are usually termed the categories, are not certain forms of thought, pure conceptions of the reason ; but simply generalizations of individual objects or things. This is evinced by considerations and arguments drawn from space and time, cause and effect, the finite and infinite, &c.

The author in his system has nine categories, which, he conceives, embrace all the relations sub-

sisting among all things of which the mind can be conversant. These are :

- | | | |
|------------------------|-------------|------------|
| 1. If they are ?..... | Category of | Existence. |
| 2. What are they ? ... | „ „ | Essence. |
| 3. How are they ?..... | „ „ | Mode. |
| 4. By what ?..... | „ „ | Causality. |
| 5. Why ? | „ „ | End. |
| 6. Where ? | „ „ | Space. |
| 7. When ? | „ „ | Time. |
| 8. How many ?..... | „ „ | Number. |
| 9. In what relations ? | „ „ | Relation.' |

M. PHILIPPE DAMIRON.

M. Damiron* is a distinguished and popular philosopher. His writings are all characterised by sound sense and critical judgment, and they breathe the spirit of a liberal and candid mind. His works have gone through many editions, and are well known in every country of Europe.

M. Damiron is, however, more a historian and critic, than a systematic writer on the mind. He professes to belong to the eclectic school of Cousin, and zealously supports this method of philosophical investigation. *Eclecticism* is to him every thing; and we shall furnish the reader with a few observations of his own upon the advantages

* "Cours de Philosophie," 1842, 4 vol. ; "Essai sur l'Histoire de la Philosophie en France au 19^{me} siècle," 1834, 2 vols.

which he supposes mental philosophy derives from it. "It would not be impossible to form a philosophy without the aid of eclecticism; but such a philosophy would be a monstrosity, and would require a genius which could, by its unaided energies, equal in the highest accomplishments the united genius of the greatest philosophers; those who are, in fact, great only through their teachers and through history. We cannot count upon such a phenomenon; and eclecticism is a much more natural mode of procedure, inasmuch as it is only that form of philosophy which is suggested to the mind,—the labour by concert and association. Eclecticism is only philosophy by association; that philosophy which, by historical criticisms and discussions, is enriched with all the legitimate acquisitions of past times. And what enhances the value of this philosophy is, that it is more in communion with previous systems of speculation, participates in a greater number of doctrines, and has more numerous materials out of which to make a choice.

"It would be hazardous to affirm that eclecticism will never change; either in reference to its criterion of truth, or to its spirit of erudition. * * * At present it has a *spiritual* tendency, arising from the nature of psychological speculations. I believe this tendency to be good, and that it will prove durable; but still it may undergo change. * * * What will be the consequence? Clearly that it will be improved, strengthened, and perfected;

not that it will ever come to an end. At least this cannot happen until it is fully completed. * * * * Eclecticism is not a definite state for philosophy ; it is not an end, it is only a means ; but a means for a long futurity, and, in our times more than ever, of indispensable application. The science of human nature did not commence, and will not finish, with eclecticism ; but the science has lived, and will continue to thrive, by eclecticism ; which is to the world of ideas, what associations of persons are in active life. The longer I live, I find this conviction strengthened."

FRAN. BOULLIER.

M. Boullier is the author of "*Histoire et Critique de la Révolution Cartésienne*," Paris. This work is the successful Prize Essay, for the solution of the question proposed by the French Institute, on the Influence of the Philosophy of Descartes. It is a very able work, and it is well entitled to the high honour which has been conferred upon it.

After entering most minutely into the writings of Descartes, showing their general principles and spirit, and their influence on the subsequent history of metaphysical science, the author gives us his own opinions in the last chapter of his book. These seem to be the offspring of a sound and healthy philosophy.

M. Boullier vindicates the supremacy of human reason, both in matters of philosophy and theology.

He shows by clear and convincing arguments, that those who attack human reason, with a view of establishing more firmly the truths of religion, pursue a dangerous and foolish course. On this point he subscribes to the truth of the remark of Christiana, queen of Sweden, who was a disciple of Descartes, "that to abase reason with a view of exalting religion, was like recommending a man to put out his eyes, that he might the more clearly perceive the light."

The following chapters in M. Boullier's work are especially worthy of consideration: "Des Idées Innées de Descartes;" "De l'Idée de l'Infini et de la Souveraine Perfection;" "De la vraie Notion de Substance;" "De l'erreur de Descartes relativement à la Puissance et à la Liberté de Dieu;" "De l'Hypothèse de l'Animal-Machine."

The most faulty and erroneous part of M. Boullier's speculations relates to what he has said respecting Mr. Locke's having borrowed all the leading principles, contained in his celebrated "Essay," from the philosophy of Descartes. There never was a more mistaken notion than this. Locke's work bears all the internal evidence of its having been the fruit of his own vigorous and enlightened mind; and there is no truth, in the whole circle of science, that we believe more firmly, than that he never drew from the Cartesian fountain a single idea for the construction of his famous performance.

CLAUDE HENRI COUNT DE ST. SIMON.

Saint Simon is one of the French mystical writers, whose works have obtained more notoriety since his death than during his life. He appears to have been a good, virtuously disposed man, who thought much on, and felt keenly for, the mass of human ills. He fancied that he not only saw the cause of them, but could point out the remedy. In 1814 he published a small work on "Reorganization of European Society," with the view of leading the way to such social reforms as he conceived requisite. Several other Tracts of a similar kind made their appearance in Paris before his death, which took place in 1825.

What practical measures he suggests rest upon a philosophical idea that the evils of life arise from a want of *social unity*. There is no common tie or bond among men; every one stands apart from his neighbour, vigorously engaged in trying to supersede or supplant him. There are no ideas, ends, or purposes held in common by the community; but every member of it is opposed to every other; follows after the suggestions of his own will and heart; and, in consequence, so far as his individualism proves successful, it can only be at the expense of the happiness and comfort of several other of his brethren. Human life, instead of being a system of mutual succour, assistance, and co-operation, for the good of all, is an individual enterprise, a speculation, a lottery; in fact, a steeple-

chase for existence, where every thing depends upon the individual strength, courage, activity, and recklessness of those who start for the prize of life.

St. Simon maintains, then, that philosophy and religion have been in all ages, and are now, aiming at the correcting of the evils that arise from this spirit of rivalry, which practically exercises a more despotic and pernicious influence over the individual happiness of man, than any mere abstract and formal system of public misrule could possibly effect. But both philosophers and the clergy labour under mistaken notions as to the means of improvement. Highly wrought theories of mental and moral science are of little or no use ; and religion, which has doubtless produced some good, has never been fully portrayed in that lofty spiritualism which is its true and native character. This spiritual energy must conquer the *material* interests of man ; or social and individual happiness can never be achieved.

Religion and philosophy, to be beneficial, must be based upon *historical* deductions. It is only from the past history of our race that we can predict its future destiny. Humanity is a progressive march to perfection, and we can clearly detect two distinct epochs alternating with each other. The one is the *organic*, and the other the *critical*, epoch. The organic displays human movements bound together by a strong and powerful law ; and the critical epoch commences when unity of action becomes weakened or broken up, and

individual and personal objects, interests, and pursuits, clash with each other. We have a specimen of the organic state in Pagan history; and when this was destroyed it gave place to the critical. This was the first alternation of the two opposing elements. The second grand organic period of human society, was the unity effected by the Catholic Church; and the critical period which succeeded this, commenced with the Reformation, and terminated with the French Revolution. Another great epoch or phase is now developing itself, when all evil and discord, war, misery, and crime, shall be for ever banished from the world; and men will be united by religious sentiment, intellectual acquirement, and industrial co-operation, into one great and harmonious whole.*

CHARLES FOURIER.

The social theory of Fourier† is, at the present moment, engrossing the attention and exciting the apprehensions of thinking men, not only in France, but in almost every country in Europe. As the system is based on certain metaphysical notions, we shall endeavour to furnish as succinct a sketch of it as will enable the general reader to comprehend its leading principles.

* "Doctrines de St. Simon," Paris, 1829; "Exposition de la Doctrine Saint Simonienne, 2 vols.

† "Théorie de Quatre Mouvements," 1808; "Théorie de l'Unité Universelle;" "Nouveau Monde Industriel et Sociétaire," "La Fausse Industrie."

Fourier is an independent thinker, so far as the originality of his own system is concerned; for he did not, as commonly supposed, derive his leading views from St. Simon. He published a sketch of his theory in 1808, but there was no notice taken of his opinions. Before his death, in 1837, some ingenious writers in Paris had directed their attention to his doctrines; but it was not till after that period that a school or society was regularly formed, for the express development and illustration of his tenets. Two periodical works sprang out of this association; "*La Phalange*," and "*La Démocratie Pacifique*;" both of which have excited considerable attention throughout France.

According to Fourier, reason is the foundation of all knowledge to man; it is to him the sole organ of truth. But this faculty does not seize truth at once; it is progressive in its operations and acquirements. There are only a few data given to it for a starting point; consequently it falls, in its first movements, into many errors. Still it keeps its ground, and a progressive step is gained. We have this amply and strikingly verified in the history of physical science. Judging from analogy, we may rationally expect the same advantages from continued and judicious observations on the laws which regulate the movements of civil society. Truth is here just as progressive as in natural philosophy.

We must, however, look beyond mere reason; we must look to God. His existence is the most

infallible and demonstrable of all truths. He is a Being of infinite goodness, intelligence, and wisdom; and we bear the imprint of His perfections upon our own souls and minds. This is abundantly proved by the inward concord and harmony which subsists in all departments of nature. Man was created in His image, and is a living mirror of the universe. In our own organization, then, we may expect to find the fullest harmony and agreement; and such is the fact. In every part of our nature,—the intellectual, the moral, the religious, and the physical,—we recognise the most wonderful adaptations of means to ends, and the most harmonious mechanism. There is *evil* doubtless, but it is not from the machine itself; it springs from the awkward and ignorant movements of those who have the management of it. We came forth perfect from the hand of the Creative Power; but our own perverseness has been the sole cause of the discord and strife introduced into human life.

We must, therefore *study man*, — we must gaze upon him with the full force of reason, and through the medium of that knowledge which we have of God, and of His attributes and universal government. The history of human nature embraces two separate divisions; history, properly so called, and a knowledge of man's organization. Viewing the movements of humanity through a series of ages, we see it pass a succession of stages, corresponding to what we call, in reference to the individual, *infancy*, *adolescence*, *virility*, and *old-age*; called by the author, Edénisme, Patriarcat, Barbarie,

Civilisation. In these respective epochs the principle of union is gradually unfolded, and manifests itself in the rise of the sciences, arts, and general knowledge.

The grand object of inquiry is, How are we to destroy individualism, and restore mankind to a state of union and concord? In Fourier's opinion, we must look into man's nature; examine all its parts and movements; the bearings they have on each other; and the purposes or ends they are individually and conjointly fitted to produce. In doing this, we recognise three grand principles; 1st, The passions, or active principle; 2nd, The bodily frame, or passive principle; and 3rdly, Mind, or the regulative principle.

This external and internal dissection of man, makes his body a mere organ or material instrument; his mind the ruling power, and the passions the direct incentives to action. The *will* or voluntary power must be an especial object of our investigations; for upon its movements, the whole man's intellectual and moral improvement rests.

Looking at the nature of the passions as a *whole*, Fourier classifies them into three divisions; in the same manner as he has done our entire organization. First, there is the passion or desire for physical enjoyment, comprehending the sensitive feelings or passions, arising out of taste, smell, sight, hearing, and touch. Secondly, there is the passion or desire of aggregation; to be united in communion with each other; to form families, tribes, states, and kingdoms. A multitude of distinct passions, feel-

ings, and desires, are set apart to carry out effectively this purpose of our being ; such as love, friendship, desire of esteem, ambition, love of fame, domestic pleasure, &c. Then, thirdly, out of these smaller or greater social communities or confederacies, there springs a powerful thirst among men for certain ranks and stations in them ; and here the passions of emulation, agreement, and diversity, take their rise. Now all these various passions or desires are beautifully fitted to accomplish the grand object of social institutions, the happiness of the whole, and of every individual member of them. The body politic resembles the natural body of the individual ; there is a principle of life in it ; and a variety of functions, organs, and powers ; and a *vis medicatrix naturæ*, which preserves the native vigour and health of the whole social and political frame of life.

These are Fourier's theoretical materials, we must now give an outline of their practical application. There is, confessedly, a great deal of misery and vice in the world ; and it is clear to every one, that, though all the main and primary functions of life and activity in the body politic are sound and in full play, yet there are morbid obstructions to the full amount of social vigour and health, which, but for these, it would otherwise obtain. The harmony of the several parts is impaired. Some faculties are too much strained, while others are allowed to lie comparatively inactive. The cause of this disordered state of things is, that every individual only thinks, and acts, and schemes for

himself. He places himself in hostile array against every other member of the community. Moral or personal purity is checked, because the physical appetites and passions have no natural sphere of action; and they become consequently deranged, distorted, and extravagant; bringing in their train a host of evils and crimes. In Charters and in written Constitutions man is declared to be free; but practically he is the veriest slave to incessant and ill-requited toil; a system totally at variance with all his powerful aspirations, hopes, tastes, and desires. If the various passions of men be misdirected, impaired, blunted, or extravagantly excited, the proper equilibrium of the social state is destroyed; but if, on the other hand, we proceed upon sound maxims, giving to every natural desire its full play, we shall repress vice and disorder; not by coercion and restraint, but by making each member of the community feel that his personal happiness is inseparably connected with his following out his own individual destination, according to the purposes and intentions of nature.

The *material* machinery for this grand purpose is the following:—Fourier parcels out society into small communities, say 400 families, or 1800 individuals. Such a community he terms a Phalange; and the building or palace in which they all reside, a Phalangère. This building must be constructed in a particular form, containing dwelling houses of all sizes, workshops, gardens, and conveniences of every kind. The building must stand in the centre of a piece of ground a league

square, which is to be specially cultivated for the use of the community. Here the first class of passions are supposed to be ministered to ; for the cattle, fruits, vegetables, and flowers, which are reared on this piece of ground, will gratify the sensitive passions or desires ; such as taste, smell, sight, &c. This is one theoretical point carried out. The second class of passions will, in their turn, be gratified, such as social intercourse, friendship, &c., without any admixture of selfishness or individualism. Laudable ambition will spring up in the breasts of men, who will rival each other in disinterested deeds of greatness and beneficence. The holy and sacred passion of love will unite kindred spirits, whose pure and genuine affections will never be chilled by the clashing of contending interests or rival enterprises. Families will spring up in tenderness and brotherhood, without cares, anxieties, or troubles of any kind. The third class of our passions have their natural play, in the different tastes we shall have in prosecuting our labours. There will be nothing like dulness or monotony. Some will follow commerce, some agriculture, some science, some religion, and some the fine arts. Here every one enjoys liberty ; he is free to change his occupation whenever he pleases : for Fourier assumes it quite certain that every man will do *something*, and that the idea of idleness will never once enter the mind. Rivalry, sympathy, and variety, will agreeably stimulate men to follow various paths to honour and renown. The property of the community is capital, labour, and talent. These

are all disposed of according to their intrinsic value. There will, and must be, diversity of rank; for nature, though harmonious, knows nothing of *equality*. The grand aim is to reward every member of the community with that share of honour, wealth, fame, and influence, justly proportioned to the amount of his talent, industry, and perseverance.

Such is the bare sketch of a system which is, at the present moment, engrossing the attention of philosophers and statesmen. It is necessary we should observe, that this political or social part of the philosophy of Fourier, does not embrace the whole of his metaphysical speculations. His "*Cosmogony*" contains his disquisitions on the spiritual nature of man, his unity with the Deity, and the universe at large. His views, however, partake largely of mysticism and extravagance; at once showing the fruits of a somewhat great but ill-regulated intellect.*

PIERRE LEROUX.

The philosophy of Pierre Leroux† has excited considerable attention in France. He received his first rudiments of knowledge from the writings of

* "See "*Exposition Abrégée*," by M. Considérant; "*Le Fou du Palais Royal*," by M. Contagrel; "*Solidarité*," by M. Renaud; and "*The Life of Fourier*," by M. Charles Pellarin.

† "*De l'Humanité, de son Principe et de son Avenir*," 2 vols.; "*Réfutation de l'Eclecticisme*;" "*Sept Discours sur la Situation de la Société de l'Esprit Humain*," 7 vols.; "*De la Mutilation d'un Ecrit Posthume de Thomas Jouffroy*," 1 vol.

St. Simon and Fourier, whose views he at first entered into with ardour ; but of later years he has shifted his ground, and assumed the position of an independent thinker.

Pierre Leroux has pitted himself against all the eclectic philosophers of Europe. He maintains that their *method* of philosophical investigation is constitutionally erroneous. A philosophy, to be worthy of the name, must be perfect in all its parts ; a harmony and union must reign throughout. A thing made up of scraps and patches ; of a little from this system, and a little from that ; is irrational and delusive. It can never satisfy the speculative wants of mankind. All eclectic theories have as grotesque an appearance in Leroux's eyes, as Joseph's coat of many colours.*

Leroux's ideas of a philosophy is to study *man*. We must examine what he is, what is his destination, what are his rights and privileges, what are his duties, and what are the laws which should govern and regulate his conduct. These constitute the first elements of all sound knowledge. It is of no use speculating on man in the closet : we must bring him out into open day ; anatomise his constitution ; consider him in all his divers relations, both as an individual and a member of society ; and then grasp those general truths which his nature clearly and satisfactorily develops.

M. Leroux conceives that all the psychological schools of philosophy since Descartes' time, have

* See "Réfutation de l'Eclecticisme," pp. 24. 36. 72. 81. 101.—Edit. 1832.

been wandering in the dark. They have taken an erroneous starting point. They have converted simple consciousness into the prolific source of all mental science. The *me* is merely an individual reason, which can only speak for itself. We gather nothing from it as to what man in general is ; and by continually keeping the intellectual eye fixed on the point of mere personal consciousness, we cramp and fetter our own legitimate powers of investigation. The *moi* is a mere abstraction, a philosophical fiction, possessed of no real existence. It has not the characteristics of an independent creation. Every individual mind, every personal reason, exists only as a portion of a great whole ; as an atom in the totality of humanity.* The *moi* is only one link in the endless chain of universal existence. Our mere personal feelings, passions, desires, thoughts, reasonings, which we conceive spring independently out of the native resources of our own minds, derive their origin from the common stock of general truth belonging to all mankind. To study the *moi* then is delusive ; for it is the study of mankind alone from which we can realize a rational and sound philosophy.

We must look, therefore, to the *science of life*, for really important philosophical truths. We can know neither its source, nor its end ; all we see are but certain intermediate parts of it. To embrace as many of these as possible through the Catholic traditions of our race ; to determine what

* See "De l'Humanité," pp. 113. 116.

has transpired in the past; and to deduce from this historical chart the progress of future events; these are alone the effective and legitimate instruments of scientific inquiry.

What is the individual man? An animal; a living soul? A being existing alone in time and space, having no connection with universal creation? None of these are correct definitions of him. Man is neither a soul nor an animal; he is an animal transformed by reason, and united to humanity.* History teaches us that he is individually perfectible; that societies or communities of men are perfectible; and that the universal race of mankind are perfectible. The principle of evil, of disorganization, of disturbance, can be modified, and eventually entirely suppressed; and when this is accomplished, human life will be so balanced in all its interests, wants, happiness, and enjoyments, as to present a splendid and consolidated whole of intellectual and physical perfection.

In order to illustrate his views, M. Leroux enters learnedly and minutely into all the traditions of mankind, from the earliest records of their existence. He states their conceptions as to the nature of Deity, and the immateriality and immortality of the soul. The chief inference he draws from these statements is, that the Christian system is a legitimate and regular deduction from the universal consent of the world upon these important and Catholic doctrines. Christianity will, however,

* De l'Humanité, p. 120.

undergo modifications, and give way, under the irresistible law of human progress and perfectibility, to a more spiritual and elevated religion.

Pierre Leroux's philosophy is, in its leading features, wild, fanatic, and irrational. That there are not some truths mixed up with it, it were uncandid not to acknowledge; but the preponderance is vastly on the side of folly and mysticism. His views of Christianity are, like those of the school from which he derives most of his materials, erroneous and distorted. They are the result of crude generalization and illogical conclusions. His whole system is but another phase of those pantheistical notions which have been so rife in France, and other Continental countries, since the commencement of the present century.

DICTIONNAIRE DES SCIENCES PHILOSOPHIQUES.

Our sketch of modern French philosophy would be imperfect without some notice of this excellent and comprehensive work. It is eclectic in its spirit and doctrines, and it promises to prove one of the most valuable compilations of metaphysical philosophy in Europe. A number of the most able and learned writers of France are among its contributors. We shall merely present our readers with a brief outline of the leading principles on which the biographical notices and scientific speculations of this publication are based.

The Editors express their inviolable attachment to that principle of religion which accompanies

man from the cradle to the grave, and points out to him another and a better country. At the same time, it is maintained that philosophy and religion are two distinct things, and that the one cannot supply the place of the other. Both are necessary to the speculative cravings of, and to give dignity to, man. Philosophy is independent, and speaks only to reason. This reason is not, however, a sterile power ; it comes from God ; it is invariable and absolute in its essence ; enlightening the path of individuals, of communities, and of whole kingdoms.

Every science must have a method. The method here adopted is that of Socrates and Descartes ; but applied with more strictness, and expanded to suit the more comprehensive range of modern philosophy. The psychological method will be strictly observed ; admitting only palpable facts, and keeping aloof from that indiscriminate speculation which merely feeds our fancies and chimeras. This method will collect together all principles and ideas which constitute the foundation of rational knowledge ; and by the aid of induction and reasoning they will be raised to the highest unity, and their results accurately and faithfully developed.

Psychology is viewed through a spiritual medium ; amalgamating the system of Leibnitz with that of Plato and Descartes. Mind is not to be considered as a mere idea, a pure thought, an abstract notion ; nor a power without liberty ; nor anything fugitive in form, and evanescent in move-

ment : but a perfect reality ; a free and responsible power ; having an independent existence entirely distinct from every other ; and which knows itself, regulates itself, and carries in itself the pledge of its immortality.

In all questions relative to Deity, a part is assigned to *feeling* ; because it often exercises a beneficial influence over the individual, without in the slightest degree impairing the strength of those arguments commonly brought forward to assert the authority and supremacy of reason. By reason we demonstrate the existence of a Creator, of his attributes, and of his relation to the universe of beings ; but by *feeling* we enter into closer communion with Him, and more immediately and personally feel His influence. Mysticism and pantheism, in all their shades and hues, are unceremoniously rejected. A Divine *Providence* is placed in their stead.

The history of philosophy is inseparable from philosophy itself ; they are identical. All the problems which philosophers have grappled with ; all the solutions they profess to have given to them ; and all the theories and systems which have prevailed over the minds of men at particular epochs of their history ; have been grounded on the human consciousness. Without this power, nothing could have either been known or conceived. It must be admitted that truth is the same in all times and in all places, and that it constitutes the very essence of the human intellect ; but still it does not manifest itself invariably under the same form, nor in the same degree.

There is a wise system of progress entirely compatible with the loftiest principles of reason ; and it is from this cause that the present condition of science is closely allied with the past.

AUGUSTE COMTE.

Though a little out of our chronological order, we shall now make a few observations on the celebrated work of M. Comte, "*Cours de Philosophie Positive*," 6 vols., 1842. It is quite superfluous to descant upon the philosophical talents of the author ; they are acknowledged and appreciated wherever philosophy is known and studied. But great talents do not always yield corresponding blessings to mankind ; and it is from this consideration that we feel ourselves compelled, from a sense of duty, to examine the merits of a system, whose evident object is to materialise all human thought, to leave nothing in the universe but matter, and to banish even the bare idea of a God from the human breast. Had not the intellectual merits of the author been great and unquestionable, and did we not know that the influence of his speculations is widely extending itself, we should not have presumed to raise our feeble voice against a theory which we know, from history as well as fact, has no claim to originality or solidity. Such a work, under ordinary circumstances, might have been left to fall into that state of neglect and oblivion, which must ever be the ultimate fate, no matter how splendid the talents which embellish

them, of such philosophical disquisitions as those of M. Comte.

We shall now attempt to give a brief outline of the *positive* philosophy of this author.

In casting an eye over every domain of knowledge, we see elements of confusion and strife. We perceive one system of opinion opposed to another. This is particularly apparent in all branches of science connected with human nature. We see one social theory adopted in one country, and a different one in an opposite direction; one system of theology reigns paramount here, and another there; one mental hypothesis becomes the orthodox creed among one sect of philosophers, and a contrary one gains the ascendancy over the minds of other speculators. There is no *unity* in the mass of knowledge; everything bears the imprint of contrariety and antagonism. And even in the science of natural philosophy itself, there is something demanded in the way of unity. Though every branch of it—such, for example, as astronomy, chemistry, &c.—professes to have each a basis of its own; and while all sciences are daily furnishing proofs of their progressive character towards perfection; still there is a method required which shall bind into one great whole that evidence on which all physical knowledge is grounded. This places man on a vantage ground. He no longer confines his attention solely to the evidence of one science, or to the philosophical method employed for its prosecution and development; but directs his eye to those comprehensive rules or maxims, at which all par-

ticular studies invariably terminate. To gain a knowledge of these rules is, in M. Comte's estimation, the highest intellectual achievement of a philosopher.

According to M. Comte, all kinds of knowledge pass through three distinct gradations or stages. 1st, The *supernatural*, or theological; 2nd, The *metaphysical*, or abstract; and 3rd, The *positive*, or scientific.

The supernatural is the first development. Man views the operations of nature through a religious medium; he "sees God in clouds, and hears Him in the wind." He peoples the hills and the valleys, the woods and the rippling streams, with genii and spiritual beings; and every thing he cannot readily comprehend, he endeavours to account for by the agencies of supernatural powers. The history of astronomy affords many striking illustrations of this tendency of the mind. This infantile age of our race passes away, and ushers in another,—the metaphysical; which deals in abstract conceptions, and real mental entities. Here we meet with the numerous theories of the origin of the world, broached by the Pythagoreans, and all the Eastern nations; in which light, numbers, harmonies, unities, and similar general conceptions of abstract powers or agencies, play a distinguished part. These, though but the feeble gropings of mental weakness and imbecility, gradually lay the foundation for more solid acquirements. A scientific method emerges out of this pristine haziness; and this method is the *positive*, which embraces nothing but *facts*, which are traced to certain ge-

neral principles, called *laws* of nature. The French philosopher makes all sciences pass through these three stages. He considers such sciences as astronomy, physics, and chemistry, to have got through this slough of theological and metaphysical degradation; but other branches of learning are not so fortunately situated, being still in purgatorial suffering. *Biology*, or physiology, has only attained its second stage; while *sociology*, or the science of humanity, is yet unhappily in its pupillage, being encumbered, in the author's conception, with certain ideas about a Deity and a human soul.*

It must be remembered that M. Comte affirms that it is perfectly futile to institute any inquiry into the causes or essences of things. We know nothing of them, nor ever can know anything. What science has to do is to obtain *facts*, and classify them according to certain rules or principles arising from the succession and similitude of things around us. This is the highest and noblest achievement of the positive philosophy.

The foundation of the positive science of M. Comte is formed by the combination of numerical relations, the geometrical relations of space, and the abstract principles of mechanics. The mind being now stored with a given stock of abstract principles, or general notions, we then enter upon an investigation of material bodies. These are of two kinds; *inorganic*, and *organic*. The former are the more simple of the two; and are, therefore,

* Cours de Philosophie Positive, vol. 1, pp. 3. 7. 22. 36.; Lectures 25 and 26.

fixed upon to take precedence after mathematical quantities and mechanical principles. The philosophical inquiries into unorganized matter are likewise divided into two classes: celestial physics or astronomy; and terrestrial physics, which embraces all those modifications of matter which we experience upon our globe.

There are five fundamental branches of knowledge in the positive sciences. First, *astronomy*, which displays the highest generalization of the laws of matter and motion. Every thing here is on a gigantic scale; and the movements of the heavenly bodies exercise a visible influence over terrestrial phenomena. Secondly, in *mechanical* combinations, and when we descend to material objects and agencies in our own globe, we perceive less order and regularity in their action, than in the first science. Their results are more complex and diversified. Thirdly, the science of *chemistry* is replete with physical movements and powers of an extraordinary kind; and it terminates where *life*, in its simplest form, commences. The fourth science is *biology*, which comprehends all above mere unorganized matter; from the lowest vegetable production, to man, the highest and most perfect of organized beings. The fifth and last science is *sociology*, or the philosophy of human nature. Here we find numerous questions of great complexity and uncertainty; chiefly arising from physiological and mental laws but very imperfectly understood.

This is a brief sketch of M. Comte's classification

of human knowledge. It is eulogised by his admirers as the most complete and splendid offering ever made on the altar of science. The professed aim of his system is, to trace out the co-existences and successions of whatever falls within the range of our senses ; or rather, perhaps, to develop the relation of cause and effect in every operation in nature. We have simply to attend to and register *facts* ; and discover those *laws* which appertain to them.

The first thing which forcibly strikes us in this system of philosophy is its material complexion. We have nothing but matter, its movements and laws. In physical inquiries we observe the facts of the material world ; in physiology, the principles of organic life ; and in human nature, those historical facts which mark man's intellectual career. These are all placed under one and the same material category. They are *facts* ; they follow the great law of progression ; and obtain their highest point of generalization when entirely denuded of every reference to any thing like a *cause* which produces them, or to any external influence which guides them to their results. We are irresistibly forced, therefore, to the conclusion, that there is nothing in the universe but matter and its laws of action ; and that to believe in the existence of a mental or spiritual Being, who created and governs it, is to believe in a thing totally at variance with truth and sound philosophy.

A system of atheism, founded on an exclusively *material* basis, is of all things the most illogical

and unintelligible. A purely *ideal* species of atheism has something in the shape of argument in its favour, and may be comprehended; but the man who has nothing but matter to work with, is always in a sad plight, and is, mentally speaking, one of the most perverse of human beings. With matter alone he can do nothing. As well might the mason build a house with barely looking, with his arms folded, on the stones and lime and timber around him; as a philosopher construct a universe without an animating and directing principle. The latter must have instruments; he must *do* something, or he must stand still. Now what does he do? What are his first movements? Why, he does this; he calls something into existence which is a pure *conception* of his own mind; not a material *fact*; not a thing to be seen or felt; but a pure abstraction of thought; and which, after he has adopted it, and used for a time, he pretends to discard, to cover with ridicule, and to pity the man who is so ignorant as to admit its very existence. What is this conception? It is something to *create*, to *do*, to *make a change in* material substances, or their relations, and to *draw out* their hidden qualities or properties. This conception,—this perfectly gratuitous thing, to which he has no right whatever, on his own logical principles—the atheistical materialist calls by various names; it is a *principle*, an *energy*, a *law*, a *force*, a *power*, a *rule*, a *law of nature*, a *tendency of nature*; in one word, he makes to himself a God, before he moves a single step in his investigations. Can he do

without this *active* and moving *energy* ? He is a statue ; he cannot even open his mouth, nor put forth his hand, without it. What extreme folly is it, then, for a man to pretend to give us a system of knowledge based solely on *facts*, when the things themselves are utterly unintelligible unless they be conjoined with those very things which he so strongly denounces as absurd and irrational ?

The *powers*, and *laws*, and *agencies*, which M. Comte is obliged to employ in his world-making, are invested with all the lofty attributes of Deity. They work towards a *final end* or purpose ; they are not blind impulses, but follow certain plans, carry out certain results, which even our material philosopher himself eulogises as characteristic of great wisdom. All this is simply to display that very thing which all men are irresistibly impelled, by the mere force of instinct, to deny that *matter* has the power in itself to do. Our philosopher is, therefore, practically and logically, as complete a *slave* to theological opinions, as the poor superstitious savage in the wilderness, whom he so feelingly mourns over. The only difference between the two is, that M. Comte calls a certain power or agency, a *law*, which the other calls a God.

Observe further ; that the whole of Comte's system obtains its force and logical tangibility from certain intellectual and *à priori* principles, which he takes for granted at the outset. All his mathematical forms or relations are of this stamp. They are not things which mere experience has

any thing to do with ; they would exist were there not a single *material fact* in the universe. They have a mental or spiritual origin. He may pretend to deny this ; he may call them *facts* ; and attribute an empirical origin to them ; but this is not true philosophy ; and he will soon find, that if he takes this ground, he will be driven into a corner, and worsted.

The notion of every branch of knowledge going through three stages, has more of imagination about it than *positive* science. Man is a religious and thinking being by nature. He can no more divest himself of religious feelings or mental abstractions, then he can withdraw himself from his own body. To talk of mental and theological science ever assuming the same regular appearances of matter and motion which characterize the heavenly bodies in their movements, is to make an unwarrantable demand on the credulity of mankind, and to suppose that every principle of his internal consciousness is to be radically rooted out and completely materialised.

A great portion of the delusion which attaches itself to the theory of M. Comte, arises from the ideas he entertains on cause and effect. He adopts the hypothesis that there is nothing more involved in causation than mere *relation*. Now, the notion of *power* is involved in every possible conception of a cause ; as something belonging to, and adhering in, that which we fix upon as a cause. We cannot experience a simple sensation, from any external agent, without having a *notion* of cause appended

to it; so that, in reality, every system of philosophy (and Comte's among the rest,) can never by possibility be any thing else than inquiries and determinations as to causes and their consequences. The mind of man is perpetually in search of them; and though it cannot bring them into open day, and invest them with material figures and properties, there is nothing which the individual consciousness more forcibly and directly obliges us to attend to.

Every material theory like this of M. Comte's, must assume, upon the face of it, that *mind*, in all its aspects and movements, is merely a property or modification of matter. To suppose any other theory, under such circumstances, is manifestly preposterous. Here we have, then, at the outset, a system of speculation which certainly does not come within the range of *positive* science; hypothetical it *may be* termed, but not by any means *positive*. There never was a materialist of any talent or candour, who did not always admit that there might be a *doubt* as to the materiality of the thinking principle; he might consider that the preponderance of evidence was in his own favour, but beyond this he would not go. In such a theory, however, as this now under consideration, it is laid down as a *positive truth*, in its most absolute sense, that mind *is* matter. It does seem to us to be nothing but a very reasonable demand, that we should call upon our philosopher, before he takes a single step in his physical investigations, or reduces them to what *he* terms an *intellectual*

law, to demonstrate the materiality of the instrument he employs. Nothing can be more logically fit and proper than this. If there be nothing but matter, his task is quite easy ; he has only to show that thinking, in all its manifestations and phases, is simply a material *fact*. It is hardly fair to wrest the instruments of philosophical investigation from the hands of the metaphysician and theologian ; and then turn upon them, and treat them with ridicule and contempt.

There are some points connected with the study of natural philosophy, which ought to be referred to, when opinions are expressed by its cultivators on abstract questions of mind, and on their relative value and importance. The habitual dealing with physical agencies has a natural and powerful tendency to materialise all our notions. Being constantly familiar with matter and motion, we insensibly imbibe the idea that there *may be* nothing else in the universe. The mind has a very limited range in all material investigations ; and these are besides calculated to produce an apathetic dullness. The higher and more brilliant faculties of the understanding are never fully called into play : not that natural philosophers may not have their fair share of them, but the fact is, they do not require them. They are instruments which their peculiar craft does not demand. If possessed, and not used, they get rusty ; and at length become useless. In all investigations into matter, the philosopher simply places nature in a certain position, and *observes* the result. He does not *reason* ; he

merely looks on ; and notes what he sees, or hears, or smells, or tastes, or feels. These observations, or effects upon his senses, he denominates *facts*. He considers them to be the foundation of all true knowledge. He goes on accumulating and accumulating them. They become at length troublesome from their number, and fill up all the crevices of his memory ; where they lie in higgledy-piggledy confusion. He perceives certain relations of resemblance or contrariety among the *facts*, and he sets about arranging them in a certain order ; just as he did when a little boy, playing with his toys. The facts get classed together under some arbitrary or capricious rule, which he calls a *theory* or a *principle* ; and when so placed, he denominates the whole stock of facts, along with the plan of arrangement, a *philosophy*, or, perchance, a *philosophical method*. This method becomes a surprising thing ; a lasting monument of his genius. It must be applied to every thing ; and if the things themselves will not square with the *method*, why then it is a clear and incontrovertible proof, either that they do not exist at all, or that they are useless and foolish baubles. Nothing can gainsay *his* stock of facts ; it is the largest upon record, and constitutes the whole of human knowledge. If a doubt be even whispered, we have all the five senses rushing instantaneously into the witness box, to declare on oath their exclusive claim to validity and reliance.

Besides, there are certain worldly and fashionable appliances which aid the natural philosopher

in assuming a superiority, in point of evidence, over the divine, the moralist, and the metaphysician. The observations and investigations of the chemist, the mechanician, and the astronomer, have often a direct and palpable effect on the physical condition of man. The chemist may discover something which diminishes his pain, the mechanic something to lessen his toil, and the astronomer may prove useful to the mariner who ploughs the trackless ocean. These are things which cannot be doubted or gainsaid. Their existence or use, it is folly to question. It is different in other branches of knowledge. The benefit from moral, mental, or religious investigations, is not so immediately apparent; not so speedily realized. The principles they develop and illustrate, operate silently and unobserved; and years may elapse before they yield any fruit visible to the understanding and the senses. The natural philosopher is always, therefore, in a position to display a good balance-sheet in favour of his own branch of science. He keeps more cash in hand, and has fewer unrealized securities, than the moral philosopher or the divine.

Again, wealth and fashion have no little influence in the prosecution of the physical sciences, and in maintaining their reputation among men. A chemist, a mechanician, or an astronomer, if he have the pecuniary means, can make a very imposing display upon a slender intellectual capital. Splendid and expensive laboratories, extensive collections of models and instruments, and grand observatories, can be had for money; with

a full complement of dependents to work and direct them ; so that the philosophy of the *positive* studies may be prosecuted in a great measure by deputy. A chemist or an astronomer may be, comparatively speaking, a *made up* man. He may avail himself of the intellectual labours of the persons he employs. This cannot be successfully practised by the philosophers of mental science. They must spin their webs out of their own brain, and with their own hands. Natural philosophy is far from being a *personal thing* ; nor has it so much *mind* for its base, as the world commonly imagines. And it is just because there is comparatively so little *real mind* required, that the study of physical science is so popular. It comes in contact with no masses of thought. It touches none of those sympathetic chords of society, from which opposition and contention spring, and rival interests burst into life and action. The entomologist, the geologist, the chemist, and the astronomer, may each pursue his respective branch of study, and never meet with a hostile thought ; all above is clear sky and sunshine. Even the government of the day will take them by the hand ; and, conscious of the soothing and sedative nature of their respective pursuits, would much rather give twenty thousand pounds for a collection of preserved insects and stuffed monkeys, to promote the cause of "general education" and "useful knowledge," than it would give as many farthings to develop an important moral, political, or theological truth, and illustrate its nature and value to the people.

Now these, as well as other circumstances which

might be noticed, give an evident advantage to physical over metaphysical studies, totally irrespective of their intrinsic merits and importance, so far as abstract truth is concerned. Every thing which is based on the senses, claims priority of attention. We have only to point the finger to what can be seen, handled, and tasted; and all reasoning and argument are superseded. The philosophers of human nature are differently situated; and are perpetually twitted for the want of palpable facts. Their rivals think it strange they have no material or tangible representations of their knowledge. When they talk of justice, duty, responsibility, existence, mind, Deity, or soul, they are only met with a cold shake of the head from the disciple of physical science; who points, with a supercilious air of conscious pride, to the contents of his museum, and exclaims, "There! that is knowledge; these *are* facts; no one can dispute them; and when you can make a similar display of *your* knowledge, I shall listen to what you say."

We are willing to pay all manner of respect to the physical sciences; it would be folly to act otherwise. But we beg to inform M. Comte, and all his disciples, that we tender our admiration, not because he has pleased to present us with an assemblage of *facts*, which he terms a *positive* philosophy; but because he shows us a piece of machinery *which has been made*, which owes its existence to an intelligent power which we term a Deity, whose existence he openly, as well as virtually, denies. It is upon this principle, and this

principle alone, that we offer our admiration ; and it is only upon the same grounds that M. Comte, if he acts consistently, can solicit that admiration. For *why* should a man admire a *fact*, or a number of facts ? What sense, what object is there in such admiration ? What is it which does admire ? What are those exquisite feelings, emotions, and passions which admiration creates ? Are they *facts* too ? Can they be stuffed and placed in a glass case ? Does the microscope or the telescope reveal them ? Do they come within the category of mathematical forms, as squares, cubes, angles, and circles ? In fact, we venture to tell M. Comte that if he could to-morrow multiply in a thousand-fold all his physical facts, and descend to the minutest crevices of the universe, he would fail to extort a single sentiment of praise, admiration, or wonder, except upon the principle that the machinery he displays to our view, is the *workmanship* of *something* external both to it and ourselves. Banish this idea, and physical science is a perfect nonentity.*

* Want of space precludes our noticing more at length several other French philosophers. The reader will find in Note G., at the end of this Volume, a pretty copious list of French authors, and their works, not specially mentioned in this Chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

THE METAPHYSICAL WRITERS OF ITALY, FROM
1800 TILL THE PRESENT DAY.

FROM the agitated state into which Italy was plunged after the French Revolution, and the accession of Napoleon to supreme power, mental philosophy was but very sparingly cultivated for several years after the commencement of the present century. The formal nature of academical instruction in this country, strongly tinged with the scholastic system, tended to check the growth of free and enlightened discussion on matters of philosophy. Still, however, the spirit of speculation was not altogether suppressed; as writers of original views and great learning made their appearance at intervals, and imparted a little life to the slumbering inmates of the Italian Universities. But theological jealousy was ever upon the watch; and it was always a matter of some difficulty to import foreign works, on philosophical topics, into the Italian States. This circumstance checked

literary ardour ; and the Italian student, seeing himself in a state of mental isolation from the general republic of letters, became an easy victim to apathy and unconcern.

Within the last twenty years a change for the better has been conspicuous. A more open and extended interchange of philosophical opinion has taken place between the Italian *litterati* and those of other European nations. Subjects nearly allied to metaphysical studies have been prominently brought before the public ; particularly matters appertaining to social and political economy. All the Italian writings on these subjects have hitherto been characterised by sound sense, and breathe a healthy spirit of manly freedom and independence ; equally removed from the wild and impracticable on the one hand, and the obscure and mystical on the other.

The metaphysical speculations of the Italian writers in this century, are mostly of an elementary and educational character. They generally aim at making mental science subservient to moral and religious purposes. Though they are now freely importing opinions from Germany and France, yet they look upon them both, but the former especially, with an eye of suspicion, as containing divers matters which require judgment and caution in their development and application.

There can be no doubt but the publication, about twenty years ago, of the "*Collezione dei Classici Metafisici*," has had a beneficial influence in exciting the philosophic mind of Italy of late years.

This extensive and well arranged work embraces a miscellaneous collection of valuable treatises on the mind, by all the most distinguished philosophers of Europe. It is a work which reflects no small honour on the Italian name.

CARDINAL GERDIL.

Gerdil is a writer who properly belongs to the latter part of the eighteenth century. We have placed him here, however, from his whole works having been published in 1806. He was born in Savoy, in 1718, and died in 1802. His writings are voluminous, and on the whole important. They amount to *forty* volumes quarto, and are in the Latin, Italian, and French languages. The *third* and *fourth* volumes contain metaphysical speculations; though a portion will also be found in his "Opere Scelte," in 3 volumes, published in 1836. The first and second volumes of this treatise contain his Introduction to the Study of Religion; and the third is devoted to the demonstration of a Moral Sense, and the existence of a Deity.

Cardinal Gerdil conceives that Locke's demonstrations of a Deity, and of the immateriality of the soul, rested upon too narrow and too material a basis. Locke always supposes matter to be merely a thing extended, divisible, and susceptible of motion; but having no *power* in itself; that is, having no power of causation in its own nature. This position which he took, for the construction of his general argument, proved, in Gerdil's

opinion, the fruitful source of all those objections which were brought against Locke's views on these important subjects, by Bishop Stillingfleet and others.*

This dissertation of the Cardinal's upon the Immateriality of the Soul, is by far the most able and complete which has ever made its appearance against Locke's ideas on the subject, either in this country or in any other. It is so calmly and methodically reasoned out; so candid and dispassionate in its sentiments, displaying on every occasion such an anxious desire to view every argument in its most favourable light, that we cannot but feel that the Cardinal was a man of a really philosophic spirit, and invariably influenced by a desire to know the truth.

The author's "Dissertation sur l'Incompatibilité des Principes de Descartes et de Spinoza," is an important one; inasmuch as the author takes an entirely different view from the commonly received notion as to the respective natures of the speculations of Descartes and Spinoza. Gardil conceives that nothing can be so erroneous as the opinion, that the system of the latter was only a fuller and more logical development of Descartes' system. The grand difference between them lay in the different meaning they respectively attached to the words *extension* and *matter*. Spinoza himself declares plainly, that *his* meaning of these two terms was entirely at variance with that of Des-

* Opere, Vol. 3, p. 12.

cartes. We recommend all those who feel an interest in this question, so often referred to in the history of modern philosophy, to consult the Cardinal's "Dissertation," where every thing is stated with great minuteness and care.

The author's "*Essai d'une Démonstration Mathématique contre l'Existence éternelle de la Matière et du Mouvement*," is a curious production. The author partly coincides with those scholastic divines who maintained that nothing but *faith* could effectually protect the mind from entertaining a notion that matter was eternal. But still Gerdil conceives that this consideration ought not to make us relax our efforts to find out a philosophical argument to effect the same purpose. This he thinks he has done. He attempts to show that an infinite series of events is an absurdity; that the mind must, from its nature, stop somewhere, and rest upon a purely creative energy.

The arguments in this "*Essai*" are of such a character as not to be susceptible of condensation; we must therefore leave them to the reader's consideration.*

The Cardinal's Essay against Locke was replied to by an anonymous Italian author. Gerdil wrote an answer to this attack in the Italian language, and enforced and illustrated his former opinions at considerable length.†

Gerdil's defence of Father Malebranche is a beautiful piece of reasoning. In the fourth, fifth, and

* See particularly Vol. 4, p. 271.

† Opere, Vol. 3, p. 267.

sixth Sections, the author examines the principle laid down by Malebranche, of perceiving external objects through the medium of the Divine agency, and of conceiving all things generally in God. The argument is ingeniously and ably sustained; and though we cannot say that it is by any means conclusive to our minds, yet no one can peruse the whole Dissertation, without feeling that he is in the presence of a man of superior attainments. The arguments of Locke, Arnauld, Regis, and others, are noticed at some length.*

Gerdil is directly at variance with Rousseau's opinions on the nature of the human mind, and the sound principles of education.

TAMASSIA.

This author obtained some reputation in Italy on the production of his "*Saggio Fisiologico sulla Facoltà di Sentire dell'Uomo, per servire d'introduzione alla Scienza Ideologica*," 1823. His main object is to trace out those obvious and conspicuous facts, which point to the relation which subsists between the bodily functions and our organs of sensation. The phenomena here are only to a certain extent susceptible of explanation; if we go beyond a definite point, we become bewildered, and must do one of three things; we must make mind into body, or body into mind; or we must confer upon both a certain degree of influence

* Opere, Vol. 4, pp. 117, 122.

in the manifestations of thought. There appears to be no other course to steer, if we institute a philosophical inquiry into our bodily and mental natures conjointly. It is seldom that works upon the plan of this now under consideration, are productive of much instruction to the student of mental science; and chiefly from this reason, that it is an open and undisguised attempt to bring into juxta-position two contrary things, matter and mind, and to attempt to reconcile and harmonize their respective modes of action. There is invariably some degree of inward dissatisfaction felt at the limited and inconclusive nature of our investigations.

LALLEBASQUE.

This Italian writer considers mental science as the highest and noblest of all the branches of knowledge. In his "*Introduzione alla Filosofia Naturale del Pensiero*," 1825, he gives us an eloquent eulogium upon its dignified nature and importance.

In proportion, however, to its sublimity, is the difficulty of its successful prosecution. Its perplexities are neither few in number nor insignificant in magnitude; but they may all be traced, in the author's opinion, to the want of a proper philosophical method. Everything depends upon the suitable instruments we employ in our critical investigations. If these be unsuitable, or unskillfully used, error and delusion must be the result.

The great security against dangerous systems of speculation, is to view the understanding through the medium of its divine origin and spiritual nature.*

GIUSEPPE GRONES.

The philosophical arrangement of Signor Grones is concise, yet comprehensive. In his "Saggio di Filosofia Teoretica," 1828, he divides the subjects of his inquiry into three parts: Man, a material Universe, and God. On each of these topics he displays great learning and a truly philosophic spirit. He shews the various relations which connect them with each other; and how fitted they are, when united, to constitute a *philosophy*. They must not, however, be discussed apart; that is, each of them cannot of itself embrace a comprehensive subject of inquiry. Mind, matter, and a creative power, are the three indispensable ingredients in every rational system of philosophical investigation.

Out of a systematic and judicious examination into these three elements there arises a *unity* of conception; this conception is *truth*. These elements, man, matter, and Deity, must all be viewed reciprocally, otherwise philosophic truth is not elicited.

The immateriality, the immortality of the thinking principle, and its influence over, and connec-

* Saggio, pp. 27, 106, 109. Edit. 1829.

tion with, the bodily functions, give rise to a series of discussions, characterized by good sense, though not by any novelty in argument or illustration.* The author considers it beneficial to discussions on mind, to view it through the means of distinct faculties. These faculties or powers may be looked upon as only clusters of mental phenomena, possessing an individuality of character. The most conspicuous of these distinct faculties, are sensation, memory, the association of ideas, imagination, and reasoning. All the movements of the mind must be *free*, otherwise no moral responsibility can be maintained.†

VINCENZO BINI.

Bini's "Corso Elementario di Lezioni Logico-Metafisico-Morali," Perugia, 1818, was considered, at the period of its first publication, a good and useful work on mental topics; but it has recently been superseded by other later and more popular treatises. It still, however, maintains a reputable station in Italian philosophy. There is little of novelty in the author's opinions; and his arrangement of the mental faculties, and the principles of logic and morality developed in his work, are much of the same character as those of preceding Italian philosophers.

* Saggio, pp. 25, 81, 99, 100, 105. † Saggio, pp. 131, 139, 167.

SIG. ACCORDINI.

The "Elementi di Filosofia," 1826, of Accordini, gives a general summary of the intellectual faculties, in a very clear and perspicuous manner. His nomenclature of distinct powers does not differ, in any essential degree, from those of Dugald Stewart, Condillac, and some Italian philosophers. The treatise is elementary, and contains few disquisitions of a speculative character. He considers all the abstract ideas we possess, such as time, space, existence, power, substance, and the like, to be purely *à priori* conceptions, and not derived from the senses. The idea of a Supreme and Creative Mind is the grand source of all true philosophy.

B. POLI.

Signor Poli is the author of "Saggio d'un Corso di Filosofia," Milano, 1828; a treatise which has obtained considerable attention in Italy.

The first volume of Poli's work is devoted to Experimental Psychology, and is the most interesting to the metaphysical reader. His classification, and observations on the various faculties of the mind, are ingenious and solid, and show the extensive reading of the author.

The following tabular view of his psychological arrangement of powers of the mind, will give the reader a correct idea of his system.

TABLE OF THE FACULTIES OF THE MIND.

1. INTELLECTUAL.

- (a) Inferior, or the Senses. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Direct. ...} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Intuitive,} \\ \text{or sensi-} \\ \text{tive fa-} \\ \text{culty.} \end{array} \right. \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{External.} \\ \text{Internal.} \end{array} \right. \\ \text{Indirect.} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Memory.} \\ \text{Imagina-} \\ \text{tion.} \end{array} \right. \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Associa-} \\ \text{tion of} \\ \text{Ideas.} \end{array} \right. \end{array} \right.$
- (b) Superior or Comprehensive. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Intellect or Intelligence.} \\ \text{Reasoning.} \\ \text{Judgment.} \end{array} \right.$
- (c) Subsidiary Faculties. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Attention.} \\ \text{Reflection.} \\ \text{Abstraction.} \\ \text{Invention.} \\ \text{Fancy.} \end{array} \right. \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Sensual.} \\ \text{Intellectual.} \end{array} \right.$

2. SENSITIVE.

- (a) Inferior or Animal Sensibility. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Physical.} \\ \text{Sympathetic.} \end{array} \right.$
- (b) Superior or Sentimental. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Fine Arts.} \\ \text{Belles-Lettres.} \\ \text{Morality.} \end{array} \right.$

3. APPETITES.

- (a) Inferior. ... $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Instinct.} \\ \text{Sensual Appetite.} \end{array} \right.$
- (b) Superior Will.

There are some profound remarks in the third Section of the first volume, on intuition, conception, and on our ideas of knowledge and science generally. In the fifth Section, the author examines the doctrine of the Idealists, occasional causes, the pre-established harmony, immediate intuition, phrenology, and physiognomy.

The second volume of the author's treatise is devoted to Logic. This is purely of an elementary character, and displays little novelty either in matter or arrangement. The third volume treats of the principles of morality, which are considered by the author to be necessary, immutable, and intuitively perceived, or engraved on the heart of man.*

SIGN. PERRON.

This author's work, "*Compendio Storico delle Scienze Filosofiche e Morali*," 1830, contains a brief sketch of philosophical opinions, from the earliest date to the present century. It is Catholic in its spirit, but candid and liberal. It has been found in Italy a useful work to students and general readers.

GAETANO VENTURA.

This author's work, in Latin, is entitled "*De Methodo Philosophandi*," 1828; and is highly

* *Elementi di Filosofia*, vol. 3, pp. 16. 17.

spoken of by many Italian writers.* The views of Ventura are based upon the necessity of theological principles to guide us to sound and useful truths in philosophy. We must commence at the root of all knowledge, the existence of a Deity; and when this great truth is acknowledged, we are then in a position to rear a superstructure of science upon it.

ANTONIO ROSMINI.

The treatise of Rosmini, "Saggio sull'origine delle Idee," 1830, is a remarkably able and scientific performance, and has excited great attention, both in his own country and among the philosophers of foreign nations. The author displays a profound and accurate knowledge of the works of our most distinguished metaphysicians since the revival of letters in Europe. He has, however, been vigorously opposed by many mem-

* " Il P. Gaetano Ventura nella sua bella opera sulla filosofia, dettata in latino, ha avvertito il dogmatismo iniziale della buona filosofia scolastica nei bassi tempi. Certi scrittori, che non se ne intendono, vollero fare del Ventura un discepolo del Lamennais, quando l'illustre Italiano non assentì al Francese, se non per quel poco di vero che si trovava nelle sue opinioni, e recò nella quistione della certezza un senno e una dottrina di gran lunga superiori a quella di chi scrisse il Saggio sull'indifferenza. Il solo torto del Ventura fù la troppa modestia, con cui egli attribuì agli altri i propri trovati, e che gli fece spesso credere di esser semplice ripetitore, quando era correttore e miglioratore delle altrui opinioni. Ma chi oserebbe chiamar colpa una sì bella virtù? Egli è però da dolere che un tant'uomo, in vece di far troppo caso di scrittori forestieri a lui inferiori di sapienza e non superiori d'ingegno, non si sia accinto più animosamente a riformare la scienza Italica; chè egli possedeva tutte le doti a sì grande opera richieste."—(Gioberti.)

bers of the Catholic Church, for holding some opinions which they conceive inimical to all sound and rational theology.

Rosmini demands to know the origin of our idea of being, or general existence. Whence does it come? How is it that we find it within us? Two sources of it have been suggested; abstraction, and reason or judgment. But what is abstraction? How do we come to have a different conception from a multitude of things, which does not belong to any of them individually? Abstraction does not *create*; it only sets apart, or divides, or groups together.* Again, what is reason? The immediate recognition of a thing termed a *truth* or conclusion, from certain facts, or abstract data, previously laid before it. But this cannot give us the idea of being; because this idea is presupposed,—in fact, present to the mind before the reason or judgment is drawn, or in any mode called into requisition. Neither abstraction nor reason, then, can possibly be the source of the idea of being or existence. It must be sought for elsewhere.†

* Nuovo Saggio, tom 2, pp. 75, 90.

† “L'essere in universale, pensato essenzialmente dalla mente è di tal natura . . . che da una parte non mostra alcuna sussistenza fuori della mente, e quindi si può denominare un *essere mentale* o logico; ma dall'altra egli repugna che sia una semplice modificazione del nostro spirito, e anzi spiega egli tale attività verso a cui il nostro spirito è interamente passivo e suddito.

“Noi siamo consci a noi medesimi di nulla potere contro l'essere, di non poterlo immutare menomamente: di più egli è assolutamente immutabile, egli è l'atto di tutte le cose, il fonte di tutte le cognizioni.” N. Saggio, tom. 3.

“In somma egli non ha nulla che sia contingente, come noi siamo: è

The author examines with great care the opinions which the most eminent of modern philosophers have entertained on this question; (among the number may be mentioned the names of Locke, Condillac, Reid, Stewart, Hume, Kant;) but all the various statements made on the point, seem to Rosmini delusive and unsatisfactory.

The position which Rosmini lays down on this fundamental question of metaphysical science is, that the idea of being, or existence in general, is an *innate idea*. It is the production of neither sensation, abstraction, nor reason. On this point his opinion coincides with many modern as well as ancient philosophers. But having taken his stand upon this ground, and entered into certain explanations and made certain modifications of this innate principle, his own real opinions have not only become dubious, but have been exposed to opposition and censure.

Rosmini says that being is not concrete but abstract, and the ultimate possible abstraction.

un lume che noi percepiamo naturalmente, ma che ci signoreggia, ci vince e ci nobilita, col sottometterci intieramente a se.

“Oltracciò noi possiamo pensare che noi non fossimo; ma sarebbe impossibile pensare che l'essere in universale, cioè la possibilità, la verità, non posse. Avanti di me il vero fù vero, il falso fù falso, nè ci potè mai essere un tempo che fosse altro che così. E questo nulla? No certamente: che il nulla non mi costringe, non mi necessita a pronunziar nulla: ma la natura della verità che risplende in me mi obbliga a dir: Ciò è; e ov'io non lo volessi dire, saprei tuttavia che la cosa sarebbe egualmente, anche a mio dispetto.”—(Nuovo Saggio, tom. 2, pp. 326, 327.)

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2nd, It is not individual or particular, but generic and universal. 3rd, It is not personal, but common. 4th, It is not real, but *ideal*; not *effective*, but *possible*. 5th, It subsists in itself, and is not a derivation from the resources of the human mind. 6th, It is not determined, but entirely indetermined. 7th, It is not God. 8th, It is not an idea of, nor any thing appertaining to, Deity. 9th, It is not the word (verb) of God.*

It must be quite obvious that these positions are exposed to controversy. They are not reconcilable with each other, nor do they by any means assist in forming a general conclusion as to the character of Rosmini's philosophy as a whole. Looking at the passages in his work immediately following those we have just referred to, we may suppose that, confining the author's doctrines within the limits of what may be termed mental science, his views rest upon the four following propositions or principles.

1st, Every idea originates from the general idea of being.

2nd, The primitive idea of being represents only *possible being*.

3rd, The perception of the real existence of any created thing is the work of reason, which is itself grounded upon possible being and mental sensibility.

4th, We conceive the reality of positive or *ab-*

* Nuovo Saggio, tom. 2, pp. 712. 719. 722. 733. 749. 750. 751.

solute being, that is, of God, not by any immediate or intuitive mode, but only through the medium of demonstration.

The leading objections urged against the system of Rosmini, by his Catholic brethren and others, may be stated under the following general heads.

1st. Rosmini affirms that the science of mind is a *reformatory* one ; thereby inferring that its principles are uncertain, fluctuating, imperfectly developed, and, in fact, that, like as in other sciences, we may fully expect the discovery of some new intellectual law or principle, which may possibly alter the position of the whole science, and overturn every thing which has been recognised and established since the earliest records of mankind. Now this, it is contended, is an erroneous notion, calculated to shake our convictions in truths of great moment. The philosophy of human nature rests upon immutable maxims or conclusions, all of which have manifested themselves in the movements and conduct of men in all ages of the world. These maxims might be, and really were, more imperfectly systematised and embodied in scientific forms, at one period of history than at another ; but this does not alter the state of the question in the least, relative to their entire and universal recognition and existence. Besides, it is alleged, and there is, in the general reasonings of Rosmini, a foundation for this allegation, that the reformatory or progressive character of the mental philosophy he contends for, is of a *mechanical* and not of an intellectual nature. The contemplated reformation is

attributed to the *necessary* movements of the absolute *ideal*, and not to any direct personal or individual agency, either Divine or human.*

2nd. It is urged against Rosmini's theory of the *ideal*, that science, instead of being progressive, would, were his views logically carried out, be retrograde, or at least unfruitful. The theory wants a clear and intelligible principle; such a principle as the mind can readily grasp, and develop in detail. What he states is negative, variable in its apprehension and application, illogical in its results; and, as a whole, enveloped in obscurity and mystification.

3rd. The author's system may be viewed as favouring a mental theory grounded on pure sensibility. Every intellectual operation, judgment, and rational deduction, may be referred to some internal emotion. All mental conceptions belonging to the ideal of Rosmini are considered relative to a species of abstraction, of the most attenuated kind, resting on a certain effect upon the senses. This gives his theory a peculiar complexion. When viewed from this point, it assumes a sensational

* "Le reforme filosofiche non debbono essere imprese semplicemente erudite (come quelle dei filosofi quattrocentisti, che voleano far rivivere di pianta l'antica sapienza del paganesimo) ma scientifiche; non riproduzioni sterili, e imitazioni morte, ma veri risorgimenti, e rinnovazioni dotate di vita, come le opere pellegrine dei grandi poeti ed artefici negli ordini del bello. Ora la vita scientifica, intellettuale, speculativa, la vita propria delle idee, consiste nella loro esplicazione dinamica, mediante l'organismo ideale, come la vita estetica dei fantasmi è riposta in quella personalità mentale, che l'immaginazione loro conferisce." (Degli Errori Filosofici di Antonio Rosmini, per Vincenzo Gioberti; p. 378. Brusselle, 1841.)

aspect, although always aspiring after the maintenance of a highly spiritual character.

4th. Rosmini's theory is a purely nominal one. General ideas or conceptions do not belong to the mind; but arise solely from the constitution and mechanism of language.*

5th. The disquisitions of the author have a decided leaning to pure *idealism*. Our conception of the existence of material objects is derived from reason, which is made to rest upon *possible* being, and is received through the channel of bodily sensibility. By making objective merely *possible*, all solid foundation is effectually removed from the philosophy of an external universe; and nothing remains but the subjective reasonings and suggestions of possible ideality.†

6th. It is confidently alleged that the system of Rosmini leads, by direct inference, to pantheism and atheism. Under this head it may be mentioned, that he makes the following somewhat contradictory statements. 1st. He makes the existence of Deity doubtful. 2nd. He makes the

* Nuovo Saggio, tom. 2, cap. 2, 3; tom. 3, p. 131.

† "L'esistenza dei corpi, secondo questo sistema, ci è conto per mezzo di un giudizio, che consta dell'idea dell'ente possibile e della percezione sensitiva dei corpi; la qual percezione diventa intellettuale associandosi all'idea suddetta. La congiunzione dei due elementi è effettuata dall'unità dell'animo umano, in cui le impressioni sensitive e l'idea intellettuale si riuniscono, per modo che lo spirito veggendo il sensibile nell'intelligibile, e trovando fra loro una equazione perfetta, applica alla cosa sentita l'idea generica dell'ente e afferma la sussistenza di quella. Ho già mostrato altrove l'assurdità di questa teorica del giudizio, e la ripugnanza di una equazione fra due termini, un solo dei quali è conosciuto."—(Degli Errori Filosofici, Brusselle, p. 398.)

Divine Being in his nature and attributes pantheistical. 3rd. The existence of a First and efficient Cause is altogether of a negative character. 4th. It is affirmed to be only *possible*. And 5th. Inferences, destructive of all sound and rational theology, are directly deducible from his principles on this ground also, that the Deity must be a *necessary* Being.*

The whole of the reasonings of Rosmini on this highly important doctrine, have the tendency to represent the Deity merely as a part of universal nature. He confers upon Him no independent existence; His personality is not developed and sustained; and, on the whole, our minds are left, after the perusal of his writings on this subject, in a state of sceptical uncertainty, unfavourable to proper religious sentiments, and to the Author's reputation as a sound and orthodox philosopher.†

* Nuovo Saggio, tom. 3. pp. 152, 158, 327.

† "Questi due elementi mi conducono per due vie a conoscere l'esistenza di Dio. Poichè se io applico al primo il *principio di causa*, io debbo concludere: *Esiste una causa che esercita un'azione infinita, e che perciò dee essere infinita*. Considerando poi il secondo elemento, io vedo che quella causa che manifesta un'infinita energia è l'oggetto stesso della mia mente, e che non mostra in se altra esistenza che in una mente; quindi conchiudo: *La natura di quella causa infinita è di sussistere in una mente, cioè di essere essenzialmente intelligibile*. A cui applicando il *principio di sostanza*, ritrovo ch'ella non può essere un semplice accidente, o in generale parlando, una semplice appartenenza di una sostanza, come apparebbe essere se fosse in se un oggetto puramente mentale; di che conchiudo: *Esiste una sostanza, mente infinita, la quale ha la proprietà di essere per se intelligibile, e quindi d'esistere altresì nelle menti, e come tale è causa di una infinita energia manifestata nelle menti nostre, e di ogni nostra cognizione*."—(Degli Errori Filosofici, p. 437.)

As the philosophical opinions of Rosmini have attracted more than usual attention on the continent, it is but fair that we should observe, that a defence of his opinions has been put forth, in a publication entitled "*Lettere di un Rosminiano a Vincenzo Gioberti*," Torino, 1841. This appeared without a name, but it is ascribed to the pen of Sig. Traditi. Connected with the controversy to which Rosmini's doctrines have given rise, the name of Dr. Wiseman has been associated; and we believe that public statements have been made, both at Rome and Paris, that he openly defended the philosophical positions of Rosmini. We shall give, in a note, extracts from these "*Lettere*" of Sig. Traditi, which bear on some of the chief points in dispute.*

G. D. ROMAGNOSI.

The works of this Italian philosopher have been recently published in nineteen volumes; but it is in the 12th, 13th, 14th, 17th, and 18th vols. that his speculations on mental science will chiefly be found. Romagnosi is a copious writer, and he discussed metaphysical subjects for the purpose of fully illustrating the sciences of jurisprudence, political economy, and theoretical morality. On all these branches of knowledge, he is one of the most able and erudite of modern Italian authors.

* See Note H. at the end of this Volume.

In the twelfth volume we have a treatise entitled, "Collezione degli Scritti sulla Dottrina della Ragione." In the introductory remarks to this miscellaneous collection of Essays, the author makes some comments on the eclectic philosophy of Cousin and Damiron, and contends that their respective views of the nature and attributes of *reason* are not supported by a philosophical investigation of the phenomena of mind.

On the subject of logic, many excellent remarks will be found on the operations of the mind; especially in the second book, on *invention*. He shows the intimate connection which subsists between this faculty and that of attention; and how the concentrated power of the latter seems to aid the mind in its creative energies.* In the third and fourth books, on judgment and reasoning, the author endeavours to prove that though these two powers are nearly allied to each other, yet there is sufficient grounds for a logical distinction between them.

The abstract foundation of all logical truth, the author develops in his Essay, "Vedute Fondamentali sull'Arte Logica." He considers the phenomena connected with the direct investigation of truth, to be the most difficult to analyse of any presented by our mental constitution. It is only by the most patient and careful attention to the inward workings of the mind, that we can possibly

* Opere, tom. 12, pp. 6. 14. 31.

detect any of those laws which regulate its movements in abstract reasoning.*

The sources of logical error are, in the author's opinion, almost infinite ; but the following general heads comprehend some of the most glaring and common. Errors spring from an imperfect or erroneous observation of matters of fact, from a feeble or treacherous memory, from implicit belief, and from mental illusion. These arise from the person himself. But there are other sources of error which he obtains at second hand ; an inability to comprehend the writings of others, an incomplete or partial examination of them, false deductions from them, and a too brief or condensed exposition of the subject of which they treat.

In the thirteenth volume the author enters into a variety of questions connected with the science of mind. We have his opinions on the foundation of moral obligation ; a Dissertation on the Critique of Pure Reason of Kant ; an Essay on the Nature of Mathematical Truths, and on the Progress and Development of Metaphysical Philosophy generally. On all these topics the reader will find a rich fund of profound thought and critical sagacity.

The speculations of Romagnosi in the eighteenth volume, are also very interesting. They are entitled, "*Ricerche sulla Validità dei Giudicj del Pubblico a Discernere il Vero dal Falso.*" This is one of the author's best productions ; and we would call the reader's especial attention to chap-

* Opere, tom. 12, pp. 277. 283.

ters 8, 14, 19, and 22. A part of this treatise was published after the author's death.

The general spirit of Romagnosi's disquisitions on mind, displays many of the characteristic qualities which belong to the speculations of the late Professor Stewart, to whose writings the Italian philosopher seems to have been very partial. We have in both the same perspicuity, the constant desire to give a practical application to abstract speculations, a similar psychological arrangement of mental faculties, the same enthusiastic admiration of mental studies, and the firm and conscientious conviction that many of the most important branches of social and political knowledge can only be successfully prosecuted and developed through the means of a comprehensive acquaintance with the rules and principles of mental science. In perusing Romagnosi's writings, we are constantly reminded of the occasional wanderings of the Edinburgh Professor into the outskirts of economical and political philosophy, where he often so happily illustrated an interesting and general truth by a reference to some intellectual fact or great law of thought; and showed, in a very pointed manner, that grand principle of harmony and connection which binds the entire of human nature into one stupendous and perfect whole. And to those who know his writings, and have been partakers in some degree of his philosophic ardour and feeling, many recollections must spring up of the pleasure they have felt in these short excursions into foreign regions of inquiry.

The same emotions are awakened in the breast of an Italian student in perusing the works of Romagnosi. They have an agreeable and familiar charm about them, from an absence of profound theories; from the plain yet serious and elegant manner of treating even the commonest facts; and from that admirable tact of applying intellectual principles and maxims to the solution of problems connected with every-day life, feeling, and action.

MELCHIORE GIOJA.

This author's work, "*Ideologia Esposta*," 1823, is very scientific and methodical. The writer discusses the origin of sensation. This he places in external objects, acting upon a certain organization of our senses. He afterwards goes on to point out the various anomalies which are incident to sensation; arising chiefly from the state of our organs, the situation in which we happen to be placed, and the state of the mind for the time being. All these, and thousands of other causes, exercise a continual influence over our sensational feelings.

Gioja considers the mind through the medium of certain distinct faculties or powers. *Sensation* furnishes the materials on which they respectively act. *Memory* is an important power; but it assumes two distinct phases, an active and passive one. *Imagination* is a well defined faculty, and is invested with spontaneous activity. *Attention* is

indispensable to both memory and imagination. *Reason*, or judgment, is the crowning faculty, and has a direct reference to, and communication with, every other class of mental phenomena.

One of the grand characteristics of the human mind, in the author's conception, is its thirst after knowledge. This is the source of the progressive nature of mind, and is also a powerful indirect argument for the immateriality and immortality of the thinking principle.

The author enters into the discussions of Darwin, and Drs. Gall and Spurzheim, relative to the influence of the nerves on the trains of ideas. To their respective systems he is opposed, and considers their general tenets to be inimical to the interests of knowledge, morality, and religion.

The author's work, "*Elementi di Filosofia*," (Milano, 1824), is designed for the use of students. The doctrines laid down in this treatise are precisely the same as those in the author's work just mentioned. The internal and external senses are the two grand sources of our knowledge. All our notions of time, space, relation, existence, and the like, are *à priori* conceptions of the *internal* sense. The work contains a general summary of metaphysical doctrines, as well as of those connected with the science of morals and social economy.

PIETRO BOTTURA.

Bottura's work, "*Logica*," 2 tom. 1833, con-

tains 'many metaphysical observations of some value and originality. He was a Professor in one of the Italian universities, and a man of considerable scientific attainments.

His work makes an especial reference to the French theories of Condillac and Tracy; from a great portion of whose opinions the author however dissents. The reader will find Bottura's observations on adequate and inadequate conceptions, in the 1st volume at page 96, and in the 2nd, at page 169.

The author makes the distinction between a sensation and an idea, in conformity with the arrangement of several philosophers who have preceded and followed him.*

SIG. FAGANI.

This Italian's speculations refer particularly to certain principles connected with our notions of *time* and *space*. His treatise, "*Storia Naturale della Potenza Umana*," 1833, enters into many curious calculations as to the nature of human power, the various modes of its manifestation, and its direct and indirect influence over the mental faculties. He views the psychology of mind through

* "Chi sente, egli dice, ha una sensazione; chi si accorge di sentire ha un'idea; la sensazione non può accorgersi di sè stesso: è l'intelletto quello che si accorge della sensazione, e l'idea della sensazione è appunto l'accorgimento che noi della sensazione prendiamo. * * * L'idea è quella modificazione dell'anima la di cui mercè acquista conoscenza di un oggetto."—(Tom. 1, p. 8.)

the physical analysis of power. The work is interesting.*

SIG. FABRIANO.

This author, in his work "Prospetto degli Studj Filosofici," 1833, divides his speculations into two heads, the bodily and the mental powers of man. Mind he considers under three aspects, psychology, ideology, and logic. The intellectual faculties have their fullest and most complete development in the art of reasoning. The author's work is sensible, and of a practical nature, but contains little worthy of especial notice.

PIETRO PEROLARI MALIGNATI.

The mental speculations of this author take their rise from an idea that the principles of moral judgment and action contain alone all that is really sound and incontrovertible in philosophy. The various and opposite theories of mental science seem to have led him to infer that where there were so many conflicting views, there could be

* "Parlando della memoria," says the Author, "che dessa non si deposita in noi se ricusiamo di volere, o se scindendosi le corrispondenze della volontà co'suoi mezzi, ci è reso impossibile di esercitarla. Non si fa in somma in noi memoria se noi non vogliamo o non possiamo volere." (p. 81.) "Anche il giudizio," according to the Author, "è dipendente dalla volontà. Questo fenomeno mentale consiste nel risuscitarsi nella memoria all'occasione di un'azione presente, che giovi d'indizio; l'esistenza, il sentimento, di una cosa lontana consiste nel conflitto della potenza nostra con una forza residente unicamente in memoria."—(pp. 115, 116.)

little truth ; and this notion has thrown him back upon the ancient system of Greece, where moral speculations, in his opinion, occupied a more prominent rank in mental studies, than in modern times. True philosophy must, therefore, take its stand upon the moral maxims and *à priori* suggestions of the human understanding. Unless these are given as preliminary data, no speculations on mind can be sound.

In the author's work, "Lezioni Filosofiche," (1833, Venice,) he attempts to show, in his first Lesson, that all true philosophical investigations must take their origin from Christian morality, and must be prosecuted in conjunction with the doctrines and precepts of Christianity.

The doctrines of Rousseau are pointedly and severely condemned, as leading, by a direct route, to deistical and atheistical opinions. The attempt of the French philosopher to separate the principles of natural from revealed religion, the author considers a most unphilosophical proceeding.*

ANDREA ABBA.

The author's work, "Delle Cognizioni Umane," 1835, was originally, a few years before, published in Latin. It was composed with a view to counteract the notion of Rosmini on the innate idea of being, in his "Nuovo Saggio." Abbà is inclined

* Lezioni Filosofiche, pp. 30, 36, 57, 71.

to adopt the general principles of the philosophy of Locke and Stewart, rather than those advocated by his countrymen.

LUIGI PIERACCINI.

The author's work, "Sistema delle Cognizioni Umane," 4 vol., 1836, is a useful compendium of knowledge.

Pieraccini takes his starting point from the Deity and humanity. The first is the primary element of existence and thought. An idea of a superior intelligent cause of what man beholds around him, is one of the very first conceptions of which he is conscious, and which manifests itself by visible and palpable action. Man is the representative image of the Divinity.*

Human knowledge was originally synthetical. It was embodied in general principles and comprehensive axioms; and its analysis was the work of future times. Moses, in our author's conception, was the living *encyclopedia* of his time. His system is an epitome of all lofty and useful information. We have here revealed, the creation of man, the existence of a Deity, of mental and moral responsibility, and, in fact, all those lofty and transcendent doctrines, which philosophy, in all ages, has been wont to discuss. These positions are

* "L'uomo rappresentante la divinità sulla terra come quell'anello per cui dall'ultimo effetto si risale alla prima causa, è posto in mezzo a Dio e l'Universo."—(Tom. 1. p. 2.)

illustrated very happily in the first book of the author's work.

After these preliminary matters are disposed of, Pieraccini considers man as he is affected by the universe around him, and as he re-acts upon nature. This inquiry embraces philosophical topics of great interest, and opens up, in fact, the whole of inorganic and organic existences. The reader will find a rapid but perspicuous sketch of the origin of our knowledge, and the gradual development of scientific truth generally, in the second book of the first volume of the treatise.

BIOLOGIA PSICHICA.

VITA DEL PENSIERO.

Atti dello Spirito . . . Azione della Natura sull'Uomo, Mutamento dell'Uomo, e Reazione dell'Uomo sulla Natura.

VITA INTELLIGENTE.

Vita Instintiva . . . Prevalenza dell'Azione della Natura sull'Uomo.

Facoltà Naturali . . . Sensazione, Ricordanza, Fantasia, Linguaggio.

Vita Razionale . . . Prevalenza della Reazione dell'Uomo sulla Natura.

Facoltà Artificiali . . . Attenzione, Riflessione, Immaginazione, Eloquenza.

Origine del Pensiero 1ma Facoltà, Sofogenia.

Sviluppamento 2da Facoltà, Filosofia.

Modificazione Creatrice 3za Facoltà, Poesia.

Azione del Pensiero sul Pensiero . . 4ta Facoltà, Oratoria.

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2 A

Pieraccini thinks all previous genealogical systems of knowledge are imperfect; and gives this one of his own, which he conceives is entitled to consideration.

In the third volume the author enters into an examination of the notions we have of space and time. These discussions do not seem to have much novelty about them. But his theory as to the origin of abstract forms of speculative knowledge, which will be found in the sixth book, is entitled to especial consideration. It is concise, brilliant, and ingenious.

The last volume of the author's treatise considers man under a social and political aspect. All his moral and public duties are based upon *à priori* conceptions of the mind; but these are susceptible of progressive extension and development. The order of progression is manifested by the harmony which exists in every part of human thought, action, and feeling. These all point to great ends and purposes, which it will be the intellectual employment of man, during many future ages, to accomplish and carry to their final consummation.

BARON PASQUALE GALLUPI.*

This philosopher's works have excited considerable attention in Italy, and even in France. His

* "Saggio Filosofico sulla Critica della Conoscenza, o sia Analisi distinta del pensiero Umano." Napoli, 6 tom. 1819; "Elementi di Filosofia." 6 vol. Napoli, 1835; "Lettere Filosofiche su le Vicende della Filosofia relativamente a' principj delle Conoscenze Umane, da Cartesio sino a Kant inclusivamente." Napoli, 1837; "Lezioni di Logica e di Metafisica." 3 tom. Firenze, 1841.

“Elementi di Filosofia” are divided into three parts. The first volume contains the author’s opinions upon metaphysical topics, and upon logic; the second is devoted to morals; and the third to the principles of natural and revealed religion.

The Baron Gallupi enlarges, at considerable length, on the singular utility of general terms and general maxims. Without these, as he justly remarks, our scientific knowledge would indeed be very scanty.*

The notion of identity, he considers, involves many curious and important questions; among the number is the distinction he makes between individual being, and the modifications we perceive of general being. On this point he differs from some positions laid down by M. De Gerando, relative to the knowledge of the *moi* being derived from the outward resistance of material bodies. The first sensation we experience gives us an idea of our personality.†

Gallupi censures the general tenets of Condillac and his followers. They appear too material, and refer too much to the power of physical sensibility; and too little, nay, scarcely any thing, to the native powers or resources of the mind itself.

The principles of Hume, on cause and effect, and on the association of ideas, are examined with minuteness and philosophical skill. Gallupi thinks his theory of causation unsound; and that all the

* Tom. 1, p. 61.

† Tom. 1, pp. 114, 131.

notions we possess, in reference to the resemblance and contrariety among objects, and from the entire process of analogical reasonings, rest upon an *à priori* basis. They are all pure mental operations and movements, and are not of an empirical origin.*

The innate activity of the mind is, in our author's conception, the source of all those mental ideas, such as existence, numbers, mathematical relations, &c., which seem to enter into almost every movement of thought, and to be ever present to the intellect. These abstract notions become so familiar, that we are apt to overlook their presence and importance on ordinary occasions; but that they play a necessary part in the great economy of mind, must be apparent to all philosophers who will look sedulously into what passes within themselves.

The ideas of M. Bonnet of Geneva, relative to the phenomena of memory, Gallupi dissents from. Indeed, the entire philosophy of the Geneva philosopher seems to be repudiated by the Italian Baron.

Gallupi argues strenuously for our intellectual and moral responsibility being placed on a purely mental basis. All the conceptions which are involved in them, arise out of the mind itself, and form a part of its nature or essence. Every thing variable, experimental, material, or secondary, is inimical to the loftier ideas of mind, and moral

* Tom. 1, pp. 189. 194.

power and agency ; and in every system of sound philosophy, great care should be manifested to place questions of this character upon their own solid and legitimate grounds.*

Baron Gallupi has recently made some comments on certain philosophical speculations of the Belgian metaphysician, M. Gruyer, relative to the immateriality of the human soul. The Italian philosopher thinks that M. Gruyer† has fallen into an error, in supposing that the immateriality of the thinking principle has not been clearly and satisfactorily demonstrated. The foundation of this erroneous notion, Gallupi maintains, lies in the false idea formed of simple being. It is denied that every thing extended is necessarily composed of parts, and is consequently divisible. Now, this is a denial of an obvious truth. If extension be not composed of parts, it cannot be extension at all. Every candid atomist acknowledges that the atom has many parts. That which is extended occupies many portions of space ; but a single thing cannot occupy, at one and the same instant, many different points. That, therefore, which is extended, can never be invested with perfect or absolute unity. This position cannot be denied without involving ourselves in the most palpable contradictions.

The Atomists, says Baron Gallupi, affirm that there is no force or power in nature capable of dividing ultimate atoms. Bodies, it is said, are

* Tom. 2, pp. 24, 97, 101, 146.

† See Gruyer's "Principes de Philosophie Physique."

divisible because they are porous ; but the ultimate atoms of bodies are hard, and deprived of pores ; consequently, there is no agency in nature to effect a separation in them. But even if this were admitted, the question remains in precisely the same position. If the ultimate atoms of bodies were not susceptible of division, they must still be supposed to be constituted of parts, to be extended, and to occupy space. This intrinsic divisibility of the atom is not merely imaginary ; it must be real ; for indivisibility rests not on its own nature, but upon the want of a sufficiently powerful agent to effect a separation in the parts of the ultimate atom.

The principle, says our author, which is commonly laid down by those who take an incorrect view of this question of the mind's immateriality is, *that a being can be extended and yet simple*. This is contrary to every conception of the mind ; to every one of its direct judgments on extension or space.

Baron Gallupi further contends that M. Gruyer has been misled in consideration of the monadological theory of Leibnitz, by not recognising the truth which lay at the foundation of it. Leibnitz invested all his elementary atoms with metaphysical simplicity, by depriving them of extension and figure.

PAOLO COSTA.

Paul Costa is one of the most able and dis-

tinguished writers in Italy. He is a poet, and a man of a refined and intellectual mind. His philosophical talents and acquirements are far above an average. His "Dissertation on Synthesis and Analysis" has met with high commendation, even beyond the limits of his own country.*

In the author's work, "Del Modo di Comporre le Idee," Firenze, 1837, we have his opinions on mental science. His speculations are psychological. He enters fully into a consideration of our sensations and perceptions; into the powers of attention, reasoning, judgment, and imagination; on all of which topics the reader will find observations bearing the stamp of originality and genius.

Sensations are the foundation of our doctrine; the first or primary elements of thought. When we experience a particular taste or sound, it leaves a certain trace in the mind; and this trace or vestige of its former efforts, is the means we have of calling it up or remembering it afterwards.

On the spirituality of the mind, the author inquires, how the mind acts upon the body, or the body upon the mind? a question which has been more frequently asked than satisfactorily answered. In the author's conception, *attention* is the grand faculty which displays the spirituality of the mind. We arrest our sensations, so to speak, in their passive character through the mind, make them objects of our inquiry and examination, and then draw

* "Del Modo, &c.," pp. 305. 310. 336.

certain mental conclusions from them. This freedom of the mind is absolute in its nature ; it is the innate stamina of its very existence. The author on this subject is, however, rather hesitating and obscure.*

The author examines the opinions of Kant, Reid, Hume, and many other writers ; and displays in all his critical remarks a dispassionate and enlightened spirit.

All our ideal conceptions repose on an *à priori* basis, and they are the source of all our ideas and emotions which spring from a knowledge and cultivation of the fine arts, such as painting, sculpture, music, &c.

The principles of moral agency rest upon the free and intelligent action of the human mind ; unless this be conceded, we have no foundation for moral obligation or duty.†

* “ Sappiam noi l'essenza di quello intorno a che disputiamo ? Il corpo, dicono, ha parti ; lo spirito no. Ma è ella questa l'essenza o una qualità del corpo, l'essenza o una qualità dello spirito ? Chi è che cel dice ? In un pezzo di materia a noi sembra impossibile la facoltà di pensare : e parrà più possibile in un non so chè, che non possiamo immaginare se non come esistente nello spazio, cioè come materia ? Poichè la nostra immaginazione non sa dare che immagini. Noi crediamo le fibre del cerebro quali il nostr'occhio le vede aiutato da un microscopio : ma la infinita divisibilità della materia, e per conseguente la sua variabilissima modificabilità, sappiam noi a che possa condurre ? Toglierem noi a Dio il potere di far che un ente creato da lui comechesia, pensi e senta ? O mostri almen di pensare ? Come Dio ha create le bestie per nostr'uso, non potrebb'egli averci creati noi per diletto d'un'altra specie di creature migliori ? ” (Del Modo, p. 161.)

† Del Modo, &c., pp. 245. 256.

LORENZO MARTINI.

The opinions of this author on mental science will be found in the second volume of his "Storia della Filosofia," 1838. The author defines the philosophy of human nature, by that which we term *humanity*; embracing both physical and mental life. Man has a bodily organization, the same as inferior animals; sense and movements like unto them; but in his mental powers he far surpasses them. It is of this part of his constitution that we are continually desirous to know all the springs and movements, and which we consider as embracing the highest species of philosophic wisdom. Metaphysics comprehends two grand divisions, the intellect and the will. The former comprehends all our intellectual powers and *à priori* conceptions, and the latter those various active powers which impel us to motion and duty.

The author's ideas on the nature of sensation,* the immateriality and immortality of the soul, the faculties of attention, reflection, generalization, abstraction, and language, do not differ, in any essential degree, from those of several other Italian writers we have named.†

* "Idea sovente esprime immagine, e veramente tale è il suo senso intrinseco: in altri casi idea rappresenta il tipo od esemplare di molti oggetti; in altri vuol dire una qualche nozione di un oggetto; finalmente in altri luoghi esprime una nozione chiara od almanco non affatto superficiale." (Vol. 2, p. 221.)

† Storia, vol. 2, p. 223.

FRANCESCO ZANTEDESCHI.

The author's doctrines are derived from those of the Scottish common-sense school. In his work, "Dei Principj Generatori delle Umane Cognizioni," 1838, he defines common-sense to be that power which enables us, upon the spur of the moment, without any apparent reflection or consideration, to form correct judgments on what is true and right.

The author enters into examinations of many mental theories, both of the ancients and moderns. His critical observations are characterised by good sense and a liberal spirit.

The perception of the *moi* he makes a primitive fact, and inseparable from the *non-moi*.

NICOLAS TOMMASEO.

Nic. Tommaseo, who is now (June, 1848) one of the influential members of the Government of Venice, has long manifested a great interest in the question of general education in his own country. He is a philosopher of distinguished talents and learning; and his "Studii Filosofici," 1840, is a work which has extended the author's reputation beyond the confines of Italy.

This treatise is in two volumes, and is divided into five parts; namely, the philosophy of religion, of reason, of morals, of civil government, and the philosophy of the fine arts. The first volume con-

tains those two branches of his subject, which have the most direct bearing on metaphysical science.

Tommasео makes theology the foundation of all human knowledge; and the first principle of religion is *faith*. This faculty steps into active exercise at the precise limits of the human understanding. As we cannot know all things, it follows that the supernatural inevitably enters into our mental constitution. It is not a question whether we *will* believe, but whether we can do otherwise.*

Faith, however, in Tommasео's conception, viewed as an ingredient of philosophical investigations, is a somewhat different thing from what the French "Ecole Théologique" generally consider it. The Italian makes faith an independent, mental reality; an active principle of our mental nature; and not necessarily confined to mere traditionary knowledge or information. We must distinguish rational faith from pure credulity; and if we make this distinction with judgment, and in a truly philosophic spirit, we shall find that faith, theologically considered, does not make greater demands upon our reason, than it does in almost every other branch of human inquiry. The author attempts to prove this position by showing that many of the peculiar doctrines of the Christian dispensation—such, for example, as the *Trinity*—are not more

* "Il mistero è la posizione dei limiti dell'umana natura. Natura dell'uomo si è non intendere molte cose; onde il soprannaturale necessariamente entra nella natura sua." (Studii, p. 1.)

mysterious or incomprehensible than the infinite divisibility of matter; a dogma which has ever proved puzzling to the natural philosopher.*

The author enters very fully into the question of religious authority generally, and the arguments which have been brought forward by Lamennais, Bautain, and others, to support it. The qualifications which Tommaseo makes in the opinions and conclusions of the French philosophers, will be found in the 8th Section of the first volume of the "Studii."

In the second part of the author's work, we find his speculations on mind, its nature and faculties. He defines philosophy to be the inspired love of truth. Analogy, testimony, experience, and language, are the four great instruments for the discovery and promulgation of knowledge. It is only by their judicious employment, that we can make any real progress in the science of our intellectual constitution.

We cannot know things by simply contemplating the unity of the mind; we must analyze and dissect it, and then collect the result of our investigations under general principles and axioms.

Thinking is not the essence of the mind; it is only its essential action. To reflect is to think of our own thoughts; to marshal them, as it were, before us, and to draw certain conclusions from the relations among them.

* "La Trinità è mistero non più inesplicabile della infinita indivisibilità de' corpi." (Studii, p. 57.)

Cause and effect Tommaseo considers as mysteries beyond our knowledge. But he affirms there is in every idea of causation a notion of *power*; but the difficulty of thoroughly understanding the matter, is precisely the same as the difficulty of comprehending an act of creation. Motion, abstractly viewed, stands in the same mysterious category. The author refers to the opinions of Plato, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Dante, on this point; and rejects the definition of cause and effect given by Hume—that of mere sequences.

The author's observations on time and space are judicious, but display little that can be termed original. The idea of space, when reduced to a unity, is the source of many of our conceptions of the sublime and beautiful.

The mind, psychologically speaking, manifests itself in three distinct states; in the active, the passive, and intelligent. All mental phenomena may be viewed through the medium of these three conditions of the intellect.

Memory, intelligence, and imagination, are three of the most comprehensive and distinctly defined faculties of the mind. The will, however, has a powerful hold of all the movements of the thinking principle; and it is solely in and through its agency that we derive all our knowledge relative to morals, and the general conduct of human life.*

Tommaseo enters into minute investigations on the limits of knowledge; those distinctly defined boundaries between that which is tangible to the

* Studii, Vol. 1, p. 100.

understanding, and that which is shadowy and evidently placed beyond its reach. These form the frontier regions which separate the known from the unknown. There is always more or less of ambiguity in sketching out logical bearings and positions in such localities; because much depends upon the personal opinions of the writer himself. He is sometimes, from prejudice, or mistaken views, induced to consider that to be within the grasp of the mind, which yet lies clearly beyond it; and to fix the boundary line, which separates the knowable from the uncertain, in a wrong spot. The criterion of certainty is often an *ignis fatuus* which beguiles the reason into bogs and quagmires. Our author is, however, very careful in all his inquiries on the nature of absolute certainty and uncertainty; and lays down his rules and maxims for the government of the mind, with judicious reservations and commendable caution.*

In the third and fourth parts of the treatise of Tommaseo, he examines the principles of morality and of the social contract. These depend for their validity upon the knowledge of a Divine law, and the personal responsibility of the human will. No moral obligation appears to the author possible, unless we take these two principles with us in our inquiries. The whole frame-work of social and political existence rests upon them.

In the fifth and last part of Tommaseo's disquisitions, he treats of the maxims and rules on which the whole of the fine arts are grounded. There is,

* Studii, pp. 133—165, Vol. 1, parte seconda.

however, little of novelty in his remarks on these topics.

SIG. MANIO.

The work of this author, "*Saggio Postumo su i Principj delle Scienze Morali*," was edited by Sig. Restelli, and published in 1840, at Milan. Though expressly treating of the principles of moral obligation, the author grounds all his reasonings on broad metaphysical axioms, and the reader will find many excellent remarks on the mental systems of Jouffroi, Cousin, Gallupi, Rosmini, and Broussais; from nearly all of whom he differs on many essential points of philosophy. The chapter on the nature and influence of the will, is decidedly the most profound and interesting in Manio's work.

SALVATORE MANCINO.

The author's "*Elementi di Filosofia*," 1841, is a standard work in the philosophical literature of Italy. Its general principles are founded upon the spirituality of the thinking principle, and the necessity of intuitive conceptions. The discussions embrace every modern theory of mind, of any note; and the reader will find the criticisms judicious and candid. The first volume contains the author's opinions on the more abstract portions of metaphysics; and the first eight chapters are exceedingly interesting; adverting as they do, to many of the leading theories in France, Germany, and England.

VINCENZO GIOBERTI.

The philosophical publications of this Italian author* are of a first rate class. They display throughout great reading, joined to a most acute and profound spirit of investigation.

In the first part of the "Introduction to the study of Philosophy," the author lays down the plan of his work, and furnishes us with an outline of his own views as to the nature and tendency of philosophy in general. He declares his zealous attachment to Catholicism, and dislikes the etherial and attenuated speculations of modern times, and the whole scope and tenor of the German philosophy in particular.

A considerable portion of this work is devoted to the consideration of the decline of speculative studies in recent years; and to the discussion of particular tenets and doctrines. This will be found the most able portion of the publication; for it evinces a profound acquaintance with all the most abstruse and recondite questions in mental philosophy which have, within the last two centuries especially, engaged the attention of metaphysicians.

In the other parts of the work, we have the author's speculations on the formula of the *Ideal*; on the scientific universality of this principle of the Ideal, in reference to mathematics, logic, morals, cosmology, the sublime and beautiful, and politics;

* "Introduzione allo Studio della Filosofia," 4 vol. 1841; "Degli Errori Filosofici di Antonio Rosmini," 1841; "Del Primato Morale e Civile degli Italiani," 2 vol.; "Del Bello e del Buono," 1843.

on the conservative tendency of the Ideal; on the alterations it undergoes; and on its application to and influence on matters of revealed truth and religious establishments.

On this last topic the author remarks, that "True philosophy is not inimical to sound and virtuous principles, nor is it calculated to excite a reasonable suspicion of a zealous and sincere attachment to religion. How can it give rise to apprehension, seeing it is founded on religion itself, and cannot without its assistance bear any fruit, nor even exist for a single moment? The consequences of a syllogism cannot consistently be urged against its premises. We must distinguish the waywardness and caprices of philosophy from philosophy itself, and from its proper use." * * * * "True philosophy has for its aim the restoration of the *Scientific Deity*; the conducting us in the paths of true wisdom; the imbuing us with the spirit of religion; and it may also be defined to be *the incorporation of the divine idea with human knowledge.*"*

The leading metaphysical opinions illustrated in the works of Gioberti, are substantially the following. He affirms that there is in the human mind a *super-rational* element, which is not susceptible of analysis, but the existence of which can be psychologically demonstrated. This element, which is nothing but *pure thought* itself, is, notwithstanding, perceived by the mind, through the instrumentality of an intellectual symbol. The *super-rational* element is truly *noumenal*, and is entirely

* Introduzione, vol. 1, p. 69.

different from that of Kant, who, having been misled, at the outset of his inquiries, by an erroneous view of the Cartesian philosophy, confounded the *intelligible* with that which is *above reason*, and placed this *unknown* of the mind in his *being in general*, or *personal identity*. This idea or notion is enriched by a legitimate induction from the *super-rational* element, which is presented to the mind as possessing, as it were, two sides; namely, that which constitutes clear and positive evidence, and that which is obscure, negative, and mysterious. We perceive this obscure side in a negative manner, by the abstract and generic notion of *being*, which we borrow from the clear side of the idea; and this borrowed notion serves us as a symbolical representation of the *unknown*. But this notion of abstract and generic *being*, thus symbolically employed, can furnish us only with a negative notion of the grand matters which are hidden from our view by the natural constitution of our minds. Something is, therefore, wanted to supply this defect. That something is found in Revelation. This instrument performs its office through the means of an external declaration of principles and human duties, and declares to us whatever is positive, concrete, and particular, in reference to things which are, by the mere glimmerings of the light of nature, but very faintly shadowed forth. That which is naturally unknown, negative, and abstract, becomes positive, intelligent, and particular, by the mysteries of Revelation. These mysteries give us great additional power, and confer upon the whole

range of human knowledge and science an altogether new attribute or character. That natural mystery, under which many important truths are veiled, always remains as a complete void, an uniform abstract generality; but by the magic touch of Revelation, it is rendered prolific, and multiplied into many mysteries. But this multiplicity, which has its root in the profound abyss of the great *unknown*, has its prescribed limits; and all mysteries become invested with positive and absolute evidence. This view of things naturally leads us to one great source of truth, which rests upon, and is derived from, the divine nature itself. Here is the source of all those ties which connect Reason with Revelation, and Nature with Grace.

The author maintains that mystery is a necessary constituent principle of all sound and rational religion, and forms a part of its essence; just in the same way as rotundity forms a part of a circle. He also says that all men who have been guided by common sense have invariably recognised the leading maxims of revealed religion, and have considered them as affording an explanation of all those mysterious principles which are involved in the creation and government of the world. The difference between those mysteries which belong to true, and those attached to false, religion, is, that in the true theology the mysteries are revealed by the direct word of God himself; while those of the false are the pure offspring of the wild and disordered imaginations of men.

In addition to these statements we shall here present another view of this writer's opinions, which may, perhaps, be more readily perceived by the general reader.

He distinguishes, in human knowledge, the condition of intuition from the condition of reflection. This distinction, he maintains, is an admitted fact by most psychologists. All reflection, and consequently all reasoning, presupposes an anterior operation, an unreflected intuition, which forms the material on which all reflection operates, and which is the true point from which all philosophical investigations should take their departure. Reflection creates nothing; it produces no intellectual element; it only labours upon the materials which intuition furnishes. Reflection attends to the *form*, but not to the *matter* of thought. The first consequence which strikes us from this fact is, that all reflection has a pre-existence in intuition; and we are warranted in placing all the positive developments of knowledge in this primitive germ of thought. Thus, if intuition contains, in this manner, all reflected elements under one form, an absurdity will follow; that is to say, that all reflection, where this element intervenes, will be impossible, and the element itself will not even exist. To avoid this, we ought then to conceive this act of intuition after a particular form or fashion, so that it may comprehend whatever is necessary to explain all the substantial elements of thought; and in calling them substantials we must exclude all that which appertains to *form*,

which is the exclusive result of a reflex development. Briefly; intuitive thought should transgress neither by its deficiency nor by its excess; for it will prove defective if it exclude some positive and substantial data of reflected knowledge; and, on the other hand, it will be superfluous, if it embrace ever so little of that which belongs to *form*. To fulfil, therefore, all these requisite conditions, intuitive thought ought to perceive *perfect causation*, or a *substantial and free existence of being*; and the truth which seizes this, may express it in these words, BEING CREATES EXISTENCE. This formula the author terms the *ideal*; taking the word *idea* in the Platonic sense, because it contains the *objective* foundation of all human knowledge. The thought which represents the mental proposition, is objective, uniform, and always identical with itself; it constantly dwells within us, is exempt from all succession, possesses the highest degree of evidence: and it is, moreover, the source of all evidence and certainty; so that we cannot call it in question, nor discard it, without extinguishing all intellectual light, and completely annihilating even thought itself.

With these elementary principles of metaphysics, the author enters into an extended examination of all the most profound and recondite problems in philosophy; and endeavours to demonstrate, that there can be no solid foundation for any portion of human knowledge, unless it be based upon this power of intuition. Without it, he affirms, contingent perception is altogether inexplicable: which even the sceptic cannot deny; since, if he did, the very doubt


itself would be logically destroyed. In fact, without this intuitive basis, he likewise maintains, it is impossible to reason at all on any subject; for this reasoning process must be grounded on some principles, which are only so many individual abstract propositions, which have their foundation, after an ultimate analysis, in intuition, and must derive all their cogency and conclusive power from it.

According to the mental theory of Gioberti, the proofs of the existence of a Supreme Being derive all their force from a previous intuition; and as the object of the intuitive act is a created being, it follows that we cannot demonstrate the existence of this Being, when it is intuitively presented to human intelligence. The neglect of this important consideration has often excited the unseasonable and profane jests of the Atheist. We ought never to forget, when we undertake the defence of the most solemn of all truths, that man here below can only know God in two distinct ways; namely, by *intuition* and *reflection*; according to the psychological condition in which he finds the two modes of knowledge which result from it. Now the existence of a Supreme Being is, under the point of view of reflection, a *theorem* which has to be proved; but considered intuitively, it is an *axiom*, which is not susceptible of demonstration, inasmuch as it is itself the basis of all demonstrative truth.

We shall here, in addition to these remarks, give a table of the Ideal Formula, which will illustrate pretty clearly the general principles of Gioberti's metaphysics.


TAVOLA

Che rappresenta l'Albro Enciclopedico, conforme all'Organismo Ideale.



For the purpose of illustrating this encyclopedic tree, we shall here offer a few general observations on the nature of time and space, as they are closely interwoven with all the speculative views of the author, and have, moreover, a decided bearing on some of the leading doctrines embodied in the metaphysical philosophy of Germany.

Before, however, we advance any further, we shall lay before the reader another of the author's tables, relative to time and space. This will, we hope, render our remarks more readily comprehended.



To form correct notions of time and space, according to Gioberti's ideas of them, we must refer to the synthetic process by which the human mind descends *à priori* from the notion of being, to the last stage of existence. Here are the first and most important manifestations of the synthetic principle, which proceeds from demonstration, and then passes through the intermediate degrees of opinion, probability, conjecture, and falls ultimately into the contingent or uncertain.

From the idea of being and that of existence, there must be an intermediate conception, which varies by reason of its descending from the first termination to the second, or ascending from the second to the first. In the course of descent, that is to say, in synthetic order, the immediate idea is that of *absolute production*, that is of *creation*; in the ascent by analysis, it is *simple production*, which being disjoined from the other, gives rise to error in the process of analyzation.

The idea of absolute or relative production, which intervenes between being and existence, according to a descending or ascending scale, contains in itself the idea of time and space, which are the psychological and ontological circle from the primary duality of the idea of truth and fact. From thence, mathematics occupy a middle place between pure philosophy, which is the science of the idea, and physical science, which is the science of facts. Time and space are not *facts*, since they are not of themselves objects of sense; nor are they *ideas*, since they are not of themselves intelligible.

But both can be rendered sensible and intelligible by a process of participation, in being clothed with a sensible form, as in numbers and arithmetic; and with an intellectual form, as in the possible, (of co-existence and succession) in the science of metaphysics. Time and space are, therefore, a true synthesis of the two extremes of the formula.

To comprehend this synthetic process correctly, we must notice, that time and space are to be considered *ad intra* and *ad extra*; that is, in respect to being, or existence, which embraces two diverse or opposite elements, according as we contemplate them in one or the other state. Now considering them *ad intra*, we must proceed synthetically, and *à priori*, descending from being to time and space; by considering them *ad extra*, we proceed analytically, *à posteriori*, ascending from existence. The two elements of which we speak, meet or touch each other in one of the two extremes of the formula, and each partakes of the nature of that extreme. Hence it is, that the element *ad intra* is apodictical or demonstrative; and the element *ad extra* is contingent or uncertain. We must, therefore, imagine that these two elements can be represented separately, and clearly distinguished from each other by the mind, through the operation of abstraction. Both the apodictical and contingent elements are fused into one inseparable idea of time and space; and it is by virtue of this synthetic unity, and through the medium of the formula, they become the necessary condition of relative or absolute production.

The apodictical element of time and place is continuous; the contingent element is discrete. The first develops itself as one and infinite, excluding multiplicity and variety. The second is recognised as multiple and varied. The multiple of time results from *moments*, and gives rise to succession; and the multiple of space results from *points*, and gives rise to co-existence. The continuous displays time and space in their contact with being; that is to say, in their approximation to being, and their greater distance from existence. The discrete is seen in contact with existence; a nearer approach to the existing, and at a greater distance from being. From the continuous, or ascending process, we have only the possible, that is, being itself; and from the discrete or descending process, we have only the contingent, that is, intermediate existence. The possible and the contingent are the two extremes of each process, which connect themselves with the two extremes of the formula, and are united together in the act of creation.

The confusion of the two elements, and of every thing connected with them, is the cause of all those rational antinomies involved in the consideration of time and space, which the history of philosophy, from the earliest ages, has recorded; and which have proved so troublesome and perplexing to modern speculation, that Emmanuel Kant has even denied the very existence of these two mental conceptions. The "Critique of Pure Reason" is a

species of scientific suicide ; an act of hopeless despair, which aggravates the evil, instead of remedying it. But, regarded as mathematical conceptions, our notions of the two elements are not real ; being the offspring of the confusion between the continuous and the discrete. Infinite, for example, appertains to the continuous, but being transported into the discrete, we are obliged to imagine an infinite number of points and of moments ; an infinity greater in the one case than in the other ; that is, a greater and less infinite, and an infinite number of infinites, and similar extravagant conceptions ; which being transferred out of the region of abstraction and the conditioned of mathematics, or the domain of pure intellect, become rank absurdities. But such absurdities are not the result of malicious spirits which make sport with the incongruities of reason to bewilder men ; they arise from the continuous and discrete, forming an union in every act of creation. The manner of this union is mysterious, because founded on impenetrable essences ; but the reality of existence shines forth in vivid evidence. The union of the continuous and the discrete is the primordial duality, united to every creation ; but this union is the key to every other duality, and is inseparable from that of mind, and the constituent existence of the formula.

The sole cause of such antinomies of reason, as well as of all other philosophical errors, rests upon a psychological basis. In like manner the ascend-

ing process of the mind cannot arrive at the conception of a creative cause, as we have already noticed ; and cannot come more readily from the apodictical element of time and space ; therefore these conceptions rest upon those of being. Time and space, psychologically considered, can be nothing but *a succession of moments, and a co-existence of points*. But, as has already been noticed, the conception of intuition, the idea of the continuous as well as the infinite, pierce through the mind of the psychologist, and create the confusion with the idea of the discrete ; which is nothing more than an intellectual scheme, embracing an infinite succession of instants, and an infinite heap of points, as an infinity of instants and points. And is it not surprising that the psychologist should mix the discrete of reflection with the continuous of intuition, making the latter subordinate to the former ; since by virtue of this we mix the reflective conception of existence, of power, of secondary causes, of relative production, and such like, with that of creation, of the absolute in creation, of the first cause, and of being ; all furnished from intuition ? The psychologist is obliged to confound the data of reflection with the data of intuition ; because reflection and intuition are simultaneously in exercise ; and he is under the necessity of bending the intuitive conception to that of reflection, because it has itself the predominance ; and on this predominance psychology claims its supremacy.

All these inevitable consequences are rendered

impossible according to an analytical process. For in the movement of created being, it was impossible to arrive at the elements of the discrete, without passing through the continuous, and contemplating it as distinct from and superior to the former. The continuous and the discrete appear as two stations mentally distinct ; although merging ontologically into unity in the act of creation. The ontological process, besides shunning the confusion, is the guide of the mind to the ideal ; that is, to pure being, and to all the intervening gradations of existence ; an office which it is impossible that mere analysis can perform. In fact, the discretiveness of the points and moments, gives the idea of motion, which is the synthetical result of the combination of time with space ; and at the same time guiding us to the various forms of existing, relative, absolute motion, &c. This idea of motion gives us the idea of lineal as well as superficial distance ; that of solidity, &c., all of which are special objects of geometry ; that is, of possible body. Besides, from the points of space emerges the idea of secondary substance ; from substance and motion, the idea of secondary causes ; and from these, the idea of the monad or ultimate power. The whole of which ideal process is united in the act of creation.

This is the chief mode in which the synthetical ideal manifests itself in time and space ; and it shows us the necessity of our following, in all investigations of mind, the ontological method of inquiry, in preference to the psychological.

The philosophy of Gioberti is held in high estimation, not only in Italy, but on the Continent generally. It is characterised by lofty views, a profound acquaintance with most of the metaphysical theories of Germany and France, a sincere and ardent love of truth, and a generous and candid spirit. It is based on Catholic doctrines, and has an especial reference to the philosophy which the Roman clergy usually countenance and support; but there is nothing narrow, bigoted, or uncharitable in the speculations of Gioberti; on the contrary, every topic is discussed in the spirit of true Christian philanthropy and enlightened criticism.*

* “ Quest’opera del filosofo Torinese, di cui appena abbiain delineato i concetti sommari ontologici, onora non poco gli studii speculativi Italiani. Tutti coloro che fino a qui sonosi sforzati di trarre con ragionamenti *a priori* dalla scienza dell’infinito la scienza dei finiti, o rompono nel panteismo, o lungamente paralogizzano. Ma il Gioberti scampa dai due pericoli, radicando l’ontologia nella visione simultanea dell’ente infinito e del suo atto immanente di creazione, il che porge a tutta la sua metafisica un carattere nuovo. Ella offre altresì a nostri tempi il primo esempio forse d’un filosofare scrupolosamente ortodosso, e ciò non di manco ardito e originale, ed è un bello e nuovo tentativo di mostrare l’armonie, i collegamenti, e le illustrazioni reciproche tra la filosofia e la rivelazione cattolica, tenendo conto del crescere quotidiano delle scienze sperimentali, del progredire dell’incivilimento, e del mutare delle opinioni; anzi conviene guardare tutto il suo trattato sotto questo principal lume d’un temperamento scientifico dei dogmi razionali coi rivelati. Mirabile è poi come il nostro autore, entrando in mille questioni di storia, di filologia, di erudizioni, e di politica, avvivi e informi ogni cosa dello spirito filosofico, ed in tutti i subietti applichi ingegnosamente, e quasi diremmo incarni la sua dottrina ontologica.”—(Mamiani. Dell’Ontologia e del Metodo, p. 62. Parigi. 1841.)

COUNT TERENCE MAMIANI.

Count Mamiani* is one of the most distinguished Italian philosophers of the day. His works are held in great estimation by all the learned of his own country, as well as many of the most popular authors in France and Germany.

In the "Rinnovamento," the author has divided his mental speculations into two parts. The first treats of *method* in general, and the rules and principles on which it should at all times, and on all subjects of philosophy, be founded. In this division of his treatise, the author takes a review of philosophy since the revival of letters in Europe; and makes especial reference to the speculations of Bacon, Galileo, Leonardo da Vinci, and many other writers belonging to the modern school of Italian metaphysicians and logicians.

Method in general he divides into five parts; namely, invention, induction, demonstration, synthesis, and analysis.

In reference to the application of these principles to the science of man in all his intellectual, moral, and religious relations, Mamiani enters into an examination of the nature of propositions; of time and space; and into all those conceptions which

* "Del Rinnovamento della Filosofia Antica Italiana," Paris, 1834; "Sei Lettere del Mamiani a Rosmini," Paris, 1838; "Dell'Ontologia e del Metodo," Parigi, 1841; "Dialoghi di Scienza Prima," 1846; "Mario Pagano, ovvero della Immortalità," 1846.

we commonly refer to an *à priori* origin. We have also valuable dissertations on the criterion of truth, common sense, human testimony, causation, and the nature of the absolute. The author's remarks on the criterion of truth and on the absolute, are worthy of a careful perusal, as they display great ingenuity and cleverness.

DEFENDENTE SACCHI.

The speculative writings of this Author, with the exception of his "Storia della Filosofia Greca," (6 vol. Pavia, 1820), are connected with the sciences of morals, politics, and social economy. There are, however, many important principles slightly touched upon in his treatises on these subjects, as well as in those relating to the history of Italian literature, which are connected with the science of mind.* He is an author of great learning and originality of thought.

BATTISTA CAMPAGNA.

This author is a professor of philosophy at Brescia, and his "Sistema di Psicologia Empirica" was published in 1841. The treatise is of an elementary nature, and contains few theoretical views or observations. Intuition is one of the leading sources

* See "Varietà Letterarie," 1832, Article, Melchiorre Gioja, Vol. 1, p. 147, and the Article, Condillac, Vol. 2, p. 72.

of mental truth; and, in conjunction with sensation, may be said to form the main-springs of the thinking process.

Sentiment, imagination, remembrance, conception, reasoning, are the leading faculties of the mind, according to the psychological system of Campagna.

The religious principle of a creative power is necessarily implied in all rational systems of mental philosophy. Without it, they must be vague and unsatisfactory things.

BENEDOTTI MONTI.

The author's treatise "Saggio Interno al Fondamento, al Processo, ed al Sistema delle Umane Conoscenze," was published at Rome in 1841. This Essay is grounded on an aphorism of St. Thomas Aquinas, that truth and mind are synonymous. Professor Monti develops this idea at great length, and endeavours to show the numerous and highly important questions which arise out of it. This work is a very interesting one, and will amply repay a careful perusal.

GIUSEPPE SANDONA.

In the treatise on the nature of moral obligation, entitled "Della Filosofia Morale," 1847, the author proceeds upon the principles of mental intuition, and the innate conception of a Divine creative

cause. The work has an especial reference to the great objects of civil and political institutions. It is, however, even in a metaphysical point of view, an interesting publication, both for the elevation of its sentiments and the profundity of its discussions. The first volume will be found the most interesting to the student of mental philosophy.

SIG. PESTALOZZI.

The work of this author, "*Elementi di Filosofia*," 4 vol. 1847, has received a very favourable reception in all the Italian states. Its chief object is elementary and educational; but the author has availed himself of all the valuable speculations in France and Germany in mental science, and has turned many of them to good account. The first and second volumes contain his disquisitions on the primitive faculties and conceptions of the mind. This work gives us, on the whole, a very favourable idea of the progress of philosophy in Italy, and of the great talents and acquirements of those who cultivate it.

The following Italian works I have not been so fortunate as to meet with :—

ABB. PANESIO.—"*Elementa Metaphysices*," 1794.

SIG. CUOCO.—"*Platone in Italia*," 1806; "*Esercizio Logico*," 1824.

CESAROTTI.—“Saggio sulla Filosofia delle Lingue, del Gusto,” &c., 1821.

GAETANO PESCE.—“Sui Negri e sulla Natura Primitiva dell’Uomo ; Saggio Ideologico e Fisiologico,” 1826.

PIETRO BAROLI.—“Introduzione di Filosofia Teoretica e Morale,” 1829.

A. DRAGHETTI.—“Psychologiæ Specimen,” Parma, 1818.

C. ANTONIO PEZZI.—“Lezioni di Filosofia.”

ALFONSO TESTA.—“Della Filosofia dell’Affatto,” 1830.

POMPEO AZZOLINO.—“Introduzione alla Storia della Filosofia Italiana, ai tempi di Dante,” 1839.

MISSERINI.—“La Sapienza Morale degli antichi filosofi Greci e Latini dimostrata,” 8vo. Milano, 1846.

The philosophy of mind is now cultivated with great ardour and success in all the Italian states. Every University has an able and popular lecturer on the subject ; and the opinions of the philosophers of Germany, France, and England, are now becoming more generally and accurately known to those of the rising generation who are destined to take a part in all theological, civil, and legal professions. The Italian press has also taken up this branch of science with zeal and enterprise ; and translations of foreign publications on speculative subjects, form

no small share of the bookselling trade in this portion of Europe. When the whole country shall emerge out of its present contests, and feel again the blessings of peace and freedom, there can be no doubt but that mental philosophy, along with every other branch of useful and ornamental knowledge, will experience the benefit of the change, and shoot forth with renewed strength and vigour.*

* See Note I. at the End of this Volume.

CHAPTER V.



METAPHYSICAL WRITERS IN BELGIUM AND HOLLAND, FROM THE TIME OF HEMSTERHUIS (1784) TO THE PRESENT DAY.

FOR many years the speculations of Hemsterhuis exercised a great influence over the philosophic mind of Holland, though but partially recognised in Belgium. They were especially favourable to the Dutch ; for their system of theology harmonised to a considerable extent with the main points in his mental disquisitions. The leading principles of theology were fully embodied and developed in Hemsterhuis's philosophy ; and this circumstance rendered his writings generally acceptable in all the universities and public seminaries of learning in Holland, among a people of such a concentrated, thoughtful, and reflective temperament.

The doctrines of Kant were, for many years after they were rife in Germany, viewed with great suspicion in the Low Countries, by learned Academicians, as well as unprofessional writers.

The speculations of "Pure Reason" did, however, partially gain a footing at last, but not until there had been several violent and personal conflicts among the erudite and philosophic in the chief localities of public instruction. Still the progress of the Kantian theory was slow and lingering; and it is a fact, which the whole philosophy of the Low Countries substantiates, that up to the present moment the "Critique of Pure Reason" has exercised a very slight influence indeed upon the general current of speculative opinion in Belgium and Holland. The doctrines of the Königsberg sage have been viewed at a distance, and never allowed to engross any thing approaching to a concentrated or an undivided attention.

There have been several public incidents in the history of Belgium which have exercised a considerable influence over the ordinary course of speculative studies among her people. And we may notice, in the first place, the zeal which was displayed by Joseph II., son of Maria Teresa and Emperor of Germany, to promulgate certain sentiments and opinions on philosophical subjects in this country, then under the power of Austria. He was deeply imbued with the irreligious and sceptical dogmas of Voltaire and Frederic the Great of Prussia; and so firm a hold had they taken of his mind, that he sent emissaries into Belgium to propagate his ideas, and disseminate them in every direction. He even established Colleges for the express purpose of making his opinions known among the educated portion of the community. A seminary called the *Philosophical College*

was founded at Louvain, and Professors appointed to its chairs, to give a peculiar direction to the speculative studies of the young men who attended the University, and particularly to those who were destined for the Church. This was so openly and offensively carried on, that public feeling became powerfully directed against the Emperor's scheme; and at length his outrageous attempt to undermine the religious opinions of a whole people, excited such universal detestation, that his agents were ignominiously driven out of the country. This gave rise to the first Belgian revolution of 1787. The persecution of the clergy was violent and unprincipled. They were denied all command over the tuition of the students at the University of Louvain. The Emperor even went so far as to remove the Professors' Chairs of Philosophy and Civil Law from this place to Brussels; but such was the antipathy against this interference in matters of education, and such the respect the people entertained for their Clerical Pastors, that not a single pupil attended the philosophical course of Lectures at the new Metropolitan seat of instruction. The clergy taught philosophy in their diocesan schools or academies, in spite of the violence and cruelty of the Emperor. Austria, from these and other political causes, gave up the contest in 1790, after many civil contentions and bloody battles.

Some years after, the same kind of enterprise was undertaken by William, king of Holland, though from very different motives, and with a view to very different ends. The king, seeing

the intimate connection between certain philosophical systems and opinions and the general doctrines of Catholicism, conceived that the only effectual mode of making converts of the whole Belgian people, then placed under his government, and of consolidating his political power, was to commence with the elementary education of those who had to fill the pulpit, the bar, and the political and civil functions of the state. What was termed *philosophical rationalism* was the speculative system he patronised, and ordered to be taught and promulgated at the University of Louvain. The minds of the young were to be in some degree materialised; they were never to be allowed to think or hear of any theories of a spiritual or elevated character; they were to be tutored in the most insipid and formal doctrines; and their mental powers and faculties cut and trimmed in all the dull and formal stiffness so characteristic of Dutch notions and customs. This intellectual tyranny roused the indignant feelings of the whole nation, and was one of the efficient causes of the Belgian Revolution of 1830.

There were, in addition to these circumstances just mentioned, other public events which greatly influenced the speculative philosophy of the Low Countries, in the latter part of the last, and the commencement of the present century. When the French republican wars took place, this section of Europe fell into disorder and distress, and ultimately into the hands of their powerful invaders. Belgium and Holland became a part of the French

territory ; and as Napoleon was decidedly hostile to all mental speculations forming any essential part of public instruction, the newly conquered countries soon began to feel the influence of Imperial displeasure and indifference. For many years no work on mental philosophy, of any note for originality, made its appearance in Belgium or Holland ; every thing of this nature being viewed as an almost direct act of hostility against the reigning dynasty. It was not, therefore, till the fall of the Emperor, that the human mind regained once more its wonted liberty and scope, and that abstract studies were looked up to, as pursuits honourable to those devoted to them, and beneficial to the State. In 1817, the Universities in Belgium were established ; and new speculative vigour was communicated to the national intelligence in this section of the European continent.

There are four Universities in Belgium, where mental science occupies a distinguished position, and is made a necessary part of all public education ; namely, at Brussels, Louvain, Liege, and Ghent. In Holland, the Universities of Leyden and Gröningen are the two most important places of instruction in the country.

But before the complete establishment of the Belgian Universities in 1817, there were several zealous and able cultivators of mental science, although their respective publications enjoyed but a very limited circulation, and their names are but little known even in their own country. Most of these writers we shall notice in subsequent

parts of this chapter. Among many of them who have just claims to distinction, there is none to whom the philosophers of Belgium, and indeed of all countries, owe a deeper debt of gratitude for his zeal and talents displayed in the pursuit and interests of mental science, than M. Van Meenen, now President of the "Cour de Cassation" of Brussels. He has laboured disinterestedly and arduously in the cause of philosophy; and our only lament is that we should have so few published memorials of his remarkable acuteness and extensive information in this branch of human knowledge.

As the doctrines of Kant obtained a partial footing in Holland from about the time of the first Revolution, in 1790, till the year 1800, we find that the general system of speculation followed both in and out of the universities of Leyden and Gröningen, was a mixture of the opinions of Descartes, Leibnitz, Wolff, Locke, and Kant. Most of the treatises published in Holland during this period are of an elementary character, and display a comparatively narrow range of observation and discussion. The French system of Condillac and Tracy, now and then made its appearance, in a modified shape; but could scarcely be said to form a constituent element in the philosophical literature of the country.

The philosophers of Belgium at the present moment may be classed under three divisions. Those who still maintain, in its general integrity,

the theory of Condillac and his immediate followers, and who make the impressions on the external senses the chief source of all thought. Secondly, those who are attached to the high Church party, and who take, substantially, the doctrines of the "Ecole Théologique" of France for their guide. And thirdly, the *rationalists*, who blend, in various proportions, the elements of both preceding theories; and who consider that our ideas are derived both from sensation and from the pure *à priori* resources of the mind itself. Speaking generally, and with many reservations, the pure sensational philosophers are but few in number and very limited in influence; the High Church opinions are powerfully and ably supported; but the third and last class of thinkers are decidedly most numerous and influential. They have a preponderance in three out of the four national universities; those of Brussels, Liege, and Ghent. Louvain is the seat of those doctrines which are considered most in unison with the general tenets and ritual observances of the Catholic faith.

In Holland the influence of French speculation has never been so great as in Belgium. Within these twenty years, German opinions have been more generally discussed among the Dutch than they had previously been; but the leading doctrines of philosophy, taught and discussed in their chief Universities, present now nearly the same aspect that they did fifty years ago; being a compound from Descartes and his immediate disciples and

commentators, and the philosophical opinions of Locke and S'Gravesande.

JOHANN KINKER.

Kinker was born at Nieuwen-Amstel, near Amsterdam, in 1764, and took a very active part in the promulgation of Kant's doctrines, both in Holland and in Belgium. He published at the Hague, in the "*Magaziyn der Kritische Wijsbegeete*," a popular abridgment or summary of Kant's system, which was afterwards translated into French, under the title of an "*Essai d'une Exposition Succincte de la Critique de la Raison Pure*," Amsterdam, 1791.

In this work, Kinker considers mind as possessing the following faculties. Cognition he assumes as meaning the general power of thinking. Sensibility designates the passive nature of the mind in receiving impressions from external objects. Perception is the effect of an impression from without. Experience, considered in its comprehensive meaning, embraces perception, conception, understanding, and reason.

In the acquisition of knowledge, the progress of the mind is described in this manner. Objects act immediately upon the mind through the external senses. We then, by a determined inward mental act or process, collect a certain number of these perceptions together, and this collection constitutes a conception. The mind, in like manner, combines a certain quantity of those conceptions under one

aspect; and by this means reasoning and argumentation are produced.*

Kinker applied his metaphysical doctrines to illustrate the sciences of morals, politics, and theology.

The author has popularised Kant so much that there scarcely remain any vestiges of the original. It must have been amusing to many of the learned sages of Germany to see their favourite philosopher dressed out in this garb.

Kinker published "*Briveen von Sophie*," in 1797; in verse, with copious notes. It is written against his zealous and indefatigable opponent Feith, who denounced the system of Kant as an atheistical and pantheistical hypothesis.

Kinker became Professor of Literature at the University of Liege, which he resigned at the Revolution, in 1830. He published "*Briveen over het Naturrecht*," with a view of applying the doctrines of Kant to the illustration of the principles of natural law.

BISHOP NELIS.

This philosopher, Bishop of Antwerp, was a man of a contemplative and highly cultivated mind, and enjoyed considerable political influence and reputation during his lifetime. He was a zealous cultivator of philosophy; but he published most of his speculations privately, for distribution among a

* *Essai*, &c. pp. 6, 8, 10.

few select friends. Sometimes these productions consisted of only a few pages, and probably, on some occasions, only five or six copies were struck off the press. This circumstance has rendered his philosophical reflections and disquisitions extremely rare.* The Bishop's "*Aveugle de la Montagne*" bears, in the first edition, the date of 1789, and appears to have been privately printed, and distributed among the author's friends.

This work is written in the form of "Instructions" or Essays. It is in the epistolary and familiar style, and abounds with sublime and beautiful thoughts and sentiments, clothed in the most perspicuous and harmonious language. The first six Essays are on the "*Nature of the Creation.*" The first and second are especially dedicated to Mallebranche, Dr. Clarke, Leibnitz, Bonnet, and to all the other metaphysicians of the eighteenth century.

In the first Essay or Dissertation, the Bishop gives us a vivid and beautiful impression of the grand truth of a Deity. This is a subject to which, in his eyes, no language can possibly do justice. Philosophers, in all ages of the world, have been filled with wonder and admiration at the existence of a Divine Mind, who called every thing around us into being, and who sustains and governs all, with such consummate order, wisdom, and bene-

* His Excellency, M. Van de Weyer, the Belgian Minister at London, has, as far as I am aware of, the only complete collection of these fugitive pieces. His Excellency has also the MS. copy of the Bishop's "*Elements of Morality.*"

ficence. A subject so sublime and interesting, the pious author conceives, ought to awaken in us the most lively emotions of gratitude, love, and thankfulness.

We must not, however, in considering the nature of God, conclude that matter has no veritable existence. The Bishop affirms it is a positive and independent creation; a thing apart altogether from the Deity, and also from our minds. The operations of material bodies upon us are not to be considered in the light of a perpetual Divine operation, power, agency, or influence. They are the result of two certain and positive creations; each having a series of mutual relations to each other; but both endowed from the first with those powers which mark or designate their reciprocal action or influence on each other. The Deity is truly the Creator of all; but it is not by his direct and immediate agency that external bodies affect us; they do so by virtue of that power which Almighty wisdom conferred upon them and us at our respective creations.*

In the second Essay, we have a Dissertation on the nature of matter. This is exceedingly interesting. The Bishop maintains the objective reality of external bodies, and he rests this on the testimony of the senses. Still, however, we know nothing of matter as a real or abstract substance. Our author observes, "Matter is not that which I see; it is only the cause of my sensations. It is

* *Essai, Entretien Second*, pp. 20. 23. 32.

neither red, nor blue, nor cold, nor hot, nor long, nor broad. All these qualities exist only in myself ; they are an affection of the senses, a vision, a modification of the mind. That which is external to my mind, that which I denominate matter, must necessarily be a uniform and simple substance.*

The third Essay is occupied with the opinions which many of the ancient philosophers entertained on the nature of a Deity ; and the same historical train is maintained throughout the fourth, fifth, and sixth Essays. In the seventh, we come to God. This is a very beautiful piece of writing ; and every reader who entertains any just or sound principles of theological truth, will feel pleasure in perusing these few brief though interesting and eloquent pages of this really good and pious philosopher. He here views the Deity in connection with physical nature. In the eighth Essay, we have the Divine Essence, considered in relation to intelligent beings ; and in the ninth, the Deity is considered in conjunction with the astronomical science of many worlds. The tenth Essay is on Providence.

In his Essay entitled “ *Le Chant du Cygne, ou La Vie à Venir et L’Immortalité,*” the bishop depicts the glorious prospects of another life, and the reasons we have to hope for it, in the most glowing language. He shows that the whole economy of external nature, as far as man has been able to examine it, and all the internal feelings of

* Entretien Second, p. 19.

the heart, unitedly bear testimony to the validity of this great and consoling truth.*

ANDRE ERNEST MODESTE GRETRY.

M. Grétry, a Belgian, is well known in the history of music, in all parts of the continent of Europe. It is a somewhat singular circumstance to have a work of a philosophical character from such a quarter. His "*De la Vérité*," in 3 vols., was published at Paris in 1801. Though not containing much that can strictly come within the range of mental science, yet the general spirit of the treatise is an emanation from the systems of French speculation at the termination of the last century. The various topics treated of, and the manner in which they are discussed, show that the author is a shrewd observer of human nature.

In the first volume we have dissertations on the utility of public instruction, and on the general principles which should guide statesmen in promoting and encouraging it; on the different species of civil governments; on the vices and virtues of respective classes or orders in society; and on public emulation and felicity. In the second volume, we have the arts and sciences dwelt upon, and their general bearings upon the civilization

* See a review of Nelis in the "*Esprit des Journaux*," 1792. His "*Aveugle de la Montagne*" was translated into German by the celebrated Lavater, in 1795. The bishop's first work is entitled, "*Fragments sur les Principes du Vrai Bonheur*," 1764, of which only five copies were printed.

and happiness of mankind. In the fourth chapter of the same volume, the author discusses the various relations which subsist among our sensations, and shows that without such established laws of connection every thing would be merged into an abyss of confusion. Grétry, although he does not adopt the whole of Condillac's opinions on sensations, nevertheless subscribes to all the leading doctrines of the Abbé on this subject. In the other parts of the fourth volume, we have the influence of climate, and various other external agencies on the mind, stated in an agreeable but rather superficial manner.

The metaphysical speculations in the third volume are confined to the immortality of the soul, to the existence of a theological principle in man, to the instinctive powers of his nature, to physical and mental sympathies and antipathies. The author thinks there are some grounds, from the physical constitution of man and of the universe, to hope that there is another state of existence after this. The religious principle, he conceives, is quite an original and instinctive one in our nature; and is so prominently developed that it clearly points out the duty of civil governments to support a system of religious instruction among all classes of the people.

RHYNVIS FEITH.

This Dutch author was indefatigable in his opposition to the introduction of the philosophy of

Kant into Holland. His writings, which are chiefly to be found in the periodicals of the day, were numerous, but mostly confined to the controversy in which he was engaged. He is spoken of as an able man, well versed in mental science and skilled in controversial warfare.

PAUL VAN HEMERT.

Van Hemert was one of the most active and intelligent writers of his day of whom Holland could boast. He was born at Amsterdam in 1756, and while yet a mere youth, displayed a remarkable enthusiasm for philosophical studies. In 1795, he published and edited the works of Kant, in four volumes, and was the first writer of any eminence that made the speculations of the Professor of Königsberg known in Holland. The Dutch had, however, a great aversion to the new "philosophy," as it was termed; and this led Van Hemert into several controversies relative to the merits of Kant, and his "Critique of Pure Reason." In all these disputes Van Hemert displayed uncommon talent and the most profound learning. His small work entitled "Pauli Van Hemert Epistola ad Danielelem Wittenbachium," manifests controversial abilities of the first order.

In Van Hemert's "Elements of the Philosophy of Kant," written in the Dutch language, we find the following summary of matters discussed in his four volumes. He enters into a disquisition on the nature of knowledge in general. This is de-

rived from two sources. A distinction is made between mathematical and philosophical knowledge. All science is characterised by four qualities ; it is general, special, true, and necessary. Error is not the result of the circumscribed nature of the intellect. The senses by themselves could never lead us to truth. The author then discusses the nature of reason ; points out what constitutes pure reason ; shows the subjective nature of the senses ; the basis of synthetic unity ; the origin of analytical judgments ; the source of synthetic judgments ; the nature of analogical reasoning ; of unity and diversity ; of matter and form ; of idealism and realism ; of the existence of a Deity ; the object of the creation ; the limitations of human knowledge ; its division into theoretical and practical ; the nature and principles of the fine arts : and the true standard by which to estimate the relative and positive value of all knowledge and science.

There is a small treatise on the sublime, by Van Hemert, which he published when Professor at the College at Amsterdam ; and in addition to the works we have already named, the reader will find a great many disquisitions connected with mental science in the author's general collection of literature, philosophy, and history, under the title of " *Lectuur by het Outbijt en de the-tafel,*" in 11 volumes, 1807.

ALLARD HULSHOFF.

Hulshoff was born at Gröningen in 1734, and

in early life devoted himself to the medical profession, which he afterwards abandoned, and confined his attention solely to philosophical studies. His first publication was, "A Demonstration of the Best Possible World;" wherein he attempts to prove, that the principles of Leibnitz and Wolff were destructive to the fundamental principles of theology. This treatise attracted considerable attention throughout the North of Europe, and gave rise to many controversial tracts, both in defence of the author's views, and in favour of the Leibnitzian philosophy. This warfare only terminated in 1789; and from 1764 to this period, Hulshoff published three or four different philosophical works. The leading principles which pervade all these several speculations, are that the Deity is the foundation of all sound philosophy; and that his existence, attributes, and moral government of the world, are all pointed out to us by the internal sentiments of our souls.

In the author's treatise, "On the Existence of God," he expresses his regret that the proofs offered in support of this great truth by Descartes, are not satisfactory. In two other works on the general arrangements of Divine Providence, he affirms that the world does not exist necessarily, but is the creation of a necessary Being. These speculations he designates by the title of "An Exposition of the True Principles of Nature;" which is specially directed against the tenets promulgated by D'Holbach in his "Système de la Nature."

DIONYSIUS VAN DE WYMPERSSE.

This author was a Professor of Gröningen, and afterwards at Leyden, and published his "Abridgment of Philosophy" in 1789. The principles of this work belong to the Eclectic school; and there is but a small portion of originality displayed in its pages. The author had the reputation, however, among his philosophical contemporaries, of being profoundly skilled in all the speculative systems cultivated at that period in the North of Europe.

PIERRE PAULUS.

This author was an active and influential public functionary in the Low Countries, and partial to speculative studies. His work, "Discours sur l'Egalité des Hommes," 1794, displays considerable ingenuity and philosophical reading. The metaphysical questions involved in this inquiry, are directed, by the author, towards giving us a clear conception of those principles and maxims on which civil governments rest. The "Discours," beyond this, has little claim on the attention of the metaphysician.

C. F. DE NIEUPOORT.

There are two works of this Belgian author, connected with metaphysical subjects; his "Essai sur

la Théorie du Raisonnement," 1805, and his "Un Peu de Tout, ou Amusemens d'un Sexagénaire," 1818. The first is prefixed to an edition of Condillac's Logic, and enters pretty fully into the rational and mental phenomena of all our abstract judgments. The author informs us in his preface, that what he has here written was the result of his own individual reflections ; that he was not a slavish admirer of any writer, but had endeavoured to view the subject under consideration in his own way. As may be surmised, he differs in many particulars from Condillac. He confers a greater degree of spirituality on the mind, than the French philosopher ; and enters more fully into the nature and operation of those several intellectual powers which are evidently called into requisition in every process of the reason or understanding.

In the treatise termed "Un Peu de Tout," we have a series of Essays, under the name of "Conversations." Those which bear on mental science are the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, On the Mind. The first "Conversation" is a light, spirited, and ingenious disquisition on the nature of mind, considered relatively to the body. Mind, the author tells us, does not mean an altogether spiritual thing, entirely unconnected with physical agencies. We must take the whole man, that is, body and mind together ; and then we shall have a correct idea of his whole, *as a thinking being*. Whatever theory we may adopt on the nature of mind in the abstract, we must 'still admit that it is under a considerable influence from material causes. This

is apparent in every moment of our lives, and in every situation in which we are placed.*

In the second and third "Conversations" the subject is continued; and the writer's aim is to show, that a very feasible theory of mind may be established from a consideration of physical agencies on the brain and nervous system generally. The subject is treated in a light and humorous strain, in good keeping with the title of "Conversations" which it bears.

The Dissertation in this volume on Analysis in Philosophy, is interesting. The author, as a matter of course, is in raptures with this faculty. He thinks it is capable of accounting for every thing appertaining to the human mind and to human knowledge. He does not, however, throw any additional light on the subject, beyond what Condillac has stated in his chapter on this intellectual power.

* "Considérons donc notre corps comme l'établissement total d'une grande manufacture, dont le chef représentera notre ame. Notre cerveau devient alors le département de la manufacture proprement dite, c'est-à-dire, des magasins, des ateliers, &c., et enfin de tout ce qui concerne, tant l'ouvrage, que la matière même à ouvrir; et cette matière n'est évidemment ici que nos idées primaires. Notre ame, en tant qu'elle préside à ce département particulier, est donc ce que nous nommons en nous *l'intellect*, ou l'être intelligent. Mais de même que le chef de cet établissement, tout en surveillant cette partie importante, ne néglige cependant pas l'entretien des bâtimens, le soin de sa cuisine, de ses écuries, et enfin de tous les accessoires; de même notre ame agit, quoique d'une manière différente, sur toutes nos autres facultés. Ainsi elle est sensible et irritable dans le siège de nos affections; elle digère dans notre estomac, &c.; parce qu'elle est essentiellement en nous le principe de vitalité, et que la vitalité n'est que l'ensemble de toutes ces diverses facultés."—(Un Peu de Tout, p. 6.).

PROFESSOR WYTTENBACH.

This author is chiefly known as a metaphysician from his opposition in Holland to Kant's theory, and his controversies on this subject with Van Hemert. Wytttenbach's opinions on the nature of the Kantian hypothesis, are contained in his "*Bibliotheca Critica*," 1809; a work which once enjoyed an extended reputation throughout the whole of Europe. It is generally affirmed by those who may be considered disinterested judges, that he had the worst of the conflict with Van Hemert; who, besides possessing a profound knowledge of Kant's doctrines, wielded a sharp controversial pen, and never failed to strengthen a weak argument by a liberal seasoning of sarcasm and ridicule. In one of the letters of Van Hemert, he accuses Wytttenbach of great ignorance of Kant's system. This gave great offence to Wytttenbach, who never forgave the insult.*

PROFESSOR LIEBAERT.

We have no metaphysical works from the pen of Professor Liebaert, but he is, nevertheless, entitled to a passing notice in the history of Belgian Philosophy. He filled the chair of Mental Science and Logic at the University of Louvain, during almost the whole period that Belgium was

* See M. Mohne, "*Epistolæ Sodalium Socraticorum Philomathie*," 1813.

under the government of France; and he was the principal expounder of what speculative opinions were taught throughout the whole country, during the existence of the Imperial dynasty. The Professor's text book was nothing more than a bare elementary work on Logic, entitled, "*Tractatus de Logica*," 1818. This small work is divided into two parts: the first treats on general and universal laws of thought; on ideas, judgment, and reason: and the second, on the different kinds of truth, and the various degrees of certainty which belong to each class.

IGNT. DENZINGER.

The author's two publications on Logic, "*Prima Lineamenta Logices*," 1818, and "*Compendium Logices*," 1823, contain some metaphysical maxims and views, but not of any great importance. The "*Compendium*" is the most philosophical in arrangement and matter. The third Chapter, on the Philosophy of Logic, and the fourth, on the History of Philosophy, may be read with advantage. They both display considerable reading, and an intimate acquaintance with various modern systems of intellectual science, both in Germany and France.

M. VAN MEENEN.

We have already mentioned that M. Van Meenen is one of the most acute and original

thinkers in Belgium, and we feel confident, when the reader peruses his "Lettre à M. Haumont," Brussels, 1818, he will coincide with this opinion. It would be difficult to find, in so small a compass, so much profound thought and general reading, published in any book of modern times. This "Lettre" is quite a philosophical gem, and reflects the highest honour on the mind of its author.

Independently of this publication, great praise is due to M. Van Meenen for the interest he has invariably manifested in the extension of mental science in his own country. Long before the establishment of the Universities of Belgium, in 1817, he took an active part in promoting a desire for mental studies among the young men with whom he became acquainted. And so enthusiastic was he in the cause of mental science, that he actually prepared, in 1825, a series of answers to every one of the philosophical propositions of M. Laromiguière in his "Leçons de Philosophie," and had them transmitted to the French philosopher at Paris, for his especial consideration.

The mental speculations of M. Van Meenen are directed against the leading tenets of Condillac's theory, as a whole, and the opinions of several of his commentators and supporters. The question which our author grapples with is, *that the senses are the origin of all our ideas*. This position, he affirms, has no foundation, in the sweeping sense in which the Abbé applied or understood it. M.

Van Meenen is deeply impressed with the mischievous tendency of the Abbé's hypothesis; and he even goes so far as to say, that Helvetius, and D'Holbach in his "*Système de la Nature*," were more frank and candid opponents, and better logicians, than the learned Abbé.*

There are some opinions of M. Van Meenen, which, to the English reader of metaphysical treatises in particular, may seem a little startling. In speaking of the real mental phenomena displayed in the process of reasoning, he conceives that no truth which requires arguments to support it, can be valid. If the proposition stated does not, by its own internal evidence, strike the understanding so as to command its assent, no arguments can ever effect this purpose. Arguments are necessary, M. Van Meenen affirms, to separate or disentangle falsehood from error, but not for the discovery or promulgation of truth; for truth is independent of us, and needs no extraneous assistance. We *feel* truth as it

* J'ai vécu une vingtaine d'années, comme tant d'autres, de la philosophie de Condillac, qui n'est, quoi qu'on en pense, ni celle de Locke, ni celle de Bacon : depuis que je me suis un peu rejeté du côté de la philosophie, moi, qui me suis imbu pendant ces vingt années de toute autre chose, je découvre tous les jours de plus en plus le vide et le néant de celle de cet écrivain et de son école ; et, je dirai plus, le danger et l'immoralité (car il ne faut pas s'y tromper, Helvétius et l'auteur du *Système de la Nature* même, n'ont été que plus francs, ou plus logiciens que Condillac.) Je la combattrai donc, si j'en suis capable, et si Dieu m'en fait la grâce. Si je n'avais qu'une hypothèse pour cela, j'aurais regret à la perdre."—(Lettre à M. Haumont, p. 11.)

were ; we have no occasion for learning it, either in morals, metaphysics, or even in social or political science. It is highly necessary to disengage the truth from the error with which it is incorporated ; to separate the pure metal from the base alloy : but when so separated, truth needs only to be presented to the mind, and we embrace it without any conditions or reserve whatever.*

The principle here laid down may, in a certain sense, be considered true ; and in another, erroneous. The author assumes truth as a fixed, unalterable *unity*, to which nothing can be added, and from which nothing can be deducted. But this theory is not without its difficulties, (as so profound a metaphysician as M. Van Meenen must know,) not merely of a speculative character, but also when considered relatively to practical life. There are many truths belonging to human nature

* “ Je regarde comme fausse, ou comme mal exposée, toute idée qu'il faut défendre par des arguments : si elle ne frappe pas par sa propre évidence, les arguments n'y aideront pas. Les arguments sont un levier dont on peut se servir utilement pour détruire le faux, non pour construire le vrai ; car le vrai ne se construit pas ; il est indépendamment de nous, malgré nous ; il ne s'agit que de le découvrir, et presque toujours que de le dégager des erreurs qui l'offusquent, pour qu'il se manifeste lui-même à quiconque ne se couvre pas les yeux du bandeau des passions. On le sent, on n'a pas besoin de l'apprendre, ni en morale, ni en métaphysique, ni même guère en politique : mais il faut désapprendre l'erreur, les erreurs si nombreuses qu'on prend pour de la science, parce qu'elles ont beaucoup coûté : *hoc opus, hic labor est*. Je sais bien que le tour d'esprit ou les préjugés de ceux à qui, ou pour qui, l'exposition se fait, y est pour beaucoup : mais il faut se mettre à leur portée.” (Lettre, p. 9.)

which require to be placed in certain positions before the mental eye, by a ratiocinative process, before it can detect them; and arguments, in this point of view, are certainly intellectual instruments of great importance and efficiency. If, however, M. Van Meenen simply means, that when truth is seen, it is instantly seized hold of, and recognised by the mind, as a thing possessing the character of absolute simplicity and unity, then his statements may be allowed to be sound enough. But as the author's observations now stand in his "Lettre," they are apt to be misconceived by the reader, and to give him an erroneous impression as to the nature of truth generally, and of those means or instruments we have of unfolding and promulgating it.

I think, with M. Van Meenen, that the real source of the main portion of error in Condillac's theory, arises from his notions as to the power of *abstraction*. The Belgian philosopher clearly proves to actual demonstration, that, from the Abbé's definition of it, we can never account for any of our general conceptions. The analytical process of the sensational hypothesis, can lead the mind only from one particular thing, attribute, essence, or quality, to another; but can never furnish us with aggregate or general notions, which seem to be the life-spring of all intellectual action and reasoning. M. Van Meenen presses this weak and faulty part of the French theory with so much force, and in so truly logical a manner, that he makes it appear as one of the

most shallow and ridiculous systems that ever occupied the attention of philosophers.

The question is not, as M. Van Meenen justly observes, *how we acquire* general notions, but *if we have them*; and if so, do we derive them solely from the senses? In answer to this question, he enters into a lengthened discussion, which our limited space will not allow us to embody, but the perusal of which will afford the reader much useful instruction. The chief point which M. Van Meenen here insists upon is, that all our important ideas of Deity, of mind, of causation, of personality, of duty, of obligation, of right and wrong, and many others, are altogether inexplicable on Condillac's theory of the nature and process of the power of abstraction.*

M. Van Meenen proceeds in his speculations to show, that in matters relative to reasoning or judgment, the French system is lamentably inadequate to afford any thing like a plausible solution. All judgments rest ultimately upon the internal feeling of consciousness, which is denominated by some philosophers by the term *common sense*.†

* See particularly, "Lettre," Edit. Brussels, 1840, pp. 19, 20, 22, 25, 35, 38.

† "La certitude de nos jugemens repose sur la base irréfragable pour chacun de nous, de *notre conscience*, que les uns nomment *sens intime*, les autres *sens commun*. C'est là notre critère de la vérité, ou du moins le pivot de notre certitude: car nous n'avons que de la *certitude*; nous ne l'avons elle-même, que parce que nous nous sommes *conscients de l'impuissance de douter*." * * * "Toute proposition énonce un jugement de l'esprit; tout jugement exprime un rapport, ou perçu ou conclu, entre deux idées. Le jugement *pensé* est la *vision* du rapport entre les

For M. Van Meenen's observations on the nature of language as an instrument of thought, and of moral and religious truths, we must refer the reader to his admirable little work. He will find that our philosopher probes to the bottom all our conceptions and ideas on those interesting subjects, and places them on their true and philosophical basis.

M. Van Meenen has just written an important "Essay," upon the Statistics of Morals, published in the "Mémoires de l'Académie Royale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-arts de Belgique," 1848. This paper was communicated to the Society, in conjunction with another from M. de Decker relative to the nature and importance of M. Quetelet's "Statistique Morale, et les Principes qui doivent en former la Base," which had been formally read to the members of this learned body. M. Van Meenen's "Essay" or "Report" is a beautiful piece of philosophical discrimination; and all who feel interested in these peculiar studies, must, we are confident, peruse his observations and reasonings with much pleasure.

deux idées ; vision qui est instantanée, indivisible ; qui suppose bien les deux idées senties, souvenues, imaginées, perçues, conclues, il n'importe comment, ni depuis quand, ni où, ni pourquoi : mais qui ne suppose absolument rien de plus. Mais, pour *parler le jugement pensé*, soit qu'on ne veuille le parler que pour s'en assurer la possession, le rappel, et même la vérification, ou pour le communiquer aux autres, il faut *l'exprimer* ; et on ne peut *l'exprimer*, si on ne nomme les deux termes du rapport, en même temps qu'on énonce le rapport."—(Lettre, &c., pp. 46. 84.

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A. 'F. M. D'ELHOUNGNE.

This author, a member of the legal profession, published a work of considerable merit, entitled "Dissertation sur le Principe Fondamental du Droit de Punir," 1822. The mental and philosophical principles on which rewards and punishments are grounded, are treated of in the Introduction, and in the first two sections of the work, in a general but distinct manner. The author's publication has been followed in Belgium, in latter years, by several others upon the same subject; all of which show a profound knowledge of the leading principles by which the civil and criminal codes of nations should be guided.

FRAN. MICH. NOEL.

The author's small treatise entitled "Dissertatio Inauguralis Medica de Facultatibus Intellectus," 1825, is connected with physiological studies. M. Noël does not, however, show any decided inclination to materialise the mind; on the contrary, he is anxious that we should hold the balance of evidence fairly between material agencies and intellectual facts. He says that all candid physiologists maintain the *unity* of the thinking principle, but entertain various opinions as to its locality; some placing it in one part of the nervous system, and some in another.*

* Dissertatio, p. 17.

GUEDON DE BERCHERE.

This gentleman belongs to the legal profession in Brussels, and is favourably known as the translator of a part of Locke's celebrated "Essay;" that portion of it which relates to the conduct of the understanding. The translation bears the date of 1826, and appears to have been executed with great care, and scrupulous fidelity to the original.

J. G. OTTEMA.

M. Ottema's work, "*Commentatio ad Quæstionem Literariam, Propositam ab ordine Philos. in Acad. Lovaniensi; Exponatur, Quænam fuerint in Tractanda Philosophia Francisci Hemsterhuisii Merita,*" 1827, was written at the suggestion of the University of Louvain. The author points out all the essential parts in Hemsterhuis' philosophy, and shows their bearings on important doctrines. It is an elaborate and scientific work; but as the Dutch philosopher's speculations have already come before us, we are precluded from entering farther into their nature and merits, or into the able work of M. Ottema.*

BARON REIFFENBERG.

Baron Reiffenberg† is one of the most erudite

* See ante, Vol. 3, p. 529.

† "*De la Direction Actuellement Nécessaire aux Etudes Philosophiques,*" 1828; "*Eclecticisme, ou Premier Principe de Philosophie Générale,*" 1828; "*Principes de Logique,*" 1833.

philosophers of Belgium, and a voluminous writer on many subjects apart from mental philosophy.

The Baron is a zealous and able advocate of the eclectic philosophy, and considers it as the only scientific mode of successfully prosecuting inquiries into the phenomena of the thinking principle. He looks upon the eclectic method of all sciences as based upon the plainest suggestions of the mind, and the most obvious and common-sense views of the end or purpose of all human knowledge. It is that method which mankind follow in every movement and in every simple transaction of life. To cull out, to select, to set apart, what is obvious, indisputable, uncontradicted, certain, is only to give exercise to one of the most early and elementary functions of the intellect.

Philosophy, in its comprehensive meaning, the Baron divides into four parts. 1st, Sensibility, or the generation of the faculties of the understanding and will, which embraces psychology. 2nd, The products of the understanding, which properly appertain to metaphysics. 3rd, The products of the will, or moral determinations, which constitute ethics. And 4th, The rational forms and methods by which we arrange our knowledge and impart it to others; which forms and methods, when embodied into one whole, make that which we denominate logic.

The psychology of the author embraces then the faculties of the mind and the voluntary powers. He prefaces his disquisitions on this branch of his subject with many acute observations and statements, as to the true starting point of psycho-

logical speculations, the *à priori* laws of human thought, the passive and active nature of mind, and the various theories, both ancient and modern, which have been devised with a view to explain the reciprocal influence which exists between thought and matter.

Under the division of sensibility, the author treats of consciousness, attention, memory, comparison and judgment, imagination and reason.

On the nature of the moral faculty, the Baron maintains, that all responsibility depends upon the liberty of the will. He argues this succinctly but forcibly. Necessity in every shape and form is inimical to sound knowledge and rational discussion.

Logic consists, according to Baron Reiffenberg's definition of it, in a right use of the faculties of the soul, in accordance with certain mental laws. It is an instrument for the discovery and promulgation of truth.* All reasoning is a perception of a relation between two judgments. Every judgment is a perception of a relation between two ideas. Logic is divided into four great parts; the idea, judgment, reasoning, and method.

M. HAUMONT.

The metaphysical tracts of M. Haumont, "Discours sur Les Arts et Les Sciences en Général, et sur leur Langue en Particulier," 1828; and "Discours sur Les Systèmes," 1828, attracted some attention among the philosophers of Belgium.

* Psychologie, pp. 2. 29.

They are both interesting publications; and the chief aim of the first "Discourse" is to shew the influence of language upon the general current of mental speculation. The author seems to coincide with the leading principles of Condillac's philosophy, on the nature and influence of language. The second "Discourse" of M. Haumont relates to Systems of Speculation. These he conceives are generally pernicious, and retard the progress of real knowledge. We think that M. Haumont draws too sombre a picture of the pernicious influence of systems. Theories may be greatly abused, but they are not without their use in the general march of science.

LOUIS JOSEPH DEHAUT.

This learned gentleman was one of the Professors at the University of Ghent, and a metaphysical writer of great profundity and extensive attainments. He died a few years ago. The only published work we have on mental science, is his translation of Ammonius Saccas, and an introduction on the nature of his doctrines. The author wrote a treatise, at the request of the University of Louvain, on the existence, immateriality, and immortality of the soul, which obtained the chief prize of the gold medal. This has been considered by some philosophers, unconnected with the University, to be a remarkably able work; so much so, that in 1845, when M. Van de Weyer, the present Belgian minister in this country, was one of the members of the Administration at Brussels, as Minister of the

Interior, a proposition was made to the family of Professor Dehaut to publish this important treatise at the public expense.

SYLVAIN VAN DE WEYER.

M. Van de Weyer,* now Belgian Minister at the Court of Great Britain, received his education at the University of Louvain, where he became a very early proficient in philosophical studies. He was highly favoured in obtaining the instructions of M. Van Meenen; and our author soon entered with all the zeal and enthusiasm of his youthful mind into every plan and suggestion of his master, for the successful prosecution and extension of mental science. As we have already noticed,† M. Van de Weyer edited, whilst scarcely of age, the whole philosophical works of Hemsterhuis; and displayed such consummate ability in the task, that his philosophical reputation, strengthened as it has been by subsequent speculations, is now well known beyond the limits of his own country.‡

* "Dissertation sur le Devoir;" "Discours sur l'Histoire de la Philosophie;" 1827. "Essai sur le Livre de M. Jacotot, intitulé Enseignement Universel, &c.," 1823. "Opuscules de Morale." "Coup d'œil sur la Philosophie d'Hemsterhuis."

† See ante, vol. 3, pp. 94. 526.

‡ "Enfin le Professeur auquel fut confiée la chaire nouvelle, (Bruxelles) se trouva précisément l'homme le plus capable d'en tirer le meilleur parti, M. Sylvain Van de Weyer, l'élève et l'ami de M. Van Meenen, l'éditeur d'Hemsterhuis, dont le zèle connu et le talent remarquable d'élocution étaient tout-à-fait propres à inspirer et répandre le goût de la Philosophie."—(Cousin, "De la Philosophie en Belgique," 1830, p. 142.)

The author commences his "Discourse," by defending the value and importance of mental philosophy, and by especially pointing out its utility in successfully prosecuting many other branches of knowledge. He shows that the same reasons for calling in question the usefulness of mental science, commonly brought forward at the present time, are precisely those which have been the captious instruments in the hands of a vociferous, but small class of philosophical declaimers, from the earliest records of speculation.

The author places philosophy on an elevated position; all his ideas of it are grand and interesting. Nature and her laws; God and His attributes; these are the fundamental principles of all sound speculative science. It is, by virtue of its intrinsic excellence, entitled to take precedence over all others. Shall a classification of animals, of plants, of insects, of minerals, be termed a science; and yet the human mind, with all its splendid powers and faculties; a type of the Divine mind; the instrument of all knowledge; the real source of all scientific truth; be disregarded, or placed in a subordinate station in our estimation? This were indeed to make a perverse and retrograde movement, and to run counter to the plainest dictates and instincts of nature.*

It may be considered as almost a demonstrative

* "Quoi! l'art de décrire et de classer les animaux, les plantes et les minéraux; l'art de composer, de décomposer les corps, et de manipuler la matière, seraient des sciences; et l'étude de l'homme et de son esprit,

truth, that every thing which is true in human nature has already been matter of observation and philosophical remark. Instead, therefore, of setting out in our speculative career with a view of discovering new regions, we should employ ourselves in reconciling the real and apparent contradictions which are to be found among many systems, and to bring their leading principles into something approaching to a harmonious and logical unity. Such labours would prove both interesting and beneficial. We should soon perceive that many theories of mind are separated by apparent rather than real differences; and that when we come to abstract the generally admitted truths on each side, arrange them in proper order, rejecting the false and setting aside the irrelevant or unimportant, there is a much greater unanimity of opinion among philosophers than is commonly imagined. Contradictions relative to general principles would be found to have almost no existence whatever.

M. Van de Weyer defines philosophy to be the science of wisdom. It has man for its object; and by judicious and circumspect observations, it discovers in his actions certain general and universal rules; and in his thoughts certain fundamental principles of truth; and philosophy places all these

de cet esprit, créateur de toutes ces sciences, qui, dans son insatiable activité et sa vaste étendue, embrasse l'univers, interroge le passé, sonde l'avenir; l'étude de l'homme comme être pensant, comme être moral, comme être religieux, n'en serait pas une !!!" (Discours sur l'Histoire de la Philosophie, p. 15.)

in the individual consciousness, or in that which all men feel and practise. It assumes, then, the shape of a science, or collection of rules or principles, embracing all that men know and do; though the knowledge may be vague, and the actions apparently merely the result of habit or instinct. Philosophy, in fact, theorises, or systematises all human action and thought; and simply clothes in a more imposing and fascinating garb the every-day and popular truths and ideas current among mankind. The philosopher takes his departure from the internal feelings of man; tests the truths which lie buried in the depths of the consciousness, by observation and rules of thought; and thus moulds into the form and rank of a science the whole phenomena of human nature. Philosophy is not, therefore, a purely speculative or abstract science; but is founded on the practical results of the actions of mankind in all ages and conditions of life.

Humanity speaks, and philosophy listens; men act, and it observes. It rests, therefore, on consciousness; and the truths developed from this source are denominated by the phrase or term *common sense*. This is the light which guides us in all our philosophical inquiries. From the earliest records of time, and following the course of human events with the light of history, throughout all their diversified aspects, we everywhere recognise the principles of common sense, as universal elements of human thought and action. No violence can suppress, no sophisms obscure them. They

steadily and unerringly guide us through the revolutions and destruction of nations and empires. The eye pierces with rapid glance through the long vista of ages, amid the sanguinary conflicts, the territorial aggrandisements, and chequered fortunes of states and kingdoms; and from the wreck of all that is debasing, glorious, or powerful, we still recognise the great and universal truths of humanity. One generation passes away after another, but they remain for ever the same. They are the life-blood of human nature; the intellectual air we breathe. Without them society could not for a single hour exist; governments, laws, institutions, religion, the manners and customs of men, bear the indelible imprint of their universality and indestructibility. They are revealed in the daily and hourly actions, thoughts, and speech of all men; and must ever form the basis of all systems of philosophy; for without them it can only be a phantom, a delusion, an unmeaning assemblage of words.*

The existence and perpetuity of these universal principles of common-sense, constitute, therefore, a great fact, with which it is the province of philosophy to deal. Its proper office is to recognise these elementary and primary truths, to classify them, to analyse and explain them, and to show their utility and bearings on the vital interests and happiness of men.†

* Discours, &c., pp. 24. 24. 26.

† “ L’office propre de la philosophie est donc de reconnaître ces vérités, de les classer, de les expliquer, de les juger. et d’établir que, si

The author tells us, however, that the history of philosophy is not to be identified with a chronological or genealogical classification of human events, manners, customs, or opinions. It has a more profound origin and purpose. It comprehends the history of the human mind relative to those branches of knowledge which we term philosophical. These constitute a multitude of rules, principles, and facts, in relation to man as a feeling, a thinking being, and one endowed with voluntary power or agency ; or the philosophy of human nature may be considered as embracing the physical, intellectual, and moral powers of our race. We are not, however, to consider the history of philosophy as constituting a bare record of speculative notions, or the real or supposed causes of them. It is true, that systems of philosophy have often been the mere creations of times and circumstances, and sometimes have been manifested as causes and sometimes as effects ; and in this point of view their development may form a part of the history of philosophy, but by no means its foundation. This rests upon the

elles sont la vie de l'humanité, elles sont aussi la lumière qui éclaire tout homme venant au monde ; qu'elles brillent et se révèlent dans toute action raisonnable, dans toute pensée juste ; qu'en interrogeant le sens intérieur, guide de nos jugements, et qui sert à reconnaître et à constater ces vérités, on apprend qu'on ne peut les rejeter sans se dépouiller de la qualité d'homme ; qu'on les adopte et qu'on les met en pratique, lors même qu'on les nie en théorie, c'est-à-dire, que, quel que soit le système de philosophie que l'on suive, les vérités du sens commun sont toujours, dans le commerce de la vie, le guide de nos actions, la règle de nos jugements, la lumière de nos pensées, la vie de notre intelligence." (Discours sur l'Histoire de la Philosophie, p. 29.)

entire of humanity as developed in all times, places, circumstances, thought, and action.

M. Van de Weyer proceeds then to show what has been the history of philosophy, and what influence it has exercised over the general interests of humanity.

On this portion of the "Discourse," we are compelled to be brief. Man is to be viewed in all his relations, both theoretically and practically. Whatever appertains to universal humanity, whether appearing under an explicit or implicit form, must be taken as the only real foundation for the principles of *common sense* or reason.

Now if we look into human nature with any degree of care and philosophical skill, and can compare facts with the history of speculative opinions among our race, we shall perceive that there are certain general truths which have been rallying points for the reasoning powers of men in all ages of the world, and which are at the present moment exercising the same power and influence over the ordinary and abstract conceptions and conclusions of reason among all classes of men. These rallying points, or elementary principles, though not numerous, are nevertheless comprehensive. We may enumerate the firm conviction of our own individual existence; the existence of an external world around us; the reciprocal intercourse which subsists between both; the general powers of recognising what is true, beautiful, and good; our notions of freedom or voluntary power; of moral duties and obligations; of justice and

injustice ; of merit and demerit ; of the dignity or worth of human nature ; of the belief in the general stability of the laws of nature ; of the ideas or conceptions of a Deity ; of the immortality of the human soul ; and of religious sentiments, feelings, and duties. These may be considered as forming the staple ingredients of man, as an intellectual and moral being.

The history of philosophy embraces, therefore, a consideration of all these important elements of man's inward frame. It must refer to their origin, to their mutual relations, their influences on the every-day movements and sentiments of mankind ; and, in fact, to all those springs and principles, from which thought, reasoning, sentiment, and feeling take their rise.

In M. Van de Weyer's "Dissertation" on duty or obligation, many excellent thoughts and observations will be found ; for he makes the whole of our ideas of obligation rest upon the *à priori* conceptions of the mind. Nothing can overturn the arguments he adduces, nor the learned authorities he cites. He examines with great acuteness the chief principles of Bentham's theory of Utility, and shows its logical defects. On this point the following remarks are strikingly conclusive and forcible. "To manifest the radical imperfections of this theory, let us cast our eye, for a moment, on man in the exercise of his active moral powers. We see him daily placed, in every moment of his life, amidst a crowd of domestic duties, the obligations arising from civil intercourse, from the rela-

tions of a family, the offices of friendship, and the duties springing out of his social connections; from all of which conditions and states there arises an urgent necessity for prompt and energetic action. How then, may we ask, is it possible, that before he could in any given case discharge a single duty, he could enter into cold and refined calculations as to the greatest good to be obtained? Besides, even supposing the possibility of such a refined and subtile power of balancing contingent benefits, would it not be necessary, from innumerable comparisons of relative interests, that there should be some uniform and active principle, always ready to perform its office, in all such pressing emergencies? That the greatest good or happiness principle of the Utilitarians is insufficient for such a purpose, must be evident to the plainest understanding.”*

Many of the important principles of mental science are discussed in M. Van de Weyer's "Essay" on the book of M. Jacotot, who maintains that all men are of equal intellectual capacity. This position, M. Van de Weyer shows, has not the slightest foundation. On the nature of language, as a philosophical instrument of thought, and on the power of generalizing our observations, M. Jacotot makes many statements, the incorrectness of which his acute adversary has not failed to point out. M. Jacotot has also favoured us with several opinions on the philosophy of Kant, which his critic has shown are grounded upon an entire misconception of the system of the Philo-

* Dissertation, p. 51.

sopher of Königsberg. What M. Jacotot has stated in reference to the nature of mathematical evidence, falls, in like manner, under the animadversion of M. Van de Weyer.*

Among M. Van de Weyer's "Opuscules de Morale," are many small dissertations on subjects of great practical importance and interest. They all display remarkable acuteness, and a thorough knowledge of the human heart. His "Moyen Facile et Economique d'Être Bienfaisant," is a beautiful fragment; and his "Pensées Diverses," are a series of condensed thoughts and maxims full of point and sententious wisdom. "The Art of Saying No," is an Essay showing how much of our moral greatness, worth, usefulness, and happiness depends upon a course of *self-denial* in reference to our passions, desires, appetites, amusements, and recreations. An "Essay on Silence" points out the utility of keeping our loquaciousness within due bounds, and of cultivating a mental habit of inward thought and contemplation. The author illustrates his positions by many happy references to the practice and recommendations of some of the ancient sects of philosophers as to the benefits to be derived from silence; and particularly to the institutions of chivalry, which, among many other things, rigidly enforced numerous rules for the repression of idle or unprofitable conversation. "The Art of being Ill," shows how the mind and moral feelings and sentiments are affected by the physical ailments of the body; and that a certain

* See "Essai," &c. pp. 34, 40, 58, 63, 64.

prescribed moral regimen is requisite for such diseased action. An "Essay on the Dangers of Reading Plutarch," has an especial reference to the influence of warlike and a species of theatrical virtues on the minds of youth. M. Van de Weyer conceives that the perusal of such characters as are sketched by Plutarch, is apt to impart to a young man an erroneous view of moral duty and obligation, and to inspire him, in the outset of life, with an ambition of being a great, rather than a good and useful, member of society.

JEAN HERMAN JANSSENS.

This metaphysical writer belongs to the Clerical body, and was once Professor at the University of Louvain. He is the author of several treatises on mental science, written in the Latin language, one of which I have only seen, and then for so limited a period as not to afford me a sufficient opportunity to speak of its contents. The French names of these works are as follows: "Prolégomènes de la Philosophie, et Anthropologie Somatologique et Psychologique;" "Logique;" "Métaphysique Générale;" "Métaphysique Particulière;" and "Philosophie Morale."

ABBE G. MOENS.

The Abbé's publication "Revue du St. Simonisme, ou Réfutation de la Doctrine de St. Simon," 1832, is, as its name imports, a formal

refutation of the opinions of St. Simon, whose notions are developed in another part of this volume.* It would appear that, after the French Revolution of 1830, the St. Simonians undertook an excursion into Belgium, for the purpose of extending their opinions among the people of that country. The heads of the sect lectured at some of the chief towns, and circulated an immense number of tracts, which gave a brief but very flattering account of their system. The Clergy became alarmed at the introduction and dissemination of such tenets; and the consequence was that the worthy and pious Abbé Moens took up his pen, and, under the deep impression of religious duty, entered into a full and lengthened refutation, in two volumes, of all the chief principles embodied in the creed of the fanatic and deluded sectarians.

As the views of the St. Simonians, though grounded on certain general metaphysical notions, have a direct reference to social and political objects, they do not necessarily fall under the range of our discussions. We shall merely notice, therefore, that the reader will find the Abbé Moens an able reasoner on the doctrines he has undertaken to refute, and one who has made himself fully acquainted with every argument which his antagonists have brought forward in support of their system.

* See p. 290.

LE COMTE HENRI DE MERODE, AND
LE MARQUIS DE BEAUFFORT.

These are members of two of the oldest and most honourable families in Belgium, and joint authors of a work entitled "De L'Esprit de Vie, et de L'Esprit de Mort," 1833, which has attracted considerable attention among a certain class of philosophers on the Continent. The metaphysical principles incorporated in this treatise are those which belong to the "Ecole Théologique;" but their application is, in this instance, characterised by such an originality of plan and conception, as to entitle them to a specific though brief notice.

The grand object of the work is to repress the doctrines of philosophical rationalism, and to place the elements of pure and refined Christianity in their stead; but this object is developed in so novel a manner, and the reasonings which the authors bring forward to support their views are so plausible, and urged with such an ardent and zealous spirit, that we hope the reader will not consider his patience too severely taxed by a short but necessarily inadequate notice of them.

The idea of Deity is everywhere; and all truth, beauty, and goodness centre in Him. All created and finite beings, which are emanations of the Eternal, can only realize their felicity and perfection in reposing on Him. Finite creations must all necessarily be imperfect, and from this a principle of evil and disorder originates; but how, or

in what manner, is one of the mysteries we are not allowed to look into. The existence of the two principles of good and evil is, however, attested by the unanimous voice of history, as well as by everyday experience. But there is a great difference not only in the nature and objects of the two principles, but also in their original vigour and intensity of operation. Man, in every state of being, recognises the existence and attributes of Deity; they have a firm hold of his affections; he is perpetually panting after happiness, and truth, and goodness, and beauty. These have never ceased, since his appearance on earth, to be the especial objects of his esteem, admiration, and desire. All his movements, all his energies, all his hopes are centred in their acquisition. Not so with the evil principle. It is the exception to the rule; it assumes the character of an isolated obstacle and accidental hindrance, rather than a regular constituted creation. It is not an object relished, sought after, desired, or enjoyed for its own sake. Its nature is innately repulsive, ungenial, forbidden, and repugnant; its fruit, wrath, bitterness, misery, and death. Man invariably searches for good, and avoids evil.

Now there are three leading principles which impel him to action, and regulate all his movements; the theological principle, the social principle, and the intellectual or literary principle. These must all act in harmony with each other, or man's happiness cannot be promoted or secured. The latter is the active principle, which excites derangement in the other two. When it is de-

veloped in a mode or manner not in unison with the theological and social principles, then vice, error, and misery are the inevitable result, both to states and to individuals. Speculative error is just as pernicious as practical error. It is as much the duty and interest of individuals and communities to think right, as to act right. The evidence of a want of harmony among the three great principles of human thought and action is, when the intellectual powers pursue such a course as to diminish the influence and cramp the operation of the theological principle. This opposition or incongruity may assume many different aspects, and be characterised by many different degrees of error.

In the history of mankind, we find nations and individuals suffering under various degrees of vice and misery, in proportion as the derangement between the intellectual and theological principles has been more or less violent and antagonistic. We find in the ancient world disorder and wickedness prevalent, to an almost incurable extent. The Roman Government, until the introduction of Christianity, was one huge mass of iniquity, cruelty, and injustice. When the theological principle was recognised in Christianity, we perceive a great and decided change for the better. And throughout the whole range of European history we find, that when the intellectual and the religious principles have been in harmonious action with each other, a corresponding and beneficial change in the general state of society has been recognised as the infallible consequence. When the mind of man attempts to govern the

affairs of the world, without reference to the inherent principle of theological truth, then it is that he falls into all manner of errors, both speculative and practical; and produces miseries of revolting intensity and number.

The question then comes to this point. We cannot cultivate knowledge and science beneficially, without the assistance and co-operation of religious principles and instruction. The authors of the "*Esprit de Vie*," maintain that this position is established by the most powerful and irrefragable evidence; nothing short of the evidence of the senses, and the universal experience of mankind. The Church is the true conservative principle of human society; and every means of instruction, both public and private, of whatever nature it may be, and whatever purpose it be destined to promote, ought to be based upon its doctrines, its rituals, and its decisions.*

L. A. GRUYER.

This Belgian author† is rapidly gaining distinc-

* "*L'Eglise, douée d'une immortelle sagesse, possède toujours des moyens de salut pour toutes les situations de l'âme et de la société, et si les hommes éclairés par l'expérience et les malheurs, et par les développemens qu'une saine philosophie donne aux vérités religieuses, s'offraient à son action réparatrice, nous n'hésitons pas à le dire, le monde, rajeuni par cette puissance bienfaisante, s'avancerait vers de nouvelles et glorieuses destinées.*"—(*De l'Esprit de Vie*, p. 261.)

† "*Essais Philosophiques*," 1832; "*Tablettes Philosophiques*," 1842; "*Des Causes Conditionnelles et Productrices des Idées, ou de l'Enseignement naturel des propriétés et des phénomènes de l'âme*," 1844; "*Principes de Philosophie Physique*," 1845. "*Méditations Critiques, ou Examen Approfondi de Plusieurs Doctrines sur l'Homme et sur Dieu*," Paris, 1847.

tion and honour, not only in his own country, but in neighbouring nations, for the number and excellency of his philosophical works.

His "*Essais Philosophiques*" contain a great body of metaphysical speculation. In the first and second volumes we have the general principles of metaphysics treated of under the three-fold division, of external bodies, the faculties of the soul, and a sketch of the philosophy of Descartes. Under the second head, of the faculties of the soul, the author has furnished us with more than thirty distinct dissertations. The principles of Descartes are developed with great clearness and faithfulness. In the third volume, we have the properties of external bodies treated of, considered in relation to the sensations we experience from their action on the senses; and in addition to these matters, we have the opinions of all the most distinguished ancient philosophers, on the nature of first causes, and on an universal ether. The fourth volume is devoted to the consideration of method, the principles of certainty, and the existence and attributes of the Deity.

The treatise "*Des Causes Conditionelles*" of M. Gruyer, is entitled to profound consideration. It embraces matters of great moment and complexity. We have here dissertations on conditional causes; on the properties of the soul; on the faculty of thinking; on the metaphysical system of Laromiguière; on the Cartesian philosophy; on essence, substance, time, infinity, efficient

causes, innate ideas, the system of Kant, and extracts from his works.

In a work of this kind and extent, comprehending so many topics fruitful of discussion, we cannot pretend to offer even a general outline. We can merely state that M. Gruyer refers all intellectual phenomena to two causes; the one external, which he denominates *efficient*; and the other internal, which is called *conditional*. This division branches out into many ramifications.

M. Gruyer's treatise, "*Principes de Philosophie Physique*," displays his philosophical skill to great advantage. We refer the reader to what he says, in the first part, on extension, impenetrability, atoms, and body. There are many original and interesting speculations scattered throughout this portion of the work. The second part is devoted to the consideration of motion.*

The "*Méditations*" contain many valuable critiques, not only upon several writers and their respective theories, but also on various subjects; such as, Final Causes, Creation, the Beautiful, Liberty and Necessity, and many others. These critiques are conducted in an enlightened spirit, and with a complete command over the grand and prominent points of controversial interest.

These "*Méditations*" give a very favourable view of M. Gruyer's original powers as a metaphysical writer. They abound with acute and striking thoughts and happy illustrations. They

* The reader will find many interesting remarks on the views of M. Gruyer in M. Tissot's "*Observations Critiques*."

grapple likewise with many of the most profound, but as yet unsolved, problems in the science of mind. The Essays on Moral Necessity, Free-will, the Spontaneous Activity of Mind and Motives to Action, are beautifully arranged, and the question in each Essay is stated with great clearness and conciseness. There is, however, a fault in M. Gruyer as a writer. He is a little too captious or hypercritical in his definitions of philosophical terms; and it is from this cause that he seems betimes to labour under a conception that he is demolishing an antagonist's argument, when, in reality, he is only showing the imperfect meaning of his opponent's terms. M. Gruyer sometimes fails to perceive, that the strength of an argument often lies solely in the discordant or incongruous nature of certain ideas, and not in the verbal or formal drapery in which it is clothed. Such incongruities often arise in reference to questions in mental science. And its history furnishes innumerable instances of writers undertaking the solution of difficult problems, through the means of instituting what they considered a more correct definition of terms. In following their lucubrations, we become for the moment enamoured with their remarkable acuteness in detecting the imperfections of the current phraseology on the question, and the precision and aptness of their own language; but we soon perceive the delusion. They go on defining and defining till the new definitions become more cumbersome or incomprehensible than the old, or until we discover that they

have landed us at precisely the same spot from whence we took our departure. The fact is, that many questions relative to the nature and operations of the thinking principle are difficult of solution, from the antagonistic or incongruous complexion of certain *à priori* conceptions. These are to be found in every branch of human knowledge ; but in greater number in the science of mind ; inasmuch as it professes to be the source of all our ideas and notions of every subject of inquiry. These contrary conceptions are not to be rendered harmonious, or explained away by mere verbal definitions ; which are of themselves unquestionably necessary and useful, but often imperfect and unsatisfactory, things. Ideas are what we have to deal with in purely abstract questions. We often labour long and arduously in clearing away what we think the verbiage of imperfect or barbarous terms ; and yet, after all, experience the mortification of perceiving that the logical object of which we are in search still eludes our grasp, and that our critical exertions and ingenuity have been thrown away.

CHARLES MARTIN FRIEDLANDER.

Dr. Friedlander is one of the savans of Brussels, and a metaphysician of some reputation. He has written on the systems of Broussais and Cousin ; and there is also a treatise of his entitled "*Lebens Philosophie*," 1833, which I have not had the opportunity of perusing.

M. NIEWENHUIS.

This is one of the most profound philosophers of Holland; a man of great learning, and talents of a high order. His "*Initia Philosophiæ Theoreticæ*," 2 vols. 1833, I have not seen; but it is considered by many able critics to be a first-rate performance.

The "*Commentatio de Renati Cartesii, &c.*" 1828, is a valuable work of Nieuwenhuis. It contains a very accurate and minute account of the progress of the Cartesian philosophy in Holland and Belgium, and of the successes and obstacles it met with in particular districts of these countries. There is also a reference to all the most distinguished philosophers of the day in the northern parts of Europe, with whom Descartes kept up a general correspondence. This makes the "*Commentatio*" an interesting and useful book for the philosophical historian.

P. F. XAV. DE RAM.

This author is one of the most learned theologians in Belgium, and belongs to the theological school of metaphysics. His "*Historia Philosophiæ*," 1834, is a respectable publication, and contains a very useful summary of the ancient systems of speculation, from the earliest ages to the establishment of the Christian dispensation. There is, appended to the history, an Exposition of the

Philosophical Systems of India, written in the French language.

W. VAN HEUSDE.

Van Heusde* is an author of great learning and talents. His reputation is not confined to his own country; his works are tolerably well known in Germany, France, and even in England.

In the first volume of Van Heusde's "Initia," he enters very fully into the nature of the ancient Grecian system of philosophy; shows its chief bearings on important doctrines; and winds up his reflections by many profound and sagacious observations. The second volume contains all the metaphysical works of Plato, as well as those in reference to dialectics. In the third volume the politics of Plato are discussed and developed, and many excellent remarks made upon the important questions which the Grecian sage discusses.

Van Heusde's work, "The Socratic School of Philosophy for the Nineteenth Century," is considered in Holland and Belgium a useful and valuable production. It has been highly praised by some learned critics.

In this publication the author gives us, in the first place, those arts which are more immediately connected with feeling or general sensibility; such

* "De Socratische School of Wijsgeerte, voor de Negentiende Eeuw," Utrecht, 1834; "Initia Philosophiæ Platoniciæ," 1831.

as poetry, the fine arts, &c. In the second part, we have the nature of scientific truth pointed out, in various chapters of the book. The author asks, What is logic ? It is the art of communicating knowledge according to the principles of sound reason ; and is not to be confounded with the dialectics of the schools.* The author then treats at some length of the connection of arts and general knowledge in relation to man's internal recognitions of truth. This he considers the most important part of his work. The beautiful and the true are indissolubly connected ; and both have such a relation to the human mind as to promote the gradual but certain progress of knowledge among all mankind.

In the second volume, the principles of natural theology and of morals are discussed ; and their relation with other branches of human knowledge succinctly pointed out.

ADOLPHE QUETELET.

M. Quetelet is Director of the Royal Observatory at Brussels, and a voluminous writer on many topics of physical science. He has of late years directed his attention to matters connected with the principles of morals, with a view to ascertaining their bearing upon questions of social philosophy. His treatise "Sur l'Homme

* De Socratische School, vol. 1, p. 281.

et le développement de ses facultés, ou *Essai de Physique Sociale*," 1835, is written with this aim.

The author has entered into some practical details under the title of "*Sur la Statistique Morale*," in illustration of several of the principles contained in his work on *Man*. These details have come before the "*Académie Royale*" of Brussels, and were published in the volume of their *Transactions* for 1848. As the subject of which the author here treats lies beyond our sphere of inquiry, we shall merely refer the reader to the statements contained in the volume just mentioned. They will be found to be curious and interesting.

In M. Quetelet's recent publication, "*Du Système Social et des Lois qui le régissent*," Paris, 1848, the moral and intellectual powers of man are considered in relation to his social and political condition; not in a metaphysical point of view, or in their relations to pure abstract ideas or principles. The most interesting portion of the volume to the metaphysician, is the third chapter of the third book, which treats of the development of the intellectual faculties. The author has here started an important question, not as to the operations or powers of the mind, abstractly considered, but as to their practical development in particular sciences and arts, and at particular periods of life. He gives us several examples of remarkable precociousness of intellect, both in science and in

art; but these are evidently only exceptions to the general rule. The author has taken only one view of this question; we shall take the liberty of laying another before him, of some importance, as to the practical education or improvement of man; and curious in itself, as connected with those general laws which govern the mental economy. The comprehensive and important faculties of the mind, such as reasoning, judging, &c., are, in all men, of *slow growth*, compared with some other of our faculties. An individual examination of the most distinguished men of all nations, who have directed their concentrated attention to branches of knowledge in which solid and profound judgment is required, would show this statistical result, that the average age at which literary men have executed such intellectual works as form now the foundation of their respective reputations, would be found to be from *forty-five to forty-seven years*. I ground this calculation on all writers who treat philosophically of human nature; those, in fact, who discuss metaphysics, morals, divinity, politics (theoretically), history, and philosophical history. There are two intellectual pursuits exempted from this calculation; namely, mathematics and poetry. The history of literature, in all ages and countries, furnishes us with instances of able mathematicians and poets at a comparatively very early age. The reason for this is, I apprehend, that the higher faculties of judgment and reasoning are but partially called into requisition in these pursuits. But

whatever may be the cause, the facts will be found as here stated. Scarcely any man ever gained reputation as a metaphysical, moral, theological, political, or historical writer, until he had past what is called the *meridian* of life; and this demonstrates the position, that the mind, in all its loftier and more important developments, is of comparatively slow growth.*

H. GIBON.

The author, a Professor at the University of Liege, has published "Fragmens Philosophiques," 1836; and "Cours de Philosophie," 1842.

M. Gibon is opposed to the views of the sensational school of philosophy, on account of its logical imperfections, and also for its pernicious influence on the minds and morals of youth. His system is a rational spiritualism. There are three striking developments, or characteristical conceptions in the mind of man; ontological, psychological, and logical. Every thing appertaining to human knowledge may be arranged under one or other of these general divisions.

M. Gibon maintains, and the point is often directly and indirectly presented to our notice in

* "La mémoire se développe plus tôt que l'imagination, qui ne fait que reproduire en quelque sorte les éléments acquis par la mémoire, pour en déduire ou des conceptions scientifiques ou des images que la littérature et les arts savent mettre à profit. La raison exige un temps plus long pour arriver à sa maturité." (Du Système Social, p. 131.)

his various speculations, that many of the most distinguished of modern metaphysicians have fallen into a grievous error, by constituting *the origin of our knowledge* a primary and fundamental principle in their respective systems. Locke, Condillac, and several others, have followed this erroneous course. In our author's conception, the origin of knowledge is not so important to ascertain as *its nature*, and the precise intellectual characters which mark its development.*

NICOLAI JOSEPH DE COCK.

The "Ethicæ seu Philosophiæ Moralis Elementa," 1837, is a production from the "Ecole Théologique" of Louvain. All human laws must rest upon Deity; and must be guided in their formation and application by the doctrines and declarations of Scripture. The metaphysical positions laid down in this work will be found under the head of "Prælectiones," from the first to the eleventh page.

G. C. UBAGHS.

President Ubaghs, of the University of Louvain, is a man of great erudition and considerable mental ability. His chief works on Mental Science are, "Précis de Psychologie," and "Précis de Logique Élémentaire," 1838. These are both valuable publications, and enjoy great popularity throughout most of the Collegiate establishments in Belgium.

* *Fragmens*, p. 80.

The author belongs to the High Church party, and his philosophy is based upon that of the "Ecole Théologique" of France. In his psychological illustrations, however, he seems to have taken Condillac and several other French authors of the same school for his guide; as we find that the nature and operation of the various faculties of the mind are attempted to be explained in accordance with the general views entertained by these writers on the subject.

There are many very excellent observations on the nature of philosophy generally, in the introduction to his "Logique." He shows the grand purposes for which it should be cultivated; and in what manner, and to what degree, it should be placed under the control of theological truth and sentiment. As we have just stated, the author belongs to the school of philosophical theology; but he is not by any means a servile follower of the leading spirits who are zealous members of it, relative to subjects connected with the science of mind. There is a lofty tone of independence in all the President's speculations; and a total absence of every thing approaching to narrow views or bigoted intolerance. All his disquisitions are characterised by a truly philosophic spirit, and a desire to obtain the favourable judgment of his reader only through the medium of truth itself.

M. BECART.

Professor Bécart is the author of a small work

entitled, "Exposé des Facultés, des Lois, et des Opérations de l'Ame," 1838. The design of this publication is, to facilitate the mental studies of young men at the Universities, and it is very happily and judiciously arranged for the purpose. More than one half of the work is occupied by a formal dissertation on Logic.

According to Professor Bécart, the human mind possesses three distinct powers or divisions; to *know*, to *will*, and to *feel*. 1st, In reference to the faculty of knowing, there can be no knowledge without a *real object*, nor any inward or imaginary thought or conception, without a *real subject*. Every thing intellectual must, therefore, rest upon subjective and objective reality. 2nd, The faculty of the will renders that *objective*, which was previously *subjective*. 3rd, Feeling involves consciousness, or the state of the soul. When the mind perceives individual and passing things, it is through the instrumentality of the senses, constituting that which we term *sensibility*. When the mind perceives divine and immutable things, the act is ascribed to reason, or superior sense. We must join to these two mental powers, that of *intelligence* or understanding, whose office it is, to render matters clear and definite for the full and free exercise of the judgment.

There are two faculties involved in the will; the one superior or rational; and the other inferior or sensual.

The following table gives us a general view of M. Bécart's system.

SOUL—MIND -INTELLIGENCE ;—PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE.

RECEPTIVITY OF SENSIBILITY.

(The Soul in repose is simply affected by forms, colours, sounds, odours, &c. The mind has a representation of an individual object in consequence of internal and external impressions.)

SENSE :

External, Internal,
Space. Time.

Formal Elements,
SENSATIONS.

Material Elements.
ORGANS.

BEAUTIFUL.

ACTIVITY OF SPONTANEITY.

(The active Soul reflects and directs its attention to external and internal objects, with a view to know, desire, or enjoy them. It analyzes and distinguishes objects from one another.)

I.—INTELLECT :

Consciousness, Intellectual Soul, Logical
Power of the Soul.

Attention.
Memory.
Reflection.
Observation.

Comparison :— Relations between Sensations, &c.

Judgment.
Imagination.
REASON.

TRUTH.

II.—WILL :

Moral Nature.

Liberty.

Instincts.

Appetites.

Desires.

Passions.

Affections.

Sympathies.

Imitation.

Moral Law,
(Heart.)

GOODNESS.

H. AHRENS.

M. Ahrens is a well known Belgian philosopher, and his "Cours de Philosophie," 1838, is a highly respectable exposition of the leading phenomena of mind.

The first volume is devoted to psychological speculations, which are preceded by a short sketch of the history of philosophy from the earliest date to the appearance of the principal German systems. In the second Lecture we have a discussion on nature in general, and of the different orders of animated existence. Man is an especial object of attention. To obtain any thing like a correct knowledge of him, we must examine him in his unity of being; in his bodily as well as mental capacity. We must ascertain the physical condition of his existence, before we are in a position to distinguish the faculties and laws of his mind.

The first volume of M. Ahrens' work is entirely devoted to an examination of the faculties of the soul in conjunction with the physical frame. His book is interesting; and many acute and original observations are made in the course of his inquiry. In the second volume he takes a higher ground, and discusses the nature of mind and being generally. The three fundamental faculties of the mind are thought, sentiment, and will or volition. In the last two lectures he passes from psychology to ontology; and treats of the Deity, His personality,

providence, good and evil, Divine justice, and of the personal and social happiness of man.

J. PEEMANS.

‘Professor Peemans belongs to the University of Louvain, and displays in his “*Introductio ad Philosophiam*,” 1840, an accurate and extensive acquaintance with the philosophy of mind. The treatise, though small, contains many original observations, and the arrangement of it is well fitted to guide the student in his course of inquiry. The principles of mental science expounded in the “*Introductio*,” are those which the Catholic clergy maintain; namely, that human reason is not of itself sufficient to lead us to sound knowledge; but that a theological guide is requisite, who derives his information from such subjects as the high and *à priori* conceptions of the mind suggest; and which subjects are the most important for man to know.* In that part of the work where the author shows the connection between natural science and theology, this position is laid down at considerable length, and supported by many references to illustrious names in the annals of speculation.

* “*Ratio, stricte loquendo, non sufficit ad cognoscenda, explendaque cuncta legis naturalis officia. Et revelatio absolute necessaria est ad cognoscenda plurima quorum notitia magni nostra interest, et quæ ad completum religionem etiam naturalem pertinent.*”—(*Introductio*, p. 103.)

Professor Peemans is also the author, in conjunction with J. de Decker, of a work on Logic, entitled "*Institutiones Logicæ*," 1842. This is a formal treatise for the use of students at the University; but contains few remarks or observations on the philosophy of the science of general reasoning.

M. ALTMeyer.

The work of this Belgian metaphysician, "*Cours de Philosophie de l'Histoire*," 1840, is founded upon a modified rationalism, and displays an intimate knowledge of the various speculative systems in Europe which are now subjects of philosophic interest. His treatise is elementary and useful; and it has secured the good opinion of many of his learned contemporaries.

SOCIÉTÉ LITTÉRAIRE DE L'UNIVERSITÉ
CATHOLIQUE.

In the Memoirs of this Society, which have been published in several volumes since the year 1840, the metaphysical student will find many excellent papers, on various branches of the science of mind. They are all written with great care, and by philosophers of first-rate knowledge and talent. In the volumes up to 1844, the following interesting Essays will be found. "*Des Conséquences Morales du Panthéisme*," by Professor Ubaghs; "*Le Panthéisme, ou Point de Vue du*

Sentiment," by M. Lemaire; "Théorie de la Création, ou Doctrine de la Philosophie Chrétienne sur Dieu et sur ses rapports avec le Monde, comparée aux principes du Rationalisme Moderne," by Professor Tits; "Examen de la Théorie Philosophique de M. l'Abbé Rosmini, sur l'Origine des Idées," by M. Labis.

N. J. SCHWARTZ.

M. Schwartz is a German, but a Doctor of philosophy and Professor of History of the University of Liege. He is the author of "Manuel de l'Histoire de la Philosophie Ancienne," 1842, a work of great merit and usefulness. The History is preceded by a clear and concisely written Introduction, which displays a consummate knowledge of speculative systems, both ancient and modern, and a great aptness of generalizing or grouping together detached or isolated facts under some theoretical rules or forms. These qualities of the author's mind render his remarks and statements valuable to general readers, and particularly to young students during their Academical education.

He divides the Ancient systems of speculation into three periods: the first commences with the Ionian philosophers, and terminates with Dionysiodorus of Chios; the second, from Socrates to the New Academy; and the third, from the Greco-Roman to the time of Julian. This Historical Sketch is interspersed with many valuable disserta-

tions, characterised by sound judgment and critical acuteness.

WILLIAM TIBERGHIEU.

The "Essai Théorique et Historique sur la Génération des Connaissances Humaines," 1844, is the production of a very young gentleman, a student at the University of Brussels. The publication reflects the highest credit on the philosophical talents of the author.

The treatise is preceded by a copious and well written Introduction; and the author divides his matter into two portions; the theoretical, and the historical. We shall confine the few observations which we can devote to the subject, to the first of these divisions.

All philosophy is occupied with two inquiries: one, which relates to man himself; and the other, to those objects which are external to him; or, according to recent and fashionable phraseology, to the *moi* and the *non-moi*. The philosophy of man is psychology; the philosophy of external objects is ontology.

The philosophical questions relative to man, centre in the origin, nature, and promulgation of his knowledge or ideas. There have in all ages been divers theories to solve the problems arising out of these subjects; but still the facts of human existence remain always the same; they are unchangeable, perpetual, abiding, regular. It is

only the speculative creations of man respecting them, which manifest the contrary attributes.

If man have the power of recognising the existence of things in themselves, the origin of knowledge is then *in himself*. Various speculative systems which we have often alluded to, take their rise from this point of inquiry. These must, in some measure, be familiar to all metaphysical readers. We shall not, therefore, make here any further reference to them ; but merely observe that all knowledge presupposes three things : a being who knows, an object known, and the existence of a certain *relation* subsisting between the mind and the object. This relation is not, however, strictly conformable to the nature of things. Knowledge is not truth. Knowledge is a subjective or mental conception, a thing relative to the mind itself ; truth, on the contrary, is an absolute and independent reality. The source of truth is in Deity ; knowledge belongs to man. Knowledge becomes truth from the moment it recognises this absolute reality. Again, truth is not certainty. The former can exist in itself, apart from the mind of man. Truth is transformed into certainty when it embraces a proper philosophical *method*. This forms the bond or link between truth and knowledge.

M. Tiberghien proceeds then to show the nature and importance of certainty and method. Certainty rests on two points ; the subjective, or the human consciousness ; and the objective, or abso-

lute of being. God and consciousness ; these are the two pillars of all truth and knowledge. Method is an essential condition of the principle of certainty ; and is that path which the mind follows in the search and communication of knowledge.

The principles of certainty are examined and discussed at considerable length ; and he points out, with great acuteness and discrimination, the various degrees in which they are developed in reference to man, God, and external nature.

The author enters into an examination of the knowledge we possess of consciousness ; of the divers modes in which it unfolds itself,—as in thought, desire, will, passion. Then we arrive at the faculties of the mind. We obtain here a view of man simply as an intellectual creation. We possess two parallel faculties, each characterised by its own categories ; *thought* and *sentiment*. The first analyzes, distinguishes, combines, and reasons on matters which we find in the consciousness. The second faculty assimilates itself to things in their aggregation or totality. Both faculties are in strict harmony with the organic construction of every thing we see around us.

The faculty of thought comprehends individual or sensible knowledge ; abstract or reflected knowledge ; and a knowledge of the rational or absolute. On all these topics the author shows great judgment and critical discernment.

The reader must bear in mind that the author's

theory of the origin of human knowledge is to be considered relative to moral, political, and religious principles. When he comes, therefore, to make a practical use of his theoretical views in these important branches of inquiry, he considers certain abstract systems in their actual effects upon the general condition of humanity.

The following tabular statement furnishes us with a bird's-eye view of the system of M. Tiberghien.

1. SENSATION	{ Pure or exclusive Sensualism. Sensualism modified by Reflection.
2. REFLECTION...	{ Reflection, with a tendency to Sensualism. { Pure or exclusive Reflection. Reflection, with a tendency to Rationalism.
3. REASON	{ Rationalism, with a tendency to Reflection. { Pure or exclusive Rationalism. Rationalism, in harmony with other systems.

The consequences which result to morals, politics, and religion, from the predominance of any of these systems just classified, may be stated in the following table.

CONSEQUENCES OF SENSUALISM.	Each true Principle of	<i>Morals</i> : Egotism or Enjoyment. <i>Politics</i> : Interest or blind force. <i>Religion</i> : Athe- ism.
CONSEQUENCES OF SYSTEMS OF REFLECTION.	Abstract or voluntary Principles of	<i>Morals</i> : Abstract formulas, grounded on individual in- terpretations. <i>Politics</i> : Social contract ; per- sonal liberty ; exclusive equality. <i>Religion</i> : Deism ; an external Creative intel- ligence.
CONSEQUENCES OF EXCLUSIVE RATIONALISM.	Absolute and exclusive Principles of	<i>Morals</i> : Identity of objects in the absolute order of things. <i>Politics</i> : Iden- tity of man in society ; abso- lute communi- ty or equality. <i>Religion</i> : Pan- theism ; iden- tification of God with the world.

CONSEQUENCES
OF RATIONAL-
ISM IN HARMO-
NIOUS ACTION
WITH OTHER
SYSTEMS.

Absolute
Organic or
Synthetic
Principles of

Morals : Order,
divine and ab-
solute; the law
of personal ac-
tivity.

Politics : Social
Organism,
reared on the
basis of ration-
al equality and
liberty.

Religion : Theism.
God superior
and independ-
ent of the
world by vir-
tue of His es-
sence.

The author illustrates all these fundamental positions, in the second part of his work, which embraces a historical narration of the speculative opinions of mankind, from the earliest times to the present day; and the practical effects which these have respectively exercised over the moral, political, and religious condition of mankind, as far as history and observation can verify them.

P. DE DECKER.

This author, a Member of the Chamber of Deputies of Belgium, has directed his attention to the Statistics of Morals; and a paper of his will be found in the volume published by the "Académie Royale" of Brussels, for 1848. He examines the

statements and principles laid down by M. Quelelet, and makes many excellent observations upon them.

The following publications of Belgian metaphysical authors may be consulted with some degree of interest. Our limits prevent any special notice of their contents.

EUG. DESWERT.—“Dissertatio de Heraclide Pontico,” Lovaniensis, 1830.

AB. FRED. VERBURGH.—“Specimen Literarium Inaugurale de Carneade Romam Legato,” Amstelodamensis, 1827.

C. H. THIEBOUT.—“De Sapientis Humanitate,” 1825.

JOS. PAQUET.—“Specimen Inaugurale Philosophicum de Actionum Liberarum, &c.” Louvain, 1827.

“Eléments de Logique, ou Principes Propres à former la Raison, avant de l’appliquer à l’Etude des Hautes Sciences,” 1817, by a Clergyman. This is a useful and sensible work; and the reader will find several sections in the *third* part worthy of his attention.

“Remontrances aux Représentants du Genre Humain, sur l’Autorité du Sens Commun,” par un Cosmopolite, Courtrai, 1829. This is a small work, written in the form of dialogue, in which questions of the gravest nature are freely and sensibly discussed.

FRANCOIS BOUVIER.—“Le Panthéisme,” Mons, 1830.

C. CROMMELINCK.—“Dissertation Medico-Psychologique,” Bruges, 1840.

“De la Civilization au 19me Siècle,” Tournay, 1815.

E. TANDEL.—“Cours de Logique, à l’usage de l’Enseignement Universitaire,” Liège, 1841.*

CHAR. JOSEPH BRETON.—“De l’Origine des Idées ou du Principe Générateur de la Connaissance Humaine,” Louvain, 1842. This is a brief though useful sketch of the subject it attempts to discuss. It is based on the peculiar metaphysics of the University.

M. F. NEVE.—“Etudes sur les Hymnes du Rig-Veda,” Louvain, 1842. There is some important information on the philosophy of India in this small work.

* See Note J. at the end of this Volume.

CHAPTER VI.

METAPHYSICAL WRITERS OF SPAIN, HUNGARY, POLAND, SWEDEN, DENMARK, AND RUSSIA.

WE have but a meagre account to present to our readers, both of the past and present state of mental science in these several parts of Europe. Still, however, its prospects on the whole are cheering. Year by year a decided progress is made in favour of unfettered discussion. The philosophical literature of England, France, and particularly Germany, is becoming more and more cultivated in the remote and less enlightened parts of the Continent. The prejudices of the learned, the jealousies of the Church, and the apprehensions of rulers, are gradually subsiding; and the day is perhaps not far distant, when a full and free interchange of philosophic thought will be established throughout all the civilized nations of the world.

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SPAIN.

We have given brief notices of the metaphysical writers of Spain up to the termination of the last century. From that period to the present we have little of original importance to communicate. In the early part of the present century the country was unhappily involved in foreign and civil wars; and its domestic history to the present moment still continues unfavourable to the cultivation of literature generally, and philosophical discussions in particular. Discouraging, however, as Spain appears to the eye of the enthusiastic promoter of scientific knowledge, yet even here, within the last half century, considerable mental illumination has taken place, and improvements have been effected, in the higher branches of education and academical instruction. In most of the seats of learning we still, it is true, find the general character of mental speculation confined to the limits of scholastic doctrines and methodical forms; but these are now undergoing a regular process of transformation, and more liberal opinions and views are being adopted by the clergy and other enlightened classes of society. St. Thomas Aquinas is no longer the Sovereign Pontiff of Spain, from whose philosophical decisions there is no appeal. Students in the Spanish Universities now go through a regular course of metaphysical study, embracing a period of a couple

of years, and are expected to be no mean proficient in the theories and systems propounded in foreign countries.

There have been several elementary works on the human mind published in Spain since the commencement of the present century ; but they are not entitled to any specific notice. The same remarks may be applied to treatises on Logic. Of late years we have a little treatise, entitled "De la Inteligencia y de la Fe," which contains many theoretical observations on mind, and the principles of belief, out of the common order of academical works on the same subjects. The principles of natural theology have been philosophically and ably handled by Alejandro Tassoni, in his work, "La Religion Demonstrada y Defendida," 1847. D. Teodoro de Almeida has just published his "Elementos de Filosofia," 1847, and his "Elementos de Logica," both for the especial instruction of the young. These publications reflect great credit on the liberality and intelligence of their respective authors.

Many French systems of philosophical speculation have been translated within these few years into the Spanish language. We may enumerate, among several others, the philosophical works of Voltaire, Cabanis, Condillac, Condorcet, Batteux ; and, what may appear something strange, even the atheistical and material doctrines of D'Holbach. The opinions of Descartes and Leibnitz are to be met with in many academies of public instruction.

HUNGARY.

Besides Hungary Proper, we embrace in our remarks Bohemia, Moravia, and Galicia. Within these twenty-five years considerable progress has been made in philosophical pursuits in these countries, not only in places of Academical instruction, but among the more intelligent and wealthy portion of the inhabitants. The progress of civilization has been comparatively slow in all these sections of the European continent. Hungary itself has been little more than a century and a half freed from the dominion of the Turks. But even within the last ten years philosophy has made rapid progress within her territory. One of the chief retarding influences has been the general attempt to revive her ancient language. This has checked, in some degree, the cultivation of the German, which had taken a deep root in Hungary, and which necessarily carried with it much of the speculative knowledge peculiar to the people of Germany.

There are at present several philosophical institutions in Hungary, which were, up to the time when the recent disturbances overtook the country, in a very prosperous condition. There are fourteen Academies, with a full body of Professors in every department of literature and science. There are three institutions expressly for the cultivation of philosophical knowledge. Pesth is the chief seat of learning, though Ofen is the capital of the

kingdom. There are also too Academical institutions ; one at Presburg, and the other at Hermannstadt, where philosophy is regularly cultivated by a system of public lectures delivered every year.

In Bohemia, speculative science is cultivated to some extent. There is a University at Prague, the capital, where Professors are appointed to teach philosophy. There is a similar institution at Brün, the capital of Moravia. Lemberg, in Galicia, has also a thriving University, and speculative studies have been cherished here with great zeal and care. Generally speaking, the German systems of metaphysics are much better and more extensively known in these respective countries, than the French. In most of the academies, however, the leading theories of the latter are familiarly known among the tutors and professors.

Paul Joseph Schaffarik, a Doctor of Philosophy at Prague, wrote several works on mental science.

POLAND.

We have little to say of the philosophy of Poland. Before her dismemberment there were several Academical institutions, where the ordinary routine of mental science was taught; but now, deprived of nationality, her literary inhabitants are driven into exile to exercise their talents. The University of Warsaw, when closed in 1831, contained a library of 150,000 volumes of books, which were transferred to St. Petersburg, and all specu-

lative studies were checked in the Polish capital. We may mention here that Joseph C. Szaniński, a native of East Galicia, studied Hegel's philosophy with great diligence and success, and transplanted it into Poland soon after it was known in Germany. The following are three of the treatises of Szaniński:—"Was ist Philosophie?" Warschau, 1802; "Ueber die vorzüglichsten moralischen Systeme des Alterthums," Warschau, 1803; "Ueberblick der Philosophie seit den Zeiten ihres Verfalls bei den Griechen und Römern bis zum Wiederaufleben der Wissenschaften," Warschau, 1804.

SWEDEN.

We are in possession of a fuller and more correct account of the history of philosophy in Sweden, than of any other of the northern States of the European Continent. She has for more than two centuries had distinguished professors in her Universities, who have cultivated the science of mind, and endeavoured to popularise it, with great zeal and some success.

In the sixteenth century there were several metaphysical writers of distinction in Sweden, who illustrated the general tenets of the scholastic philosophy. Fred. Aug. Frankonius was a mystical writer; and in his book he blended the principles of mind with theological speculations in such a singular manner, that his treatise has always been considered by the Swedish literati as a very strange and fantastical production. Several

other writers of the same kind followed in the wake of Frankonius. Georg. Stjernhjelm was one of these. He taught that all things were derived from water, air, and fire. Joh. Buraens, in 1568, illustrated the doctrines of Zoroaster at great length.

In 1570 we have Olaus Nicolai Nericius, who illustrated the doctrines of Ramus. Johan Skytte gave lectures, and afterwards published them, on the metaphysics of Aristotle. He flourished in 1577. Launtius Paulinus Gothus was a professor of theology, and a Bishop; and is represented as a man of vast erudition and great talents. He commented on the metaphysics and logic of Ramus, and his works were published in 1578. J. M. Frougdonius wrote, in 1588, several works on the fundamental principles of morality. About the same date J. Rudbeckius wrote a treatise on Logic, in which the general doctrines of metaphysics are concisely stated. Jonas Magni discussed the principles of mind and ethics in 1583; and Johannes Canuti Lenæus considered these in relation with the leading points of theology, in 1593. In the same year the "Philosophical Conversations" of Joh. Frankenius made their appearance at Upsala, at the University of which he was a Professor.

In the seventeenth century Sweden partook of the impetus which was communicated to philosophy in various other countries of Europe. Speculative pursuits were vigorously prosecuted within her dominions, on every branch of knowledge immediately connected with human nature. Mind, ethics, civil

law, and the principles of theology, engrossed nearly all the active and intelligent men of the day. We have two works on theoretical morality from M. Gyllenstolpe, in 1609; and several others on the same subject, in conjunction with some metaphysical dissertations and discussions on Aristotle's works, from the pen of Alex. Kempe, in 1623. In 1629 Joh. Chesneiopherus flourished as a logician. A mystical writer, Sigfrid Aronus Forsius, excited considerable attention from his works, published in 1624. Petr. Aurivillius wrote on the Logic of Aristotle, and was also the author of a treatise, termed "*Elementa Philosophiæ*," 1636, in which are many able dissertations on important subjects. S. N. Enander, 1640, was also popular at this time as a philosophical lecturer on Logic and other kindred topics of philosophy. Kunnuga Styrlise was contemporary with him, and published a work, in folio, at Stockholm, 1640, on the foundations of natural and revealed religion. He was the author of several other treatises. J. Boëthius, 1641, was a Professor of Metaphysics and Logic, and acquired great reputation in his day; as well as Ol. Lauræus, H. L. Javelin, and Gezelius, who were all writers on subjects connected with mental philosophy, and who filled important offices of general instruction at the same period.

The most distinguished metaphysician about the middle of the seventeenth century was And. Thuronius. His "*Metaphysica*," appeared in 1662, and excited much attention throughout Sweden.

Its principles were, however, severely attacked, in some fugitive pieces, by two or three learned men in the University of Upsala. J. Flashsenius, 1667, was also a philosopher of reputation at the same time. We have two works on philosophy from his pen. About 1670, George Olavi lectured on the mystical views of Plotinus, and collected crowds of students around him. The following writers on the abstract principles of morals, flourished about this period :—J. Billovius, 1660 ; J. Enhergh, 1675 ; P. E. Liungh, 1676 ; A. Iterus, 1680 ; A. Wanochius, 1680 ; and Isaac Axelius, 1682. A little after this, G. Sjöbergh published an abridgment of the metaphysical works of Thuronius ; and P. Rathe distinguished himself in his discussions on the principles of Logic, Ontology, and Ethics, 1721.

The philosophy of Descartes was early introduced into Sweden, and excited great interest and no small share of controversy. On the whole, however, it was very favourably received. And. Rydelius, 1680, was a strenuous advocate for the new system. He was a Professor of Metaphysics, and a man of splendid talents and vast erudition. His works are, "*Nödiga och välmenta påminnelser emot den så Kallade Apokatastasin ton panton, beller alla fördömdas ändtheliga återställning i sitt förlorade salighetsstand,*" 1728 ; "*Epistola de Anima Brutorum ;*" "*Sententia Philosophiæ Fundamentalis ;*" and "*Compendium Logices.*"

M. G. Block was also an able and zealous advocate for Descartes. His writings on the subject

bear the date of 1708. Joh. Bilberg who was a Professor of Theology, entered enthusiastically into the Cartesian system, and published "Dissertations" on the subject; a treatise on "The Existence of the Deity," 1688; and another learned work on the "Nature of the Human Soul." At the same time Andreas Peträus, also a theological professor, supported the general maxims of Descartes' theory.

The speculations of Wolff opened out a wide field for philosophical discussion in Sweden. In the first half of the eighteenth century, writers on metaphysics became very numerous. N. Wallarius, 1706, was a professor of some note, and an author of several works on Metaphysics and Logic. P. Brunnmark, 1717, was an eloquent lecturer on Moral and Mental Philosophy; J. F. Kryger, 1720, treated profoundly on the leading doctrines of natural religion; as likewise did Joh. Hallman, 1748, a man of some philosophical reputation in his day. About the same date, Lallerstedt, J. Plenning, P. Holstrom, A. Wahlstrom, S. Sinus, Elis. Hyphoff, A. J. Molander, B. Wettersten, C. Mesterton, O. Rönigk, H. Möller, A. Axelson, H. Busser, M. S. Froling, and A. Ekmark, severally discussed the chief principles of Descartes, Leibnitz, and Wolff, with a view of illustrating ethics, theology, civil law, jurisprudence, and logic. The writings of many of these authors are very voluminous. In 1756, P. Forsakäl published his "*Dubia de Principiis Philosophiæ*," which excited some attention and controversy at the time.

Locke's works became pretty generally known about the middle of this century. M. Van Storkirch discussed logic and ethics, on the English philosopher's system. His chief work on the former branch of knowledge is, "Logica, eller Stutkonsten, som består uti sanningens uppletande; sommanhemtad af ätskillige Auctorer, som i thetta studio varit namnkundige, och på thet tydeligaaste förestäld, med Svensk uttolkning öfver alla definitioner," Stockholm, 1721.

A. Schönberg also wrote his "Inledning till den naturliga lagen och sodoläran," Stockholm, 1759.

E. O. Runeberg illustrated at great length Locke's doctrines of Sensation and Reflection. J. Faxé wrote also "Ethical Dialogues," in the spirit of the English system. P. Kolmark constructed a speculative system on the principles of Wolff and Locke. The best account of the latter philosopher's "Essay on the Human Understanding" which is to be found in Sweden, is from the pen of C. G. Leopold, the author of "Ideer till en populär philosophie öfver Gud och odödligheten, samt om Religionsfriheten och Fornuftsfrihet." Stockholm, 1803.

We must now notice one of the most eminent of all the Swedish philosophers, and the only one, in fact, whose reputation has extended far beyond the limits of his own country. This is the mystical Emanuel Swedenborg, whose opinions, both on matters of philosophy and religion, are known to a considerable extent in England, as well as in other countries. He was born in 1688, and studied

at the University of Upsal, where he greatly distinguished himself by his philosophical knowledge and general academical attainments. After filling some public stations of trust and importance in Sweden, his mind received a sudden impulse and direction. He conceived he had a direct and special intimation from heaven ; and under this impression, which he retained till his death, all his philosophical notions and doctrines were concocted.

The mental philosophy of Swedenborg can scarcely be considered apart from his theology. It is only indistinct glimpses we can obtain of the former. It may readily be surmised, that a man who conceived himself living and thinking under the direct influence of heavenly illumination, was not placed in the position of ordinary philosophers, in treating of the nature and springs of human knowledge. Every thing would be viewed by him through another medium. Hence it is, that all his statements and observations receive a marked colouring from this monomaniacal notion ; and when his disquisitions become altogether of a speculative character, we recognise at once the radical error which pervades them.

Swedenborg was an acute and faithful observer of nature, and cultivated physical science with great industry and success. The peculiarity of his views becomes developed in his mode of arranging or of systematizing facts. Mechanical science was a favourite pursuit with him ; and there are many curious and interesting speculations in some of his works, on matters appertain-

ing to the atomic theory. Nature is here to be studied through the means of *forms*, which characterise all her movements in this direction, and the ultimate form of all material objects is the *angular*. His researches into the "Animal Kingdom" are upon a grand and comprehensive scale. Every thing possessing life and activity comes under the *circular form*, and man is considered the perfect representation of animal existence. What relates to the mind or spirit in conjunction with its material tenement, puts on the *spiral form*, as indicative of its ethereal or spiritual essence.

In the third chapter of the author's "Economy of the Animal Kingdom," we find his opinions on the Soul. We cannot obtain a knowledge of it through the medium of the senses; but we may reason from the material to the spiritual, by adopting the doctrine of *degrees*, which, Swedenborg says, is "to enable us to follow in the steps of nature; since to attempt without it to approach and visit her in her sublime abode, would be to attempt to climb to heaven by the Tower of Babel; for the highest step must be approached by the intermediate."* This doctrine unfolds those relations which subsist amongst all the objects of nature, from the perfect and angelic form in heaven to the most insignificant object on earth. The hypothesis is but a very rude and bungling apparatus, and totally inadequate to accomplish

* Economy of the Animal Kingdom, Chap. III., Sec. 210.

what it undertakes to perform. We fail to discover the intellectual from the material by his proposed method of philosophising. There is not one strikingly pointed illustration of the usefulness or aptness of the instrument.

Our spiritual nature is compounded of many degrees. That portion of it connected immediately by the external senses is the most humble. The mentality inseparable from imagining and deriving, is the *animus*, and is a rank above that which appertains to sensation. The understanding and will have a superior kind of intellection joined with their respective actions; and the highest kind of mind is that which bears the fruit of intuitive knowledge. *The love of God* is the animating and active principle of every thing belonging to man and the universe.*

Swedenborg has had several followers in his own country. The most distinguished of them is Märt Sturtzenbecher, who published a work called the "Philosophy of Nature," which embodies the leading views of his master.

After the establishment of Kant's system in Germany, the Swedish metaphysical writers increased both in number and in the voluminous nature of their productions. P. R. Christiernin was a professor of logic and metaphysics, and felt a lively interest in the speculations of Kant. His views are a compound of Locke's principles with those

* See the works of Swedenborg, published by the Swedenborgian Society in London.

of the "Critique of Pure Reason." In 1794 the author published a work at Upsal, entitled "Försök till en allvarsam och hufvudsaklig Granskning af den Kantiska eller nya så kallade Critiska Philosophien och det förmenta rena förnuftet, i anledning af Stycken till befrämjande af rätta Begrepp om Philosophien, dess ändemål och närvarande tillstånd."

Towards the latter part of the century, we have Bjurbaeck's Dissertations on Kant, and a treatise on the Immortality of the Soul and the existence of a Deity. The only work we have seen of the author's, is entitled "Försök till en Granskning, af Kantiska Grunderna, för odörlighet och en Gud," Stockholm, 1798.

Nicholas Walleris was an able writer on the Mind, and his works are deservedly held in high esteem in his own country. The following is a list of some of them : "Systema Metaphysicum," Stockholm, 1752, in four volumes ; "Compendium Logicæ," Stockholm, 1755 ; "Compendium Metaphysices," Stockholm, 1755, 1 vol. ; "Psychologia Empirica," Stockholm, 1755, 1 vol. ; "Psychologia Naturalis," Stockholm, 1758, 1 vol.

J. Gottmark illustrated the connection between mind and body upon the Kantian hypothesis ; and published his "Kantiska så kallade Philosophien från dess sjelfgjorda obegriphlighet utvecklad och updagad," Stockh. 1796 ; "Tankar om Ordning och Sätt i våra Theologiska Systemer," Westermäs, 1804.

Magnus Blix wrote, about the same time, his

"Philosophiskt Försök, att utur Menniskans egenshaper utröna ändamålet, hvartill menniskan är skapad samt att utur djurens egens kaper utröna ändamålet för djuren," Upsala, 1797.

Dan Boëthius was well known for his genius and learning. He was a disciple of Locke, and wrote several works, five of which bear the following titles:—"Utkast till Föreläsningar i den Naturliga Sedeläran," 1782; "Försök till en Lärobok uti Natur Kätten," Upsal, 1799; "Anvisning till Sedeläran säsom Vetenskap," Upsala, 1807; "Grundläggning till Metaphysiken för Seder af Im. Kant," Upsala, 1797.

C. A. Ehrensvärd was an idealistic writer, and obtained some distinction among the learned in Sweden. He published "De fria Konsternas Philosophie," Stockholm, 1782; "Stycken till befrämjande af rätta Begrepp om Philosophien, dess ändamål och närvarande tillstånd," Upsala, 1794.

Th. Thorild was a writer on Esthetical science, and J. Lagerstrom composed a work entitled "Dissertatio de Causis cur in invidiam adducta sit Metaphysica," 1787.

The eighteenth century was closed by the numerous and profound treatises of B. H. Hoijer. The following are the titles of some of his philosophical disquisitions. "Afhandlingar: 1. Om Anledningen till den Kritiska Philosophiens Uppkomst, ofulländad; 2. Hoad är sensus Communis? 3. Om ett pragmatiskt föreställningssatt i historien, ofulländad," Stockh. 1795; "Afhandling om den Filosofiska Constructionen, ämnad till In-

ledning till Föreläsningar i Philosophien," Stockh. 1799 ; "De Fundamentis Cognitionis Empiricæ. De Reflexione. De Operationibus Intellectus. Aphorismi Logic. transcendent. De Systemate, Dissertationes Academicæ," Upsala, 1812.

The present century ushers in a number of able Swedish writers on philosophy. The various systems to which Kant's speculations gave birth in his own country, became objects of curiosity and interest in the Universities of Sweden ; and we find all the chief commentators on his theory, and modern German philosophers generally, well known among the Swedish literati.

Samuel Grubbe distinguished himself in Sweden, in the early part of this century, by his philosophical writings. He was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Upsal. He adopted the speculations of Schelling, though he did not coincide with his subsequent modifications of his principles. Grubbe's works are, "Anmärkningar i anledning af Anmärkningarna om rätta förhållandet mellan och Moralitet," Upsala, 1812 ; "Om förhållandet mellan Religion och Moralitet," Upsala, 1812 ; "Anmärkningar öfver Philosophiens närvarande tillstånd," Upsala, 1820.

A. Lidbeck wrote several works of great merit. He was partial to the views of Schelling, and made an attempt to form a system of Kantian eclecticism. His works are, "Anmärkningar hörande till Læran om Smaken och det Sköna," Lund. 1805 ; "Om Medlidande Academisk Afhandling," Lund. 1807 ;

“Anmärkningar, hörande till läran om Vardighet,” Lund. 1808; “Anmärkningar, hörande till läran om ded Löjlige,” Lund. 1808; “Anmärkningar, hörande till det läran om Behag,” Lund. 1808; Framställning af Wolffs, Baumgartens, Mendelsohns, och Sulzers, Kants, Schillers, och Schellings läror om det Sköna,” Lund. 1817.

A. Bethén formed an eclectic system out of Kant's theory, and applied it to several branches of knowledge. J. G. Bure was a metaphysical writer of eminence, and published a work entitled “Utkast till Förnuftsläran eller Konsten att tänka,” Stockh. 1812.

G. L. Hartman treated of philosophy in a scientific and methodical manner; and among other works, published “Kunskaplära, Ett försök till framställning af Vetenskapen om Kunskapernas grunder, lynne och värde,” Abo, 1808.

Chr. Askelöf was the author of “Reflexioner i anledning af filosofiens föregifna obegriplighet,” Stockh. 1811; and E. G. Geyer wrote on the nature of truth, and the elementary principles of theology. He published the two following works, “Om Sann och falsk Upplysning i afseende på Religionen,” Stockh. 1811; “Om Historien och dess förhållande till Religion, Saga och Mythologie.”

We have a treatise from the pen of L. M. Enberg, called “Afhandling om sambandet mellan en rätt smak och en rätt förståndsodling, sammanflyttelse Smaken, under detta afseende betraktad, han på samhället,” 1815; and about the

same period Södersten, who endeavoured to form a union between Wolff and Locke, wrote his "Utkast till den naturliga sedoläran för Ungdom och Begynnare af bägge könen."

D. Munk, of Rosenschäld, adopted Schelling's views, and was popular among a certain class of thinkers in his own country. He published "Tal vid Prestmötet i Lund, I hvilket afseende den Schellingska filosofien ej är öfverensstämmande med Christendomen," Lund. 1815. About the same time W. F. Palmblad obtained some distinction for his metaphysical disquisitions, and published his "Nägot om den så Kallade nya filosofiens syftning," 1814.

L. Hammarsköld wrote a history of Swedish philosophy; and we have from his pen, besides several other works, "Tvänne afhandlingar om det Sköna, efter Plotinos, med Inledning;" "Bref om Plotins filosofiska Lärohyggnad," Stockholm, 1814.

C. M. Schoerbing's views were of a pantheistical and material cast, and were but indifferently received in Sweden. P. A. Atterbörn is a distinguished writer and philosopher of the present day, and has published "Studier till Philosophiens Historia, och System," Upsala, 1835; "De filosofiska systemernas Historia, af Socher, öfversatt af E. C. Grenander," Upsala, 1820.

And in addition to Atterbörn, C. J. L. Almquist has written a great number of works on mental subjects; and is, in fact, at the head of the philosophical school of Sweden at the present time.

DENMARK.

Denmark and Norway have furnished a certain quota to the general philosophy of human nature. The philosophers of these countries have been greatly indebted to the Germans, and in some measure to the Swedes.

During the latter part of the last century, we have Rothe Tyge, born in 1731, and died in 1795. He published "Philosophies Ideer til Kundskal om var art," 1789. He was a clergyman, and his philosophy is based on theology. After him comes Christian Bartholm, who also belonged to the Church. His philosophy was rather practical than of a speculative cast; and he aimed at making abstract views of mental phenomena instrumental in illustrating religious doctrines. His works are, "Philosophie for Ulaerde," 1787; "Philosophiske Breve over Sjaelens Tilstand efter Legemets," 1790; "Viisdoms og Lyksaligheds Laere," 1794; "Philosophisk Undersogelse om de aeldste Folkeslags religiose og philosophiske Moninger," 1802; "Historiske Efterretninger om mennesket i dets vilde og raae Tilstand," 1803, 4 vols.

In 1795, Chr. Hornemann delivered a series of Lectures in the University of Copenhagen on the Philosophy of Kant, with great éclat. And about the same period Laurids Smiths published his "Forsog til en fuldstaendig Laerebygning om Dyrenes Natur og Menneskenos Pligter imod Dyrene."

Niels Treschow has, for more than half a century, been the leading metaphysician of Denmark. He has published a great number of works. In his *Philosophical Sketch* he treats of speculative principles generally; of the opinions of Locke and Hume; of the general faculties of reasoning; of *à priori* truths; of objective and subjective knowledge; the categories of the German systems; and of our ideas of eternity, existence, space, and time.

In the author's *Philosophy of History*, he shows what claims it has to be considered a science; and afterwards enters into lengthened discussions on the origin of society, on the progress of the human understanding, and the freedom of the will. His works are, "*Forelaesninger over den Kantiske Philosophie*," 1798, 1799, 2 vols.; "*Anthropologie til Brug for de laerde Skoler*," 1802; "*Philosophiske Forsog*," 1805; "*Om Philosophiens Natur og Dele*," 1811; "*Elementer af Historiens Philosophie*," 1811; "*Om den menneskelige Natur i Almindelighed, isaer dens aandelige Side*," 1812; "*Almindelig Logik*," 1813.

In the early part of the present century, H. Steffens, who afterwards went to Germany, where he became well known as a philosopher, published "*Inledning til Philosophiske Forelaesninger*," 1803.

Fred Ch. Sibbern has distinguished himself in philosophical pursuits. He has taken Hegel's opinions as his guide, and has even, it is said, gone beyond them in speculative abstruseness. His chief works are, "*Psychologie*," 2 vols., 1828;

"Hinterlassene Briefe des Gabrielis," 1826, which created a great sensation, and drew down upon him the charge of being a mystical philosopher ; "Ueber Erkenntniss und Forschen," 1822, which is a speculative Propädeutik, intended for academic study ; "Logik als Denklehre vom Standpunkte des Intelligenten Wahrnehmens in Analytisch-Grammatischer Darstellung," 1835.

J. L. Heiberg also wrote very profoundly on philosophical subjects. He was considered throughout Denmark a man of great powers of mind and extensive erudition. He published at Kiel, in 1824, an Essay, entitled, "Ueber Menschliche Freiheit;" and "Ueber die Bedeutung der Philosophie für die Gegenwart," 1833. In this work the author advocates the system of Hegel. Heiberg considers it the most profound and philosophic of any which Germany has produced. He has published another treatise, called "Einleitender Vortrag zum Logischen Coursus."

RUSSIA.

It is almost needless to say that Russia is a country where mental science is at its lowest ebb. But even here, the hyperborean frosts, and the still more chilling effects of an absolute Government, have not altogether depressed the inquisitive and active faculties of man. Here and there, amidst cheerless wastes and perpetual bondage, the powers of thought pierce through the gloom, and quicken into life a few kindred spirits, who claim sympathy

with the great family of mankind, and offer their mite to the common stock of universal knowledge and science.

According to the scanty records of historical literature of Russia, it would appear that one Maxim, a Greek monk of the Watopedsch Monastery, was the first person who excited the speculative spirit of the country. He wrote and published, in the middle of the sixteenth century, "An Inquiry into the uses of Grammar, Rhetoric, and Philosophy." What his philosophy was we are not informed.

In the early part of the last century, Nikodim Sellj, a Russian monk, who had been educated in Denmark, where he studied philosophy, gave private lectures in Russia on mental science, and on the general principles of logic and reasoning. He is reported to have entered profoundly into the Scholastic dialectics, and to have given abridgments of the chief topics of speculation of some of the learned doctors. He died in 1746, at St. Petersburg, where he had resided for many years. There are no printed works of his, but a large number of his manuscripts are said to be in the Library of St. Alexander Newskj; chiefly on philosophical topics, poetry, and grammar.

Prince Kantimir was a contemporary of Sellj, and published several philosophical fragments of his own composition, as well as translations of foreign works. He made the Russians acquainted in their own language with Fontenelle's "Plurality of Worlds," and the moral system of

Epictetus. A few years after this, several French works were translated, which indirectly treated of some of the important questions of the philosophy of mind.

In the year 1756, Nikolaj Popofskj was elected Professor of the University of Moscow, and was the first person in Russia who ever gave public lectures on Philosophy. He wrote "On the Uses and Influence of Philosophy," a work which contained the substance of his public addresses to his students. He translated Locke's work on Education into the Russian language.

After the death of this Professor, Michael Katschenofskj, a Doctor of Philosophy of the same University, delivered a series of Lectures on the mind and its faculties and powers, which excited considerable attention in all the seats of learning and instruction in the country. He was followed in his academical duties by Wassilj Sergejewitsch Podschawaloff, a man of great genius and knowledge. He became Professor of Logic, and a general writer on Polite Literature. We have from his pen, "Psychology, or the Doctrine of the Human Soul," Moscow, 1789. The French "Encyclopédie" was published in 1792, as far as the letter K, by Count A. J. Mussin-Puschkin. Iwan Martunoff, a Councillor of State, translated, in 1802, Longinus on the Sublime, and several of the writings of Rousseau.

Of late years a great number of German and French works on Philosophy have found their way into the Russian dominions; but their circulation

is almost solely confined to a few of the nobility who have a taste for letters, and to the Professors of the several Universities. Kant's philosophy has been ably and learnedly expounded both at Moscow and St. Petersburg, as well as the speculative notions of Hegel. These have latterly in a great measure superseded Kant. The latest Russian authors of whom we know anything, are Sidonski, a man deeply versed in all the metaphysical systems of Germany and France, who has published "*Einleitung in die Philosophie*;" and Kedrew, the author of "*Philosophie der Natur*."

There are six general Universities in Russia, where mental philosophy is publicly taught at the present time; namely, at

Moscow.....	Established 1755,	with 11 Colleges,	1 Lyceum.
Krakow.....	" 1804	" 8	"
Kiew.....	" 1813	" 9	" 1 "
Kasan	" 1814	" 10	"
St. Petersburg ..	" 1819	" 9	"
Dorpat*	"	" 4	"

Odessa has 6 Colleges and 1 Lyceum, but no University.

* The University of Dorpat was founded by the Swedish Government in 1632, and was removed to Permau in 1699, but afterwards re-established at Dorpat by the Emperor Paul. It was re-organised in 1803 by the Emperor Alexander. This University is considered the best in Russia. The University of Abo, in Finland, (an old Swedish Province, now belonging to Russia), was transferred, in consequence of a fire, to Helsingfors, and called the Alexandrian University. In 1838 there were twenty-two Professors, besides other teachers; among the former, twelve were Professors in philosophy.

. See Note K. at the end of the Volume.

CHAPTER VII.

METAPHYSICAL WRITERS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA.

THE metaphysical writers of America are not very numerous, but this comparatively infant Commonwealth has shown no lack of ability to cope with all those subtile questions which the science of mind presents. What works have emanated from the press of this country, on mental philosophy, are all of a highly respectable and judicious character ; full of vigorous thought and wholesome doctrines.

A newly-founded country, emerging, as it were, out of wild and boundless forests and prairies ; having its public laws and institutions to form, its commerce and agriculture to create, and its independence to maintain ; could not possibly prove a very favourable locality for the growth of speculative philosophy. The more pressing physical wants of the community must take precedence over the acquirements and embellishments of the

mind; and the plough, the sail, and the loom, must be the most interesting objects to the mass of the people. Learning and science are, in a certain sense, social luxuries; they spring out of wealth and leisure; and can never exist to any extent in a country actively and pressingly engaged in procuring the first elements of national subsistence and power. It is only where large cities are reared, and the surplus wealth of the community takes a direction into channels of refinement and taste, that mental acquirements gain strength, and develop themselves in the foundations of Universities, Colleges, and other institutions of literature and science.

But the United States have been favourably situated in reference to literature in general, and philosophy in particular. She has not had everything to rear from the foundation. From the intimate connection which has always subsisted between the governments, laws, language, and religion of the United States and Great Britain, the former had a philosophy ready for immediate application; and has always shewn a marked predilection for the metaphysical doctrines and opinions of English writers. Their works have been widely circulated throughout the Union, and closely interwoven with the philosophical speculations of the native authors of this portion of the New World. The speculative doctrines of the mother country are taught in nearly all the public institutions of education in the United States. The

mental theories of the Continent of Europe have made but slight progress here ; and, on the other hand, little or nothing is known among the philosophers of France, Germany, or Italy, of the extent or peculiar characteristics of American speculations. Of late years there has unquestionably been a positive increase in French and German metaphysics throughout the States ; but it has not assumed such a commanding influence as to overshadow the theories and systems of British speculation. These still form, in all the seminaries of learning, the ground-work of elementary and scientific instruction.

DR. JONATHAN EDWARDS.

Dr. Edwards was born at Windsor, in the State of Connecticut, 1703. He became a preacher at New York to a Presbyterian congregation ; and in 1724, being then only in his twenty-first year, was chosen Tutor of Yale College.

Jonathan Edwards is one of the most subtile and profound thinkers of whom America can boast. To the present day few have equalled, none surpassed him. He furnishes a remarkable instance of the power of a single unassisted intellect stamping its image on its own age, and giving a fixed and permanent direction to particular currents of thought among considerable masses of men. Few individuals were ever placed in circumstances more unfavourable for the acquisition of this sin-

gular influence. Born in the midst of a wild and thinly-peopled region ; educated at a small seminary, affording the most meagre facilities for philosophical pursuits ; then becoming a pastor of a secluded village, and eventually an Indian missionary, yielding himself to the hardships and privations of savage life ; he nevertheless laid the foundation of a system of speculative thought, which is not only unique in itself as a mere display of intellect, but which, in its practical application to other branches of knowledge, has attracted a large share of attention in the theological world, and will continue to do so till the end of time.

The author's work "On the Freedom of the Human Will," is that which we are immediately alluding to. He has stated and illustrated the principle of necessary connection in a manner altogether different from the way in which Collins, Priestley, Hume, and others have argued it. Indeed Edwards's work is one of the most remarkable specimens of ratiocinative compositions extant. And it is from the application of certain principles therein stated, to some fundamental maxims of theology, and attempted to be demonstrated with scientific rigour, that he has been enabled to establish his fame as a Christian philosopher. These maxims have always been matters of deep interest with numerous and influential sections of the Christian Church in all ages of its history ; and particularly with Calvinistic Protestants since the Reformation. He is, and very justly, a great and shining light among them. His peculiar speculations have,

since his day, exercised a marked influence on the theological writings of the Presbyterian Church, both in Great Britain and Ireland, as well as in America. This is not at all to be wondered at, when we remember the extreme subtlety of his genius, and his singular tact in amalgamating his metaphysical notions of cause and effect, with the elementary doctrines of Protestant theology.

We shall divide our observations on Edwards's treatise into two parts; we shall first consider it *metaphysically*, and then in conjunction with certain theological principles. On both points we are compelled to brevity; and, consequently, to offer an imperfect and unconnected outline of the whole as a system. On the first part we have already made several observations* on the general bearings of the doctrine of necessity. That which we shall now add will, in some degree, more fully illustrate what has elsewhere been stated on this knotty question. The second division of our observations will be more extended, as we are anxious to give to the general reader and the student of philosophy, as full a view as possible of the chief bearings which Edwards's metaphysics have on the science of theology; knowing and believing as we do, that among every class of Protestant divines, in our own country as well as in the United States, the leading questions here referred to, constitute matters of deep and general interest.

* See the Articles, "Spinoza," in the second, and "Anthony Collins," in the third volume.

The nature and scope of the author's treatise on the *will*, may be thus stated. In the first part, containing many sections, the author confines himself to the definition of several philosophical terms, such as the *nature of the will*, its *determination*, nature of necessity, impossibility, inability, and contingency ; and in the last section of this part, we have a distinction made between natural necessity and moral necessity. These two kinds of necessity, so far as cause and effect are concerned, he considers identical. We shall quote his remarks on this point, because they are important for the perfect comprehension of his views. "Moral necessity," says he, "may be as absolute as natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause, as a natural necessary effect is with its natural cause. Whether the will in every case is necessarily determined by the strongest motive, or whether the will ever makes any resistance to such a motive, or can ever oppose the strongest present inclination, or not ; if that matter should be controverted, yet I suppose none will deny, but that, in some cases, a previous bias and inclination, or the motive presented, may be so powerful, that the act of the will may be certainly and indissolubly connected therewith. When motives or previous bias are very strong, all will allow that there is some difficulty in going against them. And if they were yet stronger, the difficulty would be still greater. And therefore, if more were still added to their strength, to a certain degree, it would

make the difficulty so great, that it would be wholly impossible to surmount it ; for this plain reason, because whatever power men may be supposed to have to surmount difficulties, yet that power is not infinite ; and so goes not beyond certain limits. If a man can surmount ten degrees of difficulty of this kind with twenty degrees of strength, because the degrees of strength are beyond the degrees of difficulty : yet if the difficulty be increased to thirty, or an hundred or a thousand degrees, and his strength not also increased, his strength will be wholly insufficient to surmount the difficulty. As therefore it must be allowed, that there may be such a thing as a *sure* and *perfect* connection between moral causes and effects ; so this only is what I call by the name of *moral necessity*.”*

In the second part, however, we find the leading principles of his whole system. These are few in number, but full of weighty and important considerations. In fact, Edwards’s system hinges on one principle developed in the third section of the second part ; namely, *there can be no event without a cause*. His words are : “ But if once this grand principle of common sense be given up, that what is not necessary in itself must have a cause. and he begin to maintain, that things may come into existence, and begin to be, which heretofore have not been, of themselves, without any cause ; all our means of ascending in our arguing from

* Freedom of the Will, p. 30.

the creature to the Creator, and all our evidence of the Being of God is cut off at one blow. In this case, we cannot prove that there is a God, either from the Being of the world, and the creatures in it, or from the manner of their being, their order, beauty and use. For if things may come into existence without any cause at all, then they doubtless may, without any cause answerable to the effect. Our minds do alike naturally suppose and determine both these things; namely, that what begins to be has a cause, and also that it has a cause proportionable and agreeable to the effect. The same principle which leads us to determine that there cannot be anything coming to pass without a cause, leads us to determine that there cannot be more in the effect than in the cause.

“ Yea, if once it should be allowed, that things may come to pass without a cause, we should not only have no proof of the Being of God, but we should be without evidence of the existence of any thing whatsoever, but our own immediately present ideas and consciousness. For we have no way to prove any thing else, but by arguing from effects to causes: from the ideas now immediately in view, we argue other things not immediately in view; from sensations now excited in us, we infer the existence of things without us, as the causes of these sensations: and from the existence of these things, we argue other things, which they depend on, as effects on causes. We infer the past existence of ourselves, or any thing else, by memory;

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2 K

only as we argue, that the ideas, which are now in our minds, are the consequences of past ideas and sensations. We immediately perceive nothing else but the ideas which are this moment extant in our minds. We perceive or know other things only by *means* of these, as necessarily connected with others, and dependent on them. But if things may be without causes, all this necessary connection and dependence is dissolved, and so all means of our knowledge is gone. If there be no absurdity or difficulty in supposing one thing to start out of non-existence into being, of itself without a cause; then there is no absurdity or difficulty in supposing the same of millions of millions. For nothing, or no difficulty multiplied, still is nothing, or no difficulty: nothing multiplied by nothing, does not increase the sum.”*

This is a fair specimen of Dr. Edwards’s reasonings. We see clearly that he materialises the whole argument; that he considers cause and effect in the light of one ball hitting another and putting it in motion. It is this naked and physical view of the question of human liberty, that confers such cogency and mathematical precision on his conclusion.

We shall just quote a few more observations on the Cause of Volition, which in fact present another view of the author’s notions of Cause and Effect. We have in many parts of this history mentioned at considerable length the doctrine of mental spon-

* Freedom of the Will, p. 61.

taneity. The Doctor's ideas are in direct opposition to this doctrine, and therefore the reader will have an opportunity of perceiving what can be stated on both sides of the question. "An active being," says he, "can bring no effects to pass by his activity, but what are consequent upon his acting: he produces nothing by his activity, any other way than by the exercise of his activity. But the exercise of his activity is action; and so his action, or exercise of his activity, must be prior to the effects of his activity. If an active being produces an effect in another being, about which his activity is conversant, the effect being the fruit of his activity, his activity must be first exercised or exerted, and the effect of it must follow. So it must be, with equal reason, if the active being is his own object, and his activity is conversant about himself, to produce and determine some effect in himself; still the exercise of his activity must go before the effect, which he brings to pass and determines by it. And therefore his activity cannot be the cause of the determination of the first action, or exercise of activity itself, whence the effects of activity arise; for that would imply a contradiction; it would be to say, the first exercise of activity is before the first exercise of activity, and is the cause of it."*

As we have already stated, the metaphysical opinions of Dr. Edwards have excited a great deal

* Freedom of the Will, p. 68.

of attention both in America and in England, and various attempts have been made to overturn and refute them. From the peculiar logical position in which he has entrenched himself, this it is almost impossible to do. Some writers of ability and distinction have attempted to show that there is a fallacy lurking in his process of reasoning, which takes its rise from the hypothetical nature of his premises, and from his mingling them with facts connected with the physiology of mind. This is, I conceive, not a fair and effectual way of meeting the arguments of Edwards. The principle on which his system rests, is one of the most simple and elementary which we possess; namely, *that every effect must have a cause*; and it is upon this naked view of the subject that he has erected his whole scheme of reasoning. The author has, strictly speaking, but one argument through the whole of his book; *one thing must precede another thing*. He has really nothing to do, in his logical arrangements, with the diversified circumstances which may mark various kinds of *motives*, or with the manner in which they may act upon each other. His answer to all these is, Does one thing necessarily go before another? and on this being answered in the affirmative, he is under no logical obligation to examine the complicated processes of volition. The only true way, I conceive, to answer Edwards is, to demand of him, Can you, upon your own principle, that *every effect must have a cause*, rear a system of theological, moral,

and metaphysical philosophy? This is the simple question to be asked; and here it is that the necessitarian feels his own weakness and insufficiency. True it is, that the human mind is so constituted that it must adopt the principle, and act upon it to a certain extent also; but there is a point at which it stops short, and takes the very opposite principle for granted, that *some things exist without a cause*. These are two contradictory elements of the human intellect; but there is this marked and striking difference between them, that the first principle is inadequate to satisfy the demands of a rigorous philosophy; whereas the second principle is the only foundation we have on which to erect a system of human knowledge. On Edwards's theory it is impossible to found the existence of a Deity, and the obligatory nature of moral distinctions. These important doctrines can only rest upon a maxim entirely contrary to that which Edwards so concisely and forcibly lays down in his work.

In the philosophical writings of Dr. Edwards, though he shows himself a most zealous disciple of the necessitarian scheme, we shall find, nevertheless, that when he comes to apply his principles to the doctrines of natural and revealed religion, he illustrates these principles with so many qualifications and reservations, that it becomes not only difficult to say what opinions he really does hold upon necessary influence when applied to religious subjects; but he lays himself open to inferences favourable to the opposite side of the controversy.

From the general line of argument he follows, it would seem that he was very desirous to avoid the doctrine of necessity in its absolute and unconditional sense, as it appeared to him hostile to all our just notions of Deity, and of moral obligation. The following words contain the substance of his remarks upon this subject. "The sovereignty of God is his ability and authority to do *whatever pleases him* ; whereby 'He doeth according to *his will* in the armies of heaven and amongst the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, what doest thou.' The following things belong to the sovereignty of God, viz. (1.) Supreme, universal, and infinite *power*, whereby he is able to do what he pleases, *without control*, without any confinement of that power, without any subjection, in the least measure, to any other power ; and so, without any hindrance or restraint, that it should be either impossible or at all difficult for him to *accomplish his will* ; and without any dependence of his power on any other power, from whence it should be derived, or which it would stand in need of ; so far from this, that all other power is derived from him, and is absolutely dependent upon him. (2.) That he has supreme *authority* ; absolute and most perfect right to do what *he wills*, without subjection to any superior, or any derivation of authority from any other, or limitation by any distinct independent authority, either superior, equal, or inferior ; he being the head of all dominion, and fountain of all authority, and also without restraint by any obli-

gation, implying either subjection, derivation, or dependence, or proper limitation. (3.) Thus his *will* is supreme, underived, and independent of any thing without himself; being in every thing determined by his own counsel, *having no other rule but his own wisdom*; his will not being subject to, or restrained by, the will of any other, and other wills being perfectly subject to his. (4.) That his *wisdom*, which *determines his will*, is supreme, perfect, underived, self-sufficient, and independent; so that it may be said, as in Isaiah x. 14, ‘With whom took he counsel? and who instructed him and taught him the path of judgment, and taught him knowledge, and showed him the way of understanding?’ There is no other divine sovereignty but this, and this is properly *absolute sovereignty*: no other is desirable, nor would any other be honourable or happy; and indeed there is no other conceivable or possible. It is the glory and greatness of the Divine Sovereign, that *God’s will is determined by his own infinite all-sufficient wisdom* in every thing; and in nothing at all is it either directed by any inferior wisdom, or by no wisdom, whereby it would become senseless arbitrariness, determining and acting without reason, design, or end.”*

From this passage we may observe, that it is explicitly laid down here that any thing like constraint, influence, or power, exercised over the divine nature, would be totally destructive of its

* On the Freedom of the Will, Part IV. Sect. 7.

essence. This declaration is sufficient to show that our notions of necessary connexion, or dependence, are hostile to correct conceptions of the divine government. But the principal thing worthy of consideration, and which bears upon the doctrine immediately under notice, is that which affirms that the *infinite wisdom* of God regulates, acts upon, impels, disposes, and rules his *infinite will*. The Doctor thought that by removing the divine will from any influence *external to the Deity*, and by placing that influence *within himself*, he was setting the question out of the reach of all cavil; but in this he was mistaken, for the difficulties are only taken from one place and set down in another. How does this attribute of wisdom act upon the will? Does this *infinite wisdom* contain within *itself* the principles of its own movements? Wisdom in the Divine Being, as well as amongst us, his finite creatures, must mean something which *is done*; some particular action or motion, directed to some particular *end*, and productive of some particular consequence or consequences; but if it moved of itself, it must have moved, or acted upon, or influenced another thing *without any cause, end, purpose, motive, or object*, which, according to the principle running through the whole of Dr. Edwards' reasonings on the freedom of the will, must be impossible and absurd. The divine will is here represented as an entirely *passive thing*, unable of itself to do anything without being moved or set in motion by *infinite wisdom*; but in what manner, or by what causes

this attribute of infinite wisdom *itself* is directed or brought into action, we are not informed. This omission is calculated to teach us, that we cannot form to ourselves consistent or intelligible notions of the divine nature, without supposing, or taking for granted, a degree of *spontaneity* in the Deity. If we wish to reason rationally on his attributes, we must invest one of these attributes with *spontaneous motion*, to guide, direct, move, or call into action the rest; and this underived power may, for any thing which can be advanced to the contrary, be as properly invested in the *will*, as in any other attribute. It must always be borne in mind, that the same arguments drawn from the difficulty of conceiving how the human will can act *without motives*, present themselves when we maintain that the *infinite wisdom* of the Deity is exercised *without any motive foreign to its own nature*. The obligations in both cases are founded upon the same principle, and must stand or fall together.*

In the second division of our remarks, we have to notice the application of Edwards's theory of cause and effect to some elementary principles of theology. We shall only bring one of these prominently before the reader's attention; namely, that which relates to the nature of the Deity, and his Divine government and attributes;—fundamental articles of all religious truth.

The Doctor published a theory of morality; and it is here that we find the fullest and most com-

* See the Author's Essay on Free-Will, London, 1848. 2nd Edition. Saunders, 6 Charing Cross.

plete view of the manner in which he applied his metaphysical ideas, and of the light in which he considered the whole of the Divine nature and procedure. We shall state his position,—that morality does not depend upon the *will of God*,—as concisely as possible, and under separate heads.

1st. The doctrine which maintains that what we now call virtue or merit, and vice or demerit, became purely such from an act of the *Divine will*, must be unsound; for if this exercise of the will of the Deity had not taken place, then there would not have been any such things as virtue or vice, merit or demerit. In founding the existence and nature of virtue and vice upon the pure will and pleasure of the Almighty, we stamp both with equal authority, and confound the qualities of each.

2nd. If the mere act of the will of the Deity, abstractly considered, made or created that which we call virtue, and rendered it obligatory, *because*, and only *because*, it was the act of His will or pleasure; then vice, which is in its nature and effects quite opposite to virtue, being likewise created and called into operation by this self-same act of the will, must be considered as possessing a power of obligation upon us every way equal with virtue itself; and that wickedness and folly must become as excellent in their natures and effects as goodness and wisdom; seeing that, if the *will* made virtue, and vice owed its existence to the same will, then they must both be, in every item and respect, alike.

3rd. To affirm that virtue and vice owed their

origin and distinctive characters to the will of God, presupposes that before the exercise of the will, virtue and vice had nothing different in their natures; but were viewed by the eye of the Almighty, as it were, as one and the same thing; therefore there would seem to have been no *motive* or inducement in the Almighty to create a difference, or give a preference to virtue more than to vice.

4th. The Almighty might, had he chosen, have ordained that man should rebel against him, and not obey him; should hate, and not love him; and that he might have violated, with pleasure and advantage, the whole ten commandments.

5th. The doctrine now under consideration is inconsistent with the attribute of the Deity which we call *omniscient*. Every thing which has been from eternity, existed, as it were, in the Divine mind; for the past, the present, and the future, are but as one to Him. All moral natures, moral relations, and moral consequences must have been, with other things, in the Divine mind, prior to their creation; that is, must have existed in the same manner as figurative representations of material or moral objects may exist in our own minds, perfect in all their parts and relations; such, for example, as a landscape, or a moral being endowed with passions, virtues, or vices, such as are commonly described by us in works of fiction.

6th. The scheme that morality depends upon the *will* of God, “not only involves in it, that mankind, with all their impiety, injustice, cruelty, oppressions, wars, and butcheries, are in their na-

ture equally amiable and excellent as angels, with all their truth and benevolence, but also that the character of fiends is in itself, and independently of the fact that God chose it should be otherwise, just as lovely, excellent, and praiseworthy, as that of angels. If then God had willed the character which Satan adopted and sustains, to be moral excellence, and that which Gabriel sustains, to be moral worthlessness, these two beings continuing in every other respect the same, would have interchanged their characters—Satan would have become entirely lovely, and Gabriel detestable—must not he who can believe this doctrine, as easily believe that, if God had willed it, two and two would become five? Is it at all easier to believe that truth and falsehood can change their natures, than that a square and a circle can interchange theirs?" *

We might inquire what is the nature of the will of God? Does that will become good, holy, and just, merely because God willed it should be such; or is that will excellent in its own nature, independently of any exercise of Almighty volition? If we maintain that the will of God is not excellent in its own nature, but became such by an act of His will, then it clearly follows that, "if God had been a being equally malevolent, and by an act of His will had determined that his character should be infinitely excellent, it would of course have become infinitely excellent, and he

* See Works, Vol. II. p. 365.

himself would have deserved to be loved, praised, glorified for his infinite malice, cruelty, and oppression, just as he now does for his infinite goodness, truth, faithfulness, and mercy. According to this scheme, therefore, there is no original moral difference between the characters of an infinitely malevolent being and an infinitely benevolent one; because this difference depends on a mere act of will, and not at all on the respective natures of the things themselves. That a malevolent being would have made this determination, there is no more reason to doubt, than that it would be made by a benevolent being; for it cannot be doubted that a malevolent being would have entirely loved and honoured himself. The question whether God is a benevolent or malevolent being, seems therefore to be nugatory, for all our inquiries concerning the subject, which have any practical importance, terminate in this single question,—What has God chosen?*

We must allow that these objections possess great force; indeed some of them may be said to be entirely unanswerable. But in making this concession, we need not be prevented from laying before the reader a few statements of a directly opposite nature, which, if they are not calculated to produce absolute conviction, may at the least induce us to see that this abstruse and intricate question has two different aspects in which it may be viewed.

We may observe in the first place, that in this

* See these arguments treated more fully in Dwight's system of Theology, vol. 3.

theory of morality, Dr. Edwards seems to have been duly sensible of the weakness of some of his positions, and of the great importance of having correct and explicit ideas of free-will, in all moral judgments and determinations. He makes some curious observations and statements on this point, which clearly display a wish to qualify the extreme results of some of his logical deductions. He observes, "It is not all beauty that is called virtue; for example, not the beauty of a building, of a flower, or of the rainbow; but some beauty belonging to beings that have *perception* or *will*. And perhaps it is needless for me to give notice to my readers, that when I speak of an intelligent being having a heart united, and benevolently disposed, to being in general, I thereby mean intelligent being in general; not inanimate things or beings that have no *perception* or *will*."* Here the Doctor lays down the position, that there can be no moral virtue, without the faculty of perceiving, and the *will* to direct that faculty.

But to return to the consideration of those objections which Dr. Edwards urges against morality depending on the will of the Deity, we beg to make the following remarks.

1st, All his arguments hinge on the assumption, that we, finite and imperfect creatures, have an adequate conception of the nature and attributes of God; of his creative power, of his moral con-

* Edwards's Works, vol. 2, pp. 9, 10.

stitution, and of the final ends or purposes for which he has made and ordained all things.

2nd, But waiving this objection, and applying our reasonings to the subject, we shall soon perceive numerous and seemingly insurmountable difficulties in the way of the theory, that morality does *not* depend upon the will of the Deity.

3rd, When we maintain that the Deity has no *motive* to create virtue or vice, or to give a preference to the one more than to the other, we talk after the manner of men ; it is, in fact, to affirm that God is influenced by something external to or independent of his own nature ; for we can attach no idea to the word *motive*, but that of *foreign influence*. If the motive, in this instance, be considered part of the Divine nature, we may then demand to know at what time it began to manifest itself. If it existed from all eternity, it must have exercised its power from all eternity also. But an eternal motive is an absurdity. A *motive* or *inducement* is something arising out of the *circumstances of the case*. To say that a motive always existed, seems nothing short of a contradiction ; and to suppose an infinite series of motives is likewise preposterous ; and when carried out to its logical limits, is alike destructive of the existence of matter, and of the Deity himself.

4th, Besides these considerations, it may be observed that an eternal, self-created, and infinitely wise and powerful being, must, if we can strain our feeble imaginations to grasp at even a faint

conception of the matter, be supposed to be acted upon only by a motive, as eternal, self-created, and infinitely as powerful as himself.

5th, If a divine motive, if we may so term it, was indispensably necessary to stamp the law of God with moral validity, then this is as much as to say that the obligatory nature of this law owed its sole existence not only to this *something*, which we term a motive, which we must conceive to be external to, and independent of, the Deity himself; but of which *something*, we do not profess to have the smallest conception, and which we consequently have not been able to designate by any appellation whatever.

6th, If the law of morality be anterior to, or considered as coeval in point of existence with, the Deity himself; then this law becomes obligatory upon us;—we obey its injunctions, not from any considerations of its being his law, or of his creation, but *solely* on account of its being anterior to, or coeval in point of duration with, himself.

7th, To say that the duties and obligations of morality are eternal, and that the Deity is obliged or necessitated to regulate himself by this eternal law, then this is to place this law above himself, and to make him entirely dependent upon it. This supposition is also completely at variance with all our notions, whether philosophical or popular, of law in general; for we cannot maintain that any law can have an existence anterior to, or coeval with, the lawgiver, or framer of the law.

8th, If the distinctions between virtue and vice

be of the same nature as the truth or falsehood of mathematical axioms and propositions, and if it be true, as affirmed, that the Almighty could not alter the nature of even the simplest truth in the latter branch of human knowledge; then we are led to infer that mathematical evidence is completely independent of his power, and incapable of receiving any alteration or modification from his omnipotence.

9th, If we grant that the nature of mathematical evidence could not be affected by the Almighty's power, it is but fair to infer that all other kinds of truth must also partake of the same nature—that is, be independent of the power and will of God. And, as we find from experience that the laws of matter and motion, by which the whole universe is regulated and upheld, are possessed of the same degree of evidence as that which is ascribed to mathematics; then we must come to the conclusion, that the universe, as at present constituted, could not have been constituted otherwise; and that the principles by which the movements of great masses of matter are regulated, as well as the principles which bind together the smallest particles or atoms, must have existed from all eternity.

10th, As mathematical truths, and indeed all kinds of truths, are perceived by the mind of man, and bear a certain fixed relation to it; it does not appear an unwarrantable stretch of assertion, to maintain that it might have pleased the Almighty, and that it was within his power, to have altered

the relative connexion, or system of laws, which exists between truth in general and our minds. At any rate, those who maintain that the Almighty had it not in his power to alter the nature of mathematical evidence, must also in consistency maintain, that our minds, by which that truth is perceived, and to which it must be considered to bear a certain fixed relation, could not have been otherwise made than we find them to be. And moreover, it may also be remarked, that as there is a certain connexion subsisting between the nature and operations of our minds and the nature and operations of our bodies, it is but fair to presume, that if our minds could not have been altered from what they are now, neither could our bodies, without destroying that concord and mutual harmony of action which, experience teaches us, do at present subsist between them. With whatever difficulties the position may be attended, there are few persons who would not readily concede, that both our minds and bodies might have been very differently constituted from what they are, if it had so pleased the *will* of the Almighty to have done so.

11th, If all moral truths, and truths relating to other branches of human knowledge, be affirmed not to be independent of the will of the Almighty, in the absolute meaning of the phrase, but only to form part of his *nature* or *essence*, then this view of the matter is precisely the same as that of Spinoza—being founded upon the same principle, and differing only in forms and modes of expression.

12th, The arguments which are founded upon

an analogy between the way in which the Almighty might be conceived to have seen things, before they were actually created, and imaginary representations of material objects of the mind's conception, such as a plan of a house, a landscape, &c., are not perfect and complete, and do not in any conceivable manner seem capable of being applied to the Deity. We obtain our imaginary representations from a knowledge of realities, but in the case of the Deity, as here supposed, the moral and physical truths, and their various relations, are represented as having an existence before any thing material or substantial was created. This consideration, trifling as it may at first sight appear to many, does, in fact, destroy at once the whole argument on this point.*

We could easily extend our remarks on these subjects to a much greater length, but we must now draw our notice to a close.

Dr. Edwards had a peculiarly constituted mind ; —a mind capable of pursuing, with incomparable steadiness and clearness, the longest and most intricate chain of reasoning ; but a mind, withal, by no means endowed with the loftiest powers of logical comprehension. He saw every link in a chain of reasoning with a microscopic eye, which, when its focal power was changed, made every thing at a distance appear hazy, clouded, and ill-defined. He could do one thing as no other man has ever been able to do it ; he could reason from given

* See the Author's "Essay on Free Will," 1848, published by Saunders, 6, Charing Cross.

or assumed premises with perspicuity, neatness, and power, and with an almost superhuman ease and correctness; but he could not embrace a philosophical system as a whole, and show its manifold bearings and relations to other branches of knowledge. He was an acute, but not a great, philosopher. His was a vivid and piercing light; but its illuminating rays, at a certain distance, became limited and scattered, and gave to all surrounding objects a distorted and confused appearance. His ratiocination is so perfect of its kind, that it assumes the appearance of mechanism; and we feel a sort of secret dislike to have all the pegs and wires of an argument so minutely and obtrusively placed before us. Edwards has, in fact, been denominated a "reasoning machine;" and the epithet is by no means misapplied or extravagant. But as a machine can only do its work *one way*, and we cannot humour it, or make its power more pliable; so in like manner do we find the intellectual mechanism of Edwards unyielding and unmanageable, except in its own peculiar fashion. The substantial correctness of these remarks may be verified by a reference to the various speculations of the author. When he is dealing with the question of man's free-will; when he has cause and effect, motive and action, rewards and punishments, like so many tennis balls, to play against each other, he goes smoothly forward, and nothing can resist his logical tact and dexterity; but when he enters upon other topics, the spell seems broken, and he dwindles down to the mere dialectician,

and often to even a lower character than that. Indeed, the truth of this is admitted by the author's able commentator and critic, Mr. Rogers, who makes the following observations on the reasoning powers of the Doctor. "In these papers we cannot fail to observe how ill adapted was the mind of Edwards for those extensive exercises of induction, that long and patient investigation of facts, that laborious collection of the mere materials and elements of reasoning before the process of reasoning and generalization begins, and which are so absolutely necessary in every department of physical science; without which, indeed, the profoundest reasonings, purely hypothetical, must always, on such subjects, be worthless. As though not only conscious where his real power lay, but irresistibly impelled to exercise it, we find him perpetually escaping from the field of experiment and fact; taking his premises for granted, and consequently reasoning absurdly from them; or else, as if aware of the insecure ground on which he trod when he attempted the induction of facts, and impatient to begin his favourite exercise of purely logical illation, he is continually retreating to those obscurest of almost all subjects, the metaphysics (if we may so speak) of natural philosophy; to discussions on the elementary structure of matter, the forms of atoms, their laws of action, the *genesis* of motion, and the original principles of nature."*

* Works of Jonathan Edwards, with an Essay on his genius and writings, by H. Rogers. London, 1834.

The late Mr. Stewart has the following remarks respecting Dr. Edwards's theory :—

“ It has been objected by a most respectable writer to those who, without attempting to discuss Edwards's argument, set it down as nothing more than an intricate puzzle or quibble ; that ‘ if this argument be what they represent it, there must be some way to unravel the puzzle, although they have not the skill, or will not take the trouble to discover it.’

“ To this proposition I object. 1st, Because I can see little or nothing in the argument of Edwards which has not been completely answered by Clarke, or by Reid. 2nd, Because the consequences to which it leads, (although to the satisfaction of a few speculative men they may perhaps be evaded by means of subtle refinements and distinctions), are so directly *contrary* to the *common feelings and judgments* of mankind, as to authorize any person of plain understanding boldly to *cut asunder the knot* which he was unable to unloose. In looking over the article Sophisms, in our elementary books of Logic, I find many, (such as Achilles and the Tortoise, the Liar, the Bald, the Sorites or Acervus, and various others), to which I should be much more at a loss to give a satisfactory reply, than to any thing alleged by Collins or Edwards; and yet I should think it a most unwise employment of my time, to waste an hour in the refutation of any of them. Nor would I feel much mortification if I should be accused of want of candour for neither consenting to admit the con-

clusion, nor to undertake the irksome task of combating the premises. Of the truths *disputed* in these sophisms, there is not one, in my opinion, more *certain* than that of man's free-agency; a fact of which our consciousness is so complete, that we cannot even form a conception of a more perfect freedom of choice than we actually possess. On this point it has been justly and acutely remarked by Mr. Necker, that 'when we reflect upon our own faculties, we can with ease imagine a superior degree of intelligence, of knowledge, of memory, of foresight, and of every other property of our understanding; liberty is the only part of ourselves to which imagination cannot add any thing.' '*

LEVI HEDGE.

This American author was a Professor in Harvard College, and published, in 1816, "Elements of Logic, or a Summary of the General Principles of Reasoning." The work, so far as its metaphysical views are concerned, is founded on the opinions of Reid and Stewart. The author divides his subject into three parts. In the first, we have an account of the several powers or faculties of the mind; in the second, he treats of terms and propositions; and in the third, he comprehends those intellectual instruments engaged in the work of

* Stewart's Act. and Mor. Powers, p. 518.

argumentation or demonstration. The treatise is plain and practical, and agreeably written. "Inductive reasoning," the author says, is "founded on a belief, that the course of nature is based on uniform laws, and that things will happen in future, as we have observed them to happen in times past. We can give no proof of a permanent connection between any events, or between any two qualities either of body or mind. The only reason for supposing such a connection in any instance is, that we have invariably found certain things to have been conjoined in fact; and this experience, in many cases, produces a conviction equal to that of demonstration." *

REV. FRED. BEASLEY.

The author of this publication† was, when it was given to the world, Provost of the University of Pennsylvania, and a Presbyterian of the Episcopal Church in the city of Philadelphia.

The principal object of the work is to defend the leading principles of Locke, as they are unfolded in his "Essay on the Human Understanding." The following passage, from the Dedication of Dr. Beasley's book, will furnish the reader with a general notion of its scope and tendency. "I certainly," says he, "should not have had the presumption to obtrude upon the public a work of

* Elements, &c., p. 61.

† "A Search of Truth in the Science of the Human Mind." (Philadelphia, 1822.)

such magnitude, and upon a topic so difficult and interesting, if I had not conceived that I had something new, and not altogether unimportant, to communicate. You are aware that in the College of Princeton, to which we were attached, after the fanciful theory of Bishop Berkeley, as a kind of philosophical day-dream, had maintained its prevalence for a season, the principles of Reid and the Scottish metaphysicians superseded it; and during the period of our residence in the Seminary, acquired and maintained undisputed sway. At that time, I, together with all those graduates who took any interest in the subject, embraced without doubt or hesitation the doctrines of the Scottish school. Since, however, I came in possession of the station which I at present occupy in the College of Philadelphia, my duty, as well as inclination, led me to renew my inquiries into this branch of science. The farther I proceeded, the more interesting the subject became; and I determined, if possible, to compass the whole ground, by consulting every author who had written upon it, both in ancient and modern times. I had advanced but a short distance upon this extended plan, before I thought I perceived that the Scottish metaphysicians had either inadvertently or wilfully done their predecessors very great injustice, in their animadversions upon their writings; ascribed to them opinions which they never held; assumed to themselves the merit of broaching and promulgating the very doctrines which they

taught ; and, at the same time, had fallen into the grossest errors in that new system of pneumatology, which they claimed the merit of introducing. Dr. Reid, who is, undoubtedly, the best writer upon these topics that Scotland has produced, discovering at times considerable clearness of understanding, and neatness and perspicuity of style, acknowledges 'that he never thought of calling in question the principles commonly received with regard to human nature, until the *Treatise of Human Nature* (Mr. Hume's) was published.' "

A considerable portion of Dr. Beasley's work is devoted to the pointing out of the misconceptions of the Scottish writers, and defending the general positions of Locke's system. This defensive line of warfare has led the author into discussions on almost all the interesting and subtle questions in metaphysical science.

ASA BURTON.

The work of this author, "*Essays on some of the first Principles of Metaphysics, Morals, and Theology*," 1825, was written expressly to bear upon certain religious questions. The author has no particular theory, but says that he takes facts, experience, and common sense as his guides.

There is a great deal of valuable discussion in that part of Dr. Burton's book which treats on the faculties of the mind ; on the understanding, per-

ception, memory, judgment, conscience, free-will, and moral responsibility. His language is simple, clear, concise, and impressive.

REV. THOMAS C. UPHAM.

This American author has filled, for several years, the distinguished office of Professor of Moral and Mental Philosophy in Bowdoin College; and is well known in his own country for several works of a philosophical character.

Mr. Upham commences his "Elements"* with an Introduction, embracing the nature and influence of primary or elemental truths; the spiritual or immaterial nature of mind; the laws and rules of human belief; and a classified summary of mental phenomena.

There are three great divisions under which the author classifies all the states or phenomena of mind. 1st, *Intellectual*, or intellective states. 2nd, *Sensibilities*, or sentient states. 3rd, *Volitions*, or voluntary states.†

DIVISION 1st.—INTELLECT OR UNDERSTANDING, comprehends three parts.

Part 1st.—The External or receptive intellect; intellectual states of external origin.

Part 2nd.—Internal or suggestive intellect; intellectual states of internal origin.

* "Elements of Mental Philosophy, embracing the Two Departments of Intellect and Sensibilities." 2 vols. New York, 1843.

† This third division is embraced in a separate work, entitled "A Philosophical and Practical Treatise on the Will."

Part 3rd.—Imperfect and disordered intellectual action.

The *First Part* is again divided into fifteen chapters, which we shall here enumerate; and they will show the reader the subjects which are treated of, and something of the plan adopted in treating of them. Chap. I. Origin of knowledge in general. Chap. II. Sensation and perception. Chaps. III., IV., V., and VI. contain a full and accurate analysis of the five senses. Chap. VII. Of reliance on the senses. Chap. VIII. Habits of sensation and perception. Chap. IX. Muscular habits. Chap. X. Conception. Chap. XI. Simplicity and complexness of mental states. Chap. XII. Abstraction. Chap. XIII. General abstract ideas. Chap. XIV. Of attention. Chap. XV. Dreaming.

The *Second Part* also contains fifteen chapters. Chap. I. Internal origin of knowledge. Chap. II. Origin of suggestion. Chap. III. Consciousness. Chap. IV. Relative suggestion or judgment. Chap. V. Association—primary laws. Chap. VI. Association—secondary laws. Chap. VII. Casual associations. Chaps. VIII., IX., X., XI. XII., XIII., and XIV. are on memory, reasoning, and imagination. Chap. XV. Complex ideas of internal origin.

The *Third Part* of this FIRST DIVISION contains an account of the *Imperfect and Disordered Intellectual Action*. There are here four chapters, which embrace the ill-directed or deranged actions of the intellect, displayed in the operations of all

the states or powers of the mind which have been explained in the two preceding parts.

To the SECOND GREAT DIVISION there are two introductory chapters on the relation of the intellect to the sensibilities, and a classification of the sensibilities themselves.

DIVISION 2nd. — SENSIBILITIES OR SENTIENT STATES.

Part 1st.—Natural or pathematic sensibilities ; pathematic sentiments.

Part 2nd.—Moral sensibilities, or conscience ; conscious sentiments.

Part 3rd.—Imperfect and disordered sensitive action.

The pathematic sensibilities are subdivided into *Emotions* and *Desires*.

The Emotions occupy seven chapters ; the principal of which are, emotions of beauty, original and associated ; emotions of sublimity, original and associated ; emotions of the ludicrous, of cheerfulness, joy, gladness, melancholy, sorrow, grief, surprise, astonishment, disgust, reverence, modesty, shame, adoration, &c.

The *Desires* include the instincts, appetites, propensities ; the affections, malevolent and benevolent : and this part is concluded with a chapter on habits of the sensibilities.

The sensibilities belonging to the *Second Part* of this division our author likewise divides into two classes. 1st, Emotions of approval and disapproval. 2nd, Feelings of moral obligation. The

first Class are discussed in five chapters. Chap. I. Proofs of a moral nature. Chap. II. Emotions of moral approval and disapproval. Chap. III. Relation of reasoning to the moral nature. Chaps. IV. and V. On the nature of moral beauty and sublimity.

The author treats the feelings of moral obligation under the following heads. Chap. I. Existence of obligatory feelings. Chap. II. The nature of obligatory feelings. Chap. III. Uniformity in action of moral sensibilities. Chap. IV. Immutability of moral distinctions. Chap. V. Moral education.

The *Third Part* contains a discussion on the imperfect and disordered manifestations of the appetites, propensities, desires, affections, emotions, and feelings.

With respect to the mental doctrine of *primary truths*, on which the author lays considerable stress, his views are, in all essential particulars, the same as those of Father Buffier. His definition is, to the very letter, a translation of the French author's position. These truths Mr. Upham says, are "such, and such only, as can neither be proved nor refuted by other propositions of greater perspicuity."

On the great question as to the origin of our ideas or knowledge, he seems to have adopted the views of Locke and Stewart. With the former he makes *sensation*, the *occasion*, *source*, or *condition* of thought; and with the latter, he coincides in the belief, that many of our most abstract and im-

portant notions spring out of the natural resources of the mind itself. The following observations will fully illustrate this portion of the author's system.

“In making the human soul a subject of inquiry, it is an obvious consideration that a distinction may be drawn between the soul, contemplated in itself, and its acts or states, or the knowledge which it possesses. The inquiry, therefore, naturally arises, under what circumstances the acquisition of knowledge begins? It is enough to express our continued reliance on the general experience and testimony of mankind, so far as it is possible to ascertain them on a subject of so much difficulty, that the beginnings of thought and knowledge are immediately subsequent to certain affections of those bodily organs which we call the SENSES. In other words, were it not for impressions on the senses, which may be traced to objects external to them, our mental capabilities, whatever they may be, would in all probability have remained folded up, and have never been redeemed from a state of fruitless inaction. Hence the process, which is implied in the perception of external things, or what is commonly termed by Mr. Locke, *sensation*, may justly be considered the OCCASION of the introductory step to all our knowledge. But it does not follow from this, nor is it by any means true, that the whole amount of it, in its ultimate progress, is to be ascribed directly to the same source. All that can be said with truth is, that the mind receives the earliest part of its ideas by means of the senses, and that, in con-

sequence of having received these elementary thoughts, all its powers become rapidly and fully operative. And here we come to the SECOND great source of knowledge. The powers of the mind being thus fairly brought into exercise, its various operations then furnish us with another set of notions, which, by way of distinguishing them from those received through the direct mediation of the senses, may be called, in the language of Mr. Locke, ideas of reflection; or, to use a phraseology embracing all possible cases, ideas of INTERNAL ORIGIN. These two sources of human thought, the internal and external, however they may have been confounded by some writers, are entirely distinct."

Those chapters in Mr. Upham's work which are devoted to the explication of the phenomena of the various organs of sensation, do not present any novelty of thought or argument. They are substantially founded on the Scottish philosophy. "Perception," says he, "may be defined an affection or state of the mind, which is immediately successive to certain affections of the organ of sense, and which is referred by us to something external as its cause."* Our notions of extension, figure, resistance, and of things external to the mind, are, according to our author's ideas, the result of the sense of *touch*, at least he affirms that this organ of sensation is the *occasion*, or *condition* on which these ideas are suggested.

* Vol. 1, p. 81.

Mr. Upham's remarks on what he terms *suggestive intellect*, are precisely similar to what may be found in all the writings of the Scottish metaphysicians. Where distinctions are attempted to be made, they are distinctions without difference.

In the second volume, the Professor enters upon the consideration of the sensibilities, or *sentient states of mind*. He endeavours to point out the positive and substantial difference between the mind, and the moral constitution of man ; between what is purely mental, and what belongs to our emotions or feelings. But here we cannot recognise any novelty, either in the analysis or in the illustrations. There is, however, great clearness and force of expression. On the subject of beauty and sublimity, the author differs from those who consider them as the result of secondary and complex states of mental existence. The author contends that the beauty in certain objects, such as forms, colours, &c., belongs intrinsically to the objects themselves, and is not the result of association, or any other mental power. "Taste," says he, "in the most general sense of the term, is the power of judging of the beauty and deformity of objects, *founded on the experience of the emotions*."

This second volume of Professor Upham's work is decidedly the best, both for the general reader and the metaphysical and moral student. The exposition of the leading doctrines of philosophy is on the whole very able, though by no means marked with the attribute of originality, either in illustration or argument. His work is comprehensive, syste-

matic, and judiciously arranged ; and the general impression which the work leaves upon the mind is, that there is a healthy spirit of philosophical discussion pervading the whole.

S. S. SCHMUCKER, D.D.*

This metaphysical writer is President and Professor of Theology in the College at Gettysburgh, and enjoys among his countrymen a high literary reputation.

In the Introduction to this Treatise on the Mind, there is a review of its various divisions, or its operations, which have in divers ways been descanted on by modern philosophers of almost every school in Europe. All previous classifications the Doctor rejects, and forms a new arrangement, which is also clothed in a new terminology. His system does not involve a division of the powers or faculties of the mind, but only its operations or phenomena.

The whole of the operations or phenomena of mind, he places under THREE GREAT CLASSES. 1st, *Cognitive Ideas* ; 2nd, *Sentient Ideas* ; 3rd, *Active Operations*. The cognitive class of ideas embraces perception, acts of consciousness, conceptions, judgments, recollections, the results of reasoning, but not the process. The sentient ideas comprise sensations, emotions, affections, and passions, to a certain extent. In the active opera-

* Psychology, or Elements of a New System of Mental Philosophy. New York, 1844.

tions, volitions, processes of reasoning, but not the results, are comprehended ; the act of memorizing, but not its results ; and similar mental operations.

The *First Part* of the treatise, embracing the first class of ideas, contains three Chapters. Chap. I. Of objective entities as subjects of our knowledge. This Chapter consists of four sections. 1st, of the different classes of entities, such as solids, liquids, gases, light, mind, spirit, time, space, number, &c. 2nd, Division of these classes of entities into absolute and concrete. 3rd, Subdivision of concrete entities into substantive, adjective, and composite. 4th, Relation of entities. Chapter II. Of Cognitive ideas. This is also divided into four sections. 1st, The nature of our ideas that constitute knowledge. 2nd, The criteria by which these ideas are distinguished. 3rd, The nature and sources of error in our ideas. 4th, The division of all these ideas into individual and relative ; and retrospective, present, and prospective. Chapter III. Of the organic processes by which we obtain our cognitive ideas. Here the author furnishes us with an explanation of the processes of sensation, of which the five senses are the media.

The *Second Part* of the work is occupied with sentient ideas. This is composed of three Chapters. Chapter 1st, Classification of our feelings. These are all considered as individual or relative. The individual are, sensations, pleasant and unpleasant. The relative comprise the benevolent, malevolent, sympathetic, and antipathetic feelings. Chapter

2nd, Of entities as excitants to feeling. Chapter 3rd, The susceptibilities of the mind for feeling, and the laws which regulate these susceptibilities.

The *Third Part*.—The active operations here enumerated are, 1st, Inspection. 2nd, Arrangement. 3rd, Modification. 4th, Mental direction of our physical agency. 5th, Intellectual intercourse. Under these names we have here described the processes of perception, consciousness, conception, judgment, reasoning, remembering, impulses of conscience, classification, association, abstraction, imagination, generalization, composition, &c. The last chapter of the book is on the mode of occurrence of these five active operations. This mode is twofold, voluntary and spontaneous.

Dr. Schmucker's work is of a different stamp from that of Upham. The Doctor is of the German school, and displays a great deal of the transcendental quaintness and crabbed terminology, which belong to the speculative philosophy of this part of Europe. He calls his lucubrations "A New System of Mental Philosophy;" but there will be found, in reality, very little of novelty in it, save the new terms and phrases in which he has enveloped his ideas.

The mental philosophy of Dr. Schmucker is of the inductive school; he professes to know nothing of mind but what is phenomenal and relative, though he is not able at all times to keep his speculations within the prescribed boundaries which he has chalked out for his inquiries. As an instance of this, we shall just quote two or three passages

relative to the Doctor's classification of the active operations of the soul, which display his leaning to ontological discussions.

"1st, By inspection we would designate that active operation in which the attention of the soul is directed to some entity, simple or composite; prospective, present, or retrospective; with a view to acquire some knowledge concerning it.

"2nd, Arrangement is that active operation of the soul, by which we select some from among the mass, either of external entities themselves, or of our mental representative of them, and place them as wholes or units, in particular order, with a view to a specific purpose.

"3rd, Modification is that active operation of the soul, by which we take some from among our mental representatives, (rarely the objective entities themselves,) and bring them into such forms or combinations as do not correspond to realities; that is, make arbitrary substantive and composite entities out of them."

Dr. Schmucker differs from those writers on the mind who consider it as consisting of distinct faculties or powers. He views the mind through the medium of its *states, operations, or phenomena*. On this controverted point we refer the reader to a discussion on the nature of distinct faculties in a preceding part of this work.

The terminology, as well as the minute distinctions, of Dr. Schmucker's classification of mental phenomena, are decidedly objectionable. They tend to bewilder and perplex the student, and to

retard the progress of sound philosophy. As an example of the Doctor's mode of classification, we shall just mention, that in reference to the *active operations* of the mind we find the following enumeration:—perception, conception, judgment, recollection, and analytical reasoning, referred to the division of *inspection*; the processes of comparison, classification, synthetic reasoning, constitute *arrangement*; and abstraction, generalization, imagination, and fancy, form *modification*. This is by no means a useful and happy mode of arranging mental phenomena.

HENRY P. TAPPAN.

The writer of this work* was a Professor of Moral Philosophy in one of the Colleges at New York, and is the author of a treatise on Free-will, and other abstruse and esteemed publications. The following analysis is confined to his Introductory View of Philosophy in general, and Preliminary View of the Reason.

The *First Part* is in fourteen Sections. Sec. 1. Definition of philosophy. Sec. 2. Distinction between the phenomenal and the metaphenomenal. That which is made known to us in consciousness is the phenomenal; all without, all indeed but the operations of the mind, are metaphenomenal.

* "Elements of Logic. Together with an Introductory View of Philosophy in general, and a Preliminary View of the Reason." New York, 1844.

Sec. 3. Of the reality of the metaphenomenal, that is, the real existence of the external world, and other things, besides the operations of mind.

Sec. 4. The objective and subjective. The subjective is *the me—myself*; the objective, every thing that is *not me*, not *myself*.

Sec. 5. Reason and sense. Sec. 6. Sensualism and transcendentalism.

Sec. 7. Ideas and laws. Sec. 8. Primary and secondary phenomena. Sec. 9. Antecedents in

time and in necessary existence. Sec. 20. Ideas, the last authority of all judgments or knowledge.

Sec. 11. Divisions of philosophy; *first*, metaphysics, comprehending psychology, dynamics, anthropology, ontology; *secondly*, nomology, comprehending morals, esthetics, domatology, logic.

Sec. 12. Of the relations between philosophy and the sciences and arts. Sec. 13. Reason, the organ

of philosophy. Sec. 14. Criteria of a true philosophy.

The *Second Part* is on Reason. Sec. 1. Nature of the reason; it is that which knows and comprehends; the whole, in fact, of the cognitive faculties. Sec. 2. Ideas and functions of the reason. Ideas are of two kinds—metaphysical and nomological. The functions of the reason are, intuition, abstraction, generalization, judgment, invention, mediate perception, induction, memory, recollection, attention, imagination, and consciousness. The remaining parts of the work are occupied with an explanation of the ideas and functions of the reason.

Mr. Tappan's publication is decidedly of a high

German character. He is a transcendentalist of the school of Kant and Fichte. On this point there can be no dispute. The author says, "The first elements of thought, whatever they be, must be the foundations of all subsequent cognitions. If, according to Locke, these first elements were merely the phenomena, which are the immediate objects of consciousness, they undoubtedly would be the foundations of all the subsequent knowledge, as he has represented them. According to the transcendental system, however, the original elements are ideas, or simple intuitions of the pure reason, given upon sensuous conditions, but not formed out of them." * And he afterwards observes, that "it must follow that the ultimate bases of all knowledge and belief must be the *ideas of the reason*."

The following passage is quite fresh from Germany. "The great Creator foreknew all possible being, because he had the ideas of all possible being. Man, the finite mind, knows after creation has taken place, and after he has received, in his sensitivity, motions from that creation; but that he knows at all, arises from a reason made in the likeness of the Divine; and having preconcerted capacities or ideas adapted to primordial, universal, and necessary truths; the very truths in which the outer world, indeed the whole world of created being, lives, moves, and has its being." †

* * * An able notice of the works of Upham, Schmucker, and Tappan, will be found in the *British Quarterly Review* for February, 1847.

* Page 55.

† Page 131.

R. W. EMERSON.

Mr. Emerson, though a man of genius, and a popular writer, can scarcely be considered a cultivator of mental philosophy. What notions he has on the subject seem to be of an *ideal* cast. In his "Essays," which have been published some years in this country, we find only three out of the number which have any direct reference to metaphysical inquiries; namely, "The Over-Soul," "Intellect," and "Nominalism and Realism." But none of these contain any formal discussions on the nature and laws of thought; only some general metaphysical conceptions, couched in pointed, quaint, and antithetical language, suited to attract the attention of ordinary Essay readers. We shall give a specimen or two of his writing, in order to show the current of his thoughts, and the style in which he clothes them. In the "Essay" on the *Intellect* he observes, "In the intellect constructive, which we popularly designate by the word genius, we observe the same balance of two elements as in intellect receptive. The constructive intellect produces thoughts, sentences, poems, plans, designs, systems. It is the generation of the mind, the marriage of thought with nature. To genius must always belong two gifts, the thought and the publication. The first is revelation, always a miracle, which no frequency of occurrence or incessant study can ever familiarise, but which must

always leave the inquirer stupid with wonder. It is the advent of truth into the world ; a form of thought now for the first time bursting into the universe ; a child of the old eternal soul ; a piece of genuine and immeasurable greatness. It seems, for the time, to inherit all that has yet existed, and to dictate to the unborn. It effects every thought of man, and goes to fashion every institution. But to make it available, it needs a vehicle or art by which it is conveyed to men. To be communicable, it must become picture or sensible object. We must learn the language of facts."

* * * "The thought of genius is spontaneous ; but the power of picture or expression, in the most enriched and flowing nature, implies a mixture of will, a certain control over the spontaneous states, without which no production is possible. It is a conversion of all nature into the rhetoric of thought, under the eye of judgment, with a strenuous exercise of choice. And yet the imaginative vocabulary seems to be spontaneous also. It does not flow from experience only or mainly, but from a richer source."*

On Nominalism and Realism we have the following odd and quaint remarks :—

"In the famous disputes with the Nominalists, the Realists had a good deal of reason. General ideas are essences. They are our gods : they round and ennoble the most partial and sordid way of

* *Essays*, p. 337.

living. Our proclivity to details cannot quite degrade our life, and divest it of poetry. The day labourer is reckoned as standing at the foot of the social scale, yet he is saturated with the laws of the world. His measures are the hours ; morning and night, solstice and equinox, geometry, astronomy, and all the lovely accidents of nature, play through his mind. Money, which represents the prose of life, and which is hardly spoken of in parlours without an apology, is, in its effects and laws, as beautiful as roses. Property keeps the accounts of the world, and is always moral. The property will be found where the labour, the wisdom, and the virtue have been in nations, in classes, and (the whole life-time considered, with the compensations) in the individual also. How wise the world appears, when the laws and usages of nations are largely detailed, and the completeness of the municipal system is considered ! Nothing is left out. If you go into the markets, and the custom-houses, the insurers' and the notaries' offices, the offices of sealers of weights and measures, of inspection of provisions,—it will appear as if one man had made it all. Wherever you go, a wit like your own has been before you, and has realised its thought. The Eleusinian mysteries, the Egyptian architecture, the Indian astronomy, the Greek sculpture, show that there always were seeing and knowing men in the planet. The world is full of masonic ties, of guilds, of secret and public legions of honour ; that of scholars, for example ; and that of gentlemen fraternizing with

the upper class of every country and every culture.”*

Our limits will not allow us to dwell on the following works; we, therefore, must barely give the author's names, and the titles of their respective publications.

EZRA STILES ELY.—This author, a Doctor of Divinity, published his “Conversations on the Science of the Human Mind,” in 1819, at Philadelphia.

“An Essay concerning the Free Agency of Man, or the powers and faculties of the Human Mind, the Decrees of God, Moral Obligation, Natural Law, and Morality,” Montpelier, 1821.

REV. JOHN WITHERSPOON, D.D.—Lectures on Moral Philosophy,” 1822.

“The Alphabet of Thought, or Elements of Metaphysical Science,” Harrisburgh, 1825.—By a Lady.

SAMPSON REID.—“Observations on the Growth of the Mind,” Boston, 1827.

“Essays devoted Principally to the Discussion of the great Metaphysical Question of, How we acquire a Knowledge of External Objects,” New York, 1827.

GEORGE PAINE.—“Elements of Mental and Moral Science, designed to exhibit the Original Susceptibilities of the Mind,” Boston, 1829.

* Essays, second series, p. 154.

REV. SILAS BLAISDALE. — "First Lessons on Intellectual Philosophy," Boston, 1830.

LYSANDER SPOONER.—"The Deist's Immortality, and on Man's Accountability for his Belief," Boston, 1834.

FRANCIS WAYLAND, D.D.—"Elements of Moral Science," New York, 1835. This treatise contains much that is interesting to the metaphysician. It is grounded on the principle, that a careful examination of human nature will infallibly lead us to true results as to its real character; just, in fact, as a similar careful examination into any other department of God's creation will entitle us to pronounce a verdict upon it.

FRED. A. RAUCH.—This author is a German, but now naturalized in America, and was lately a Professor in Marshall College, Pennsylvania. His work, "Psychology, or a View of the Human Soul," was published in 1835. It is a very excellent and common-sense publication, and has been well received in the United States.

REV. JASPER ADAMS. — "Elements of Moral Philosophy," Cambridge, South Carolina, 1837.

JEREMIAH DAY.—"An Inquiry respecting the Self-determining Power of the Will, or Contingent Volition," Newhaven, 1838.

AMOS DEAN. — "The Philosophy of Human Life; being an Investigation of the Great Elements of Life; the Power that Acts; the Will that directs the Action; and the Accountability, or Sanctions, that Influence the Formation of Volitions," Boston, 1840.

CHARLES K. TRUE. — “Elements of Logic,” Boston, 1840.

FRANCIS BOWEN.—“Critical Essays on a few Subjects connected with the History and present Condition of Speculative Philosophy,” Boston, 1842.

LEICESTER A. SAWYER.—“A Critical Exposition of Mental Philosophy, or the First Principles of Metaphysics,” Newhaven, 1839. This is an able work, though the writer does not appear to have a very extensive acquaintanee with the history of philosophy. He lays down his positions, however, with great clearness; and his book must prove useful to general readers, and particularly to students.

RICHARD HILDRETH.—“Theory of Morals; an Inquiry concerning the Law of Moral Distinctions, and the Variations and Contradictions of Ethical Codes,” Boston, 1844.*

* See Note L. at the end of this Volume.

CHAPTER VIII.

PHYSIOGNOMY, THE DOCTRINE OF TEMPERAMENTS,
PHYSIOLOGY, AND MESMERISM.

It is quite obvious that as soon as men began to reflect upon their own nature and state, and to mark the divers bodily and mental faculties with which they are endowed, the more prominent relations which subsist between mind and body would be noticed and recorded. The expressions of thought in the countenance; the exhibitions of mental vigour associated with peculiar physical qualities and powers; the effects of health and disease upon the intellectual functions; and a thousand other relations which spring up between the living man and external things around him, must have formed the first rudiments of knowledge, and laid the foundation for every speculative system on human nature of which we have any account.

We find, therefore, that physiognomy, the doctrine of distinct temperaments of the body, physiological speculations as to the nature and

properties of the living principle of existence, and mesmeric phenomena, are among the very oldest memorials of philosophical inquiries. They all spring out of one source ; and, in a certain point of view, are but modifications of each other. They form, however, collectively, a separate school of metaphysical philosophy ; inasmuch as they all have a direct reference to certain modes in which the mind develops itself ; to numerous relations which subsist between minds of different orders when under the influence of various external agents ; and to certain theories, as to the abstract nature or seat of the soul itself.

As we have hitherto refrained from any formal or lengthened notice of these subjects, we shall here make a few remarks upon them ; because we feel conscious that no history of philosophical systems could possibly be considered complete without a knowledge of the leading principles on which the topics enumerated at the head of this Chapter are founded, and of the chief writers who have illustrated and expounded them.

PHYSIOGNOMY.

All men from the beginning of time must have been physiognomists ; and it is equally as true, that all men of the present day are such. No matter what theories they may adopt on the nature of mind, mankind, in their daily intercourse with each other, never lose sight of those leading physical indications of our internal movements, purposes, and desires, which the human countenance,

and bodily frame generally, are so pre-eminently fitted to express.

Physiognomy is, therefore, of the highest antiquity. It was assiduously cultivated in Egypt and India; and it is supposed that Pythagoras was the first to introduce it from these countries into Greece. Plato mentions the subject, and Aristotle has given us a regular treatise upon it. He tells us that the Thracians, the Scythians, and the Egyptians were distinguished from each other, and from other tribes and nations, by peculiarities in their manners and habits, and by certain intellectual and moral qualities. The principle was clearly laid down, that there subsisted a certain and determined relationship between the qualities or external appearances of the body, and the internal powers, dispositions, and feelings of the soul. All noviciates in the Pythagorean schools were subjected to a physiognomical examination before admission; and this fact would seem to indicate that physiognomy must have formed a regular branch of Grecian philosophy at this early period of the history of letters. Theophrastus followed Aristotle, and treated of the physiognomy of manners. And we find from the work entitled "*Physiognomiæ Veteres Scriptores Græci, Græcè et Latine*," 1780, that there were many other Greek writers on the subject.* The celebrated physicians Hippocrates and Galen are among the number.

Physiognomy was also cultivated by the Romans.

* See "*Physiognomiæ*," &c., *Præfatio*, and the first Six Chapters.

Several distinguished orators, and Cicero among the number, were passionately fond of the science. In the latter's oration against Piso, and in that in favour of Roscius, we perceive the use he makes of physiognomy. We have many scattered fragments and observations on the science in the writings of Sallust, Suetonius, Seneca, Pliny, Aulus Gellius, Petronius, and Plutarch. Indeed there is ample proof that the science was cultivated among the Romans by regular Professors, and that it formed an essential branch of public education. In the life of Titus, by Suetonius, it is mentioned that Narcissus employed a professed physiognomist to examine the features of Britannicus, and a prediction followed the examination that Titus would obtain imperial dominion.

The study of physiognomy was in a great measure suspended during several centuries before and after the fall of the Roman Empire; but it was again resuscitated by some active spirits in the middle ages. The names of Cocles, Baptista Porta, Honoratius Nuquetius, Jacobus, Alstedius, Michel Schottus, Gaspar Schottus, Cardan, Taisnierus, Fludd, Böhmen, Barclay, Claromontius, Conringius, Spontanus, Andreas Henricus, Joannes Digander, Goclenius, Alexander Achilinus, Prætorius, Belot, Gratalorus, and the commentators on the *Physiognomica* of Aristotle, Augustin Niphus, and Camillus Balbus, show the general interest which the science excited for many centuries in various parts of Europe.*

* See Morhoff's *Polyhistor*, Vol. 1, lib. 1, and Vol. 2, lib. 3.

In the eighteenth century,* the celebrated work of Lavater gave a new impetus and direction to physiognomical studies. He treated of the matter in a more plain and common-sense style, than most of the writers who had preceded him. He was an acute and accurate observer of nature, and infused great piquancy and life into all his descriptions. The science of physiognomy is defined to be, that of discovering the internal feelings and intellectual capabilities of man, by certain external indications. The speculations of Lavater were attacked by M. Formey, in the Berlin Transactions for 1775, who contended that Lavater's definition of the science could not be supported by an appeal to facts. Lavater's system, however, enjoyed for many years great popularity throughout the whole of Europe ; but he experienced, before his decease, in 1801, the mortification of seeing it gradually sink into obscurity and forgetfulness.†

We cannot enter into any formal examination of Lavater's system ; but we shall quote an observation or two from him, to show what his general conceptions of human nature were. He says, " Of all the organized beings discoverable by our senses, there is no one in which are collected and blended three sorts of life so different from each other, and

* A short time before the appearance of Lavater's work, there was an animated discussion in the Berlin Transactions for 1769 and 1770, between Pernetty and Le Cat, on the subject of Physiognomy ; the former resolved all knowledge into it, and the latter confined it entirely to the human face.

† Lavater first published his work, in the form of a pamphlet, in 1772. His great work appeared three years afterwards.

which at the same time unite, in a manner inconceivably marvellous, to form but one whole ; the *animal*, the *intellectual* and the *moral* life ; each of which is, moreover, a combination of powers essentially different, but perfectly harmonious."

"To *know*, to *desire*, to *act*, or rather to observe or think, to feel and be attracted, to possess the power of motion and resistance ; these render a man a *physical*, *moral*, and *intellectual* being."

"Man can be known only by certain external manifestations ; by the body, by his surface. Spiritual and immaterial as the internal principle is, and however elevated by its nature beyond the reach of sense, it is rendered visible and perceptible only by its correspondence with the body where it resides, and in which it acts and moves, as in its proper element. This principle thus becomes a subject of observation ; and every thing in man that can be known, is discovered solely through the medium of the senses." "The organization of man distinguishes him from all the other inhabitants of the globe ; and his physiognomy, by which I mean the surface and the outline of his organization, infinitely exalt him above all the visible beings which exist and live around him. We are acquainted with no form so noble, so sublime, so majestic as his ; with none that contains so many faculties, so many kinds of life, so many degrees of force, so many powers of action."*

* Works, Vol. 1, pp. 14, 15. Edition 1789.

THE DOCTRINE OF TEMPERAMENTS.

The doctrine of temperaments is very ancient. The nomenclature which is used to express them at the present hour is the same as that used more than two thousand years ago. Hippocrates classified all constitutions under four heads, the sanguine, the phlegmatic, the choleric, and the melancholic; and to these several temperaments various intellectual powers and tendencies were ascribed. In modern times the number of temperaments has been increased by several writers. Boerhaave makes eight; namely, the warm, cold, moist, dry, bilious, sanguine, phlegmatic, and atrabilious. Dr. Darwin attempted to improve upon this arrangement, and established only four temperaments, agreeing with irritation, sensation, volition, and association. Dr. Cullen returned to the original system of Hippocrates; which has continued to be adopted, with some modifications, to the present day.

These various temperaments are blended together in various degrees and proportions; and examples may daily be met with of every form of combination. Climate, habit, and education greatly modify the several temperaments.

In an intellectual and moral point of view, the doctrine of temperaments has been subject to considerable discussion. Various mental tendencies and habits are ascribed to different bodily conformations. Hippocrates tells us that the soul is the

same in all mankind, but that there are great physical varieties of constitution which modify and influence its powers and energy.* Democritus affirms that the intellect greatly depends upon the body, the diseases and ailments of which impair its faculties. This subject is treated of by Hoffmann at considerable length. He tells us that the choleric temperament makes good generals, ambassadors, orators, and conductors of public business ; that the sanguine temperament is favourable for courtiers ; men of a melancholic disposition should be ministers and councillors of state ; and that the phlegmatic ought to be made soldiers and labourers.

Dr. Thomas, a French writer, has promulgated a theory on Temperaments, which has excited considerable attention, both in his own country and in Great Britain. He views the human body as consisting of three great groups of organs, each performing distinct offices, and each consisting of many parts. The first part is contained in the cranium, and it manifests itself in the operations of sensation, and of the faculties of the mind generally. The second relates to the organs in the cavity of the thorax, the lungs, and heart, these being appropriated to the general purposes of sanguification and circulation. And the third group is that contained in the abdomen, the organs of which are employed in converting the chyle into food, and in the ordinary purposes of separation and excretion. These three groups constitute all the living energy

* Hipp. De Victus Ratione, lib. 1.

of the physical frame ; and on the various proportions or degrees in which they are blended in individual conformations, depends the specific temperament of the man. When these groups of organs are blended in suitable proportions, then his animal nature presents the most perfect form ; and the intellectual faculties, sufficiently developed, preserve a steady direction, neither urging into vague conjectures on the one hand, nor lapsing into mental apathy or indifference on the other.”*

Several writers on temperaments go more minutely and profoundly into the mental and moral qualities associated with particular bodily organizations. The *choleric* temperament, it is said, displays great susceptibility of feeling, quickness of perception, and energy of action ; and on this account indicates a lofty state of the bodily organs. The prevailing characteristics of this temperament are rapidity, strength, a lively imagination, violent passions, quickness of decision, inflexible perseverance, a tendency to ambition, pride, and anger, joined, however, with a degree of magnanimity and generosity of purpose. These qualities are combined with a physical form of more firmness than grace ; a rather dark and sallow complexion, sparkling eyes, and considerable muscular power. “These men,” says an able writer, “are urged by a constant restlessness to action ; an habitual sentiment of inquietude allows them no peace but in

* “*Physiologie des Tempéramens ou Constitutions, &c.,*” par F. Thomas, Paris, 1826.

the tumult of business ; the hours of crowded life are the only ones they value ; and they are to be found wherever hardness of resolution, prompt decision, and permanence of enterprise, are required." The *phlegmatic* temperament is, in a great measure, the reverse of the choleric. The phlegmatic has little inclination to action ; a very limited portion of sensibility ; no great stock of physical strength or dexterity ; has rather a dull and gloomy appearance ; all the feelings assume a subdued and tranquil tone ; the mind clear but limited ; little imagination and profundity ; and displays a strong disposition to repose and tranquillity. All the vices and virtues of this class of persons are of a mediocre character. The *sanguine* temperament is indicative of a lively susceptibility ; little inclination to action ; promptness without much perseverance ; a lively fancy ; no great depth of thought ; changeable in temper, but not of violent feelings and passions ; a tendency to pleasure, levity, and a fondness for admiration and fame. Persons of this organization are commonly distinguished for beauty and grace ; and the bodily frame bespeaks vigour and vivacity in all its leading functions. They are usually witty, gay, elegant, and engaging in society. The *melancholy* temper has but little susceptibility, but great energy of action ; a reserved and contemplative manner ; great firmness of purpose ; indefatigable perseverance ; profound reflection ; constancy of feeling and of friendship ; an inclination to gloomi-

ness, despondency, asceticism, insanity, and misanthropy.

It is generally conceded that there is much truth in the doctrine of temperaments. Every physician takes it in some measure as a guide in his professional avocations. It is, however, just one of those systems which are liable to fanciful and absurd conclusions, when closely applied to the solution of intellectual phenomena.*

PHYSIOLOGY.

Physiology takes a wider range than physiognomy and the doctrine of temperaments. It embraces nicer and more refined speculations, and is more closely allied to metaphysical disquisitions.

Physiological speculations held an important station among the Greek philosophers. Pythagoras taught that man was a microcosm of the universe; that the human soul was nourished by the blood, and became obedient to the general laws of universal harmony. Alcmaeon considered the brain as the seat of the intellectual powers. Empedocles and Democritus had each their respective theories on the subject. Plato and Aristotle were also great speculators on physiological phenomena; and it was about their era that the cultivators of the science became formally divided into two

* See Hippocrates, "De Natura Hominis," tom. 1; Galen, "De Elementis ex Hippocrate," tom. 1; Oribasius, "Synopsis," lib. 5; Aëtius, "Libri Medicinales," lib. 4; and Haly Abbas, Averroes, Alsharavius, Avicenna, Hoffmann, Dr. Pritchard, &c.

classes, the materialists and the spiritualists ; a distinction which may be appropriately adopted at the present day.

During the whole of the middle ages, physiology was more or less cultivated ; chiefly, however, by the medical faculty. Many theories and systems, of the most wild and fanciful description, sprung up in various countries of Europe ; and some of the greatest of our philosophers lent a willing ear to these marvellous delusions. The discoveries in physical science gave a heavy blow to all these learned reveries. About the beginning of the last century, Hoffmann and Stahl commenced their physiological inquiries concerning the principle of life, deriving great advantages from the improvements effected in the physical knowledge of the previous century. Hoffmann conceived that the principle of life or vitality could not be separated from matter, but was one of its essential properties ; that life was a series of mutual actions and re-actions between the fluids and the solids of the body ; and that all the operations of the body and the mind are the result of this regular and harmonious action. Stahl's hypothesis was of a different cast. He thought that an intelligent soul guided the material forces or powers of the body. The whole structure of the body is a passive instrument, and requires the soul or living agent to impress its power upon it. The soul is the active and foreseeing principle which governs by special laws all those phenomena of human life and action which may be considered as independent of the direct in-

fluence of volition. This faculty of the will is independent, and needs no assistance from anything else. There are two sets of organs on which the soul acts for the sustenance of life; sense and motion. Sensation is modified in two ways; the one in relation to external objects made known to us through the organs of sense, and the other has an exclusive reference to our internal feelings or ideas. "The soul gives to its organs the disposition that is favourable to the sensations it wishes to receive, by virtue of the judgment that it exerts respecting these sensations, before it has experienced them. This judgment is exerted on the relations between the objects that excite these impressions and the actual state of the body; and it is the intuitive knowledge of these relations that determines, in all their infinitely diversified shades, the pleasure or pain which the animal experiences from the objects that surround it."

The speculations of Haller aimed at establishing the position that muscular power was entirely different from the power of feeling, or what we term sensibility. De Whytt and Dr. Cullen opposed this doctrine; but our space will not allow our stating the grounds of this opposition. Dr. Darwin speculated deeply on physiological topics; and his views generally, though decidedly material, were founded upon a more extended examination of mental phenomena than many of his predecessors had referred to. He maintains that all human actions are resolvable into four *sensorial powers*; irritation, sensation, volition, and association. All

our muscular motions, and all our ideas, arise from the power of irritability, and are brought within the sphere of causation from sensation, volition, and habit.

From the commencement of the present century, physiological writers have been numerous, both in Great Britain and on the Continent. Their writings have generally been characterised by great ability; combining an acute and accurate observation of facts, with considerable theoretical dexterity in their generalization.

Bichat's system is worthy of notice, not only for its own sake, but on account of the influence it has had on other speculators of distinction. He describes the living principle to be the result of unknown and unknowable powers; but divides it into two parts, the *animal* and *organic* life.* Each of these is composed of two orders of functions, succeeding each other, and possessed of a mutual relationship. In animal life, the first functional

* "Compare together two individuals, one taken from each of these kingdoms; one exists only within itself, and has no other relation to external objects save those of nutrition. It is born, grows, and perishes, attached to the soil which receives its germ. The other joins to this internal life, an external existence, out of which numerous relations arise between it and surrounding objects: and this existence is united to other beings, and approaches near to, or removes it from them, in accordance with its wants or fears." * * * "I call the functions of the former class, taken altogether, the *organic* life, because all organised beings, whether vegetable or animal, enjoy it in a greater or less degree, and because organic structure is the only condition necessary for its exercise. The assembled functions of the second class form the *animal life*, so named, because it is the exclusive attribute of the animal kingdom." (Bichat, "Physiologie.")

order arises from the exterior of the body to the brain ; and the second, from the brain to powers of locomotion. Thus all objects affect successively, the external senses, the nerves, and the brain. The office of the first is to receive, of the second to convey, and of the last to recognise or perceive, which constitutes a *sensation*. All volition centres in the brain. All vital properties may be reduced to two ; feeling or sensibility, and moving or contractility. From the former flow all sensations, perceptions, pleasures, and pains. The perfection of every animated being is in proportion to the extent of its sensibility.

Cuvier's system is founded on the speculations of Hunter. The former makes a pointed distinction between the *instinct* of animals and the *reason* of man.*

Mr. Hunter's theory of the living principle is, that it is some agent or other added, by the creative power of God, to the organized structure of man, to guide and direct it to the final purposes for which it is designed. Man is endowed with an intellectual power or faculty, independent of the

* " Cette pensée qui se considère elle-même, cette intelligence qui se voit et qui s'étudie, cette connaissance qui se connaît, forment évidemment un ordre de phénomènes déterminés d'une nature tranchée, et auxquels nul animal ne saurait atteindre. C'est là, si l'on peut ainsi dire, le monde purement intellectuel, et ce monde n'appartient qu'à l'homme. En un mot, les animaux sentent, connaissent, pensent ; mais l'homme est le seul de tous les êtres créés à qui le pouvoir ait été donné de sentir qu'il sent, de connaître qu'il connaît, et de penser qu'il pense." (Résumé Analytique des Observations de Frédéric Cuvier sur l'Instinct et l'Intelligence des Animaux. Par P. Flourens. p. 55.)

mere animal life which he has in common with other animated creatures. The late Dr. Abernethy adopts this doctrine, and has publicly defended it in his "Enquiry;" a work of considerable merit.* He says, "Thus my mind rests at peace in thinking on the subject of life, as it has been taught by Mr. Hunter; and I am visionary enough to imagine, that if these opinions should become so established as to be generally admitted by philosophers,—that if they once saw reason to believe that life was something of an invisible and active nature superadded to organization,—they would then see equal reason to believe that mind might be superadded, as life is, to structure. They would then indeed still farther perceive how mind and matter might reciprocally operate on each other by means of an intervening substance. Thus even would physiological researches enforce the belief which I may say is natural to man; that in addition to his bodily frame, he possesses a sensitive, intelligent, and independent mind; an opinion which tends in an eminent degree to produce virtuous, honourable, and useful actions."†

A short time after these opinions were promulgated, Dr. Lawrence published his "Introduction to Comparative Anatomy and Physiology," 1816, in which he advances doctrines diametrically opposed to those of Hunter and Abernethy. This led to a public controversy, which created some

* "An Enquiry into the Probability and Rationality of Mr. Hunter's Theory of Life," London, 1814.

† "Enquiry," &c. p. 94.

sensation at the time. Lawrence's opinions are decidedly material. He says, "The *cerebral functions*, which are much more numerous and diversified in the higher orders of the Mammalia, than in any of the preceding divisions of the animal kingdom, receive their last development in man; where they produce all the phenomena of intellect, all those wonderful processes of thought, known under the names of memory, reflection, association, judgment, reasoning, imagination; which so far transcend any analogous appearance in animals, that we *almost* feel a repugnance to refer them to the same principle. If therefore we were to follow strictly the great series of living bodies through its whole extent, we should see its vital properties gradually increased in number and energy from the last of plants, the mosses or the algæ, to the first of animals, man." Here we have the old material hypothesis again revived; an hypothesis as old as philosophy itself. It has been attacked and refuted a thousand times over, but Mr. Lawrence approaches the question as if nothing had ever been said on the matter. His observations assume the aspect of a first discovery.*

* "Mr. Lawrence, it will instantly be recollected by every reader, whatever other merit may belong to him, has not that of being the inventor of these doctrines. They are as old as any on record, and have been advanced and confuted, and revived and driven into obscurity, again and again. In the present instance, Mr. Lawrence has copied them, and even the terms in which he has expressed them, from the school of modern French philosophy. Indeed, this is not the first occasion on which he has consented to become a mere copyist, and for the purpose of propagating these worn-out but mischievous opinions; he is understood

The "Sketches on the Philosophy of Life," 1819, by Sir T. C. Morgan, advance the same material opinions as those entertained by Dr. Lawrence, only the Baronet does not develop them with so much propriety and clearness. A line or two may be quoted from him, fully significant of the general tenor of his speculations. "Essentially linked with the power of locomotion, relative sensibility is distributed to the different animals in an exact proportion to the wants of their organization; being resident in a tissue, whose development is regulated in the various species, by the sphere of activity necessary to their preservation." * * * "There is in all animals a preponderance of some viscus (in the brain) which gives it a lead in the organization." * * * "The proposition of a Deity, without parts or dimensions, approaches to absolute Atheism." * * * "The distinction between material and spiritual beings, is made a watch-word for fanaticism and persecution."*

One of the most able and candid writers on Physiology of our own day is Dr. Pritchard, whose treatise on the *vital principle* is worthy of an especial and careful perusal. He maintains the

to be the writer of several articles on life, and other subjects connected with it, in the interminable Encyclopedia of Dr. Rees, in which the same principles are maintained, and in which Mr. Rennell has discovered, that he has translated whole sections from M. Bichat, without the slightest acknowledgment; and we have traced him in like manner, still more frequently transcribing into his own pages materials of the same description from the free-thinking physiologists of Germany." (Quarterly Review for July, 1819.)

* "Sketches," &c. pp. 276, 365.

distinct existence of mind, and shews, in a variety of instances, that its connection with the nervous influence is very circumscribed and partial. He makes the following remarks at the close of his work.

“ If the observations offered in the present section are well founded, it must be allowed that philosophers have generally gone too far, either on one side or on the other, in their speculations on the mind, and in the instruments by which its phenomena are brought about. Some have represented it as more independent of the body than it really is; while the greater number, including many writers on the physiology of the nervous system, have been mistaken in viewing the brain as the agent in all the intellectual and other mental processes, merely from having found reason to conclude that impressions and ideas require the co-operation of its organic structure. The higher powers of the mind, those in which the will sits in operation; those in which the mind is active rather than is acted upon, as when it reflects, reasons, deliberates, judges, or pronounces respecting true or false, right or wrong, or creates a world of its own in imagination—all these faculties, or modes of mental exertion, as well as the simple operation of the will itself, on which depends our moral responsibility, are entirely exempt from the evidence of any connexion with instrumental processes; or, at least, of immediate dependence upon the organized structure of the

brain ; they are, as far as we know, modes of operation of the immaterial mind or soul. But, in order that they may produce results which are cognizable by our senses, they require the subsequent aid of corporal organs.”*

Dr. Carpenter’s work, “Human Physiology,” is also an important one in support of the spirituality of the mind. Nothing can be more satisfactory than his arguments and illustrations as to the distinct existence and manifestations of the thinking principle.

The reader will find much interesting discussion on several leading points relating to this subject, in Messrs. Todd and Bowman’s “Physiology.” They come to the conclusion, that the process of thought is necessarily and constantly connected with the convolutions of the brain ; but in what way, or by what means, nothing is proved. They observe : “Thus anatomy leads to the conclusion that the operations of the mind are associated with the convolutions. These parts, in the language of Cuvier, are the sole receptacle in which the various sensations may be, as it were, consummated, and become perceptible to the animal. It is in these that all sensations take a distinct form, and leave lasting traces of their impression ; they serve as a seat to memory, a property by means of which the animal is furnished with materials for his judgments. When the membranes of the brain are in

* “A Review of the Doctrine of a Vital Principle,” pp. 190, 191.

a state of inflammation, disturbance of the mental faculties is an invariable accompaniment, to an extent proportional to the degree of cerebral irritation; and more especially so when the inflammation is seated in the pia mater* of the convolutions. It is plain that, in such a case, the delirium arises from the altered state of the circulation in the grey matter of the convolutions, the blood-vessels of which are immediately derived from those of the pia mater, so that the one cannot be affected without the other likewise suffering. We learn from the most trustworthy reports of the dissections of the brains of lunatics, that there is invariably found more or less disease of the vesicular surface, and of the pia mater and arachnoid in connection with it, denoted by opacity or thickening of the latter, with altered colour or consistence of the former. From these premises it may be laid down as a just conclusion, that the convolutions of the brain are *the centre of intellectual action*: or more strictly, that this centre consists in that vast sheet of vesicular matter which crowns the convoluted surface of the hemispheres. Every idea of the mind is associated with a corresponding change in some part or parts of this vesicular surface. * * * The action of the convoluted surface of the brain, and of the fibres connected with it, is altogether of the mental kind. The physical changes in these parts give rise to a corresponding manifestation of ideas; nor is it likely that

* The covering membranes.

any thought, however simple, is unaccompanied by change in this centre.”*

Several other works on Physiology have recently made their appearance in London, possessing considerable merit, but comparatively limited in their range relative to metaphysical purposes. They all view man through the organs of sensation ; seldom lose sight of the body in contemplating the powers and faculties of the mind ; and have an invariable tendency to materialize, to a certain extent, our thoughts and opinions on human nature. Nothing can be further from the wish of most of these writers, than to impart to their investigations any influence which could be considered decidedly inimical to the true interests and happiness of man. The imperfection which, we conceive, belongs to these respective works, is fairly attributable to the instruments which the writers have to use, and the philosophical method they pursue, to obtain a desirable physical end or purpose ; the health and well-being of the body.†

As we very clearly perceive, from the foregoing observations in this Chapter, physiologists are divided into two principal classes ; the materialists and the spiritualists : those who consider mind, in all its aspects or developments, to be a mere pro-

* Physiology, Vol. I. p. 364.

† The following are some of the treatises here alluded to :—Meryon’s “Physical and Intellectual Constitution of Man ;” Messrs. Yarnold and Bushman, “On the Philosophy of Reason and Instinct ;” Dr. Moore, “On the Power of the Soul over the Body,” “The Use of the Body in relation to the Mind,” and “Man and his Motives ;” Newnham, “On the Reciprocal Influence of Body and Mind ;” Renon’s “Delineations, Physical, Intellectual, and Moral.”

perty of matter; and those who view it as an immaterial creation superadded to the functions of animal life. There are, however, many intermediate classes, whose creed arises from a blending of the material and thinking principles in various indefinite and irregular proportions. These run into each other by imperceptible degrees; and can only be formally or conditionally classified under the two chief and extreme orders of physiological speculators.

It may be affirmed, with some degree of confidence, that all physical inquiries into the nature and laws of the vital principle, have a strong materializing tendency. This arises from the very nature of things. The physiologist is perpetually dealing with secondary causes. The great mass of physiological writers are of the medical profession; and their daily and hourly thoughts are directed to the operations of mind viewed in conjunction with diseased functions of the body. They are never in a situation to consider mind in its healthful state, in a sound and vigorous constitution. The latter condition is the exception, and the former is the rule. This gives a peculiar colouring to all their speculations and statements of facts. Of all classes of professional men, physicians are the least able, from the mere mechanical routine of their occupation, to form just and comprehensive conclusions in reference to mental phenomena as they are developed in large masses of men. Minute details are the staple articles of their mental life. And hence it is,

that, in perusing physiological treatises written by medical men, where there is even no wish to depart, in point of principle, from the standards of spiritual orthodoxy, we find that they seldom raise their minds above matters of professional detail, or grasp and unfold those general principles of intellectual thought, which form the every-day guide and rule of action of the bulk of mankind. Such writers, whatever their acquirements and abilities may be, are borne down by the overwhelming influences of the dissecting-room, or the unhealthy mental atmosphere of the hospital. They have always some strange and anomalous cases to state, arising out of functional derangements of body or mind; and the more *outré* and marvellous they are, the more *éclat* is expected from their formal publication. As pathological data, these are both interesting and important; but they have no more to do with the unfettered and healthful investigations of mind, than the mutterings of the maniac have to do with the conclusions of the rational understanding.

This constitutional bias of the medical mind in favour of material opinions, may be also easily accounted for from the nature of the elementary instruction it receives. A young man quits school, with perhaps a good classical education, and a limited knowledge of mathematics; and at the age of sixteen or seventeen goes into a surgeon's establishment, where he devotes himself assiduously to the preparation of his master's prescriptions; and, during his leisure hours, has to acquire a

knowledge of anatomy, chemistry, and other essential studies connected with his profession. He is daily thinking of matter and its properties. His mind can never get beyond this material boundary. All his future prospects depend upon the quantity and accuracy of his physical acquirements; on the living and dead attributes of the human frame, and the chemical action of bodies. His reading must be solely confined to the perusal of Hippocrates, Galen, Boerhaave, Hunter, Abernethy, and other illustrious cultivators of the healing art. Were he to take a fancy to think or read anything about mind, *as mind*, he would stand a fair chance of being rejected at Apothecaries' Hall, and be considered by his master as a dull and stupid pupil. A few years roll on; and, under favourable auspices, he passes his examination as a Surgeon; obtains a diploma at the Royal College; establishes a good practice; and at the age, say of thirty-five or forty, has a few hours a-day to devote to discursive reading as he travels in his carriage from one patient to another. It may readily be considered, especially by those who have a competent knowledge of what studies on mental philosophy really are, how unfitted, from long established habits, a mind thus trained must be, to enter upon investigations of a purely intellectual character. Success in such a field of inquiry, under circumstances like these, could be only obtained in spite of all the established laws of matter and mind.

And does not a history of physiological and metaphysical speculations fully bear out the general correctness of this representation? It is a curious and interesting fact, that notwithstanding all the advantages which physiology has derived from the improvements of chemical science, and human and comparative anatomy, it has not thrown any light whatever upon a single faculty of the mind, or enabled us to ascertain its laws of action with more accuracy and precision than men were able to do two thousand years ago. What has the discovery of what are called the *sympathetic*, the *sensitive*, and the *motor* nerves done for mental philosophy? Does it throw the slightest ray of light upon the great principles of metaphysical science? Certainly not. And were the observations of the physiologist multiplied a thousand-fold, both in number and minuteness, he would fail to draw any conclusion from his facts which could bear upon the operations of mind. In fact, he cultivates a comparatively sterile and barren soil; he moves in a wrong direction. Mind can only be known by an inward operation; not from the scalping-knife, the retort, or the microscope. It sets at nought all these material attempts to penetrate into its secrets. We have the results of physiology before us. We cannot lay our finger upon a single metaphysical publication by a professed physiologist, from the earliest dawn of philosophy to the present hour, with the exception of Locke's Essay, (and Locke was only a medical and

physiological amateur), which is worthy of any degree of attention, or which displays any lofty specimens of theoretical or ratiocinative power. Every thing, under the influence of such pens, dwindles either into common-place anatomical and medical twaddle, or into fanciful and untenable theories. This is not a question as to the comparative intellectual talents of certain classes of men ; but solely as to the field of their observations and inquiries. It is just as vain and hopeless a task to attempt to explain intellectual phenomena by minute examinations into the laws of chemical, electrical, or mesmeric agencies, as it is to calculate the eclipses of Jupiter's satellites by the same method. The philosophical *method* of investigation is precisely the same in both cases, and its application is completely nugatory beyond the sphere of what is tangible and material.

We have no wish whatever to speak lightly of physiological investigations ; they are laudable and highly important in their own sphere. Their real bearings, however, on mental science, are but few and unimportant. Physiology is, and ever must be, strictly a branch of medical knowledge ; it relates to the body, and only to the mind in its more palpable and grosser feelings or attributes. No man has ever ventured to apply any physiological hypothesis to the solution or explanation of mental operations, as these develop themselves in the higher functions of thought, in morals, social or political philosophy, or in theology, without ex-

citing the risibility of mankind. All such efforts are repudiated the moment they are propounded. And here it is that every mental theory founded on a miscellaneous collection of physical facts and observations, displays its weakness and incompetency to solve the great problems connected with human existence, happiness, and improvement.

MESMERISM.

Mesmerism is another physiological offshoot, which has, particularly within the last ten years, excited a great deal of attention among scientific persons in all the countries of Europe. Its bearings on doctrines and theories relative to the nature and faculties of mind, are not very direct or important; but still they are of such a character as to entitle the subject to a brief notice in a history of speculative opinions. All mesmeric phenomena rest upon a single principle, *the effect of one body or mind upon another body or mind*. The mysteries connected with the subject are numerous, and as yet inexplicable; but certain facts seem to be now generally admitted by a number of professional gentlemen, who have devoted themselves to a candid examination of the subject. That a great deal of quackery and deception has been connected with it, particularly within the last few years, is undeniable; but still there is a substratum of facts on which the system rests, which, when viewed in relation to medical and intellectual phi-

losophy, is worthy of the fair and dispassionate consideration of every philosophical inquirer.

Facts connected with mesmeric speculations have been noticed from the earliest periods of history. The influence of the *hand* over diseases of the body is mentioned by many Greek and Roman authors; and even at the present hour forms a branch of medical practice in several countries. The proverbial wisdom of Solon deigned not to reject humble knowledge of this kind; for in some verses ascribed to him, which have been translated by Stanley,* the Grecian lawgiver says,

“The smallest hurts sometimes increase and rage
More than all art of physic can assuage;
Sometimes the fury of the worst disease,
The hand, by gentle stroking, will appease.”

We are told that Asclepiades, who acquired great reputation at Rome as a physician, recommended frictions, in certain chronic affections, to be continued until the patient falls fast asleep. Tacitus and Suetonius mention two magnetic cures, performed by the Emperor Vespasian at Alexandria.† The Chaldean priests, the Indian Brahmins, and the Persi, practised the same mode of curing certain diseases; and the Jesuit missionaries tell us that bodily ailments are removed by the imposition of

* History of Philosophy, 1666.

† Tacit. Hist. 4. 81; Suet. in Vespas. 7, §§ 5. 6.

hands, throughout the whole of the Chinese Empire.*

During the earlier part of the Middle Ages, speculations on the influences of material bodies on mind were pursued with considerable ardour, in some localities. Inquiries were extended to the powers of the will, and the effects of metallic substances on the frame; and thus the sphere of observation became wider and more varied. In St. Augustine's work, "*De Civitate Dei*," two cases are recorded, illustrative of the surprising effects of concentrated volition; one of a man who could perspire whenever he chose; and the other of a Priest, named *Restitutus*, who could throw himself into a state of complete insensibility, and appear as if entirely deprived of life, solely from an exercise of his will. Avicenna, the Arabian philosopher, in his *De Animalibus*, affirms that he knew a man, who could paralyse his limbs at pleasure, by a simple act of volition.†

In the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, animal magnetism and mesmeric inquiries were zealously pursued, both on the Continent and in Great Britain. The names of Pomponatus, Rodolphus Goclenius, Athanasius Kircher, Van

* See Sprengel's, "*Geschichte der Medicine*," and Snorro Sturluson's *History of the Scandinavian Kings*.

† Dr. J. C. Passavant, "*Untersuchungen über den Lebens-magnetismus und das Hellsehen*," Frankfort, 1821; Brandis, "*Ueber Psychische Heilmittel und Magnetismus*," Copenhagen, 1818; and Delrio, "*Disquisit. Magic.*" Mogunt. 1606, tom. 1, p. 66.

Helmont, Sir Kenelm Digby, William Maxwell, J. G. Burgraave, Sebastian Wirdig, Joannes Bohnius, Jul. Cæs. Vaninius, C. Agrippa, Christopher Irving, N. Papin, Fludd, &c., are well known in connection with the history of this class of opinions.*

About the middle of the seventeenth century, some sensation was created in London by one Levret, a gardener, Valentine Greatrakes an Irish gentleman, and Dr. Streper, who severally pretended to exercise considerable mesmeric action over persons afflicted with certain diseases.† In the last century the subject assumed a more definite and systematic form, under the hand of Mesmer, who has given his name to this branch of human observation and inquiry. Fred. Anth. Mesmer was a native of Switzerland, and born in 1734. He studied physic at Vienna, and

* Petrus Pomponatius, "De Incantationibus," Basil, 1567; Rod. Goclenii, "Tract de Manget. vuln. curat." Marburgi, 1608, et Francof. 1613; Athan. Kircher, "Magnes, sive de Arte Magnetica," Coloniae, 1643, et Romæ, 1654; "Magneticum Naturæ Regnum, &c.," Amst. 1667; Van Helmont, "De Magnet. Vuln. Curatione," Paris, 1621; K. Digby, "Of the Cure of Wounds by the Power of Sympathy," London, 1660; Gul. Maxwell, "Medicinæ Magneticæ libri tres, &c.," Frankf. 1679; J. G. Burgraave, "Biolychnium, seu lucerna vitæ, cui accessit Cura Morborum Magnetica," 1629; Sebastian Wirdig, "Nova Medicina Spirituum," Hamb. 1673; Bohnius, "De Spirituum Animalium Medela," Hamb. 1688; Jul. Cæs. Vaninius, "De Admir. Naturæ arcan.," C. Agrippa ab Nettesheym, "De Occulta Philosophia."

† See Pechlinus in his work, entitled, "Observationum Physico-Medicarum libri tres," Hamb. 1691, where an account is given of Greatrakes; also a work written by himself, called, "A Brief Account of Mr. Valentine Greatrakes," London, 1666.

for some years settled there ; but having written a treatise " On the Influence of the Planets on the Human Body," it excited so much ridicule among his professional brethren, that he was determined to leave the capital forthwith ; but through the influence of some kind friends he was constrained to remain for the present. Having formed an acquaintance with the Jesuit, Maximilian Helb, a native of Hungary, and a man of talent and learning, Mesmer resorted to the use of the *magnet* in the cure of diseases ; and, at Paris, in 1779, published his " *Mémoire sur la Découverte du Magnétisme Animal.*" This gave rise to the *Animal Magnetism*, with the history of which almost every reader is, in some measure, familiar. A great sensation was excited in Paris, among the members of the medical profession particularly, which gave rise to various and conflicting opinions. A public commission was appointed, composed of the most distinguished men of the capital, to test the merits of Mesmer's system ; and after a long inquiry, his theory was pronounced to be unsatisfactory and delusive.*

* The following statements will point out the specific objects and nature of this Report :—

1. Le fluide, que les commissaires nomment fluide magnétique animal, n'existe pas, car il échappe à tous les sens.

2. Ce fluide échappant à tous les sens, son existence ne peut être démontré que par les effets curatifs dans le traitement des maladies, ou par les effets momentanés sur l'économie animale. Il faut exclure de ces deux preuves le traitement des maladies, parcequ'il ne peut fournir que des résultats toujours incertains et souvent trompeurs.

3. Les véritables preuves, les preuves purement physiques de l'existence de ce fluide, sont les effets momentanés sur le corps animal.

After this decision, the subject seems to have lost much of its interest. We hear little of its advocates, until it was again revived by the Academy of Medicine at Paris, in 1825. A Report was then made containing thirty distinct statements, the following are worthy of especial notice.

“ We have constantly seen ordinary sleep, which is the repose of the organs of the senses, of the intellectual faculties, and of the voluntary movements, precede and terminate the state of somnambulism.”

“ Whilst they are in this state of somnambulism, the magnetised persons we have observed retain the exercise of the faculties which they have whilst awake. Their memory even appears to be more faithful and more extensive, since they remember what has passed during all the time and on every occasion that they have been in the state of somnambulism.”

“ We have seen two somnambulists distinguish with their eyes shut, the objects placed before them ; they have told, without touching them, the

Pour s'assurer de ces effets, les commissaires ont fait des épreuves, (1.) Sur eux-mêmes ; (2.) sur sept malades ; (3.) sur quatre personnes ; (4.) sur une société assemblée chez M. Franklin ; (5.) sur des malades assemblés chez M. Jumelin ; (6.) avec un arbre magnétisé ; (7.) enfin sur différens sujets.

4. De ces expériences, les commissaires ont conclu, que l'imagination fait tout, que le Magnétisme est nul. Imagination, imitation, attouchement, telles sont les vraies causes des effets attribués au Magnétisme Animal.

5. Les procédés du Magnétisme étant dangereux, il suit que tout traitement public où les moyens du Magnétisme seront employés, ne peut avoir à la longue que des effets funestes.

colour and value of the cards ; they have read words traced with the hand, or some lines of books opened by mere chance. This phenomenon took place even when the opening of the eyelids was accurately closed by means of the fingers."

"We met in two somnambulists the power of foreseeing acts of the organism more or less distant, more or less complicated. One of them announced several days, nay, several months beforehand, the day, the hour, and the minute when epileptic fits would come on and return ; the other declared the time of the cure. Their previsions were realised with remarkable exactness. They seemed to us to apply only to acts or lesions of their organism."

"The commission has not been able to verify, for the want of opportunity, other powers which magnetisers have declared to exist in somnambulists ; but it has collected and communicated facts sufficiently important to induce it to think that *the Academy should encourage the researches on Magnetism, as a very curious branch of psychology and natural history.*"

After this Report was made, experiments in mesmerism were simultaneously instituted in various parts of England, France, and America, without any pre-concerted arrangement, and with nearly similar results. Mr. Brooks of Manchester entered zealously into the subject, and made some important discoveries ; and Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Prideaux, Captain Valliant, and Dr. Elliotson prosecuted the inquiry with great ardour. A distinguished French mesmerist was introduced to

University College, London, under the patronage of Dr. Elliotson; and this circumstance brought the new science prominently before the public, and excited general discussion in every quarter. Lectures were delivered in almost every town in England; and even the dignitaries of the Church extended their fostering care to the infant science.* Every ordinary reader is fully aware of the share of public attention which has been directed, within these four or five years, to the subject; of the various bitter rivalships and contentions it has created; and of the discordant opinions it has evoked. To these matters, however, we cannot possibly make any direct allusion. So far as the science of mind is concerned, we shall offer a few general and concluding observations on the nature of mesmeric phenomena, considered as a system of philosophy.

Within these few years, several writers and patrons of mesmerism have viewed the subject as very important in relation to the abstract nature of mind. They have considered it as demonstrative of the *immateriality* of its nature, and consequently of its *immortality*. They have encouraged and fostered it, with a hope of banishing for ever all the various shades of the doctrines of materialism, and of placing the phenomena of body and mind, whether jointly or separately developed, upon a

* Mr. Brooks, of Manchester, attended the Bishop of Oxford for several weeks, to initiate him into the mysteries of the science; and the learned Prelate invited numerous parties of his friends to witness the experiments.

solid foundation. These advocates of the new science argue, that all mesmeric phenomena demonstrate this general fact, *that the mind receives impressions from other minds*, as well as from external objects through the medium of our organs of sensation. The mesmeric individual sees without eyes, hears without ears, and tastes without the aid of the palate. These facts show that the mind can operate, and display the higher qualities of its nature, without the assistance of corporeal organs. How could a mind communicate with other minds; be influenced by the mere will of another;—how interpret the thoughts, desires, ideas of those around, by the mere affection of a fibre or a nerve? The thing is impossible. Whatever does this, cannot be a material object,—cannot be matter in any shape or form. It is the result of mind, soul, spirit; not an object to see, weigh in a balance, or handle; which terminates its existence with the body; but something immaterial, invisible, and immortal. On the doctrine that mind and body are two different substances, many important questions hinge; and on this ground, it is contended, it is of the greatest moment that we should hail every philosophical inquiry with delight, which is calculated, however remotely, to throw light upon subjects of such vital importance to human interests, feelings, and happiness.*

* “In the higher degrees of *animal magnetism* we may find a complete practical refutation of all the material theories of the human mind, an impressive proof of the independence of the soul, and the strongest grounds for presuming its immortality; since it has been demonstrated

Again, it may be remarked, that at the present moment many advocates for mesmeric action entertain more rational views of its nature and uses than generally prevailed a short time since, during the fit of feverish excitement which it created throughout Europe. On the important and curious doctrine of *clairvoyance*, there is now a great change of opinion; and so far as it can be embodied from the mass of mesmeric philosophers, it seems to proclaim that the doctrine is grounded on sheer folly and delusion. Dr. Braid, of Manchester, a zealous mesmerist, thus expresses himself on this point in the *Medical Times* for January, 1844. "One of the most interesting and important phenomena connected with hypnotism, is that extraordinary activity of the imagination, whereby ideas excited in the minds, whether from recalled past impressions, or by oral suggestion, or otherwise, are instantly invested with all the attributes of reality. From this cause patients make very striking remarks, not from any desire to deceive others, but because they are self-deceived; the extreme vividness of their ideas leading them, at

beyond the possibility of rational doubt, that, in its manifestations, it is not confined to any one particular portion of the corporeal organism, and that it is capable of exercising its functions without the use of any of those material organs, by means of which it usually maintains a correspondence with the external world."—(Report on the experiments of Animal Magnetism, by J. C. Colquhoun, Esq., Edinburgh, 1833.)

"In eo tamen Wienholt adsentior, et his phenomenis ali immortalitatis spem ac augeri; cum nullum supersit dubium, posse nos sentire ac percipere sine ullo organorum externorum commercio."—(Sprengel, *Inst. Med.* p. 311.)

the moment, to believe as real what are only the figments of fancy. Thus, name any person, place, or thing, and instantly they will imagine they *see* or *hear* them, and will probably enter into elaborate descriptions regarding them. I have thus astonished many persons by descriptions which patients have given of various circumstances and places; but, in the end, I have convinced them that it was only shrewd guessing, or imaginary descriptions. *I have never yet seen any decided case of clairvoyance*; every attempt of the sort resulting in the conviction, that what at first *appeared* to be so, was nothing but guessing, an act of memory, and describing the figments of fancy as real; or from extreme exaltation of some of the senses enabling the patients to discover by smell, touch, or hearing, heat and cold, what we naturally judge by the sight."

Thus the current of opinion, in England at least, is decidedly in favour, at the present moment, of the notion, that all mesmeric phenomena are only more striking exemplifications of the old doctrine of *sympathy*; a doctrine as antiquated as philosophy itself, and which has been theorised upon in a variety of ways. The state of facts and opinions is, however, in such a position, that it would be gross dogmatism to offer any decided judgment upon their nature and bearings in reference to the important study of mental science. Our decisions must be the result of further and careful inquiry.

On a subject of this nature, I shall make no apology for introducing a few observations from

the pen of the late Mr. Dugald Stewart, as they are marked with that dispassionate candour and soundness of judgment, which commonly characterise all his mental disquisitions. "Among all the phenomena, however," says Mr. Stewart, "to which the subject of imitation has led our attention, none are, perhaps, so wonderful as those which have been recently brought to light, in consequence of the philosophical inquiries occasioned by the medical pretensions of Mesmer and his associates. That these pretensions involved much of ignorance, or of imposture, or of both, in their authors, has, I think, been fully demonstrated in the very able report of the French Academicians; but does it follow from this, that the *facts* witnessed and authenticated by these Academicians should share in the disgrace incurred by the empirics who disguised or misrepresented them? For my own part, it appears to me, that the general conclusions established by Mesmer's practice, with respect to the physical effects of the principle of imitation and of the faculty of imagination, (more particularly in cases where they co-operate together,) are incomparably more curious, than if he had actually demonstrated the existence of his boasted fluid. Nor can I see any good reason why a physician, who admits the efficacy of the *moral* agents employed by Mesmer, should, in the exercise of his profession, scruple to copy whatever processes are necessary for subjecting them to his command; any more than he would hesitate about employing a new *physical* agent, such as electricity

or galvanism. The arguments to the contrary, alleged by the Commissioners, only show that the influence of imagination and of imitation is susceptible of a great abuse in ignorant or in wicked hands ;—and may not the same thing be said of all the most valuable remedies we possess ? Nay, are not the mischievous consequences which have actually been occasioned by the pretenders to *animal magnetism*, the strongest of all encouragements to attempt such an examination of the principles upon which the effects really depend, as may give to scientific practitioners the management of agents so peculiarly efficacious and overbearing ? Is not this mode of reasoning perfectly analogous to that upon which medical inquiries are accustomed to proceed, when they discover any new substance possessed of *poisonous* qualities ? Is not this considered as a strong presumption, at least that it is capable of being converted into a vigorous remedy, if its appropriate and specific disorder could only be traced ; and has it not often happened, that the prosecution of this idea has multiplied the resources of the healing art ?”*

. See Note M. at the End of this Volume.

* Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. 3, pp. 221. 222.

CHAPTER IX.

PHRENOLOGY.

PHRENOLOGY is, properly speaking, only a branch of physiology; but it has of late years been so prominently brought before public attention, has excited so much discussion and controversy, and professes, moreover, to offer such a solution of great metaphysical problems, that a separate notice of it seems especially called for in a work of this nature. We regret, however, that our limits will not permit our entering so fully into the subject as we could wish; but we shall endeavour to place the most prominent and important points of the science before the reader's attention.

The phrenologists, like some of their other physiological brethren, lay claim to antiquity for their speculations. Among the Grecian philosophers, conjectures on the nature and mental offices of the brain were not unknown. It is said, that Aristotle taught, that the anterior ventricle of the brain was the peculiar residence of *common-sense* ;

the second ventricle, the seat of *imagination*, *judgment*, and *reflection*; and the third ventricle was sacred to *memory*. Nemeseius, Bishop of Emesa in the reign of Theodosius, substantially promulgated the same doctrine, and maintained that all sensations had their seat in the anterior ventricles of the cranium, that memory resided in the middle ventricles, and the understanding in the posterior ones. We are told by Baptista Porta, that Adamantus, a noted Greek physician, who flourished about the fifth century, speculated to a considerable extent on the mental functions of the brain. Rhazes, an Arabian physician, who lived in the middle of the ninth century, was a phrenologist of some skill. He considered a head of a moderate size and of proportional rotundity, compressed a little at each ear, as possessing the most perfect indications of intellectual power.* Bernard Gordon, a Scotchman, wrote a work in 1296, entitled, "*Affectus præter Naturam Curandi Methodus*," in which the same views are developed on the structure of the brain. He says, *common-sense* resides in the anterior part of the first ventricle of this organ, and that its province is to take notice of the various forms or images received through the different senses, and to express a judgment upon them. In the posterior part of the same ventricle lies *Phantasia*, which preserves, as in a storehouse, the images which the senses furnish. *Imaginativa* occupies the an-

* Baptista Porta, "*De Humana Physiognomia*," Vico, 1596.

terior departments of the second ventricle; and its office is to arrange and consolidate our ideas or perceptions. The faculty named *Æstimatoria* lies in the posterior portion of the same ventricle, and its especial function is to deal with all those instinctive moral feelings and emotions necessary for the maintenance of the social and political institutions of mankind. In the third ventricle we find *Memory*, without which all the other faculties would be useless. The author also wrote another work, called "*Lilium Medicinæ*," in 1305, in which many curious observations will be found, bearing on phrenological opinions. What is remarkable, however, in reference to this writer is, that he conceived all his three primary organs or ventricles as completely material and corruptible, and as possessing no power of themselves in making us acquainted with an external world. Another higher and heavenly power, called *intellect*, is necessary to the operations of thought; the power which *makes use of the organs*, but is altogether independent of them. Gordon is, therefore, a decided phrenological spiritualist.

About the same period, Albertus Magnus speculated on the mental functions of the brain; and it is said, that he delineated upon the figure of a head all the several parts in which the different faculties of the mind resided. In 1491, Peter Montagnana published a work on the same subject, which is highly spoken of by some phrenologists.

Andrew Vesalius or Wessel, a native and physician of Brussels, published his "*De Humani*

Corporis Fabrica," at Basle, in 1542. In this work, the author maintains, that the air we breathe, penetrating through the eustachian tubes, is, by a rarified process, rendered fit for the brain, and enters into the first and second ventricles, and forms the *animal spirits*. These pass on into the third ventricle, and into the ventricle of the cerebellum, from which a portion of them is transmitted into the medulla oblongata, and into the nerves springing from it. He refers to the opinions of Aristotle on the subject, and to those of Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Albertus.*

In the year 1562, Lodovico Dolce, a Venetian author, in a work entitled, "Dialogo di M. Lodovico Dolce, nel quale si ragiona del modo di accrescere e conservar la memoria," revived the doctrines of Gordon on the nature of the brain and the mental faculties. Dolce gives a sketch of a head much after the same fashion as Dr. Gall has given.

Towards the latter part of the seventeenth century, Dr. Willis, of Oxford, published a work on the nature of the animal spirits, and the uses of the brain. He maintains that the most active and volatile particles of the blood rise towards the head. This arises chiefly from the anatomical structure of man. The brain he divides into two parts. These are again subdivided into separate organs; and he then proceeds to promulgate several speculative notions on the nature of the convolutions of

* De Humani Corporis Fabrica, lib. 7, c. 6, "Ventricularum Usus."

the brain, and their connection with certain mental phenomena.

In the year 1810, Drs. Gall and Spurzheim published in conjunction the first volume of their system, under the following title, "Anatomie et Physiologie du Système nerveux en général, et du Cerveau en particulier, avec des observations sur la possibilité de reconnaître plusieurs dispositions intellectuelles et morales de l'Homme et des Animaux par la Configuration de leurs têtes." The second volume of this work appeared in 1812. Dr. Spurzheim published also another in 1815, called "The Physiognomical System of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim, founded on Anatomical and Physiological examinations of the nervous system in general, and of the brain in particular, and indicating the dispositions and manifestations of the mind." These publications excited considerable attention throughout Europe, and also in America; and from this period to the present day, phrenology has assumed the position of a legitimate subject of philosophical inquiry.

The fundamental principle of all phrenological speculations is, that the nature of man, like every other part of animated creation, is of a fixed and determinate character; and the faculties with which he is endowed are fitted for specific purposes, and are, properly speaking, *innate*, or constitutional. There is nothing about his physical or mental powers of an accidental or adventitious nature; every thing is the result of the peculiar organization with which he has been endowed. The brain is

the source of animal and mental action ; and is mapped out, as most general readers are aware, into the following divisions.

1st, The organ of *Amativeness*. 2nd, *Philoprogenitiveness*, or love of offspring. 3rd, *Inhabitiveness*, or the propensity displayed by some animals to live in high or elevated situations. 4th, The organ of *Adhesiveness*, or the desire to attach ourselves to persons or objects. 5th, *Combativity*, or the inclination to fight, and be embroiled in contentions. 6th, *Destructiveness*, or the desire of destroying life. 7th, *Constructiveness*, or a disposition to apply oneself to the mechanical arts. 8th, *Covetiveness*, or the desire to covet, to amass, or acquire. 9th, The organ of *Secretiveness*, to conceal. 10th, *Self-esteem*, or *Self-love*. 11th, *Love of Approbation*, or the pleasure we derive from the commendations we receive from others. 12th, Organ of *Cautiousness*. 13th, *Benevolence*, or meekness and gentleness of disposition. 14th, The organ of *Veneration*, by which we worship the Deity, and material objects. 15th, *Hope*. 16th, *Ideality*, or the poetical disposition. 17th, The faculty of *Conscientiousness*, or of justice and equality. 18th, *Determinativeness*, or firmness of character or purpose. 19th, *Individuality*, or the power we possess of knowing external things. 20th, The organ of *Form*, by which we take cognizance of the forms of external objects. 21st, *Size*, that power which seizes hold of dimensions. 22nd, *Weight*, that power by which we estimate weight, density, resistance, &c. 23rd, *Colour*, the

faculty of perceiving colours. 24th, *Space*, or *Locality*, the power of local memory. 25th, *Order*, or a love of methodical arrangements. 26th, *Time*, or the faculty which enters into speculations on duration. 27th, *Number*, or the power of calculation. 28th, *Tune*, or the perception of musical tone. 29th, *Language*, the faculty by which we learn artificial signs. 30th, *Comparison*, the organ by which we recognise differences, analogies, similitudes, &c. 31st, *Causality*, that power which directs our attention to the causes of things. 32nd, *Wit*, the organ of jesting, raillery, mocking, &c. 33rd, *Imitation*, power of imitating sounds, gestures, manners, &c. These are the several phrenological organs laid down by Drs. Gall and Spurzheim; but to this catalogue Mr. Combe has added other two. 34th, The organ of *Wonder*, or that which relates to the marvellous, supernatural, &c. And 35th, The organ of *Eventuality*, or that which takes cognizance of changes, events, and active phenomena.

It is laid down by phrenologists that all the thirty-five organs are possessed by every person of a sane understanding; but that they may exist in a greater or less perfection in various individuals. This irregularity in organic structure is the primary foundation of variations of intellectual endowments and moral qualities. Hence it is argued, that a doctrine of this kind is of immense importance in an educational point of view, by suggesting to parents and teachers those organic formations which, when brought under the influence of proper

culture, are calculated to further the purposes of certain modes and branches of tuition, and to give the youthful faculties such a general direction as will ultimately lead them to the effective development of their intellectual and moral powers. Even the improvement of the different races of mankind, comes within the sphere of the philanthropic views of the phrenologists. Dr. Spurzheim says, "It is certainly a pity that, in this respect, we take more care of the races of our sheep, pigs, dogs, and horses, than of our own offspring."

It is almost needless to say, that a system of this kind, so open to attack and ridicule, has excited a good deal of angry and acrimonious discussion. It is not, however, our intention to enter into a minute examination of the controversy, or to make any personal allusions either to the promoters or opponents of the science. As we consider it only in the light of a branch of physiology, and as having no valid claims whatever to a system of mental philosophy, we shall make a few general observations with a view of substantiating this opinion; without, however, claiming for them any weight or importance whatever, on the score of originality.

Speaking with all due candour, it does appear to us that the phrenologists only look to one side in their arguments and facts. The statements of facts which they furnish are, taken as a whole, liable to great suspicion on the ground of partiality and one-sidedness, and the same remark is applicable to their general mode of argumentation. They collect with scrupulous care, and indefatigable

industry, all facts and observations which are calculated to strengthen their theory; but they obstinately shut their eyes to those of an opposite tendency. A thousand facts may be brought to bear on one point; but if ten thousand be left behind, which either stand counter to, or are inexplicable upon, the assumed hypothesis, it is certainly trifling with the judgment of mankind, to speak dogmatically on the subject. "It is not enough," says Dr. Pritchard, "to have a few chosen coincidences brought forward by zealous partizans, who go about in search of facts to support their doctrine, and pass by, or really cannot perceive, the evidence that ought to be placed in the opposite scale. The principles of the system ought to be applicable in every instance. The phrenologists, however, aware of numerous and striking exceptions, elude their evidence by asserting that when a certain portion of the cranium and of the brain is greatly developed, while the faculty there lodged has never been remarkably distinguished, it nevertheless existed naturally, though the innate talent, for want of proper cultivation, has never been displayed; the predominant organic power was never discovered by the owner, though, according to the principles of the doctrine, with this organic power a proportional impulse to exertion, or an instinctive energy is combined, which communicates of itself a strong and irresistible tendency to particular pursuits. When, again, a strongly marked propensity, or a decided talent has been manifested, without any corresponding

amplitude of structure, it is in like manner pleaded that, by sedulous exercise and culture, a natural deficiency has been overcome. Thus the phrenologist avails himself of a double method of elusion; his position, like the cave of Philoctetes, affords him an escape on either side; and in one direction or another he contrives to baffle all the address of his opponents.”*

Leaving, however, the doubts which hang over the authenticity and impartiality of phrenological facts, and the inconsistencies involved in the popular mode of arguing on the subject, we shall now make an observation or two on the classification of organs which the phrenologists have adopted.

It has often been remarked, and the remark has never been rebutted by phrenologists, that their classification of organs is redundant in some parts, and very deficient in others. As an instance of the first imperfection, we have *form* and *size* as two different organs; whereas they both have an exclusive reference to *extension* or *space*. *Form* and *size* are severally comparative terms, and, metaphysically considered, are perfectly convertible words. Again, the offices which the organ of *Destructiveness* performs, can scarcely be conceived apart from those which are ascribed to *Combativeness*. The only difference, Combe says, is, that *Destructiveness* learns “to kill for food;” a distinction which induced a critic in the Quarterly Review to remark, that he thought the cele-

* “Treatise on Insanity,” p. 476.

brated phrenologist was bound to create another organ to *dig*, or *roast*, or *boil* food.*

The confusion between *attention* and the organ of *concentrativeness*, is striking in all the phrenological publications we have met with. The former power is not considered a separate or independent faculty, but is merely a vigorous effort made by an organ towards obtaining the objects it requires. Yet we are told that when two faculties are simultaneously called into action, the organ of *concentrativeness* is required to keep them tenaciously to their duty. If *attention* belongs to, or is in a certain relation with, all the organs, why need we another, called *concentrativeness*, to perform its offices, and effect all its ends and purposes? This is not in accordance with the canons of true philosophy.

On the deficiency side of the question we have a wide field for comment. If the classification of phrenological organs be considered relative to *objects*, it is one thing; and if relatively to *mental operations*, it is another. According to the general doctrine of phrenology, *memory*, *reasoning*, and *judgment*, are not distinct and independent faculties; but every organ has its own mode or power of remembering, reasoning, and judging. Now here there is, so to speak, a constellation of perplexities and obscurities. There is no theory of mind with which we are acquainted so redolent of absurdity and contradiction as this. We stand

* See Combe, p. 9; and Quarterly Review, September, 1836.

aghast at the amount of public credulity on the one hand, and philosophical charlatanism on the other, which could attempt to foist a system of this kind upon a thinking and reflective people. If we take then the position, that the classification of phrenologists must rest upon *objects*, we are compelled to have an organ for every individual thing. The organ of language, for example, is said to be divisible, and may be separated into as many organic compartments as there are languages among mankind. And this division does not stop here; for there are subdivisions depending upon the construction of language itself. There is a section of the organ appropriated to the retention of *proper names*, and a part for *general terms*; then why should there not be an organ portioned out for separate letters, syllables, consonants, and vowels? The one seems as reasonable as the other. The absurdity of this classification, when thus carried out to its legitimate and ultimate results, must be apparent even to the most desperate lover of systems. Instead of *thirty-five*, countless millions of organs would be required to carry out effectively the theory of phrenology.*

* "Not to enlarge upon the determination, enumeration, and classification of the independent faculties furnished by Phrenologists, it is quite obvious that those which they have adopted are by no means very intelligible; they have, in fact, all the vices of which they are susceptible. In one place they are redundant, in another inadequate; the consequence is levelled with the principle, and the principle is merged in the consequence; again, the consequence is detached from its principle, while a little further on, it is altogether rejected; thus breaking down the analogical process which subsists among facts and ideas. If instead of con-

By making the faculties of memory and reasoning separate attributes of each organ, the phrenologists have not only introduced numerous elements of discord into their system, but have, in reality, struck a vital blow at its very existence. A *foreign* influence or power is here introduced to the organization of the several functions. It is now not the mere organs themselves, but something which is called memory or judgment, which exercises its power over them, or in necessary conjunction with them. This is an entire departure from the fundamental principles of the science; for we are told that the organs themselves are the true and veritable instruments or indications of our thoughts and ideas; and yet it turns out after all, that this is not the case, inasmuch as we really owe everything to other separate agencies, whose office it is either to preside over each organ separately, or to dance attendance on all the thirty-five organic functions whenever and wherever their services are demanded. This is one of the palpable and striking contradictions of the phrenological hypothesis.

The division of the brain into two distinct hemispheres, with a complete set of organs in each part, is another formidable impediment in the way of an

fining our view to the nine propensities, we examine the twenty or thirty organs which the Phrenologists distinguish, what shall we find then? We shall make apparent, in a thousand phases, the profound chaos which reigns throughout this arrangement; an arrangement more worthy of chance itself, than of any serious reflection."—(M. Tissot, *Anthropologie*, Vol. 2, p. 217.)

acquiescence in the phrenological theory. A single action from double powers or organs is a perplexing consideration. True, the Phrenologists have instituted a comparison between the double functions of the cranium, and the faculties of vision and hearing, which are the result of two distinct instruments of sensation; but the argument derived from this source, which is altogether of an analogical character, is not strictly admissible. Many phenomena connected with seeing and hearing destroy the analogy instituted between the double set of organs and these two sources of sensation. There must be a perfect correspondence between the impressions on both eyes, or on both ears, to effect correct vision or hearing. If either eye or ear is at variance with the other, the unity of perception is destroyed. Besides, the duality of the organs of seeing and hearing is manifestly for another purpose, namely, to extend the field of vision in the one case, and to collect sound from different quarters in the other. But the phrenologist furnishes us with no reasons for his two sets of organs. *Unity* of action in his organs is an essential article in his creed; and, therefore, the analogy between the organs of sense and the mind is not applicable to his purpose.*

* “Ed appunto pensando al modo del distinguere e ordinare le umane facoltà, io temo forte non sia suscettiva di temperamenti l'ordinazione che i frenologi (da ogni filosofia alienati) ne fanno. Concedere un organo ai luoghi, un altro alle forme; uno alla voglia del distruggere, uno del combattere; quattro diversi all'amor del generare, all'amore, all'affetto, alla benevolenza; e l'eventualità separare dalla speranza, dal tempo, dall'ordine: non mi sembra conforme alle vie della natura che sempre

On this point it may also be remarked, that the whole science of phrenology is made to hinge upon vague analogies. There can be no doubt that analogy is a legitimate and valid instrument in all science and reasoning; but it must not be made to do every thing. There are limits to its use, and necessary rules by which its application is to be regulated. There are some excellent observations on this subject in the article *Phrenology*, in the last edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*; and we shall make no apology for quoting them here.

“Analogy, in reasoning concerning the unknown operations of nature, is, at best, but slippery ground; and when unsupported by any kind of evidence, cannot lead to certain knowledge, far less constitute the basis of an extensive system. The utility of analogical deductions, as to what takes place in one department of nature, from our knowledge of what occurs in another, consists chiefly in their affording indications of what may possibly happen, and thus directing and stimulating our inquiries to the discovery of truth by the legitimate road of observation and experi-

da semplici origini trae successioni svariate, ma tutte tra sè dipendenti. La frenologia quando sarà scienza vera, coordinerà le facoltà umane in modo conforme all'intima natura loro, molte ridurrà a una principale, e mostrerà la dipendenza degli organi che denotano quelle dall'organo che serve a queste, scoprirà gli organi che sono come passaggio dall'una all'altra facoltà; dopo esperienze minute e accuratamente notate (e non già, come finora, fatte a memoria e accumulate in confuso) segnerà gli uffizii veri di ciascun organo, e i limiti della facoltà che all'organo corrisponde.” — (Tommasco. *Studii Filosofici*, Vol. 1. Lettere a Davide Richard, p. 170, Venezia, 1840.)

ment. But to assume the existence of any such analogy as equivalent to a positive proof, resulting from the evidence of direct observation, is a gross violation of logic. Yet it is upon assumptions of this kind that Drs. Gall and Spurzheim have ventured to found all the leading propositions of their doctrine. In the secretions of the body, they observe, the preparation of different fluids is con-signed to different glands, having different appropriate functions; and they consider this analogy as a demonstrative proof of what happens in the operations of thought and the phenomena of the passions, which, because they differ as much in their nature as milk does from gall, must, accordingly, be the result of actions in different portions of the brain; which portions are, therefore, to be regarded as so many different organs, rather than parts of one organ. Even where all the analogies are favourable to one side of a question, such a loose mode of reasoning would be entitled to little confidence; but how fallacious must it not prove, when analogies can be pointed out which apply in the opposite direction. Does not the same stomach digest very different and even opposite kinds of aliment? Yet we do not find that one portion of that organ is destined for the digestion of meat, and another for the digestion of vegetable matter; although the operations required for the conversion of such different ingredients into the same chyle, cannot possibly be the same. Nerves perform the double purposes of volition and sensation; but

the different bundles of fibres which convey each impression, the one to the muscles, the other to the sensorium, are wrapped up in the same sheath, and are so intimately intermixed during their course as to constitute a single cord. The same organ serves for the hearing of acute and of grave sounds. The whole retina, and not merely different portions of its surface, receives impressions of different kinds of colours; there is not one organ for the perception of blue, and another for the perception of red rays. Guided by such analogies as these, might we not be equally justified in concluding, that the same part of the brain may serve for the memory of words, as for the memory of things; and that the same portion of that organ which enables us to conceive the idea of figure, may also suggest to us that of size?"

It is contended, and with great probability, that the mere external protuberances of the brain are, in most cases, a source of delusion; and this arises chiefly from the variation in the thickness of the *frontal sinus* in most individuals. Phrenologists have been much puzzled and bewildered by this discovery; and Gall and Spurzheim seem themselves to have looked upon it as a formidable obstacle to the systematic and harmonious adjustment of their system. The frontal bone of the skull, stretching along the base of the forehead, varies in magnitude to such an extent, as to render it almost impossible to determine the development or elevation of the brain in the adjacent region. This must render

all mere manipulations of the brain an enterprise of uncertainty and conjecture.*

In the mapping out of the brain there is a great want of definiteness among the various organs. The line of demarcation has never been pointed

* "A fundamental doubt hangs over every determination of function, which results from a comparison of the size of the supposed organ or region in different cases. If it be true, that the grey matter only is the source of power, and that the white is merely a conductor, we have no right to assume that the total size of the organ affords a measure of its power, until it has been shown that the thickness of the cortical substance can be judged by the size of the brain, or of any part of it. Certainly there is a considerable variation in this respect among different individuals, and it is yet to be proved that the relation is constant in different parts of the same individual brain. Until this is substantiated, all inferences drawn from correspondence between the prominence of a certain part of the brain, and the intensity of a particular function, are invalid; that is, if the general doctrine of the relative functions of grey and white matter be true. Further, there is, unfortunately, a considerable uncertainty attending all phrenological observations which are made upon the cranium rather than upon the brain; this we have seen from the discrepancy between the statements of Gall and the facts ascertained respecting the comparative weight of the cerebellum in castrated and entire horses. It appears to the author, too, that comparative anatomy and psychology are very far from supporting the system, when their evidence is fairly weighed. It is a very curious circumstance, that the difference in the antero-posterior diameter, between the brain of man and that of the lower mammalia, principally arises from the shortness of the posterior lobes in the latter, these being seldom long enough to cover the cerebellum. Yet it is in these posterior lobes that the animal propensities are regarded by phrenologists as having their seat. On the other hand, the anterior lobes, in which the intellectual faculties are considered as residing, bear, in many animals, a much larger proportion to the whole bulk of the brain, than they do in man. Again, comparative anatomy and experiment alike sanction the conclusion, that the purely instinctive propensities have not their seat in the cerebrum. These examples, and many similar ones, that might easily be added, collectively show the uncertainty, to say the least, of the inferences that are by many regarded as firmly established."—(Dr. Carpenter.)

out between timidity and courage, between destructiveness and constructiveness, nor between the organs employed in mechanical pursuits and those required by the poet. Here confusion reigns supreme.

One important bulwark of the phrenological structure has been recently broken down by the sheer force of more impartial and extended observations; namely, that bulk of brain is now no longer considered as a measure of intellectual power or capacity. This, in fact, prostrates the whole system, and lays it in the dust. As long as there was something to weigh to a grain, or measure to a hair's-breadth, the phrenologists had some hold of men's minds; there was a material tangibility imparted to the theory; and a ready appeal could always be made to the evidence of the senses. But this gone, all is gone. It is quite hopeless to take shelter in mere *quality* of brain. It is subject to a thousand conjectures and assumptions. It has no stability in it; it refuses to be subjected to the senses; it has no criterion for the judgment to fix upon, nor any means of directing the understanding into a rational and satisfactory channel of conviction. To be reduced to the declaration that a man's mind depends upon the *quality* of his brain, is but to give utterance to a very antiquated and trite expression, little in accordance with the lofty pretensions of philosophy, and ill-calculated to hand down the names of those who use it to the applause of posterity.

On this head we shall quote a remark or two from the pen of M. Peisse, a French writer of re-

putation. In combating the system of Gall, he instances a young Indian girl who possessed an organic development of an uncommon size, without any mental peculiarity. "I cannot perceive," says M. Peisse, "on the principles you lay down, how this difficulty can be surmounted. You would not believe on the one hand, that a healthy mind could dwell in a brain so monstrously deformed, without making a surrender of your fundamental principle, which expressly maintains that certain mental qualifications depend upon fixed physiological conditions which you have yourselves determined. On the other hand, you cannot consistently allege that the malformations of the cranium have not exercised some influence upon the constitution of the brain, without taking away from your system the only basis—the only guarantee it possesses, namely, *cranioscopy*. If indeed you concede, that, in this instance, disease or original disposition has been productive of such considerable deviations upon the cranium without affecting the brain, then all your classifications, distinctions, and organic localities are at once destroyed; for they depend upon a prior supposition of the perfect and continuous correspondence of the cranium with the brain. Were this harmony or correspondence destroyed, what becomes then of all your observations upon the statues of the ancients, on the heads of living men and animals? They are all vain, vague, and illusory Two propositions are deducible from this: first, either that the complete integrity of the intellectual and moral faculties can subsist with a monstrous brain; or,

secondly, that the cranium can be monstrous without the brain participating in its malformation. If you admit either of these propositions, the organology of Dr. Gall is reduced to a nonentity."

The charge of materialism has been often brought against phrenology; but of late years some writers, who have been inimical to the science, have treated this accusation with a good deal of tenderness. The motives for this seem rather inexplicable. That phrenology itself lies fairly open to the charge, is undoubted; and it seems hardly fair towards the interests of truth generally, to let it escape upon such easy and indulgent terms; particularly when it is considered that abstract materialism is the most irrational of all systems of philosophy, and the most inimical to the true interests and happiness of man. It must always be borne in mind, that the materialism to which phrenology necessarily leads, is of an absolute and pernicious description. It is different in many essential particulars from other branches of physiology, because the subject of investigation being direct, and limited to the separate organs of the brain, the mind naturally draws the conclusion, without any further consideration of the subject, that an act of thought is a mere attribute of organised matter. When this once lays hold on the mind, particularly of young persons, it is very difficult to be eradicated; and in the generality of cases, where this opinion is early imbibed, a return to a more rational and spiritual mode of thinking is rarely witnessed. That some able and disinterested cul-

tivators of general knowledge should have embraced phrenological doctrines with no view to promote the cause of materialism, is undoubtedly true; but this forms no conclusive argument for their own discretion, or the success of their chivalrous enterprise. The establishment of the Phrenological Society of London was, philosophically speaking, a humiliating sight; because it there presented a number of gentlemen of education and abilities, attempting to do that which it was impossible to do. There was a tacit compromise of truth and sincerity in its very formation. It was an attempt to unite light with darkness, folly with wisdom, and religion with atheism. And the truth of this was soon made manifest by the sudden and complete disruption of the whole Society. It may be considered as one of the philosophical wonders of the middle of the nineteenth century, for a number of philosophers to assemble together, with a tacit understanding that they were not to *draw an inference* from a principle, which any unlettered ploughboy of ten years of age would readily draw, and would feel satisfied with the conclusion to the end of his life. No opinion or sentiment, tainted in the slightest degree with materialism, was to be allowed to escape the lips of any of the members. What strange and innocent simplicity! "Can a man take fire in his bosom, and his clothes not be burned?" Dr. Engledue, however, soon rent this thin web of self-security and self-deception, by the mere breath of his nostrils. He told the members openly, that they "either cannot follow out the consequences

of their own doctrine, or they have not the courage or the honesty to avow them." This unpalatable announcement fell upon the ears of the members with apparent astonishment. The crisis was at hand. Immediate flight, which could only be made at the expence either of sincerity or logical acuteness, was resolved upon; and thus this notable phrenological confederation came to a sudden and untimely death.*

It has often been urged against the system of phrenology, that, in the higher walks of philosophy, it appears to be a shallow and miserably defective theory. It not only levels man to the animal creation, but it is totally inadequate to grapple with those general questions which have been inte-

* See Dr. Engledue's "Address," &c., 1848, with a letter to him from Dr. Elliotson, highly laudatory of his courage, and of the soundness of his opinions. The following passages from Dr. Engledue show that he did not mince the matter before the Society, and was determined that in future there should be no mistake upon the nature and tendency of phrenology.

"*We contend that mind has but an imaginary existence—that we have to consider matter only. What is organised matter? Merely a collection of atoms, possessing certain properties, and assuming different and determinate forms. What is brain? Merely one variety of organised matter. What do we mean by cerebation? The function of the brain—one of the manifestations of animal life, resulting from a peculiar combination of matter. The varied changes of form which this matter assumes, give rise to the numerous manifestations of cerebation in the different tribes of beings; and the varied changes of cerebation in the same being originate in molecular alterations—merely other expressions of a new condition.*" . . . "It is this conjectural doctrine—this belief in the individual essence of mind—this love of the marvellous—this thirsting after something mysterious, which is retarding the progress of cerebral physiology, and, in the same ratio, the happiness of man. It is this clinging to old opinions—this disinclination to shake off old garments, which is the cause of so much doubt concerning a question so self-evident. We oppose this system by the antagonism of *Reason* and

resting topics of inquiry and interest to him, from his earliest existence to the present hour. On all the most profound inquiries of human nature, it cannot speak a word that is either intelligible or consistent. Were there not a system of intellectual science already in existence, derived from the individual consciousness alone, the organs of the phrenologists could never have been made to indicate any thing about the mind or character of man ; so that, when it is referred back to its own intrinsic merits, it cannot furnish a single idea upon the subject of which it professes to treat. It is a beggarly collection of unmeaning words and crude conceptions.*

We are willing to allow that as a branch of physiology, it has a fair claim to attention ; but beyond this it cannot go. Its cultivation of late years has unquestionably been productive of benefit in a medical point of view ; and we think there are clear indications, from the general feeling in almost all countries at the present moment respecting it, that the scientific public will restrict it to this its legitimate offices and pretensions.

Nature. It is impossible any longer to countenance the opinion. It must be rooted up. It is like a malignant disease, which can only be cured by extermination. Let it be boldly stated, because it is true, that, as philosophers, we have to deal simply and *exclusively with matter*. Man neither possesses, nor does he need the possession of, any other stimulus than that which is given to the simplest of organised beings. From the lowest and simplest of organised beings, to the highest and most complicated, there is nothing more than a gradual addition of parts, accompanied by concentration."—(Address, &c. pp. 8, 10, 11.)

* This is, in fact, admitted by the phrenologists themselves, for the Phrenological Journal tells us, "We must know from our own consciousness the distinction between thoughts and feelings, *before* we can trace their connection with particular parts of the brain."

NOTES
AND
ILLUSTRATIONS.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

NOTE A.—Page 46.

“ All *mathematical* demonstration is built upon the notion, that where quantities or diagrams resemble each other, the relations which are true with respect to one of each kind, will be true with respect to all others of a like kind ; only *because there is nothing to make a difference among them*. So, if in all *past time* such ‘secret powers’ could be shown necessarily connected with such *sensible qualities* ; yet, in future it could not be proved to continue so, *unless supported by the axiom that like causes exhibit like effects, for that differences cannot arise of themselves*.

“ To represent the relation of cause and effect as A followed by B, is a *false* view of the matter ; cause and effect might be represented rather as $A \times B = C$, therefore C is *included* in the mixture of the objects called *cause*. If C arise once from the junction of any two bodies, C must, upon every like conjunction, be the result ; because there is no alteration in the proportion of the quantities to make a difference ; C is really *included* in the mixture of A and B, although to our senses we are forced to note down, as it were, the sum arising from their union *after the observance of their coalescence*.

“ In like manner the results of all mathematical combinations are included in their statements. Yet we are obliged to take notice of them separately and subsequently, owing to the imperfections of our senses in not observing them with sufficient quickness, and *time* being requisite to bring them out to full view, and make them apparent in some distinct shape. Indeed, my whole notion of the relation of cause and effect is aptly imagined by the nature of the

necessary results included in the juxta-position of quantities. But as long as cause shall be considered only as an *antecedent*, the future can never be proved to be included in the past, which yet is truly the case. For when it comes to be observed, that cause means, and really is, the creation of new qualities, (arising from new conjunctions in matter or mind), then it is perceived that the future is *involved* in the past; for when existing objects are the same, they must put on similar qualities, otherwise *contrary qualities* or *differences* would arise of themselves, and *begin* their own existences, which is impossible, and conveys a contradiction in terms. All that experience has to do is to show us, by what passes within ourselves, that there is a contradiction in the supposition of qualities *beginning their own existence*, and a contradiction is never admitted in the relation of ideas that present themselves.”—(Lady Mary Shepherd’s “Essay on Cause and Effect,” pp. 141—143.)

NOTE B.—Page 102.

We beg to make an observation or two on Dr. Davies’ “Estimate of the Human Mind,” in addition to those we have already given in the text. We only became acquainted with this really excellent work when our pages were passing through the press, and this was the reason of our comparatively brief notice of it. In referring to it again, we especially call the reader’s attention to the author’s introduction, which is most ably written, and abounds with useful truths and noble sentiments on the science of mind generally. In the first book, on the limits of reason in matters of revealed truth, many profound and philosophic views will be found on the great principles of human nature, and on the ends and purposes to which they directly lead. All the other portions of the treatise are likewise very interesting, and display the enlightened spirit of the Christian philosopher in every page.

Mrs. Loudon, The Light of Mental Science, 1845. This is a sensible little publication, written expressly to promote education. The metaphysician will find many observations in it, suggestive of reflections on his favourite science.—*A. L. Wigan* (M. D.), The Duality of the Mind proved by the Structure, Functions, and Diseases of the Brain, 1846. The author is not a phrenologist, but he believes

that each hemisphere of the brain is a perfect and independent mind, capable of exercising all the phenomena of thought, and moral and religious feeling and emotion. The Doctor tells us nevertheless, that "Thought is a secretion of the brain !!"

Dr. Hughes Fraser Halle, Critical Letters ;—Exact Philosophy, London, 1848. We have become acquainted, at the moment of going to press, with the "Exact Philosophy" of this gentleman. Its leading objects, independently of critical and controversial matter, are, 1st, To show that all logical errors arise from inexact ideas or conceptions ; 2nd, That the principles laid down by Mr. Stuart Mill, and other writers of the same school, are decidedly erroneous ; and 3rd, That the general tendency of what is termed *positive* science, both Continental and British, is inimical to the interests of really sound philosophy, morals, and religious principle. Dr. Halle is a most uncompromising spiritualist. We have just a moment to spare to say thus much of his treatise ; and to recommend its perusal to all who feel a peculiar interest in those parts of mental science which more immediately relate to the nature and process of the ratiocinative faculties, and to the abstract conclusions of the judgment.

On the following works we have not been able to make any individual comment ; and, consequently, merely submit them to the reader's attention.

Thomas Wirgman, Grammar of the Five Senses ;—Principles of the Kantian Philosophy, 1824 ;—Deverification of the New Testament, 1830 ;—Essay On Man ;—Science of Philosophy.—*James Douglas*, On the Philosophy of the Mind, 1839.—*Eleonora Fernandez*, The Economy of the Human Mind, London, 8vo.—*James Meickle*, Metaphysical Maxims.—*Mr. Walsh*, Lectures on the Human Mind.—*J. Robertson*, Life and Mind.—*M. A. Mitchell*, Essay on Capacity and Genius, 1816.—*Sir C. Bell*, A Treatise on the Five Senses.—*J. Jarrold*, Instinct and Reason Investigated.—*J. T. Crybbace*, Essay on Moral Freedom.—*G. Vincent*, Moral System, or Laws of Human Nature.—*J. Sellon*, New Philosophical Theory.—*Rashley*, Voice of Reason.—*G. Field*, Tritogenia, or Universal Philosophy.—*Cory (J. P.)* Metaphysical Inquirer, 1845 ;—A Way Out of Metaphysics, 1839 ;—Metaphysical Rambles.

NOTE C.—Page 136.

“ Ainsi que le spinozisme et l'idéalisme de Fichte, la philosophie de M. de Schelling est fondée sur un besoin logique considéré à tort comme une loi de la raison, et sur une hypothèse que rien ne justifie, et qui a contre elle la conscience universelle et l'expérience la plus intime et la plus certaine.

“ C'étaient des réminiscences orientales, jointes à l'exagération du cartésianisme et au besoin logique de tout réduire à un principe unique, qui avait enfanté le panthéisme de Spinoza. Fichte fut conduit au sien, sorte de spinozisme renversé, panthéisme moral, par l'ambition d'établir l'idéalisme critique sur un fondement plus solide, et par de fausses maximes sur la nature de la science et la faculté de connaître. M. de Schelling, nourri mais non satisfait des doctrines de Kant et de Fichte, et leur préférant secrètement les idées néoplatoniciennes renouvelées par Bruno et plus analogues à son génie, plus hardi que profond, plein d'ailleurs de savoir et d'imagination, plus poète que philosophe, accorda par supposition et par une décision arbitraire, à la raison une autorité souveraine et la faculté de tout connaître, ou plutôt la possession virtuelle de la vérité éternelle et absolue ; concluant du besoin logique de l'unité du savoir à l'unité réelle et objective des choses, il érigea en principe, non-seulement l'unité de tout, mais encore l'identité de la connaissance et de la réalité, de l'intuition et de son objet, de la pensée et de l'être. Il ne se contenta pas de dire avec Spinoza, que *tout étoit un et que cet un étoit Dieu, avec deux attributs, la pensée et la matière* ; avec Fichte, que *la connaissance étoit un, fondée sur un principe unique, sur un acte primitif du moi* ; avec Jacobi, qu'il y a *harmonie entre les manifestations constantes de la raison et la nature des choses* : il proclama, pour mieux assurer la certitude du jugement, *l'identité de l'acte de connaissance et de la création*, de la pensée et de l'univers, déclarant que le principe du savoir étoit aussi le principe de l'existence, et faisant de la conscience de cette idéalité, au moyen de l'intuition intellectuelle, la fin, la condition et l'essence de toute philosophie.

“ Assimilant de prime abord l'intelligence humaine à l'intelligence Divine, dont les idées se réalisent nécessairement, et sont parfaitement

identiques avec les choses qui en sont l'expression, au lieu de rechercher ce qu'est la raison, ce qu'elle peut être, la raison peut examiner sa portée et sa nature, sans révoquer en doute son autorité,—il la définit péremptoirement selon l'idéal logique qu'il s'est fait du savoir, dont il la suppose d'inspiration l'infailible instrument et le dépôt complet. Il ne s'agit plus seulement d'idées innées, ou d'idées qui se forment spontanément à la suite du développement de l'intelligence, de sentiments et de convictions rationnelles, qui sont l'expression de germes divins déposés au fond de l'âme, de ce trésor de vérité que recèle notre nature raisonnable, et que la pensée, fécondée par la vie, l'expérience, doit mettre au jour : la raison est plus que cela, infiniment plus. 'La raison,' dit M. de Schelling, 'est une, et il n'y a pas de degrés d'intelligence. Elle ne peut affirmer rien de relatif ou de fini ; elle ne peut affirmer aucune différence entre les choses. *L'affirmation de l'unité et de la totalité est son essence même.* La raison n'est pas un organe ou une faculté que nous possédons : *elle nous possède. Elle est savoir de Dieu*, et sa connaissance est la connaissance infinie que Dieu a de lui-même dans l'éternelle affirmation de soi. La raison est donc elle-même Dieu : elle n'a pas l'idée de Dieu, elle est cette idée même.'

"Ainsi, dans ce système, la raison est faite Dieu ; Dieu et le monde sont identifiés avec la raison. L'univers est le savoir divin réalisé, et la raison est en soi le savoir divin lui-même. Et sur quoi repose cette audacieuse prétention ? Sur une *illusion*, sur un *paralogisme*, sur une *exagération*, sur une *hypothèse* téméraire.

"Elle repose sur une illusion d'abord, résultant de la confusion d'un besoin de l'entendement avec une loi de la raison. En effet, cette affirmation de l'unité et de la totalité absolue que l'on déclare être l'essence même de la raison, n'est autre chose que le besoin de la généralisation logique poussé à l'extrême, et érigé en une loi réelle de la raison et des choses. Parce que l'entendement a l'habitude de généraliser les idées, et de les réduire à la plus haute unité possible, en faisant abstraction de toutes les différences et de toute réalité spécifique ;—parce que, en remontant des effets présents à leurs causes prochaines, et de celles-ci aux causes éloignées, le raisonnement ne peut s'arrêter qu'à un principe suprême, absolu ;—parce que, ensuite, en divisant logiquement cette idée, faussement considérée comme la plus réelle et la plus concrète, tandis qu'elle n'est que la plus générale, et en redescend-

ant de ce principe suprême à ses conséquences, on se persuade que tout est renfermé dans cette idée, comme les parties le sont dans un tout réel, et dans ce premier principe, comme une plante est virtuellement contenue dans son germe,—on en conclut que cette idée est la totalité des choses, tandis qu'elle en est née, et qu'elle n'en représente que le caractère le plus général, et que ce principe logique suprême est la cause réelle de toutes les conséquences qu'on en peut déduire, tandis qu'il n'en est que la raison et l'explication.

“ L'identique absolu de M. de Schelling comme l'unité absolue de Plotin, est un être de raison, un produit logique, qui se met faussement à la place de l'être primitif, de l'*ens realissimum* des scolastiques, source de toute existence, ensemble virtuel de toutes les déterminations possibles, mais non encore actuellement déterminé; c'est l'indéterminé absolu, un être sans attributs réels, un véritable non-être.

“ C'est là un *paralogisme*, comme dirait Kant, un faux raisonnement fondé sur la confusion du général logique avec l'universel, de l'unité logique avec l'unité réelle, du principe suprême de la connaissance avec le principe souverain des choses.

“ Le système repose ensuite sur l'exagération, ou plutôt sur l'altération d'un principe vrai, et que suppose toute philosophie positive, du principe de l'harmonie préétablie de la raison et de la nature, ou de l'autorité de la raison comme nature intelligente, fondement du rationalisme de Platon, comme de celui de la Bible et de Jacobi. De cette foi en la nature raisonnable de l'homme, considérée comme marquée du sceau de l'intelligence divine, ne résulte pas son identité absolue avec cette intelligence, avec l'entendement archétype, non plus que l'unité ou l'identité parfaite de ses produits avec les choses. L'autorité de la raison s'exerçant légitimement, et se manifestant avec constance et clarté, n'en implique pas l'absolue souveraineté, et s'il est permis, s'il est nécessaire d'attribuer de la réalité à ses lois et à ses intuitions, il ne s'ensuit pas que la connaissance rationnelle, dans ses conditions actuelles, puisse embrasser la vérité tout entière, telle que Dieu la voit. Encore moins les procédés logiques au moyen desquels la raison humaine arrive à la connaissance, peuvent-ils être considérés comme nécessaires à toute intelligence. Dieu ne raisonne pas, il voit; et c'est en vain que l'intuition intellectuelle de M. de Schelling cherche

à s'égaliser à l'intuition divine : elle n'est qu'une illusion, car ce qu'il donne pour telle, est évidemment un produit du raisonnement, d'une dialectique tout humaine."—(Willm's Histoire de la Philosophie Allemande, tome 3, p. 374, Paris, 1847.)

NOTE D.—Page 179.

The following list of German philosophical authors and their respective publications, since the end of the last century, is not to be considered as a full and perfect one ; but it will prove, perhaps, sufficiently ample both to guide the general student in his researches into German speculation, and to give an idea of the extent to which it has been carried within the last fifty years.

Ahron, Religionsphilosophie, 1841.—*Apelt*, Ernest Reinhold und die Kantische philosophie, 1834.—*Archin*, Königsberger, für Philosophie, Theologie, Sprachkunde und Geschichte, &c., 1811.—*Aschenbrenner* (*Prof. M.*), Lehrbuch der Metaphysik, Landshut, 1829.—*Ast* (*Fr.*), Hauptmomente der Geschichte der Philosophie, München, 1829.

Baader, Societätsphilosophie, 1837 ;—Die Incompetenz der Philosophie, Stuttgart, 1837.—*Balzac* (*V.*), Philosophische Studien, 1837.—*Bardili* (*W.*), Beiträge zur Beurtheilung des gegenwärtigen Zustandes der Vernunftlehre, 1803 ;—Philosoph. Elementarlehre, &c.—*Bauer*, Kritik der Geschichte der Synoptiker, 1841.—*Baur*, Socrates und Christus, 1837.—*Bayer* (*Dr. Carl*), Zu Fichte's Gedächtniss, Leipzig, 1836.—*Bayrhoffer* (*Dr. K.T.*), Naturphilosophie, 1840 ;—Die Grundprobleme der Metaphysik, &c., Marburg, 1836.—*Beneke* (*F. E.*), Grundlegung zur Physik der Sitten, ein Gegenstück zu Kant's Metaphysik der Sitten, &c. ; De veris Philosophiæ initiis, &c., 1821 ;—Erkenntnisslehre, nach dem Bewusstseyn der reinen Vernunft, in ihren Grundzügen dargestellt, 1820 ;—Metaphysik und Religionsphilosophie, 1840 ;—System der prakt. Philosophie ;—Lehrbuch der Psychologie, Berlin, 1833 ;—Die Neue Psychologie, 1845.—*Berg* (*F.*), Sertus, oder über die absolute Erkenntniss von Schelling, 1804 ;—Epikritik der Philosophie, 1805.—*Berger* (*J.*), Geschichte der Religions-Philosophie, oder Lehren u. Meinungen der originellsten Denker aller Zeiten über Religion und Gott, 1800.—*Bergk*

(*J. A.*), Briefe üb. Kant's Rechtslehre, 1805 ;—Die Kunst zu Philosophiren, 1802 ;—Die Kunst zu Denken, 1802.—*Betrachtungen* über den gegenwärtigen Zustand der Philosophie in Deutschland überhaupt, u. über die Schelling'sche Philosophie insbesondere, 1813.—*Beweisgründe* über die einzigmöglichen, &c., gegen das Daseyn und die Gültigkeit der natürlichen Rechte ; Von der Unsterblichkeit der Seele, aus Vernunft u. Erfahrung, 1807.—*Bibliotheca Psychologica*, Leipsic, 1845.—*Biermann*, Beiträge zur Psychologie, Ebend, 1833.—*Biese*, Die Philosophie des Aristoteles, &c., Altona, 1836.—*Billroth*, Religionsphilosophie.—*Birnbaum*, Anthropologie, 1842.—*Block (G. W.)*, Neue Grundlegung zur Philosophie der Sitten, mit beständiger Rücksicht auf die Kantische, 1802 ;—Die Fehler der Philosophie, mit ihren Ursachen u. Heilmitteln dargestellt, 1804.—*Bockshaumer (G. F.)*, Die Freiheit des menschl. Willens, 1821.—*Bodemeyer*, Commentatio de Kantianarum Categoriarum, &c., 1844.—*Böhme (C. F.)*, Beantwortung der Frage, Was ist Wahrheit ? 1803 ;—Commentar über u. gegen den ersten Grundsatz der Wissenschaftslehre, 1802.—*Brandis (C. A.)*, Von dem Begriffe der Geschichte der Philosophie, 1815 ;—Commentationum Eleaticarum Xenophontis, Parmenidis, Melissi, doctrina ex propriis philosophorum reliquiis veterumque auctorum testimonii expositat, 1815.—*Brandis (J.)*, Die Logik in ihrem Verhältniss zur Philosophie, &c., 1823.—*Braniss (Prof. D. Jul.)*, System der Metaphysik, 1832.—*Brinkmann (C. G.)*, Philosoph. Ansichten, 1806.—*Brückner (J. A.)*, Blicke in die Natur der prakt. Vernunft, &c., 1814.—*Brüning (A.)*, Anfangsgründe der Grundwissenschaft oder Philosophie, 1809 ;—Zu einer künftigen Grundwissenschaft oder Philosophie, ein Fragment u. kleiner Versuch, der misslingen kann, 1822.—*Burja (A.)*, Lehrbuch der hylodynamischen Philosophie, von der Körperwelt, von Gott und der Menschh., 1812.—*Buccinski (F.)*, Institutiones Philosophicæ, Vienna, 1844.

Callisen (C. F.), Abriss der Logik u. Metaphysik, 1805 ;—Des philosoph. Rechts u. der Sittenlehre, 1805 ;—Der Seelenlehre, nebst Erläuterungen, 1807.—*Carrière*, Die philosoph. Weltanschauung. 1847.—*Carus (F. A.)*, Geschichte d. Psychologie, 1809 ;—Moral und Religionsphilosophie, &c. &c., 1809.—*Cäsar (C. A.)*, Denkwürdigkeiten aus der Philosophie ;—Pragmatische Darstel-

lung des Geistes der neuesten Philosophie des In- u. Auslandes, 1803.—*Chalybäus*, Specul. Philos. von Kant bis Hegel, 1843.
—*Collmann*, Kritik der philos. Schule, 1836.

Danzel, Plato quid de Philosophandi Methodo, &c. 1841 ;—*Plato philosophiæ parens*, 1845.—*Daub*, Philosophische Vorlesungen, 1840.—*Daumer (G. Fr.)*, System der Specul. Philosophie, Nürnberg, 1829 ;—*Anthropologism.* 1844.—*Deinhardt*, Der Begriff der Seele, 1840.—*Deutinger*, Grundlinien einer positiv. Philosophie, 1847.—*Diestel und Ebel*, Verstand und Vernunft, 1837.—*Dmowski*, Institut. philos. 1843.—*Drechsler (J. M.)*, Ueber Wollaston's Moral philosophy, 1802.—*Druste (Hülfschhof C. A. Von)*, Lehrbuch des Naturrechts u. d. Rechtsphilosophie, 1823.

Ebel, Erkenntniss der Wahrheit, 1837 ;—*Eberstein (W. L. G. Von)*, Versuch einer Geschichte der Logik und Metaphysik bei den Deutschen, von Leibnitz bis auf die gegenwärtige Zeit ;—Ueber die Beschaffenheit der Logik u. Metaphysik der reinen Peripatetiker, 1801.—*Ehrlich*, Metaphysik, 1841 ;—Zur Reform der philos. Ethik, 1847 ;—Lehre von der Bestimmung des Menschen, 1845.—*Engel (J. J.)*, Die Philosophie für die Welt, 1801 ;—Versuch einer Methode, die Vernunftlehre aus Plato's Dialogen zu entwickeln, 1805.—*Erdmann*, Leib und Seele, 1837 ;—Geschichte der Philosophie, 1840 ;—Natur und Schöpfung, 1840 ;—Grundr. d. Psychologie, 1840 ; Logik und Metaphysik, 1841.—*Erenberg (Fr.)*, Ueber Denken u. Zweifeln, zur Aufklärung einiger Missverständnisse in der höheren Philosophie, 1802.—*Erhard (And.)*, Handbuch der Moralphilosophie, 1841 ;—Metaphysik, 1845.—*Erhardt (S.)*, Grundlage der Ethik, 1821 ;—Ueber den Begriff und Zweck der Philosophie, 1818 ;—Philosoph. Encyclopädie, oder System der gesamt. wissenschaft. Erkennt. 1818 ;—Das Leben und Seyn, &c., 1816.—*Erklärung* der Logik, Metaphysik u. prakt. Philosoph., nach Fader ; Der transcendentalen Phil. 1803.—*Ernesti (J. H. M.)*, Encyclopädisches Handbuch einer allgemeinen Geschichte der Philosophie und ihrer Literatur, nebst Beiträgen zum weiteren Gebrauch der Hissmann'schen Anleitung zur Kenntniss der auserlesenen Literatur in allen Theilen der Philosophie, 1807 ;—Pflichten- u. Tugendlehre der Vernunft u. Religion, nach den Bedürfnissen unserer Zeit, 1817.—*Eschenmaier (C. A. Von)*,

System der Moralphilosophie, 1818 ;—Moral-Rechte, 1819 ;—Psychologie, 1822 ;—Religions-philosophie, 1822 ;—Die Hegel'sche Religions-philosophie, Tübingen, 1834. — *Evertz*, Metaphys. Kosmologie, 1837. — *Exner*, Ueber Leibnitz's Universal. Wissenschaft, 1843.

Feuerbach (Dr. Ludw. Andr.), Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Anspach, 1833 ;— *Fichte* (J. G.), Antwortschreiben an K. L. Reinhold auf dessen Beiträge zur leichteren Uebersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie beim Anfange, 1801 ;—Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, als Handschrift für seine Zuhörer, nebst Grundriss des Eigenthümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre, 1802 ;—Die Wissenschaftslehre in ihrem allgem. Umriss dargestellt, 1810 ;—Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten und seine Erscheinung im Gebiete der Freiheit, 1806. — *Fichte* (J. H.), Beiträge zur Charakteristik der neueren Philosophie, zur Vermittlung ihrer Gegensätze, Sulzbach, 1829 ;—System der Philosophie 1847 ;—Grundzüge des Systems der Philosophie, 1847. — *Fischer* (Prof. Dr. Friedr.), Lehrbuch der Psychologie für akademische Vorlesungen und Gymnasial-Vorträge, Basel, 1838. — *Fischhaber* (G. C. F.), Lehrbuch der Logik, 1818 ;—Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 1820 ;—Ueber das Princip. u. die Hauptprobleme des Fichte'schen Systems, 1801. — *Franke* (G. C.), Ueber die neueren Schicksale des Spinozismus, u. seinen Einfluss auf die Philosophie überhaupt, u. die Vernunft-Theologie insbesondere ; eine gekrönte Preisschrift, 1808 ;—Ueber die Eigenschaften der Analysis u. der analytischen Methode in der Philosophie, 1805 ;—De ratione qua est critica philosophia ad interpret. librorum imprimis sacrorum, etc. ;—Ueber die hauptsächlichsten Stufen der praktischen Philosophie, &c. &c. 1808. — *Franke* (Prof. D. Fr.), Philosophie und Leben, Berlin, 1831. — *Fries*, Geschichte der Philosophie, 1839. — *Fries* (Dr. Jac. Friedr.), Handbuch der psychischen Anthropologie, oder der Lehre von der Natur des menschlichen Geistes, Jena, 1839. — *Frorath* (Prof. W.), Leichtfassliche Lehren aus der Psychologie und Logik, Frankfurt, 1833. — *Fürstenau* (K. G.), Ideen zu einer gemeinfasslichen Metaphysik der Sitten ;—Der prakt. Moral. Idealismus, im Gegensatz des Speculativ-metaphysischen dargestellt, 1803. — *Furtmaier* (M.), Briefe über das Studium der Philosophie, 1816.

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NOTE E.

The following is a list of French Authors, with their respective publications, who discuss the principles of Philosophy more or less through the medium of Theology, and on whose writings we have not been able, for want of space, to make any remarks.

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NOTE F.—Page 281.

We give the following extracts from M. Cousin, which bear upon his ideas of the Deity, His attributes, and Creation generally :—

“ Leuippe, Epicure, Lucrèce, Bayle, Spinoza, et tous les penseurs un peu exercés, démontrent trop aisément, que de rien on ne tire rien, que du néant rien ne peut sortir ; d'où il suit que la création est, je ne dis pas possible, mais nécessaire.” . . . “ Créer est une chose très-peu difficile à concevoir, car c'est une chose que nous faisons à toutes les minutes ; en effet, nous créons toutes les fois que nous faisons un acte libre. . . . Ainsi causer, c'est créer ; mais avec quoi ? avec rien ? Non, sans doute ; tout au contraire, avec le fond même de notre existence.” . . . “ Toutes les idées que nous pouvons nous faire de la création, sont empruntées, en dernière analyse, à la conscience de notre causalité personnelle. Or, dans la *causation*, pour me servir de ce mot anglais, il y a création d'une détermination intérieure, ou d'un *mouvement externe*, c'est-à-dire la création de *quelque chose de phénoménal*. Partant de-là, qui peut nous permettre de concevoir légitimement la *création de substance* ? ” — (Fragments Philosophiques, pp. 181, 221.)

“ L'idée d'attacher une substance à chaque objet conduisant à une multitude infinie de substances, détruit l'idée même de substance ; car la substance étant ce au de-là de quoi il est impossible de rien concevoir relativement à l'existence, doit être unique pour être substance. Il est trop clair que des milliers de substances qui se limitent nécessairement l'une l'autre, ne se suffisent point à elles-mêmes, et n'ont rien d'absolu et de substantiel. Or, ce qui est vrai de mille est vrai de deux. Je sais que l'on distingue les substances finies, qui me paraissent fort ressembler à des phénomènes, le phénomène étant ce qui suppose nécessairement quelque chose au de-là de soi, relativement à l'existence. Chaque objet n'est donc pas une substance ; mais il y a de la substance dans tout objet, car tout ce qui est ne peut être que par son rapport à *celui qui est celui qui est*, à celui qui est l'existence, la substance absolue. C'est là que chaque chose trouve sa substance ; c'est par-là que chaque chose est substantiellement ; c'est ce rapport à la substance qui constitue l'essence de chaque chose. Voilà pourquoi l'essence de

chaque chose ne peut être détruite par aucun effort humain, ni même supposée détruite par la pensée de l'homme ; car pour la détruire, ou la supposer détruite, il faudrait détruire, ou supposer détruit, l'indestructible, l'être absolu, qui la constitue."—(Fragments, p. 348.)

" Comme la raison n'est pas autre chose que l'action des deux grandes lois de la causalité et de la substance, il faut qu'immédiatement la raison rapporte l'action à une chose et à une substance intérieure, savoir, le *moi* ; la sensation à une cause et à une substance extérieure, le non-moi : mais ne pouvant s'y arrêter comme à des causes vraiment substantielles, tant parce que leur phénoménalité et leur contingence manifeste leur ôtent tout caractère absolu et substantiel, que parce qu'étant deux, elles se limitent l'une par l'autre, et s'excluent ainsi du rang de substance, il faut que la raison les rapporte à une cause substantielle unique, au delà de laquelle, il n'y a plus rien à chercher relativement à l'existence, c'est-à-dire en fait de cause et de substance, car l'existence est l'identité des deux." . . . " Le fait de conscience contient déjà les trois grandes idées que la science plus tard divise ou résume, mais qu'elle ne peut dépasser, savoir, l'homme, la nature, et Dieu. Mais l'homme, la nature, et le Dieu de la conscience, ne sont pas vaines formules, mais des faits et des réalités. L'homme n'est pas dans la conscience sans la nature, ni la nature sans l'homme, mais tous deux s'y rencontrent dans leur opposition et leur réciprocité, comme des causes, et des causes relatives, dont la nature est de se développer toujours l'une par l'autre."—(Fragments, p. 76.)

" Eh bien ! Messieurs, ce monde ainsi métamorphosé par la puissance de l'homme, cette nature qu'il a refaite à son image, cette société qu'il a ordonnée sur la règle du juste, ces merveilles de l'art dont il a enchanté sa vie, ne suffisent point à l'homme. Sa pensée s'élance au delà et derrière ce monde, qu'il embellit et qu'il ordonne : l'homme, tout puissant qu'il est, conçoit et ne peut ne pas concevoir une puissance supérieure à la sienne, et à celle de la nature ; une puissance qui sans doute ne se manifeste que par ses œuvres, c'est-à-dire par la nature et par l'humanité, qu'on ne contemple que dans ses œuvres, qu'on ne conçoit qu'en rapport avec ses œuvres, mais toujours avec la réserve de la supériorité d'essence et de l'absolue omnipotence.

" Enchaîné dans les limites du monde, l'homme ne voit rien qu'à

travers ce monde, et sous ces formes mêmes il suppose irrésistiblement quelque chose qui est pour lui la substance, la cause et la modèle de toutes les forces et de toutes les perfections qu'il apperçoit et dans lui-même et dans le monde. En un mot, par delà le monde de l'industrie, le monde politique et celui de l'art, l'homme conçoit Dieu. Le Dieu de l'humanité n'est pas plus séparé du monde qu'il n'est concentré dans le monde. Un Dieu sans monde est pour l'homme comme s'il n'était pas ; un monde sans Dieu est une énigme incompréhensible à sa pensée, et pour son cœur un poids accablant.

“ L'intuition de Dieu, distinct en soi du monde, mais y faisant son apparition, est la religion naturelle. Mais comme l'homme ne s'était pas arrêté au monde primitif, aux beautés naturelles, il ne s'arrête pas non plus à la religion naturelle. En effet, la religion naturelle, c'est-à-dire l'instinct de la pensée qui s'élance jusqu'à Dieu à travers le monde, n'est qu'un éclair qui illumine son âme, comme l'idée de l'utile. Mais, dans ce monde, tout tend à obscurcir, à distraire, à égarer le sentiment religieux. Que fait donc l'homme ? Il fait ici ce qu'il a fait précédemment, il crée, à l'usage de l'idée nouvelle qui le domine, un autre monde que celui de la nature, un monde dans lequel, faisant abstraction de toute autre chose, il n'aperçoit plus que son caractère divin, c'est-à-dire son rapport avec Dieu. Le monde de la religion, Messieurs, c'est le culte. En vérité, c'est un sentiment religieux bien impuissant que celui qui s'arrêterait à une contemplation rare, vague et stérile. Il est de l'essence de tout ce qui est fort de se développer, de se réaliser. Le culte est donc le développement, la réalisation du sentiment religieux, non sa limitation. Le culte est à la religion naturelle ce que l'art est à la beauté naturelle, ce que l'Etat est à la société primitive, ce que le monde de l'industrie est à celui de la nature. Le triomphe de l'intuition religieuse est dans la création du culte, comme le triomphe de l'idée du beau est dans la création de l'art, comme celui de l'idée du juste est dans la création de l'Etat. Le culte est infiniment supérieur au monde ordinaire en ce que, 1°, il n'a d'autre destination que celle de rappeler Dieu à l'homme, tandis que la nature extérieure, outre son rapport à Dieu, en a beaucoup d'autres qui distraient sans cesse la faible humanité de la vue de celui-là ; 2°, parce qu'il est infiniment plus clair, comme représentation des choses divines ; 3°, parce qu'il est per-

manent, tandis qu'à chaque instant, à nos mobiles regards, le caractère divin du monde s'affaiblit ou s'éclipse tout à fait. Le culte, par sa spécialité, par sa clarté, par sa permanence, rappelle l'homme à Dieu mille fois mieux que ne le fait le monde. C'est une victoire sur la vie vulgaire plus haute encore que celle de l'industrie, de l'Etat, et de l'art.

“ Mais, Messieurs, à quelle condition le culte rappelle-t-il efficacement l'homme à son auteur ? A la condition inhérente à tout culte, de présenter ces rapports si obscurs de l'humanité et du monde à Dieu, sous des formes extérieures, sous de vives images, sous des symboles. Parvenue là, sans doute l'humanité est arrivée bien haut, mais a-t-elle atteint sa borne infranchissable ? Toute vérité, c'est-à-dire ici, tous les rapports de l'homme et du monde à Dieu, sont déposés, je le crois, dans les symboles sacrés de la religion. Mais la pensée peut-elle s'arrêter à des symboles ? L'enthousiasme, après avoir entrevu Dieu dans ce monde, crée le culte et entrevoit Dieu encore. La foi s'attache aux symboles ; elle y contemple ce qui n'y est pas, ou du moins ce qui n'y est que d'une manière indirecte et détournée : c'est là précisément la grandeur de la foi, de reconnaître Dieu dans ce qui visiblement ne le contient pas. Mais l'enthousiasme et la foi ne sont pas, ne peuvent pas être les derniers degrés du développement de l'intelligence humaine. En présence du symbole, l'homme, après l'avoir adoré, éprouve le besoin de s'en rendre compte. Se rendre compte, c'est une parole bien grave que je prononce. A quelles conditions, en effet, se rend-on compte ? A une seule : c'est de décomposer ce dont on veut se rendre compte ; c'est de le transformer en pures conceptions, que l'esprit examine ensuite, et sur la vérité ou la fausseté desquelles il prononce. Ainsi, à l'enthousiasme et à la foi succède la réflexion. Or, si l'enthousiasme et la foi ont pour langue naturelle la poésie, et s'exhalent en hymnes, la réflexion a pour instrument la dialectique ; et nous voilà, Messieurs, dans un tout autre monde que celui du symbolisme et du culte.”—(Cousin, “ Cours de Philosophie,” 1840.)

NOTE G.—Page 322.

In presenting this list of modern French writers on philosophy

to our readers' attention, we sincerely regret, on account of our want of space, our having thus to pass over many distinguished authors without a word of comment on their several able and truly enlightened publications. There are very many names, on this list, for whose talents and learning in metaphysical science we feel the highest respect ; and among the number, (without, however, insinuating the slightest disparagement of many others), we beg to mention M. Tissot, M. Rémusat, M. Armand-Saintes, M. Renouvier, Emile Saisset, and the Baron Barchon de Penhœn ; all of whom are writers of splendid talents, and view philosophy through a rational and healthy medium.

Ahrens, Cours de Psychologie, fait sous les auspices du gouvernement, 2 vol.—*Alletz* (*Edouard*), Harmonies de l'intelligence humaine, 1846, 2 vol.—*Alliot* (*l'Abbé*), La philosophie des sciences, &c. 1844, 2 vol.—*Allmeyer*, Cours de philosophie de l'histoire, fait à l'Université libre de Bruxelles, 1 vol.—*Amard* (*L. V. F.*), Homme, Univers, et Dieu, ou Religion et gouvernement universel, 1844, 2 vol.—*Amice* (*F. S.*), Manuel de philosophie expérimentale, &c., 1 vol.—*Ampère*, Essais sur la philosophie des sciences, &c., 2 vol.—*Armand-Saintes*, Histoire critique du Rationalisme en Allemagne, depuis son origine jusqu'à nos jours, 1 vol.—*Auger*, Mélanges philosophiques et littéraires, 1828, 2 vol.—*Barbe* (*l'Abbé E.*), Cours élémentaires de philosophie, à l'usage des établissements d'éducation, 1846, 1 vol.—*Barthez*, Nouveaux éléments de la science de l'homme, 1806, 2 vol.—*Belorimo* (*l'Abbé*), Des passions dans leurs rapports avec la religion, la philosophie, la physiologie et la médecine légale, 1844, 2 vol.—*Bénard* (*Ch.*), Précis d'un cours élémentaire de philosophie, 1845, 1 vol.—*Berger*, Exposition de la doctrine de Proclus, 1841, 1 vol.—*Bersot* (*Ernest*), Du spiritualisme et de la nature, 1846, 1 vol.—*Bland*, Traité élémentaire de physiologie et de philosophie, &c., 3 vol.—*Blein* (*A.*), Essais philosophiques sur la dialectique, la métaphysique, la morale, le culte religieux et la physique, 1 vol.—*Bonstetten*, Etudes de l'homme, &c., 2 vol. ;—Recherches sur la nature et les lois de l'imagination, 1807, 2 vol.—*Bordas-Demoulin*, Le Cartésianisme, ou la véritable rénovation des sciences, &c., 2 vol. ;—Mélanges philosophiques et religieux, 1845, 1 vol.—*Bozzelli*, De l'union de la philosophie avec la morale, 1 vol.—*Brun*,

Leçons idéologiques pour apprendre à la jeunesse à contracter des habitudes sociales et des habitudes morales, 1 vol.—*Buob (Ch.)*, Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion, d'après la méthode psychologique, 1843, 1 vol.;—Philosophie de l'absolu en Allemagne, dans ses rapports avec la doctrine chrétienne, 1842, 1 vol.—*Caraman (le Duc de)*, Histoire des révolutions de la philosophie en France pendant le moyen âge jusqu'au xvi^e siècle, &c. &c., 1845, 2 vol.—*Cardaillac*, Etudes élémentaires de philosophie, 2 vol.—*Caudemberg (Gérard de)*, Rénovation philosophique, etc., 1838, 1 vol.—*Charma*, Essai sur les bases et les développements de la moralité, &c. &c., 1 vol.;—Leçons de logique, 1 vol.;—Leçons de philosophie sociale, 1 vol.;—Essai sur la philosophie orientale, professé à la faculté des lettres de Caen, 1842, 1 vol.—*Collineau, (F. C.)* Analyse physiologique de l'entendement humain, &c., 1842, 1 vol.—*Combalot, (l'Abbé)*, Eléments de philosophie Catholique, 1842, 1 vol.;—*Cournault (Ed.)*, Exposition des principes actuels de la philosophie, &c., 1 vol.—*Cros*, Théorie de l'homme intellectuel et moral, 1838, 2 vol.—*Crousse, (L. D.)* Des principes, ou philosophie première, 1846, 1 vol.—*Dassance, (l'Abbé)*, Cours de philosophie, 3 vol.—*Daube*, Question proposée par l'académie des sciences morales et politiques: Quelles sont les applications pratiques les plus utiles que l'on pourrait faire du principe de l'association volontaire ou privée au soulagement de la misère? Examen de cette question, 1 vol.—*Decorde*, Des facultés humaines comme éléments originaires de la civilisation et du progrès, 2 vol.—*Delarivière (P. S. T.)*, Nouvelle logique classique, 1 vol.—*Demouville*, Introduction à la philosophie primitive, &c., 1843, 1 vol.—*Desdouits*, L'homme et la création, ou théorie des causes finales dans l'univers, 1 vol.—*Doney (l'Abbé)*, Nouveaux éléments de philosophie, d'après la méthode d'observation et la règle du sens commun, 2 vol.—*Dufour (Ph.)*, Essai sur l'étude de l'homme considéré sous le double point de vue de la vie animale et de la vie intellectuelle, 1833, 2 vol.—*Duguet*, Pythagore, ou Précis de philosophie ancienne et moderne dans ses rapports avec les métamorphoses de la nature, ou la métempsychose, 1841, 1 vol.—*Farcy (Fr. Ch.)*, Aperçu philosophique des connaissances humaines au 19^{me} siècle, 1827, 1 vol.—*Faure*, Aperçus philosophiques sur le monde physique et sur le monde

intellectuel et moral, 1843, 1 vol.—*Feletz (l'Abbé)*, Mélanges de philosophie, d'histoire et de littérature, 1828, 6 vol.—*Flotte*, Leçons élémentaires de philosophie, 3 vol.—*Fortia-d'Urban (de)*, De l'immortalité de l'âme, 1 vol.—*Franck (Ad.)*, Esquisse d'une histoire de la logique, précédée d'une Analyse détaillée de l'*Organum* d'Aristote, 1 vol.—*Gabet*, Traité élémentaire de la science de l'homme, considéré sous tous ses rapports, 1842, 3 vol.—*Garnier (Ad.)*, Précis d'un cours de psychologie, &c., 1 vol. ;—La psychologie et la phrénologie comparées, 1840, 1 vol.—*Gasc (F. P.)*, Philosophie générale des connaissances humaines, &c., 1845, 1 vol.—*Gasc (fils)*, Etudes historiques et critiques sur l'instruction secondaire, &c., 1844, 1 vol.—*Genty (S. G. H.)*, Eléments de philosophie, contenant la logique, l'art du langage, la métaphysique et la morale, 2 vol.—*Gérard (l'Abbé)*, Essai sur les vrais principes relativement à nos connaissances les plus importantes, 1826, 3 vol.—*Gerdy (le Docteur N.)*, Physiologie philosophique des sensations et de l'intelligence, &c., 1846, 1 vol.—*Gérusez*, Nouveaux cours de philosophie, rédigé d'après le nouveau programme, comprenant la psychologie, la logique, la morale, &c., 1843, 1 vol.—*Gibon*, Cours de Philosophie, 1842, 2 vol. ;—Fragments philosophiques, 1836, 1 vol.—*Harmotin (Emile)*, Nouvelle théologie philosophique, &c., 1846, 2 vol.—*Jacob (L. H.)*, Essais de philosophie sur l'homme, ses principaux rapports et sa destinée, fondés sur l'expérience et la raison, suivis d'observations sur le beau, 1 vol.—*Ladevi*, Réfutation du matérialisme, et démonstration du spiritualisme par la physiologie et la psychologie, 1 vol.—*Larroque (Patrice)*, Cours de philosophie, 1 vol.—*Leroux (Ant.)*, Pneumatologie, nouveau système philosophique sur l'origine et le but final de toute chose, d'après les théories élevées de la philosophie, depuis les brachmanes jusqu'à nos jours, 1 vol.—*Leroy (Charles-Georges)*, Lettres philosophiques sur l'intelligence et la perfectibilité des animaux, avec quelques lettres sur l'homme, 1802, 1 vol.—*Lorquet*, Discours sur la méthode de Descartes ; *Novum Organum* de Bacon ; Théodicée de Leibnitz ; Fragments publiés avec des notes, 1840, 1 vol.—*Mallet*, Etudes philosophiques, 2 vol. ;—Manuel de philosophie à l'usage des élèves qui suivent les cours de l'université, 1 vol.—*Matter (Jacq.)*, Histoire critique du gnosticisme, et de son

influence sur les sectes religieuses et philosophiques des dix premiers siècles de l'ère chrétienne, 3 vol.—*Masure*, Cours de philosophie, 2 vol.;—*Etudes du Cartésianisme*, &c., 1 vol.—*Meister*, Mélanges de philosophie, de morale, et de littérature, 2 vol.;—*Métaphysique nouvelle*, ou *Essai intellectuel et moral de l'homme*, 3 vol.—*Noël*, Cours de philosophie, ou *Logique complète de Condillac*, &c., 1 vol.;—*Leçons de philosophie morale*, 1 vol.—*Ott*, *Hegel et la philosophie Allemande*, &c. &c., 1 vol.—*Ozanam (A. S.)*, *Dante et la philosophie catholique au xiii^e siècle*, 1840, 1 vol.—*Ozaneaux*, *Nouveau système d'études philosophiques*, etc., 1 vol.—*Paffe (C. M.)*, *Considérations sur la sensibilité mise en sa place, et présentée comme essentiellement distincte du principe intellectuel*, 1832, 1 vol.—*Para Du Phanjas (l'Abbé)*, *Théorie des êtres sensibles*, etc., 3 vol.—*Perrard (J. F.)*, *Introduction à la philosophie, ou Nouvelle logique française*, 1 vol.;—*Nouvelle logique classique*, etc. etc., 2 vol.—*Pichard*, *Ebauche d'un essai sur les notions radicales*, 2 vol.—*Pinel (Louis)*, *Essais de philosophie positive*, 1845, 1 vol.—*Ponelle (Edm.)*, *Manuel complet de philosophie*, etc., 1 vol.—*Rajon (J. M.)*, *Cours philosophique et interprétatif des initiations anciennes et modernes*, 1843, 1 vol.—*Raoux (Ed.)*, *De la destinée de l'homme d'après les lois de sa nature*, 1845, 1 vol.—*Receveur (F. G.)*, *Essai sur la nature de l'homme, l'origine des idées et le fondement de la certitude*, 1834, 1 vol.—*Redern (le Comte de)*, *Considérations sur la nature de l'homme en soi-même et dans ses rapports avec l'ordre social*, 1835, 2 vol.;—*Modes accidentelles de nos perceptions*, etc. etc., 1 vol.—*Saisset (Emile)*, *Essais sur la philosophie et la religion au xix^e siècle*, 1845, 1 vol.—*Saphari*, *L'école éclectique et l'école française*, 1844, 1 vol.—*Schoen (F. L.)*, *L'homme et son perfectionnement*, 1845, 1 vol.—*Segretain (E. A.)*, *Des éléments de l'état*, etc., 2 vol.—*Servant De Beauvais*, *Manuel classique de philosophie*, 1834, 1 vol.—*Siard (Victor)*, *Essai philosophique sur la loi de progressibilité universelle et son application au sort de l'homme*, 1843, 1 vol.—*Thibault (J. B.)*, *Pensées sur l'homme*, 1844, 1 vol.—*Thurot*, *De l'entendement et de la raison, introduction à l'étude de la philosophie*, 1833, 2 vol.—*Tissot*, *Anthropologie spéculative générale*, etc. etc., 1843, 2 vol.;—*Cours élémentaire de philosophie*, etc., 1840, 1 vol.;—*Histoire*

abrégée de la philosophie, 1840, 1 vol.—*Vacherot*, Histoire critique de l'école d'Alexandrie, 2 vol. 1846.—*Villain*, Dissertation philosophique et métaphysique sur l'identité de la vie intellectuelle et matérielle de tous les êtres qui vivent et qui végètent sur la terre; Théorie électrique et thérapeutique, 1833, 1 vol.—*Villeteurque (Alex.)*, Veilles philosophiques, ou Essais sur la morale expérimentale et la physique systématique, 2 vol.—*Zeller*, Essai sur l'homme, 2 vol.

Mellin (M.), Principes Métaphysiques du Droit, suivis d'un projet de paix perpétuelle, &c., traduit de l'Allemand par M. Tissot. 1837.—*Rémusat (M. Ch. De)*, Essais de Philosophie, 1842, 2 vol.;—*Abélard*, Paris, 1845; — De la Philosophie Allemande, Paris, 1845.—*Tissot (J.)*, Critique de la Raison Pure, 1845, 2 vol.—*Barni (J.)*, Critique du Jugement, suivie d'un Essai sur le Beau, &c. 1845;—Critique de la Raison Pratique, précédée des fondements de la métaphysique des mœurs, &c. 1847.—*Ravaisson (Félix)*, Essai sur la métaphysique d'Aristote, 1846.—*Mège (Amédée)*, Le Philosophisme réduit à sa plus simple expression, &c., Paris, 1846.—*Nicolas (Auguste)*, Etudes Philosophiques, &c., Paris, 1846.—*Geruzez (E.)*, Cours de Philosophie, &c., Paris, 1846.—*Lorquet (A.)*, La philosophie et la religion, Paris, 1847.—*Javari (M.)*, De la Certitude, Paris, 1847.—*Pezzani (André)*, Exposé d'un nouveau Système philosophique, Paris, 1847.—*E. Saisset*, Manuel de Philosophie à l'usage des Collèges, Paris, 1847.—*Plisson (F. E.)*, Les mondes, ou essai philosophique sur les conditions d'existence des êtres organisés dans notre Système planétaire, Paris, 1847.—*Lezaud (M. P. L.)*, Résumés Philosophiques, Paris, 1847.—*Giordano Bruno*, Son histoire et ses œuvres, traduit par M. Christian Bartholmèss, 1847, 2 vol.—*Frank (M.)*, De la Certitude, Rapport à l'Académie des Sciences morales et politiques, avec une longue introduction, 1847, 1 vol.—*Salines et De Scorbiac*, Précis de l'histoire de la Philosophie, Paris, 1848.

NOTE H.—Page 343.

The following observations, in defence of Rosmini's Philosophy,

are taken from the "Lettere di un Rosminiano a Vincenzo Gioberti," Brusselle, 1841:—

"La quale sentenza se, nella vostra maniera di esprimerla troppo esclusiva, è erronea, verissima si fa, quando invece di dire *fuori dell'ontologismo*, diceste solo, che *nel psicologismo* la scienza è incompetente a fondare la certezza e il dovere su basi inconcusse. Intesa a questo modo quella sentenza voi potete bensì con pienissima ragione pronunciarla contro quella scienza che, disperando della filosofia, finisce con dire che lo *scetticismo* è l'ultima parola che la ragione umana può pronunciare sopra se stessa, e che bisogna fare allo scetticismo la sua parte legittima nell'intelletto umano, legando così la scuola scozzese a quella di Kant, la quale veramente non è che uno sviluppo della prima. Voi potete anzi un simile giudizio portare su tutti quei filosofi, i quali vogliono edificare la scienza movendo da un punto di partenza puramente *Psicologico*; e non siete già solo a pensarla così, nè il primo. Ma una tale sentenza non può colpire il sistema del Rosmini, il cui punto di partenza è ideologico e non psicologico; e non è psicologico se non quanto l'ente ideale si prende, non com'egli è e a noi si mostra, ma come un prodotto soggettivo del pensiero astraeante."—(Lett. I. pp. 13, 14.)

"Certamente che noi riflettiamo sul pensiero in quanto ne abbiamo l'interno sentimento, cioè in quanto siamo tratti a riflettere da un sentimento che è come l'occasione, e voleva quasi dire lo stimolo, che attua la nostra potenza di riflettere; a quel modo stesso che voi pure dite, che *l'insegnamento autoritativo è occasione o strumento indispensabile, non causa produttiva della razional cognizione*. Ma altro è dire che il sensibile interno è l'occasione o la condizione indispensabile per riflettere, altro è dire che non si può riflettere che al sensibile interno. E la vostra riflessione ontologica non è ella pure soggetta a questa medesima condizione? Non l'assoggettate voi come a condizione *sine qua non* ad appoggiarsi alla parola che reste l'idea d'una forma sensibile?"—(Lett. II. p. 41.)

"Come distinguete voi la riflessione psicologica dall'ontologica? Dal fermarsi che ella fa al puro intuito, o dal ripiegare il suo pensiero non già sull'intuito solo ma sull'oggetto intuito, cioè sull'ente. La vostra riflessione ontologica non si distingue adunque dalla psicologica neppure per l'oggetto diverso su cui esse si portano, ma solo pel modo diverso con cui considerano l'oggetto

stesso, ossia l'intuito: l'una lo considera solo subbiettivamente, d'onde il suo nome di *psicologica*, dal nome che ha nella lingua greca *l'anima*, (soggetto); l'altra lo considera obbiettivamente, d'onde il suo nome *d'ontologica*, dall'ente che è l'oggetto dell'intuito; o meglio, l'una è parziale imperfetta, l'altra è imparziale perfetta." —(Lett. 3. p. 38.)

"Siccome la riflessione si porta come su proprio oggetto sull'intuizione o cognizione diretta, ella deve comprendere tutto, nè più nè meno, che è contenuto nell'intuizione. Che se ella comprende meno, è difettosa, mutila la verità; e comprender di più non può, se non quanto il di più che comprende, lo piglia dall'immaginazione. ... Nell'uno come nell'altro caso la filosofia è erronea per *difetto* nel primo, per *eccesso* nel secondo. Or voi credete che la riflessione del filosofo si essenzialmente difettosa, perchè la considerate come un'astrazione, quasi una sottrazione, per cui il pensiero sottrae il reale dall'essere intuito; e quindi dite che la riflessione non arriva e non può arrivare che ad un ente possibile astratto, come Primo psicologico." —(Lett. 1, pp. 18, 19.)

"La vera questione che forma il tema del Nuovo Saggio è questione d'osservazione, di fatto, d'osservazione interna e nulla più. Di che si vede come invano voi accusate il Rosmini d'aver seguito un metodo vizioso trascinatovi *dalle preoccupazioni del suo secolo*. Il Rosmini nel Nuovo Saggio seguì appunto quel metodo che la natura della questione ivi trattata gl'imponessa. Egli non avrebbe potuto meglio servirsi di un altro metodo di quel che possa servirsi *delle mani e degli orecchi* per apprendere la luce e i colori." —(Lett. 1, p. 16.)

"Stabilito che la questione proposta dal Rosmini nel Nuovo Saggio si è quella del *principio dello scibile*, e non del *principio e base del reale*, chi per poco pon mente a ciò che può essere *principio dello scibile*, non può fallir di vedere che la questione di un tale principio non può consistere in altro, che nell'esaminare quale sia l'incatenamento naturale delle idee e de' pensieri umani, affinchè, trovate le relazioni di dipendenza che hanno fra di loro, si riesca finalmente a conoscere e stabilire quale sia quella fra tutte le idee, quel *primo noto*, che non dipenda, non abbia bisogno delle altre per *poter* esser concepita dalla mente umana, e dalla quale le altre tutte dipendano, non possano cioè essere concepite, senza che essa mente concepisca insieme quella prima." —(Lett. 1, pp. 15, 16.)

NOTE I.—Page 389.

The Italian Universities, where mental philosophy is now cultivated with comparative ardour and zeal, are very numerous, and all of considerable antiquity. There are in all the libraries attached to them, an extensive collection of works on the Scholastic Philosophy, and on the age which immediately followed it. The names of the Universities are Bologna, Salerno, Naples, Padua, Rome, Perugia, Pisa, Sienna, Pavia, Turin, Parma, Florence, Catania, Cagliari, Genoa, and Modena. In addition to the Universities, there have been long established various literary and scientific institutions. These were commenced in the fifteenth century, and they have contributed greatly to the support of a free and independent tone in all speculative disquisitions and philosophical inquiries. One of the earliest of these societies is that of the *Accademia della Crusca* of Florence; the Imperial Institution of Milan, and the Academy of Sciences at Turin, have indirectly proved useful, of late years in particular, in fostering studies intimately related to the science of mind.

NOTE J.—Page 464.

We beg to notice here, in reference to the metaphysical philosophy of Belgium and Holland, that the name of Van Wymperse is twice inserted in this work; namely, in Volume II. p. 453, and in Volume IV. c. 5, p. 407. This last insertion was the effect of mistake, which was not discovered till after the sheet was struck off; but which we were not particularly anxious to rectify, inasmuch as his name seemed in some measure necessary to fill up that historical portion of time between the publication of the works of Hemsterhuys and the termination of the last century. We have therefore left the double insertion without any alteration.

We regret that we have not been able to obtain the metaphysical speculations of M. Van Meenen, jun., of Brussels; and our regret is considerably heightened from the circumstance that we have reason to believe, from the best authority, that they are not only

interesting in themselves, but that they give a promise of the author's taking a respectable position in the future philosophical history of his country. We have also to regret that we have not been able to meet with M. Quetelet's treatise, "On the Freedom of the Human Will." We understand it abounds with ingenious and original views of this knotty and hitherto unsolved question.

NOTE K.—Page 489.

We have not formally mentioned the philosophy of Portugal. Its scholastic speculations were incorporated with those of Spain, from which it has been separated only about two hundred years. The University of Coimbra was, in the latter part of the seventeenth and the greater part of the eighteenth centuries, the principal seat of metaphysical learning. Pombal, during his energetic government, from 1750 to 1777, imparted a more liberal spirit of philosophical criticism into scholastic studies, and a current of comparatively independent thinking has flowed through the educated classes of Portugal ever since. The speculations of Descartes, Leibnitz, and Locke, became known to several teachers of learning and talent; and within the last century the range of scientific reading has been considerably extended.

One Portuguese work, containing some metaphysical speculations, has fallen into our hands. It is called "Meditações ou Discursos Religiosos," Lisbon, 1844, by Jose Joa. Rodrigues de Bostos. This work has been extremely popular throughout Portugal. It treats of the general principles of theology and morality; and the parts of the treatise which bear more directly on mental science, are those in which the author shews the influence which the current notions of *philosophical liberalism* have exercised over correct ideas of religious duty and moral obligation. His statements are concise, clear, and forcible; and he shews himself no mean proficient in the philosophical literature of the times.

The general literature of Hungary, as well as its philosophy, seems to be little known in Europe. It would appear, however, from several historical sources of credit, that a speculative spirit existed among the monastic orders of this country in the eleventh century. In the twelfth, when the University of Paris was esta-

blished, many young men of birth and talent were sent from Hungary to this seat of learning, especially those who were destined for the Church. In the commencement of the thirteenth century the first *studium generale* was established at Wessprim, an institution modelled in almost every respect after the University of Paris. Here, it is said, the peculiar doctrines which form the staple articles of the Scholastic Philosophy were regularly and zealously discussed. A similar institution to the one at Wessprim was afterwards founded at Buda, to which learned professors were appointed, who discussed the principles of metaphysical theology with great learning and acuteness. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a more liberal system of philosophical inquiry was gradually introduced to the chief seats of learning in the country ; and public teachers became acquainted with many of the leading metaphysical theories of Germany, France, and England. At the present day, the public Library at Pesth contains upwards of 100,000 volumes, among which may be found many of the works of the most distinguished mental philosophers of Europe.

NOTE L.—Page 542.

The metaphysical talents of Mr. O. A. Brownson are well known throughout the United States. He is an able critic on mental philosophy ; and the several articles which have appeared from his pen in the Quarterly Review are of a first-rate character.

There are 168 Colleges or Academies in the United States, in all of which mental science is more or less cultivated. In most of them there are regular courses of Lectures delivered on the subject every year.

NOTE M.—Page 582.

The most full and practical development of the Doctrine of Temperaments, is unquestionably Huarte's Spanish work, which we have noticed in Vol. II. p. 154. This author attempted to do what the most zealous of the Phrenologists of the present day have endeavoured to accomplish ; that is, to ground early educa-

tion upon certain physical or bodily qualifications or aptitudes. The speculations of the Spanish author are infinitely more ingenious, and scientifically developed, than any thing to be found in Combe's work relative to the bearings of Phrenology on general instruction.

In the writings of Dr. Thomas Forster, now of Bruges, in Belgium, some excellent remarks will be found on Physiology and other branches of knowledge nearly allied to it.

I beg to add in this Note a few observations on *Clairvoyance*, from the pen of a popular lecturer on Mesmeric phenomena, and a gentleman of great general knowledge and information, William Brookes, Esq., who has obligingly communicated to me his opinion on the subject. "I refer," says he, "all so called cases of *clairvoyance*, to the ordinary laws or principles of sympathy, sentiment, or thought. As an illustration of this I might cite the case of Alexis, and the experiment made at Victor Hugo's, in the presence of Lord Brougham and other distinguished individuals. Mrs. Damer Dawson, who was put *en rapport* with the patient, asked him some questions. Among other things, she told him she had left behind in her boudoir, a *locket*, containing the hair of three *great men*, and could he tell her their names? He did tell her, to the utter astonishment of all present; who conceived that Alexis had annihilated distance, and penetrated opaque bodies. The truth was, however, that he had before him, and *en rapport* with him, *one* who knew all she had asked, and thus her own mind furnished the answers to her own questions, without her consciousness of the fact. But in order to accomplish this, Mrs. Damer Dawson was placed as a third party in mesmeric relation with Alexis, when she asked this question; and, therefore, there arose out of this connection a communion of sentiment between them; and she, exercising highly active volitional powers upon his passive susceptibility, impressed him with the glowing images of her imagination, and the ideas of her intellect. Let us suppose he had seen the boudoir, the locket, and the hair in it. How from the colour or any other property would the knowledge be conveyed to him, whose heads the several lots of hair belonged to? Yet his answer was satisfactory and full; the one was Wellington's, the other Napoleon's, and the third Nelson's. Suppose his clear and far-seeing eye had enabled him to penetrate all intervening obstacles, would

any power of vision have enabled him to pronounce to whom these several portions of hair originally belonged? Certainly not. But how much is the thing simplified, when we find that he was not required to exercise any extra power of vision at all; but that his fortunate answer was referable to the mere action of sympathy, increased to an unusual degree by the peculiar idiosyncracies of the beings concerned, and the operation called mesmeric or nervous relation."

"There is nothing in mesmeric phenomena repugnant to common sense or common observation. The word '*sympathy*' has invariably been indicative of *mutual sensations*, or the susceptibility of being affected by the feelings or emotions of another; therefore, I consider all such experiments as the one just mentioned, as mere elucidations of the general law. As a proof of this, I shall refer to the Rev. Chauncy Hare Townshend, a most trustworthy and amiable writer on matters relating to mesmerism. He operated on a valet of his own, a Frenchman, of respectable information in his sphere of life. He was, however, deeply tainted with infidelity; but when he was placed under mesmeric influence, he became extremely pious, and evinced a decided repugnance to every anti-religious sentiment. The Rev. Gentleman does not, however, seem to be aware, that when the mesmeric relation was once established, that *he* substituted his own more just and refined notions into his valet, who now no longer thought and acted for himself, but was the mere channel through which opinions and feelings opposite to his own were conveyed. And hence the chief features and advantages of mesmerism—its power under proper direction to correct and modify the *morbid* conditions of mind, as manifested in hypochondriacal and monomaniacal hallucinations approaching to insanity."

The following are the leading views of Mr. Brooks, on Mesmeric phenomena, which he laid before the Bishop of Oxford, and on which the whole of the examination of the subject was conducted by his Lordship and Mr. Brooks.

"That there is in the nervous system a fluid, (force, power, agency or influence, the name being taken as merely arbitrary) subject to the volition of the animal, though he is not conscious of its existence, and of which nothing can be predicated.

"That its primary function may be the transmission of im-

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pressions from the periphoral extremities of the sensitive nerves to the sensorium, and the transmission of the will from the centre or seat of volition to the muscles, which are to be influenced by it in contraction, &c.

“That this fluid possesses a greater or less affinity for its like, in or around other bodies with which it is capable of entering into combination.

“That by the force of his volition, *man* is able to propel this influence still further beyond the surface of his own body, so as to force it into contact and combination with the like agency in or around another body placed in a certain degree of proximity.

“That when thus powerfully propelled into the system of another, it is capable of producing various changes in the condition and mode of action of the other.

“That the force of the operation will depend upon the quality and quantity of the operator’s agency, and his power of propulsion on the one hand, and the quality and quantity of resistance on the other.

“That the *existence* of this agency is capable of proof, although its *substance* cannot be demonstrated.”

The following observations are worthy of remark, from the pen of Mr. Townshend:—

“The fourth cause which has banished Mesmerism from the rank and position to which it is entitled, is the early attempt to assimilate it to the certain sciences in an erroneous manner. In our researches into the discovery of Mesmer, we have, from the beginning, struck into a path which never could lead us to the desired end; and then, most unreasonably, we have charged upon the subject of our inquiry the fault which existed in ourselves. Because we have found nothing, when we did not seek aright, we have impatiently concluded that there was nothing whatever to be found. Perhaps the error has originated with the Mesmerists themselves. To secure the suffrage of scientific men for their favourite pursuit is evidently desirable. How should they accomplish this? The days are long since past in which men were content to reason after the vague mode of the Aristotelian philosophy, which leant upon conjecture rather than experiment, and discussed absurdities as gravely as the ordinary phenomena of nature. The world has reached an era, in which facts, attested by the senses, independent

of the human will, and invariably reproduced under the same circumstances, can alone engage the attention of the learned. With the scientific men of our day, (and far be it from me to censure this) certainty is the great object. In order, then, to claim the notice and the fostering protection of science, the friends of Mesmerism have long endeavoured to identify their presumed agent with physical forces already ascertained and of invariable action. In their principle, perhaps, they are right—in its application, wrong altogether. Forgetting that Mesmerism is a mental and vital, not less than physical phenomenon, and that mind and life are in perpetual opposition to the laws of the material world, they have endeavoured to recognise in Mesmerism an operation as constant as that of the galvanic battery or the electric vial. A certain school of German writers, especially, have theorised on our subject after the false method of explaining one class of phenomena in nature, by its fancied resemblance to another. Wishing, perhaps, to avoid the error of the Spiritualists, who solve the problem in debate by the power of the soul alone, they have ransacked the material world for analogies to Mesmerism, till the mind itself has been endued with its affinities and its poles. Such attempts as these have done the greatest disservice to the cause we advocate. They submit it to a wrong test. It is as if the law of life should be applied to a question in acoustics. It is as if we should expect to find in a foreign kingdom the laws and customs of our own. Thus wrongly biassed, we turn away from Mesmerism, as provoked at finding it other than we deemed it to be; as the Prince in the fairy tale, who found his betrothed, though very charming, not in the least like her portrait, and so sent her back in disgrace. Who has not experienced a thousand times the same feeling? We read, perhaps, a description of some lovely scene; we thence form an image of it in our thoughts. We at length behold it, and are discontented to find it endued, perhaps, with even more beauty than we had imagined; because the beauty is of a different kind. There is rock where we expected smooth turf; there is wildness, where we looked for cultivation; there is a withered oak, where we had in fancy placed a human dwelling. If, in matters of taste, preconceptions like these prepare the way for disappointment; in matters of reason they are not less calculated to awake disgust. A science that is misconceived, labours under peculiar

disadvantages. Thus, then, till the initial step towards a comprehension of Mesmerism be taken anew, there is no hope that it will ever be understood or appreciated. Why unavailingly seek to reduce it to a formula of which it is unsusceptible? If we ascribe it to a power already ascertained, why not treat it, at least, as an entirely new function of that power? Why limit it to what we know, when possibly it may be destined to extend the boundaries of our knowledge? Why are we to be trammelled with foregone conclusions? Yet upon these very restrictions the opponents of Mesmerism insist: thus taking away from men the means of investigating the agency in question, by forcing them to set about it in the wrong way." (Facts in Mesmerism, &c., 1844.)

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
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